Small Wars Journal

Army Learning Concept 2015: These are not the droids you are looking for

Tue, 06/07/2011 - 8:24am
Army Learning Concept 2015:

These are not the droids you are looking for

by Michael C. Sevcik

Download the Full Article: Army Learning Concept 2015

In the profession of arms, the scientific and technical approach is appropriate for learning basic and repetitive skills. Technical and mostly unimportant problems lend themselves to this scientific approach to learning found the recently released Army Learning Concept 2015 (ALC 2015). Unfortunately, our Soldiers rarely operate in the high ground where the scientific and technical approach is appropriate. Our Soldiers conduct of full spectrum operations, face uncertainty, ethical dilemmas and ill structured problems both in garrison and during combat operations. A meaningful and relevant learning strategy should descend into the challenging and messy environment of ambiguity and face the complex leadership, team-building and moral/ethical issues. These problems simply do not lend themselves to the "technical approach" to learning found in ALC 2015.

Download the Full Article: Army Learning Concept 2015

Michael C. Sevcik is an instructor at the School for Command Preparation, US Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served for 32 years as a Soldier, retiring in 2007.

About the Author(s)

Comments

Chris Paparone (not verified)

Sat, 06/25/2011 - 5:52pm

Mike,

Not sure "adults must see the application" applies as this is a presumption of technical rationality (or "applied science").

I think what education should do is help prepare sensemaking skills for that for which we do not know (and do not have preconceived application).

Education is also about having a wider appreciation for the limits of human knowledge. It's also about increasing humility (which goes hand-in-hand with decreasing reliance on TR).

Michael C. Sevcik (not verified)

Fri, 06/24/2011 - 10:38am

John,

I'm with you on everything except for the approach that says, "only send officers for masters or PhD's unless they have a professional requirement for it." This seems too narrow. In the "droids" paper I am not attacking advanced education...I tried to make the point that adults must see the application. In the profession of arms -- Soldiers MUST apply their training, education and experience (all important to learning). I am a big fan of advanced civil education for the officer corps. My comments in the droids paper pointed out that a strategy that works for high school or college aged millennial generation -- is NOT appropriate for Soldier learning the profession of arms. Additionally, advanced civil education will help officers learn to think and write -- a very important life skill.

One other central theme to the paper perhaps is best made from a paraphrase of the first Jurassic Park movie. After the dinosaurs "kick ass and take names" killing all but a few survivors, mathematician Dr. Malcolm (Jeff Goldblum) reflects to the billionaire owner of the park: "Your scientists spent so much time figuring out what & how they could that they never considered if they should."

Our Army is stuck on the how & what (technical rationality) when we ought to have a learning strategy that gets after the "why" question. This approach will be meaningful in VUCA FSO.

Regards, M

John. (not verified)

Fri, 06/24/2011 - 4:41am

For the most part, this like so many other "good ideas" will end up costing us alot, with no gain in learning retention and probably not much learning. We need this and yet shorten or most basic NCOES course to two weeks? Then NCO needs revelavent courses, not the garbage they doing now. Other than professional schools, like Ranger, Airborne etc, I put no more faith in an NCO with Collage than one without, infact I get a little leery of them because (Unless they got it before coming in) where were their Soldiers doing, while they were off getting a collage degree??? I also question the purpose of sending officers to get masters and PhD's, Unless they have a professional requirement for it (lawyer etc). Can anyone tell me what they need it for?

John (not verified)

Thu, 06/23/2011 - 3:27pm

Does anyone know what the coast is to train and equip a Soldier thru basic training/AIT?

John (not verified)

Thu, 06/23/2011 - 3:15pm

ALCON,
Here we go again. We are losing the focus of the reason we have an Army (Navy etc) Yes I can think of a few things I have seen that could help train Soldiers. But you are not (or should not) replace a good instructor and hands on training. I have seen some of the tools, apps etc that the Army has made. I tried out one for Land Nav. If you think that this thing was in any way going to replace a SGT teaching his troops to navigate you are mistaken. What whill come of this is this: Johnny will sign in, do the training and if he blows it the Army will be able to say "Well we trained him, we have a copy of his transcript right here. We don't know why Johnny walked into that mind feild. I also did one where I learned about the AT-4. You really want johnny to take on enemy armor after he does the test and watched the vidio?

Yes some of this stuff can be useful and has a place. You are going to need it for training no doubt, but for more specialized Soldiers. For most Soldiers, you need experiance, and that is only gained thru doing it, failing doing it again etc. Just because I have read Sun Su, does not make me a General.

Anonymous (not verified)

Sun, 06/19/2011 - 11:09pm

Guys, close combat tactical trainer is nowhere near Flight School XXI simulation or Aviation Training Exercise simulators. Of course simulation is no substitute for tank/Bradley live fire gunnery...but can it keep gunners refreshed? At $100 per mile for Bradley and $300 for Abrams, isn't simulation cheaper to practice some maneuver? How many live Hellfires do you think Apache guys fire?

Believe the far lower accident/loss rate of aircraft in OIF/OEF is pretty good anecdotal evidence of FSXXI and ATX simulation success. Also, compare 58,000 Vietnam dead to those tragically lost in OIF/OEF if you doubt our asymmetric advantages...even if some are defeated. You only need go to the Army Training Network to see some of the JTCOIC simulations of Afghanistan battles...and compare those single incident losses to those that were near daily occurrences in Vietnam.

Agree with you that OneSAF is (or was?) not as good. But you would have to see some of this new stuff to believe it. I don't work for those guys anymore (and even then was not doing FSXXI) but still couldn't find fault with what they do with simulation. Charles, are you saying you don't think troops must master individual and crew training prior to collective training? Will they always be as experienced as they are now?

Believe both Sec Gates and Gen Dempsey have seen it firsthand so you would need to ask them...and Gen Dempsey does not act as if he even likes tech but signed off on ALC 2015. And after reading some of it, don't recall an excess emphasis on tech anyway.

Good guess Mike. I'm still thankfully with the spouse you know and hope you had a great father's day...and everyone else too.

Anonymous (not verified)

Sun, 06/19/2011 - 2:53pm

Dear Anon (aka. Choppers Dad) Happy Fathers Day,
Just because the USAF, Marines and Navy are building multi-million/billion dollar bridges that lead to nowhere, does not mean the "Army" should take the same approach.
Perhaps this debate is really about "balance." I am not advocating the cancellation of all acquisition programs. I tried to make the point in the paper that there is utility in a technical approach to some learning... .particularly in routine, mundane tasks. Using flight simulators may be a very legitimate place considering the high cost of blade hours and gravity of crashing a helicopter.

As a rule however, the technical rationality approach, digitization, and the central focus on millennial generation in ALC 2015 is misguided. This approach will in many cases dumb down an already socially disadvantaged digital generation. ALC2015 needs to focus on "adult learning".
As the proponent for ALC 2015, many in ARCIC & other acquisition Corps types or Battle-Lab bureaucrats, etc., have "drank" the Kool-Aid. Some even believe all the rhetoric they are espousing. As a taxpayer and steward, it hurts me to see the millions and millions invested in crap. Effectively balancing all of the DOTMLPF functions is hard government work. Its much easier to write a learning strategy that is weak on references, weak on critical reflection and weak on thinking about FSO in VUCA and weak on the details of how Commanders and senior NCOs will have to execute this strategy. Besides, IF the ARCIC leadership assumes that spending tax payer funds (building expensive bridges to nowhere) is the MOE/MOP for success, what better way to ensure your next promotion?

Having lived through FXXI as a Bn Cdr/ division Staff officer and then having to fight with it as a Bde Cdr in OIF, I would gladly exchange the $ billions we wasted/spent on the promise of digital technology for just a few of things like:

1. A real pay raise for every Soldier in the Army to help them cope with the sacrifice of fighting GWOT over the past ten years.

2. Funds for meaningful learning programs focused on the Co/Bn/Bde level commanders and CSM/NCO leadership - where most truly effective learning takes place.

3. Funding programs to hire adequate numbers of highly qualified/experienced instructors at the War College, CGSC, CSM Academy, CCC throughout the Army, WOCCC, and the many NCO warrior leadership training programs.

PS. Charles, I'm a fan, really like the way you think. Great comments!!!

bumperplate

Sun, 06/19/2011 - 12:23pm

Thanks to Anon for the response. My reply is as follows:

1) As mentioned I don't think we're talking about the same types of simulations. In a prior life I worked on aircraft and I was in simulators to practice emergency procedures. They work well for that. No argument there. Now, simulating live fire for ground fire - simulations are awful in that regard. The equipment fails to function, the equipment does not range as far as the weapons, and when you deal with indoor simulators it's just not anywhere close enough to provide adequate training at this time - go to CCTT and you'll see. Should it be abandoned, not at all. But it's not a substitute and is hardly a tool for sharpening those with experience. Furthermore, look at systems like EST2000 and I think those are awful. The EST has never assisted me at the range, it has never provided good feedback. Shoot / Don't Shoot exercises just the same - don't work. Lastly, using MILES and other shoot 'em up simulation items have brought about horrible anticipations on the part of Soldiers. Anyone at any time that is shot during these simulations is declared "dead". We know from combat studies that people continue to fight after being shot in many instances. But we don't train to that mentality. Overall, as a ground force person I'd say our simulations are pretty poor.
2) I had to laugh a bit when you cited our asymmetric advantage. For ten years now we've studied and trained for all the asymmetric tactics and advantages our enemies have used against us. We've enjoyed our "asymmetric advantage" the entire time and even before. Doesn't look like it helped very much. Our profound financial asymmetry still meant that it took ten years to find Bin Laden. Not a lot of bang for the buck. Our enemies are using 2x4s, metal sheets, and $20 microwaves to defeat our million dollar technology - and none of our simulations advantages have done anything to counter that.
3) We learn when there is purpose and meaning to what we're doing. At this time I'm not ready to conceded that a 'high score' or getting a green light on your simulator is purposeful and meaningful when compared to real missions and real people. Going back to MILES and similar modalities for ground combat simulation, you never get shot when you're hiding behind a bush and your enemy is using MILES. But you'll be dead in combat by doing that. Simulations very often lead us down a road where we think we've "won" when in fact we have not. Additionally, simulations for ground forces too often lead to "rangisms" that destroy the fidelity of the training and lead to the destruction of purpose and meaning. That's when you see people drive a vehicle out into the open so they can get shot and killed by the OC. That means they can take a break for the remainder of the simulation. You can call that a Soldier-Leader issue, but it's human nature. People will not invest themselves in stupidity or fantasy.
4) All of the tools you mention are practiced in training within a motorpool environment and during training maneuver FTXs and so forth. We do not need a multi-million dollar classroom and software compilation to exercise our skills on mIRC. Go set up your TOC, CPOF, OE254s etc and have at it - huge waste of time and money to even try to do otherwise. To do otherwise is simple fraud, waste and abuse of funds. When it comes to communications, simulations are the least productive modality for training I can imagine.
5) Completely disagree - unless you are speaking solely of technical skills and rare examples such as fixing battle damaged equipment. You train skills for shooting by PMI (with good NCOs) and going to the range. You train land nav by getting out a compass and map and protractor and stomping the brush. When my PSGs trained their platoons for gunnery, not once was simulation used, because it wasn't available. Yet they produced the best M2A3 and M1A2 gunnery platoons within the BDE.
6) Very limited application of what you're talking about here and I would say it's mainly confined to air and air defense ops.
7) Hmm, after participating and viewing "networked simulation" such as what occurs in many TOCEXs, I'd say the opposite is true. Networked simulation sounds really sexy, but anything networked and anything simulated using canned scenarios is assured to have virtually no crossover effect to real application. I think one thing you're assuming is that all of our training takes place in TRADOC and in a classroom. The majority of training and the best training takes place in FORSCOM at the unit level. Take your CO or BN out to the field and run through FTXs, set up your commo, deal with real supply issues, and so forth - then tell me how some networked simulation compares. There is no comparison. You cannot simulate the establishment of a LRP with class V bulk resupply.

Finally I'll say this: the best simulation I've ever been involved in was MOUT training at Zussman. The costs to build and run that place make it a virtual one of a kind. Still it was not wholly adequate in preparing for urban combat. However, it is the best thing I've seen in my military career insofar as simulated training environments. If we think we can build one of those for each Army post or each Division or possibly down to the BCT level (since that's how we deploy) then we will not be able to pay for that. Perhaps one day it'll change, but the time and money needed to develop adequate simulation is a bridge too far, when it comes to ground combat. Aviation is further along but still, I don't see it as a panacea.
4)

Anonymous (not verified)

Sat, 06/18/2011 - 10:24am

Hi Mike, you taught me something: VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity)...although still don't understand "technical rationality" or design, and really don't need to ;). Our target audiences are different as we don't even teach MDMP to our groups.

But agree with a theme often heard on SWJ that excessive emphasis on COIN is degrading other warfighting skills. Teaching Soldiers how to deal with VUCA in simulated situations seems preferable to classroom discussions. Full spectrum operations MCO and even stability ops include offense and defense. Simulated/gamed combat or stability operations exemplifies the picture tells a thousand words proverb.

As for bridge-building, in this case the bridge is training. The question is what kind of bridge/training to build and can we afford. Does a nation like the U.S. build a suspension bridge for three services and and a rickety wooden bridge for the Army?

Proven efforts already exist at networked simulation and integration of live-virtual-constructive training in the same event. While searching for material on the Army Training Network, I found briefings about examples of integrated L-V-C training. Some forces were conducting live maneuver, others were using simulation (or simulated forces were played), while still other participated using PC gaming.

It's not important who I am and as a contractor my views might inappropriately be viewed as representing Army or my company's position. We were neighbors years ago and once I gave your dad a ride from the airport that he never forgot.;)

Michael C. Sevcik (not verified)

Fri, 06/17/2011 - 6:00pm

Hi Chris,
Could not agree more, thanks!
---------------
Dear Anonymous,
Nope, I dont have a clue who you are but thanks for your thoughts. Original drafts of this paper on ALC 2015 were 30 pages as they included my view of a meaningful strategy for ALC 2015. I backed off that approach when I read several of the references I included at the end of the "droids" article. These references are really powerful and represent a good start at an Army learning strategy. Regarding flight school XXI, I have not experienced flight school 21 but as a career Army aviator, I see being a pilot as a very technical rationality issue, more complex than driving a truck or tank, but not much more.
Perhaps a better example from Schons book "a civil engineer" is well educated in the scientific and technical engineering aspects of building a bridge based on conditions, soil, lay of the land and construction techniques. The engineer understands all the technical aspects of metals, spans, anchoring in water with a current and so on. But the truly important problem set or relevant question however, is not how to build a bridge... but whether we should build it at all. The financial, budget, tax, economic as well as environmental and a host of socio-political concerns are the relevant focus of 'should we even build the bridge? These important aspects of environmental, political and budgetary concerns are rarely taught at most universities but this is exactly the "swampy land" that has the most relevance and utility. In the contemporary operating environment, our Soldiers dont face the technical engineering type challenges of the high ground! They face wicked problems; they face complexity, ambiguity, foreign culture and constant uncertainty.
Wanna see complexity and uncertainty? Try command of an aviation, or any other type Bn or Bde in combat; want to see technical rationality, learn to fly a helicopter. I tried to make the point that a scientific approach is not evil or inappropriate for every task a soldier might do - just that the technical approach does not lend itself for VUCA issues facing Army leaders.
------
Charles, thanks and I appreciate you detailed... and thoughtful comments!
-----
Anonymous - Perhaps you are equating simulation and the like to technical rationality? In the context of my article, they are very different. Learning switchology and flying in a simulator is a simple problem set that most high school grads can master (WO1). I am skeptical that any meaningful lifting of the fog of war will occur when we approach learning by building better bridges as mentioned above. A meaningful learning strategy "must" get after learning the practice of being a Soldier by training, educating and experiencing in the tough VUCA issues like understanding financial, budget, tax, economic as well as environmental and a host of socio-political concerns are the relevant focus of 'should we even build the bridge
Best to all, MCS

Anonymous (not verified)

Thu, 06/16/2011 - 10:22pm

Well written/argued Charles, but as with Mike, I gotta disagree:

1) Unless ALC is conceptually addressed and justified, it won't get funded. To deny simulation's value is similar to rejecting ground force necessity for stability ops and COIN. Its fratricide against areas where simulation and ground forces excel. People don't live on the sea or in the air. Army's don't simulate live fire too well, either, and it ain't cheap when they do live BCT/Division wargames.

2) I know little about Flight School XXI other than it costs slightly more but produces far better results far more safely. Numerous activities performed in simulation are utterly unsafe or impossible to mimic in a real aircraft or via live fire training. Our adversaries cannot duplicate or afford our technology used for training...why not exploit our asymmetric advantage.

3) I recall something in COL(R)Sevcik's paper about learning a lot from failure. Failure in a game/simulation kills nobody. Failure in combat kills many. Wouldn't we prefer to learn from failure in simulation and gaming? Many types of simulation are the sole noncombat means of duplicating highly dangerous fire and movement.

4) Disagree that all leadership and collaboration must occur face-to-face. Tools like mIRC, CPOF/Voice over internet, TIGR, e-mail/attachments, text messaging, and of course radio communication are extremely valuable to the commander/staff elements able to master them.

5) Individual learning precedes crew learning and we fight as crews and squads. Crawl before you walk before you run. Individual/Crew training is greatly enhanced by simulation.

8) Again, switchology memorization is easily practiced in simulation vs. screwing things up pressing the wrong buttons in a vehicle or aircraft

9) Isn't problem solving facilitated by networked simulation? Isn't networked simulation and embedded training closer to the real thing than just talking about problems in the classroom?

It boggles my mind that so many Soldier leaders reject technology while leaders of the other three services (and Army aviation) seem to embrace it wholeheartedly. What gives? Just because uncertainty and the
fog of war" exists on the battlefield does not preclude attempts at resolving some of the uncertainty and turning on the foglights (sensors). Just because simulation is complex and costly does not preclude value in traveling to a few regional centers to train realistically.

bumperplate

Thu, 06/16/2011 - 12:58am

I guess I'll chime in here for a bit.

From my position I'll say I'm not too enamored with ALC2015.

1) I think many of the things it endorses are items that good instructors have been doing on their own for quite some time. Looking to "doctrinalize" these ideas will only serve to stifle them.
2) I'm currently an instructor and I've mentioned the point about cost, uniqueness and true effects produced by ALC2015 methods. However, I have completely failed to capture in words like the following, which are seminal in this tech-based cult that Army instruction has thrust itself into: "What makes any resource a strategic and importantly a "sustained" competitive advantage is not ubiquitous access but rather its "scarcity." The US Army will gain and maintain an advantage over rivals by having something that others do not. Outpacing adversaries is certain to fail and will cost millions, perhaps billions of dollars, if we rely predominantly on a technological approach to learning as advocated in ALC 2015."
I completely agree.
3) To take this a bit further, I myself am dead-set against bringing games into the classroom. The last thing I want is for people that will be charged with making decisions leading to mission success v. mission failure and dead Soldiers v. live Soldiers, is the inconsequential gaming mentality that comes with anything that only requires one to hit the reset button in the wake of bad decisions. Bad decisions should illustrate real consequences and hopefully bring about some pain in those that make them - real life vignettes, can capture that, games cannot. Games do nothing to develop empathy. Footage from Wanat, or stories as told by the Muj against the Soviets can do that. Limited, yes. But much better than games.
4) One thing I take issue with is that notion that our Army is the best leadership factory on the planet. Right now I think that leadership is hurting in the Army. And, this is where we need to focus. Our technology will get us nowhere fast if it's not accompanied by leadership. Smartphones, Apps, simulations, and games do nothing to further leadership. We still live and fight in environments that require leaders to speak face to face with their subordinates and often times their enemies. They do not "interface".
5) "Second, the stated purpose of the ALC 2015 focuses on individual Soldier learning. This focus on individual learning does not mention the key to success in creating a learning environment - leadership found in the command team." This statement is why I so heavily believe in #4 above.
6) I commend that author for taking a look at the references in the document. Additionally, looking at the references you'll see that a few key declarations are made and referenced to statements or paragraphs within books. That does not even come close to passing the sniff test for properly vetted material. Like it or not, the Army is publishing such documents that are on par with literature reviews that are to be published in peer reviewed journals. The standards for research and references must be better. The recent white paper on the profession of arms is actually worse than ALC2015. This lack of rigor and specificity in the establishment of principles and declarations of their utility does not bode well for the future of Army policy and doctrine.
7) I do appreciate the sentiment expressed in ALC2015 to replace the sage on the stage with the guide on the side. That's great and I am happy to see that - albeit a corny description. That's good stuff. Good instructors have been doing this forever. I've seen some damn good NCOs conduct "Sergeants Time" in this manner - it works.
8) The biggest logistical hurdle I see in ALC2015 is going to be in our initial level training. We are going to have to backtrack on the new found aversion to rote memorization. Learning the rank structure, learning weapons capabilities, clearing procedures, operational terms, and so forth is going to require some memorization. We cannot go with ALC2015 as a one-stop document and call it a day. Flexibility will have to be built into the system.
9) Finally I'll highlight this comment by the author: "The principles of adult learning are much more relevant to the Army learning strategy than the dozens of references to millennial generation learning through digital and technological means." Amen, amen, amen. This brings me to the last of my comments, otherwise I'll keep writing on this for quite a bit longer. The Army must take note of the author's comment - and the Army must transform its learning model to capture the effects that adult learning can produce. The millennial generation literature is crap: I see nothing in it that stands the test of in-classroom experience. The Army needs to get off that soap box. Focus on adult learning. Now, for the point that I know will never get a foothold...if the Army is to capture the benefits that adult learning (as described by the author) can provide, it must, MUST, expand the duration of training or get rid of the inane, mindless, terminally annoying crap that TRADOC does. An afternoon spent problem solving is immensely better than an afternoon spent listening to some twit rattle on about cultural awareness that he/she really doesn't understand. TRADOC is one of the worst organizations on the planet and it stifles all that adult learning looks to capture. The training requirements, minutiae, AR 350-1 nonsense, lesson plan dogma, and the perpetual focus on everything but the mission is a force inhibitor of the highest magnitude. Teaching comes secondary to vehicle inspections and other clutter. If the Army refuses to embrace this true adult learning model, it will continue to falter in the education of its Soldiers.

The author should be congratulated for putting into words, eloquently, many of the ills of the current version of ALC2015. Because it's a TRADOC thing, I don't anticipate his words of wisdom and common sense will be integrated. But, I am hoping they are noticed by someone with the ability to make some changes.

Anonymous (not verified)

Wed, 06/15/2011 - 9:59pm

Hi Mike,

We know each other from the past and think you can guess who I am if you follow SWJ. See you commanded a Corps Support Group as your last 0-6 command back in our old stomping grounds. Hope Tammy is doing well. Saw your change of command photo and you looked great in Kevlar. Also congrats on making it into the OSC hall of fame and in your CGSC job.

As to the issue, although well written, must say I disagree somewhat. They use impressive simulation in flight school XXI and other aviation training exercises. We also use no fewer than four JFCOM simulations downloaded from the Army Training Network for our own training lesson plans. War footage also seems to work to illustrate points. When our students are waiting for classes to start, they use personal laptops/I-pads and are fully teched out.

I'm only average as an instructor and appreciate all the help tech can give me. We also use old school maps together with power point maps and other recent Afghanistan history studies. Believe that makes it more relevant for adult students who have already been there and done that...like you.

Mike,

I think this just shows how relatively meaningless such strategies are...while at least the uniform debate has "substance"(literally).

In my view the Army produces so many strategies, white papers, and futures concepts that the whole idea of being "strategic" is diluted to a buzz word and widespread cynicism. This problem is not just with the Army--I have examined the almost countless federal agency strategies out there -- again there are so many it dilutes the idea to a kind of "cottage industry" for think tanks and war colleges. I wish some of our senior leaders who love to make strategies would read Mintzberg's treatise (Rise and Fall), for example.

I suggest our "learning problem" is probably better stated as a self-help issue (particularly with our more senior officers who may not read routinely, interdisciplinary, and a lot). It's hard to influence such passion for reading, for example, in someone else. Much of that comes from intrinsics ...

Michael C. Sevcik (not verified)

Wed, 06/15/2011 - 10:46am

Thanks David Maxwell, Dick & "speed and power" for the meaningful comments...I certainly appreciate your thoughts.

Some things make you go hmmmm.... The paper criticizing our new Army Learning Concept 2015 came out the same day as a short two paragraph commentary about the US Army adopting the Marine Corps camouflage uniform.

The ALC2015 got three blog comments in the past two weeks.

The article about a completely meaningless debate about USMC/Army camouflage got 35 blog hits the first day.

hmmmmm!

Vitesse et Puissance

Wed, 06/08/2011 - 2:51pm

Soldiers can and will learn on their own - and on their own time - but generally speaking, they will spend that time reinforcing skill and knowledge in which they are already strong, rather than addressing weaknesses. In many cases, this learning behavior long predated their military service. Ask yourself this question: Do you shoot in your spare time ? Would you, do you, spend your own money to do so ? This is no different than the guy who spends all his spare time playing Call of Duty. Some of us like history, and consume hours on end reading the many offerings in the military history section of Borders.

Some of this discussion is really about how the United States Army and other services manage their people. If one assumes that the service member comes in as a blank slate, then all forms of training and education as well as physical and mental conditioning are necessary. But soldiers do not come in tabula rosa. Seldom, if ever, does the system - or very often - anyone within the system bother to inquire about what that person experience in the 18+ years prior to entry into military service. It does come out in test scores, because in the absence of that information, performance-based assessment is all that the training system has to go by - and what you end up with is a remediation loop that endeavors to "shape" the soldier into a different person. It doesn't always work. Sometimes you end up "breaking" the individual, more often the soldier learns to conform to the standard - but not without a high personal cost. We accept this self-sacrifice as intrinsic to military service and the soldier's lifestyle. Eventually, all service members are released or retire, and they often spend much of the rest of their lives getting back to themselves. Not infrequently, they rediscover interests that they had forgotten during their time in uniform - this is no less so because of the demands placed on them in uniform.

So I really think one needs to be careful - and think hard - about how soldier motivation migrates from the Pavlovian responses they were taught in initial entry training through to self-actualization (presumably what senior leaders experience at the height of their profession). I do believe that the personnel system could improve self-actualization by offering service members less of a cookie cutter career path, one that offers them the chance to make a unique and irreplaceable contribution to their country and to the military institutions they serve, rather than just serving their time as a cog in the machine. And they will better able to enjoy their fishing expeditions when they have to hang it up once and for all.

Dick Pedersen

Wed, 06/08/2011 - 11:30am

Mike,

Great article; very inciteful thought, ideas, and options regarding the direction the Army needs to head with its idea of life-long learning for its soldiers.

I've studied all of the other new Army concepts, but not the Learning Concept; I will now do so. All of these concepts represent and attempt to posit something new that might be helpful to implementing much needed change. Sometimes they are of value, sometimes not, but they at least seek to posit new ideas.

I wholeheartedly agree that although technology is very much now an integral part of the 'world' environment we must all embrace, it is not the ultimate answer to all of our problems. As you point out, We must beware of the well-funded materiel developer's call as it is as intoxicating as the siren's call; like the sirens call it will lead us off our desired course.

I think there is great merit in your Chinese proverb... we need a learning strategy that addresses both individual and collective learning that incorporates close, near, and long-range development objectives (begs the quesiton of what these objective should be). The pertinent questions are 'what' does the Army provide education on? 'When' in a soldier's 20-30 year career, is it provided? Ancillary to your point of 'learning through practical experience' is 'what' should the Army motivate soldiers to learn on their own initiative [function of visionary leadership?]?

It is difficult, if not impossible, to 'learn' if one does not want to learn. Likewise teachers cannot 'teach' someone who does not want to learn. Learning how to think critically and creatively is much different than learning how to manipulate technology either to be entertained or to conduct some sort-range funciton; we must carefully distinguish between these. Again, perhaps the answer lies more in what 'motivates' one to learn [function of visionary leadership?]. This gets at your point of commander's responsibilites not only to 'teach' but to motivate their soldiers to 'learn.'

I commend you for investing the time, energy , and effort to formulate your thoughts into an inciteful article. Critical review in these blogs is much easier than actually formulating your thoughts into an article. Good on ya!

Dick

Truth in lending, I have not read the Army's Learning Concept 2015 (only the Army Capstone Concept and the Army Operating Concept). That said, this critique of the Army Learning Concept provokes some thought about learning in today's operational and strategic environments; at its root - art versus science. I certainly agree with this sentence:

"A meaningful and relevant learning strategy should descend into the challenging and messy environment of ambiguity and face the complex leadership, team-building and moral/ethical issues."