AirSeaLand Battle: Access Assured, Area Un-Denied
AirSeaLand Battle: Access Assured, Area Un-Denied
by Move Forward
The allure of war fought from afar with missiles and airpower, few casualties, low costs, short duration, and a “mission complete” stable aftermath is a quest unrealizable due to adapting adversaries. The search for that Holy Grail has projected imagined AirSea superpowers onto friends and foes alike, ignoring that targets use many means to avoid being targeted unless land power forces them into the open.
Today, instead of effects-based operations, the new Holy Grail is called AirSea Battle. This concept emphasizes threats from Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) missile, air, and sea attacks. The past AirLand Battle misstep was in name only, indirectly disparaging the sea service. However, nobody suggested the Navy or Marines lacked a major role in deterring or battling the Soviet Union. Neither were Navy funds nor force structure imperiled given President Reagan’s attempt at a 600-ship Navy.
Move Forward is a USMA graduate, retired reserve enlisted/officer, and defense contractor with no work-related interest in any of the Army or Marine systems CNAS and others have recommended for funding cuts.
I would agree that the new “way forward” as espoused by CNAS and similar agencies will come to bite us in the rear end. Might we endure another TF Smith? I don’t know, but it would not be surprising. Since I’m in a position to be one of those on a future TF that may be compromised from the constraint of doing less with less, I’m a bit angry about that COA.
Most likely, to me, is that our reduced capabilities, reduced ability to respond, and reduced willingness at the political levels to take action lead to conditions that do further damage to us economically. In our haste to save, we will set the conditions that cause us to lose more.
Rather than an aircraft carrier turned FOB, I think it makes more sense to have more port visits, more drop-anchor time and a bit less flying while these air wings are on deployment. That will save millions per deployment. Bring a ship out of moth balls to execute such a “FOB”, which I don’t think is a terrible idea, other than the fact that it’s now a ship that doesn’t sail. The savings from a slightly reduced OPTEMPO by these air wings will pay for the establishment of FOBs that you speak of. That presence then allows reduced OPTEMPO and expenses for these air wings, yet we retain their capabilities and presence, and importantly that relatively new carrier is still ready to execute its wartime mission.
I don’t work for the CBO, I don’t crunch the numbers or see the numbers but I’d have to believe that when infantry squads and platoons are having to call in two birds for CAS, two birds for an AWT just to pursue a fire team-sized enemy element, then surely we can identify a better way. Such expensive engagements are not helping us greatly from a tactical or fiscal approach. When these aircraft are consuming an E4’s two week paycheck every minute or so, obviously there’s a better way to go. But, because that fuel and those aircraft don’t require TRICARE, I guess it’s ok.
I guess the bottom line is that the almighty dollar has now become the key strategic player, taking the role of both friend and foe. While fiscal concerns are legitimate, allowing the ledger to write doctrine, policy, and strategy is not a recipe for success and will likely be a recipe for failure.
First, thanks to the SWJ Editors who made many suggestions to improve the paper over about a month. It may seem like a parochially-impossible idea but in times of tight budgets, why pay large construction costs when a multi-story barracks and flight line already exists.
Bumperplate, the USS Tarawa is sitting in Pearl Harbor and has already been decommissioned. However, the CVN carriers are so much bigger and their elevation off the water and stationary nature would cut down on salt spray on Army and Marine aircraft. As each future CVN was retired, they could become “island” FOBs in a variety of places to eliminate sailing costs and have more force available in key locations. In this case, if they retired it prior to 2016 and used only reactor at a time, the power available might be sufficient to power the stationary FOB for years before diesel-electric generators were required.
The threat to a stationary carrier is obvious from the air. But with air defenses, jamming, obscurants, and a quick reaction plan, the idea is to get off the carrier rapidly given early warning. If they are going to dismantle it anyway, it doesn’t matter much if it actually gets hit after the ship is abandoned onto the adjacent islands and bunkers. By being close to dispersed island helicopter LZs and objectives, the intertheater deployment burden is reduced. The high speed vessels would stay loaded and patrolling as would the LCS.
To me, it isn’t substantially different from consolidation of Army forces in South Korea or Marine forces in Okinawa. It makes an attractive target but the idea is to disperse off that base before the fireworks commence.
“Move Forward is a USMA graduate, retired reserve enlisted/officer, and defense contractor with no work-related interest in any of the Army or Marine systems CNAS and others have recommended for funding cuts.”
This article is so riddled with not only logical fallacies but also gross oversimplifications and errors that it pains one to read. It’s possible the author has no experience evaluating Pacific defense matters, and one should give him a break for being an amateur.