How We Got to the Syria Mess - Washington Post
Americans and Europeans are seeing the results of four years of U.S. disengagement in the Middle East. A country destroyed, with half its people displaced from their homes. Hundreds of thousands of refugees besieging an unready Europe. And now, Russian warplanes bombing U.S.-allied forces as American officials alternate between clucking reprovingly and insisting bravely that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be sorry in the end. That is a tempting dream, but it represents the same wishful thinking that got us here in the first place.
How did we get here? It’s worth recalling, briefly, a bit of history. When Secretary of State John F. Kerry took office at the beginning of President Obama’s second term, he argued that Syria could be saved only with a political solution: The United States did not want to repeat its Iraq mistake and chase President Bashar al-Assad and his regime out of office with nothing to take their place. But, he said, the regime would not negotiate seriously until its opposition was strengthened, and so Mr. Kerry and others in the administration favored U.S. assistance, including training for the rebels, protection of safe zones where they could begin to govern without fear of Mr. Assad’s barrel bombs and chlorine gas, some arms and other military aid.
Mr. Obama would never agree; or rather, sometimes he agreed, and failed to follow through, and sometimes he just said no. Mr. Kerry was left with no option but diplomacy, in particular begging Russia and Iran to bail him out…
Comments
<blockquote>The Iraq surge is hardly a viable comparison. That took place in a country under US occupation. Syria is not under US occupation. Do you propose to occupy it?</blockquote>The Iraq Surge and Anbar Awakening coincided in importance. According to this BBC article, the Surge and Awakening actually delayed the AQI transformation into ISIL.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144
In that BBC article you find this quote:
<blockquote>IS can trace its roots back to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who set up Tawhid wa al-Jihad in 2002. A year after the US-led invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and formed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which became a major force in the insurgency.
After Zarqawi's death in 2006, AQI created an umbrella organisation, Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). ISI was steadily weakened by the US troop surge and the creation of Sahwa (Awakening) councils by Sunni Arab tribesmen who rejected its brutality.</blockquote>
Given this insight, our coalition needs ground forces in a position to influence ISIL-controlled areas when Sunnis get fed up with ISIL. That could/should be in Kurd-dominated areas with FOBs able to range ISIL strongholds, targeting them with indirect fires, attack helicopters, air assault raids, and CAS. Plan on going in and out with no prolonged U.S. presence in Sunni areas. Then you make this point:
<blockquote>The assumption that the US can dissolve states, create new ones, redraw borders, and decide who rules what seems rather ambitious, does it not? How do we know what ends up in the hands of "moderates" and what does not? One must beware of hubris; it leads to places we don't want to go.</blockquote>
Redrawn “borders” and a dissolved Iraq and Syria already are reality on the ground. Currently, Assad/Iran/Russia/Iraq Shiites are deciding by force “who rules” and it is the Shiites and Alawites. Our revised coalition would offer at least in Syria and Northern Iraq an alternative supporting moderate Sunni and Kurd interests. The U.S. could bomb Syrian airpower into nonexistence and with stealth aircraft the Russians would never know it was occurring until it was a fait accompli.
We subsequently could negotiate with the Russians/Iranians to keep Assad’s Army out of certain areas and if that fails announce a policy of attacking Syrian ground forces venturing beyond announced red lines outside Alawite areas—a no-drive zone. Admittedly, this would be dangerous if Russia attempted to interfere with U.S. planes. However, given their limited forward aircraft assets, Russia would have difficulty keeping enough aircraft airborne 24/7 and we could wait until they were grounded, strike Syrian ground forces, and withdraw.
Watch Outlaw’s posted link below where Professor Joshua Landis speaks as a Syrian and Middle East expert about “Isis, Syria, and the Great Sorting Out in the Middle East.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_-roW5Y7vbw
Landis identifies how the Middle East and North Africa ethnic and religious landscape has changed through forced and voluntary repositioning of people facing armed oppression and ethnic cleansing. This is something that both helps and harms U.S. and Sunni/Kurd interests. The Russian bombing and Iranian/Hezbollah Armies will continue what Assad’s barrel bombing and armor started in driving Sunnis from areas of Syria, attempting to make the Alawite minority less of a localized minority. However, if we counter Russian and Iranian efforts by successfully bombing and attacking an ISIL composed largely of foreign fighters, former AQI-types, and Baathists, the native Syrians being pushed out of major western cities and a Shiite Iraq are likely to move to river cities and other areas in Iraq and Syria’s center. Refugees will return. Borders largely will redraw themselves just as the Sunni/Shiite make-up of Baghdad has evolved.
Our role would not be to win hearts and minds of ISIL or even locals but rather to continue degrading ISIL more effectively. Land forces could assist our airpower in that endeavor. Let locals get fed up with ISIL’s policies; then let the “Field of Dreams build-it-and-they-will-come” effect work. In this case, the “build-it” is an area where neither ISIL nor the Alawite Syrian Army is allowed, and frankly the latter is already not there. Kurds would create their own governance without U.S. help if we can negotiate with Turkey into accepting them as a state. Landis mentioned that Syrians, like Afghans, rely on local non-centralized governance. Families will band together to hold terrain and restore river cities if we can help them push ISIL out. If a group as bad as ISIL takes hold, they get attacked until the locals get it right.
Diplomacy is an aspect of DIME and redrawn borders should be a goal of negotiations. Many parts of your linked Fareed Zakaria article are bogus because this is not a counterinsurgency. ISIL’s foreign fighters are the occupying force. The U.S. could exorcise them from Syrian and Kurd territory without a Desert Storm or OIF-sized ground or air force or any need for a stability occupation. However, Zakaria does seem to get it right in this second to last paragraph which negotiation could simply formalize without telling newly formed states who to elect.
<blockquote>If defeating the Islamic State is important, then it has to become the overriding priority, allying with any outside forces that will join the fight. If Assad falls and jihadis take Damascus, that would be worse than if Assad stays. This doesn’t mean providing Assad with any support, but allowing him to create an Alawite enclave in Syria, of a kind that is already forming. The Kurds and moderate Syrians are creating their own safe spaces as well. Even if the civil war ends and a country called Syria remains, these groups will not live all intermingled again.</blockquote>
The Iraq surge is hardly a viable comparison. That took place in a country under US occupation. Syria is not under US occupation. Do you propose to occupy it?
The assumption that the US can dissolve states, create new ones, redraw borders, and decide who rules what seems rather ambitious, does it not? How do we know what ends up in the hands of "moderates" and what does not? One must beware of hubris, it leads to places we don't want to go.
<blockquote>I have never said that nothing bad can come out of Syria. A great deal of bad has already come out of Syria, and more will follow it. I question, though, whether greater US involvement would reduce any of it. Would US involvement reduce the refugee flow?</blockquote>Of course it would reduce refugees. Most of them are fleeing Assad barrel bombs leveling Sunni neighborhoods of major cities in the west. Fewer refugees are from ISIL areas along rivers that primarily are Sunnis or Kurds only. The Kurds fight back and the Sunnis have no alternative at the moment because we are not helping provide one as in the Iraq Surge.
<blockquote>Would US involvement make ISIL any less likely to spread their ideology? In the past direct confrontation with the US has made Islamist ideologies more attractive and spread them faster... should we expect anything different from ISIL?</blockquote>
If we are attacking ISIL and allowing moderate Sunnis to take charge, why would that spread radicalism? The Sunnis have no current moderate alternatives in either Iraq or Syria. Tony Blair earlier was on CNN’s New Day talking about making a place for moderate Sunnis. The Iraq Surge offered an alternative to Sunni extremism and violence declined. It was only the Shiite poor governance that opened inroads for ISIL and Baathist Army leaders who had fled to Syria.
<blockquote>Our decision to remove Saddam without any viable mechanism for filling the resulting power vacuum opened the door for vastly increased Iranian influence, and for backing the Iraqi Sunni into a corner that makes radicalism ever more attractive to them. Even in the unlikely event that our proxies were able to oust Assad, do we have any way to fill the power vacuum, or would it be a Libyan-style free for all? Certainly we are not going to "install democracy", any more than we could in Iraq.</blockquote>
Our past and continuing problem is utter unwillingness to attempt to negotiate <strong>or impose upfront</strong> a separate Kurd and Sunni federation or new state. Of course the Sunnis will continue to rebel and fight if under the thumb of Shiites or Russians/Iranians. We should be negotiating with Iran, Russia, and Turkey to allow the Alawites control of the mountainous coast (and Russia to keep its port) and parts of major cities in the West with other parts of the major cities under a Sunni or Kurd state ala Berlin with barriers separating the factions.
If that fails, we could bomb Assad’s air and ground forces with stealth aircraft and Russia would have no means of stopping it. We read in the news that Russian aircraft had locked onto Turk F-16s with radar for up to 5 minutes in recent flights. That would not occur against our F-22s, F-35Bs, and B-2s.
<blockquote>I have no doubt that, as you say, there are any number of ways the US could deliver ordnance in combat zones in Syria... possibly at the risk of direct confrontation with Russia, but that's another problem. That's only a "solution" if it serves a practical, achievable and beneficial end state objective. What is the goal of all this? What are we trying to accomplish? Outlaw doesn't seem to know, beyond vague generalities.</blockquote>
We should be trying to create a moderate Sunni and Kurd state out of parts of “Iraq” and “Syria” that are leftover vestiges of WWI poorly drawn borders. Likewise we should be letting Iran and Iraq control much of the current Iraq. Russia and Iran should be allowed spaces in West Syria to prevent Sunni genocide of the Alawites. We should emphasize to the Turks that a Kurd state created out of north Iraq and Syria would be a “Field of Dreams” attracting Kurds in Turkey rather than threatening parts of Turkey. The Turks want to rid Syria of Assad and lessen their refugee problem. Any Alawite leader who is not killing Sunnis would be preferable to them, us, Iran, and Russia. Sunnis in a new eastern-central state will need their own moderate leader.
<blockquote>If "winning" is achieving your objective, the first step toward winning has to be establishing a clear, realistic objective... because you can't achieve an objective if you haven't got one. What is the objective in Syria? What's the desired end state? That has to be defined before we can realistically assess the likelihood that any given strategy will accomplish the objective. "Remove Assad" or "crush ISIS" are not good enough: it's not enough to know what we are against, we have to know what we are for.</blockquote>
How realistic are these stated goals above? Who knows? However, the current alternative of Sunni genocide with no self-rule in either Iraq or Syria is unacceptable and breeds extremism. Removing Assad while protecting Alawites and partitioning major cities has got to be better than continued barrel-bombing. Crushing ISIL is the first step to a moderate Sunni state and less extremism as evidenced by the Iraq Surge where we had the Sunni’s backs and peace broke out --- before abandoning them in 2011.
I have never said that nothing bad can come out of Syria. A great deal of bad has already come out of Syria, and more will follow it. I question, though, whether greater US involvement would reduce any of it. Woud US involvement reduce the refugee flow? Would US involvement make ISIL any less likely to spread their ideology? In the past direct confrontation with the US has made Islamist ideologies more attractive and spread them faster... should we expect anything different from ISIL? Our decision to remove Saddam without any viable mechanism for filling the resulting power vacuum opened the door for vastly increased Iranian influence, and for backing the Iraqi Sunni into a corner that makes radicalism ever more attractive to them. Even in the unlikely event that our proxies were able to oust Assad, do we have any way to fill the power vacuum, or would it be a Libyan-style free for all? Certainly we are not going to "install democracy", any more than we could in Iraq.
I have no doubt that, as you say, there are any number of ways the US could deliver ordnance in combat zones in Syria... possibly at the risk of direct confrontation with Russia, but that's another problem. That's only a "solution" if it serves a practical, achievable and beneficial end state objective. What is the goal of all this? What are we trying to accomplish? Outlaw doesn't seem to know, beyond vague generalities.
If "winning" is achieving your objective, the first step toward winning has to be establishing a clear, realistic objective... because you can't achieve an objective if you haven't got one. What is the objective in Syria? What's the desired end state? That has to be defined before we can realistically assess the likelihood that any given strategy will accomplish the objective. "Remove Assad" or "crush ISIS" are not good enough: it's not enough to know what we are against, we have to know what we are for.
Dayuhan said:
<blockquote>The US plan is very simple and very obvious: don't get sucked in. The US will do just enough to pretend that it's doing something - that's aimed at the domestic political audience, not at achieving any result in Syria - but will resist any level of involvement that could lead to commitment. Given that the US has no vital strategic interest at stake, no allies in Syria, no viable proxy, no realistically achievable end state goal, and no exit strategy, it is hard to see how that's not a reasonable plan.</blockquote>
There were ample problems with domestic political audiences in previous wars. Plenty of hesitancy existed about commitments. Lack of early commitment contributed greatly to problems in OIF and OEF, and currently in Ukraine and Syria/Iraq. Little certainty existed that we would win and achieve goals, or that oceans away it even mattered. Thankfully, there was no exit strategy planned following Korea and WWII. What if there had been decisions not to get involved or to exit quickly afterwards? What if we had never fought or supported proxy wars like Korea, Vietnam, Arab-Israeli wars, and Afghanistan? What if we had said we had no vital national interests or certain credible allies during:
• WWI: Europe likely would have had been secured by Germany except for Great Britain.
• WWII: Pearl Harbor would not have occurred because we were minding our own business and did not impose oil sanctions. Japan would be dominating the Pacific. USSR and Germany may have still fought but that wouldn’t have been our problem. Great Britain may have fallen eventually once the USSR was defeated.
• Korea: North and South Korea would be united as communist or dominated by the Japanese.
• Vietnam: More of its neighbors would be communist to include possibly Japan.
• Cold War: No U.S. troops in Europe because we never fought in WWII. Either Germany or the USSR would be running it all.
• Arab-Israeli wars: We did not help and Israel lost. The Soviets continue to dominate the Middle East and Egypt. No strong ally exists in Israel to deter Palestinian and Arab terror. Syria is even stronger and threatens Turkey with no article 5 NATO to help because NATO does not exist. Jordan is not moderate. Lebanon is completely under Hezbollah control.
• Desert Storm: Saddaam Hussein might have continued on to Saudi Arabia and Syria.
• Balkans: USSR and Serbs would be continuing to dominate a “united Yugoslavia” through genocide, as required and demonstrated in Chechnya
• Afghanistan (both wars): The USSR would be dominating Afghanistan and Pakistan, with sights set on India. If we had let Rant Corp do his thing the first time around but did not respond to 9/11 or left immediately afterwards, the Taliban would still be in charge and we would not have access to Afghanistan through either Pakistan or the northern “stans” still controlled by the USSR. Terrorist planning by Osama bin Laden would be continuing with our sole response being cruise missiles.
• OIF: Oil prices would still be high without Iraqi supplies. The no-fly zone would have continued ineffectively. We could not have used oil as a bargaining chip against Iran due to insufficient world supply. With high oil prices, Iran, Iraq, and Russia would have had ample funds for terror/aggression elsewhere. ISIL would still exist because al Zarqawi would still be alive morphing AQI into ISIL.
In addition Dayuhan, what vital national interest existed in the Philippines during the last decade? If 90% of the country is Christian, how would their 5% Muslim population have changed much other than on a few of 7,000 mostly unimportant islands? Why did we waste our time and SF there when they could have been in Afghanistan and Iraq helping more critical efforts?
The Kelly File just showed a clip from last night’s Showtime “Homeland” where the strategy of ISIL was articulated by an actor portraying a CIA guy with a tour in Syria. He mentioned the apocalyptic and caliphate vision of al-Baghdadi and ISIL leaders that seems to draw idealistic Muslims from all over the world. We see Syrian refugees leaving for Europe with ISIL fighters no doubt embedded ready to spread terror to Europe and the U.S. while gaining more recruits. We see ISIL in north Africa, the Sinai, and Afghanistan and with their interest in Nangarhar province, Pakistan’s 200 million are next to be influenced by their fighters.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, we see Russian and Iran forces and Hezbollah spreading control of Syria and Iraq. We know Russia is using dumb bombs and bomblet munitions and has ample fuel-air explosives. Therefore, unlike our precision unitary bombs and collateral damage considerations, the Russians will have even better success in exterminating Sunnis in Syria without regard for combatant status. The release of frozen funds to the Iranians, will make Iranian IRGC, their regular forces, Hezbollah, and the Quuds forces all the more capable of cheating on the nuclear agreement in more creative ways to include underground facilities under Tehran which we never would target even with 30,000 lb massive ordnance penetrators. Of course this will lead to an Iranian nuke in far sooner than a decade which in turn will mean GCC nukes and eventually terrorist nukes infiltrated to the U.S.
No, we have no vital national interests in Syria, cough, cough. We have no strategy in Syria except hope which we know is not a plan. Our half-hearted efforts will go nowhere. Meanwhile, we see many others who <strong>do</strong> have vital interests, are going far more “all-in,” and none of their objectives seem likely to be good for us. Pick your poison: Russian/Iranian interests win; ISIL wins and spreads elsewhere to include Pakistan, eventually to India and the GCC; Israel attacks Iran or Russian/Iranian Syrian forces as they move air defenses into Lebanon; or Iranian/GCC/terrorist nuclear proliferation. Nothing dangerous there and although we have no way of knowing whether my lead counterfactuals about 20th century wars are accurate, your assertions that nothing bad can come out of Syria is much more unfounded.
You keep asking for solutions and I offered several earlier. Given the very low casualties of our forces remaining in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is not much risk of getting “sucked in” to Syria and Iraq if we stay on and raid from FOBs created in Kurd territory of both “countries” threatened by ISIL. We could launch GMLRS unitary rounds from great distances from those FOBs and launch ATACMs missiles even farther at less expense than airpower. We could launch less costly helicopter raids involving Hellfires and SF/SOF/conventional air assaults that would not require use of Turk airspace. Tell me why it would not work using Kurds as our primary partners planning on a prolonged presence of about 10,000? Do you think Turkey or Russia would launch air attacks against FOBs we shared with the Kurds and Outlaw’s FSA?
This “interactive guide to ambiguous grammar” is unexpectedly disturbing
http://boingboing.net/2015/10/05/guide-ambiguous-grammar.html …
We are observing a hot war betwn #Russia & d #USA on #Syria & no longer neither "Sunni/Shia" or "war on Terrorism". Put your safety belt on.
Russia will consider any Jet in the air as hostile if prior coordination is not carried out. This includes #Israel and #Turkey.
Another incident: #Russia/n intercepted two #Turkish jets after engaging their radars to prepare firing at the two jets who pulled away.
Come on--first CYA Statement--navigation problems NOW "weather"??????
Guess any lie in a storm is better than saying nothing---
Russian Ministry of Defence says its Su-30 entered Turkish airspace "for a few seconds" and as "a result of unfavourable weather conditions"
Few seconds WAS actually 5 minutes and 40 seconds-----
Humor-----
After realizing he flew into #NATO airspace, vacationer from #Russia needed a place to chill
pic.twitter.com/Ja2BGp0Amy
BREAKING NOT CONFIRMED-------
Syria Update# Air Duel between the Sukhoi Su - 30 Russian SM and Israeli F-15
[url]https://shar.es/17PJgN[/url] <- FYI
if it ends up going hot I imagine the su30 would be needing S&R
AGAIN NOT CONFIRMED
So the US has to do a proxy war with Russia, with a deeply unsatisfactory client, just to try to manipulate perception? Sounds... less than brilliant.
No matter what the US does, most of the ME will find some way to spin it into something negative. That's just something we have to deal with, and given that reality we have to pursue our own interests, not try to second-guess perception.
From a US journalist who truly knows the ME----
Michael Weiss
@michaeldweiss Ooooh, that's a bingo. https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C560E9A3D1FCD8/#.VhKh1rSJl… …
THIS is the "PERCEPTION" I keep talking about-----
QUOTE
The feeling is rapidly spreading among the Western-backed armed opposition that they have been betrayed by their supporters: to them, it looks like the West has secretly made the deal with Russia and washed its hands, letting Russian and Syrian forces methodically destroy them. This means a general weakening of the Western credibility and soft-power influence, both in Syria and elsewhere – outcomes very much welcomed by the Kremlin too. From Putin’s perspective, this is a quite reasonable war plan; and one very promising for future conflict as the West’s unwillingness to use decisive military tools is likely to remain. It may be time for the West to wake up to the recognition that the task of developing measures which might put limit of the Kremlin’s assertive activism is rapidly becoming the urgent need.
https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commen.../#.VhKsKpXsmM9
Russia's War Plan in Syria
RUSI Analysis, 2 Oct 2015
By Dr Igor Sutyagin,
Senior Research Fellow, Russian Studies
Quote:
As the pattern of Russian air strikes on Syria becomes clear, we can now discern Putin’s campaign plan
The third day of Russian air strikes in Syria finally offers some clarity about the possible war plan the Kremlin may have for its Syrian campaign. Some pieces of the jigsaw now seem to fit together:
◾President Vladimir Putin of Russia announced that the military operation in Syria will not last for long as it has limited objectives; Russia will withdraw its forces – or a major share of them – as soon as those objectives are achieved.
◾Eighty per cent of Russian targets so far are associated not with Daesh (ISIL), but with other armed opposition groups fighting against the Syrian regime.
◾President Putin publicly stated that Russia would never join the US-led coalition in Syria.
◾Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russia had promised to fight all terrorist groups in Syria, not only Daesh. All groups fighting against Bashar al-Assad’s regime – such as the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh – are terrorists according to Damascus policy.
◾Iranian troops have started arriving to Syria en masse.
Taken together, these produce a clear picture. There are solid reasons to argue that the supposed ‘War Plan Syria’ agreed during the talks between Russian and Iranian commands in Moscow in August, and later with the Syrian regime itself, involves a trilateral offensive of joint Syrian–Iranian land forces along with the air support provided by Russia. The strategic objective is to secure an Alawite ‘safe zone’ on the territory of ‘useful Syria’ – the densely populated Western part of the country where the major share of Syrian industry and agriculture is concentrated – leaving the eastern, desert part of the country to Daesh. As Alawites constitute approximately 12 per cent of Syrian population, and the rest of the country is at the very least moderately critical of the Assad regime, control of the whole country is politically impossible and perhaps not even considered necessary for Damascus any more.
The obvious immediate operational goals of the offensive include defeat and dispersal of the armed opposition groups in the northern and northeastern parts of Syria, as well as extermination of the opposition-controlled enclaves in the central part of regime-controlled zone between Homs and Hama – four in five Russian air strikes are concentrated in precisely those two areas. Re-establishing Damascus’s control over the territory currently controlled by Kurds is not the part of the plan as there is no Russian activity in that zone. Securing the eastern border of regime-controlled territory is also a task: the approximately 20 per cent of air strikes devoted to targets in the narrow sector around Palmyra – the only area where Daesh forces immediately contact with regime troops – indicate this. Taking into account the narrow area of contact between Daesh and regime forces, one can conclude that fighting the jihadist group is only a secondary task of the Syrian–Russian–Iranian coalition. Other nationalist and Islamist armed opposition seem to be the major targets of Russian strikes; Daesh forces serve as a secondary target, and a way to legitimate Russia’s actions.
After re-establishing control over the northern/north-eastern part of Syria currently lost to the armed opposition, Moscow and Tehran will hand over responsibility to Damascus. Moscow will withdraw the majority of its forces (most probably securing the Khmeimim air base near Latakia, where Russian air strikes originate now, for use in the future). The immediate implication of such the plan for the West and Arab countries is this: while the West bears moral responsibility for the fate of the Syrian moderate opposition against Assad, it is doomed to sit idle and watch them be hit by Russian bombs. The Kremlin’s quite correct calculation was that the West would be unwilling to use the only tool – military power – capable of immediately stopping Russian operations targeting groups the West supports; Russia would be able to achieve its goals unopposed. In this sense, the Syria campaign is the next step in development of Russia’s modus operandi after Eastern Ukraine, thus marking the general direction of Russian policy in disputed areas around the globe in the future.
The feeling is rapidly spreading among the Western-backed armed opposition that they have been betrayed by their supporters: to them, it looks like the West has secretly made the deal with Russia and washed its hands, letting Russian and Syrian forces methodically destroy them. This means a general weakening of the Western credibility and soft-power influence, both in Syria and elsewhere – outcomes very much welcomed by the Kremlin too. From Putin’s perspective, this is a quite reasonable war plan; and one very promising for future conflict as the West’s unwillingness to use decisive military tools is likely to remain. It may be time for the West to wake up to the recognition that the task of developing measures which might put limit of the Kremlin’s assertive activism is rapidly becoming the urgent need.
FSA , a phantom group propaganda, is back. The 35 000 strong guys in the south and those who shell the TOWs must be invisible.
HERE come the MANPADS-----21 minutes ago----
Here we go: Jaysh al-Islam says it's shot down a Russian jet in #Syria. http://www.albawaba.com/loop/syrian-rebels-claim-they-shot-down-russian… …
More Russian propaganda---they know exactly who this group is--Russia has taken heat over their bombing of them vs nothing against IS--now CYA statements
Do no think for a Moment the SVR and GRU do not know who is firing the TOWs.
MFA Russia Verifizierter Account
@mfa_russia #Lavrov: The Free Syrian Army is a phantom. I’ve asked Mr Kerry for emergency information about its deployment and commanders @RusEmbUSA
NOTICE
An unsubtle attempt to get targeting information.. https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/651030266866176000 …
Obama approved sending weapons for 1st time + air campaign that could lead to protecting rebels from RU
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/world/middleeast/us-aims-to-put-more-… …
More than 40 insurgent groups in #Syria vow to attack #Russia forces in retaliation for air strikes"
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/12584edcedd6434a88326a0ff948a468/syrian-… …
Freudian slip? #Russia's Ministry of Defense refers to #Syria as "Russian Arab Republic," later corrects the posting. pic.twitter.com/fASRhQUpAo
For those that enjoy Russian Propaganda porn-----
The Free Syrian Army is a phantom" & according to Sputnik the phantoms ask for Russian help
https://twitter.com/SputnikInt/status/651006433044004864 …
So ask yourself--true and or fake news---second question to judge this--would the CIA and or KSA ask for Russian support--do not think so.
Russian non linear warfare is now Syria---
Russian Admiral, Head of State Duma's Defense Committee Says Russian Volunteers Likely to Fight in Syria: http://www.interpretermag.com/putin-...irspace/#10259 …
Russian Prosecutor General summons open source sleuth @RuslanLeviev, who traced Russian troops' presence in Ukraine & Syria. https://twitter.com/RuslanLeviev/sta...27213786157056 …
Q: How did we get into the Syrian (etc., etc., etc.,) mess?
A: In a nut-shell: Post-the Cold War, the United States adopted a strategy of enlargement -- which replaced the doctrine of containment that had dominated during the Old Cold War:
"The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement -- enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies."
"During the Cold War, even children understood America's security mission; as they looked at those maps on their schoolroom walls, they knew we were trying to contain the creeping expansion of that big, red blob."
"Today, at great risk of oversimplification, we might visualize our security mission as promoting the enlargement of the "blue areas" of market democracies."
The US commitment to the FSA is at best hesitant and tentative---?
It is the largest CA run program worldwide in the last 20 years---and a large flow of TOWs have been shipped to the FSA over the last week.
Since the FSA beat up on the Syrian army yesterday and shot down two Russian copters today--not sure why you stated----
"The US commitment to the FSA is at best hesitant and tentative" as it seems to be the FSA is holding their own even against the Russians.
Info on FSA-----
After some research I've noticed a interesting development in FSA brigades in the north that went pretty much unnoticed in areas like Idlib, Latakia and Aleppo province used to count dozens of FSA formations each until the end of 2014, but in late 2014 early 2015 a lot of them basically disappeared, their social media pages were removed--they just "disappeared".
I personally had assumed these groups just fell apart, fled the country or didn't fight anymore but what I fact think happened was that a lot of smaller groups secretly joined the bigger FSA brigades which had western support groups like Fursan al-Haqq, Suqoor al-Jabal, 13th Division and the 1st Coastal Division suddenly saw a lot of new fighters within their ranks.
Fursan al-Haqq for example used to be a small brigade limited to its own area but now operates from Hama all the way to Aleppo.
Some of the FSA groups took the trouble to make a video announcement of them joining a bigger group but most just integrated unannounced so instead of the FSA we knew from 2011-2014 (with 100s of small groups) we now have a FSA with only a few dozen formations but all these formations are at least a 1000 strong, are all in some way backed by the US and are very well organized.
So Dayuhan--here is your US card in the game--elegantly formed over a four year period, combat experienced and willing to fight for a new Syria.
AND apparently done under the noses of the Russian FSB/SVR/GRU without them noticing anything.
The US commitment to the FSA is at best hesitant and tentative, and for good reason: nobody wants to overtly back someone who is not likely to win and whose commitment to us is shaky at best.
If you don't have a realistic, achievable strategic goal, there is no basis for a strategy... what is a strategy but the means by which one pursues a goal? Given the absence of a realistic and achievable end state goal, the only rational strategy is not to engage.
Dayuhan--you are 3000% correct there was not a single strategic level strategy ever developed by Obama and his NSC for the ME or for that matter the Ukraine--thus anything they do is a mess.
So when in a mess anything will actually work it just takes doing something and this Administration is incapable of even doing nothing.
As doing nothing as a superpower is really, really hard.
BTW you just keep stating the US has no proxy in the fight they do--and whether you think so or not it is the FSA.
The US plan is very simple and very obvious: don't get sucked in. The US will do just enough to pretend that it's doing something - that's aimed at the domestic political audience, not at achieving any result in Syria - but will resist any level of involvement that could lead to commitment. Given that the US has no vital strategic interest at stake, no allies in Syria, no viable proxy, no realistically achievable end state goal, and no exit strategy, it is hard to see how that's not a reasonable plan.
Soundbites like "crush ISIS", "support the FSA", "stop the war" etc are not plans or strategies, they are reflexes, and if followed they will do nothing but cause more trouble. Anyone recommending involvement has to clearly explain exactly what vital strategic interest is served, what their end state goal is, how they propose to achieve it, and how they propose to extricate. Without that there is nothing to talk about.
BTW--this is one of the biggest fallacies ie myths to have come out of the Iraqi war--as someone who spent my entire time all 18 months of it questioning Iraqi insurgents and QJBR fighters--they would tell you that yes they fled to Syria--BUT and here is the very big BUT they were not welcome at all by the government security forces and if the security forces felt you had been fighting for say QJBR or Ansar al Sunnah ie a Salafist or Tarfiri you landed immediately in jail with no charges for a very long time.
Most of them lived in Syria on the edge with little money and constantly moving to stay ahead of the Syrian security services.
Those Sunni fighters that were usually welcome where those who had been in the Baathist party and or the Iraqi IS or from a major Sunni tribe.
While many Sunni's fled many would also come back into Iraq depending on how the fighting was going and if it was safe to come back. There was a constant coming and going.
HERE is the real truth--by 2012 there were a large number of Salafists/Takfiri radicals sitting in Assad military/intel service prisons--Assad released all of them in 2012 knowing they would take over/eliminate the various resistance movements against him--that is exactly how it happened on the ground in Syria and thus the IS became for Assad his personal anti Assad street cleaning gang.
BTW Russia did the same thing in eastern Ukraine--Putin released over 200K hardened criminals in a general amnesty and promised anyone who fought in the Ukraine a clean past and money.
Right now there are three fully trained, experienced and manned Sunni Armies inside Syria--the northern group largely under JN influence funded by Qatar and Turkey--the middle Army--IS largely focused on holding the LOCs to Iraq open and the southern front under largely FSA who works off and on with JN as well-- funded by no other than the CIA/Jordan and the Sunni Front States of UAE and KSA.
They have evolved out of the rag tag anti Assad demonstrators in 2011 through the Darwinian guerrilla principle meaning only the smartest and strongest survive to the point of being combat experienced and winning against Assad.
The Kurds play no role in these three armies and will not push south as they are only interested in making sure IS is not in their territories.
We are in the mess we are in simply because this President, his entire 700 person NSC and Kerry have not a single strategy, plan, dream or whatever.
For over four years US mainstream media has largely ignored Syria and recently even the Ukraine--seems keeping US citizens "uninformed" is critical to someone. How else is it possible that the heavy use of the TOW in a series of stunning Syrian army defeats was not known to the US public especially since the TOW is US made YET we could not send it to the Ukraine??
Amazing how OIF is not listed as one of the causes of the Syrian conflict - many of the Jihadist fighters crossed over from Iraq into Syria, during the initial phase of the Syrian conflict. But such does't fit into the narrative being peddled, I admit.
Those aren't realistic options provided by the author at the end of the piece.
1) RuAF now stands in the way of destroying SyAAF aviation assets, as well as carving "safe zones." BTW "safe zones for whom? Al Qaeda and its allies? That's really what's left of the rebel resistance, aside from ISIL.
2) Kurdish militia numbers are exaggerated in the Ignatius piece, and NATO member Turkey will strongly object to such Kurdish empowerment.
I would argue a more practical option would be to join Russia in defeating Al-Qaeda, its allies and ISIL. Also, U.S. adoption of the Russian plan for a political solution to the crisis. But here again, I admit our American domestic politics preclude such sensible steps.