by Braden Civins
Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in 2006, quickly became doctrine for the U.S. armed forces. While the manual has its share of detractors, even its fiercest critics acknowledge that it is regarded as "transcendent" and has "become the defining characteristic of the...new way of war." This critique (1) explores the validity of a key assumption underlying the manual; (2) analyzes specific guidance offered as a result of that assumption; and (3) argues that the manual makes a significant omission of no small consequence.
The manual's primary assumption appears on its first page: "[a]chieving victory...depends on a group's ability to mobilize support for its political interests." The population, then, is the center of gravity in COIN. The population-centric strategy accords with the conclusions of preeminent asymmetric warfare scholars such as Mao Zedong and David Galula; and the historical case studies described in the manual support the argument that COIN should be oriented towards winning "hearts and minds" through increased reliance on soft power (e.g., strengthening host nations, creating freedom of movement, providing stability, etc.). However, the manual advocates the population-centric approach as the only path to success and does not consider the merits of alternative strategies, thereby assuming, rather than proving, its primacy.
Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
Braden Civins, a native Texan, is in his fourth and final year of study at The University of Texas, pursuing a J.D. from The School of Law and a Master of Global Policy Studies, with a specialization in Security Studies, from the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs. At the law school, he is a member of the Texas International Law Journal and former participant in the National Security Clinic, where he co-authored an ultimately successful appellate brief on behalf of a Guantanamo Bay detainee. During the academic year, he works as a student employee of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. He spent recent summers working at the Criminal Prosecutions Division of the Texas Attorney General's Office, the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Department of State.
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Comments
Bill C.
There is nothing wrong with development in general, but we have placed an emphasis and expectation on it that is completely detached from any historical or recent reality.
One driving factor is the old wife's tale that "effectiveness" of governance prevents or cures insurgency. Little history of that either.
Larger problems come when we go to places like Afghanistan as an intervening power. We just don't know who's who; we can't do projects in unsecure places; and we sure aren't going to hand a multi-million dollar contract to a know Taliban supporter.
So, instead, we go to guys like MG Shirzai who (quite purposely) has a compound just outside the main gate at KAF. The general is a great host and a great guy. People like him. You need gravel? No problem. You need security? No problem. You need anything at all, not problem. Service with a smile. People like and trust him. I like him and have had dinner at his home (be prepared to eat endless meat on a stick, but avoid the giant glass of yougurt...) He is also reportedly worth several hundred million dollars. Gul Agha Shirzai, who had the Kandahar monopoly initially is worth even more.
This means that the bulk of our development efforts enrich those who support the Karzai regime, provide jobs for the friends, family and tribes of those who support the regime; and the projects are built so that they benefit these same people. Those who are so excluded by the Karzai regime so that they see their only hope being in support to the Taliban get little benefit. This makes the revolutionary insurgency worse. Bringing in thousands of additional foreign troops and development personnel to implement such projects makes the resistance insurgency worse.
Development is not bad. Misguided development is bad, and most COIN development misguided for many very good reasons that are virtually impossible to overcome.
Bob
Should we consider that "state-building" is not, as we might have earlier believed, a positive element in winning "hearts and minds" but, rather, a significantly negative factor, as such activity (to wit: changing the political, economic and social structure of a country) is more likely to anger and alienate the subject population rather than to win them over?
Does this expected negative reaction to "state-building" (attempting to achieve fundamental state and societal change) help to explain why massive numbers of foreign security forces (to include elements of the GPF), and exceptional numbers of host nation security and police forces are required when counterinsurgency is attempted in this manner (to wit: when using the state and societal transformation/state-building approach)?
Brother Bob said this:
"No, I get it. Arguing tactics is fun. It just isn't the answer, nor is it the question. This is deeper. This is a manual that has its greatest shortcomings in its lack of understanding of INSURGENCY (not COIN); and it its failure to recognize the need for a new strategic context for such interventions that is more aware of the needs of the people involved.
This is my drum, and I will keep beating it."
Well said and please do keep beating that drum, since the voice behind it has reason and excellent thinking; shoot Bob maybe at some point somebody will assign you an avatar of an energizer battery bunny. :)
I also appreciate Publius's more thoughtful and "strategic" retort than mine to the anon post that jammed an essay in my face and declared victory. Publius is correct in pointing out that in each of these cases of a so called pop centric coin victory the counterinsurgent was the government of the place and had a long term interest in defeating the insurgents, and more importantly wasnt going anywhere anytime soon.
Lastly Braden I thought your essay was a thoughtful, well written piece. From my experience over the past number of years on this excellent blog, the value of articles is not so much whether or not folks agree with you but the discussion that they generate and your article in that regard on SWJ blog, if I may, gets a passing grade with flying colors. Thanks for writing it.
gian
(ps; Niel, sorry for spelling your name incorrectly on a previous post)
The problem with "contemporary COIN" is that it is rooted in the same perspective and mind-set as "old COIN": Going to some foreign land where we believe we either adopt or establish a government that we believe will represent our interests as their top priority, and dedicating ourselves to defending that government against all comers, foreign or domestic.
Tactics applied to execute that flawed, outdated construct are really moot. You like the "kill them all" approach? It may well suppress the insurgent, but will not likely resolve the insurgency. It also is sure to turn the segment of the populace that the insurgents emerge from into a rich recruiting ground for non-state UW actors such as Al Qaeda, who will happily sign them up to fight you where ever you might go, and back at home as well.
Prefer "nation building" approaches? The primary drivers are insurgency are related far more to the controlling nature of ones intervening control over the host nation government and the subsequent impunity such governments typically adopt in regards to their own populaces. Why would either of those two primary drivers change when the intervening power is investing even more, and the host nation is protected and enriched? So such approaches avoid or make the primary problems worse and instead offer what are essentially bribes to the populace. "Oh, I'm sorry, am I standing on your neck and disrupting your control of your government? Here, have a cookie."
No, I get it. Arguing tactics is fun. It just isn't the answer, nor is it the question. This is deeper. This is a manual that has its greatest shortcomings in its lack of understanding of INSURGENCY (not COIN); and it its failure to recognize the need for a new strategic context for such interventions that is more aware of the needs of the people involved.
This is my drum, and I will keep beating it.
Bob
Ultimately, what might confuse the locals about being presented with contemporary 'COIN' practice could perhaps be briefly stated in vulgar terms thusly, "If you f**king clowns want to be independent anyf**kingtime soon, y'all better sac the f**k up and do exactly what the f**k I f**king tell you to!" If this proves too slow, the interim default option seems to be finding the best locals that money can buy.
One more thing: people assigned to service in foreign lands should exert the greatest of efforts to divest themselves of any unhelpful domestic cultural baggage that they may be tempted to bring with them. Those who are unwilling or unable to do this should not be there. At best they will do no more than prolong the agony, at worst they will foment disaster.
Hazarding a general statement, my impression is that any substantial and sustained foreign military presence in a country is more likely to be viewed by locals as an army of occupation to one degree or another. Depending on the effects on the social environment, this occupation may be viewed as a good thing by some and a bad thing by others.
Any attempt to graft outside values or supplant local customs will likely be viewed as an 'insurgency' by the locals, even if the changes suggest long-term benefit. Hierarchical concerns aside, western militaries seem able to produce just enough high-quality personnel to convince even some of the locals that the impossible is achievable.
In a medium to high non-permissive environment, my guess is that 25 years minimum is required for even a well-handled effort. At least a third of the foreign forces would have to be stationed permanently in the country from the onset, i.e. no rotations out. Just an opinion.
Posted by Grant,
""Not sure I'd use a paper to attack someone that uses The Taliban's COIN efforts prior to 2001 as "proof" that Pop-centric COIN "works". I think what they were trying to say was that the Taliban didn't use the hearts and minds approach and that is why they lost power in 2001. If I mis-read that, then I'll stand corrected""
:-), I guess that is the danger of posting a poorly worded comment. I didn't intend intend to even come close to what you saw, but I guess I can see how you got there.
My point about 2001, was that I had the discussion with the GO prior to the 9/11 attacks implying we were talking about the value (or lack) of COIN long before everyone in the conventional military supposedly became an expert on it starting in Iraq.
I wasn't making reference to Taliban tactics at all, but rather that I came to agree with the General's comment that we shouldn't do COIN (again unless we're an occupying power and being resisted), but rather focus on FID and ensure we support the Host Nation's plan instead of forcing them to follow our COIN plan(it won't work).
Terry your comments simply support the argument that we should do COIN, which I ensure you will generally fail regardless of how nuanced we do it. The nature of the conflict in Afghanistan is different for different players. The Karzai government needs to do COIN or fall, the Taliban and other groups with Pakistan support are conducting a hybred of unconventional warfare and insurgency, and other groups are simply fighting for their individual power-doms that has little to do with the larger picture. What should be most important to us (long before we start discussing tactics) is identifying what we are fighting for? I haven't read Bing's book, but I think the point he was making based on the excerpts I have seen is that COIN in Afghanistan isn't in our interest. Killing AQ and their allies that intend to do us harm is.
We don't have to drink tea, build roads and schools, and assorted other activities that to date haven't shown much return on investment to do that. Let our IC and SOF communities fight the terrorists (and not everyone in Afghanistan shooting at us is a terrorist), let State and DOD provide support to Karsai's government (FID), and as planned start downsizing our conventional foot print on the ground there. I suspect most Afghans not personally benefiting from our wasteful contributions will welcome our departure and return to their norm. Not every fight in Afghanistan is our fight, but we sure as heck are trying to tie everything to some long term CT objectives. Regional stability is nice thought and a goal that we should help the region achieve (without a massive military presence and spending billions of dollars), but it has little to do with the war on terrorism.
Sincerely appreciate the feedback from those of you who offered. I learn something every time I follow the Small Wars threads, and today's no exception.
Was truly surprised the article started any kind of dialogue--suppose I should have known better considering some of the healthy debates on FM 3-24 I've followed on this site. Although it wasn't my intention to be provocative (and I realize FM 3-24 discussions tend to take on a life of their own regardless of how they get started), I always look forward to reading the wide array of thoughtful perspectives on this site--rarely find uniform agreement on any issue.
For context, I wrote the article a year ago for a CT/COIN class. I took an immediate interest in the intense disagreement over the value of the manual--didn't know much about it (or COIN, for that matter), but I'd heard a classmate who served in Iraq talk about it with such reverence I couldn't tell if he was joking--he wasn't. After surveying a handful of the greatest hits (Galula, Col. Gentile, Nagl, Mao) working through a few case studies, and having a handful of class discussions, it became clear that the Manual, for better or worse, was regarded as the only way forward despite the fact that people with a wealth of relevant experience were arguing that it was fundamentally flawed (I thought it was telling that the class, which included two former Army SF, a Gov't PhD, and a handful of IR grad students, split down the middle when asked whether reverence for the manual was deserved).
We were tasked with writing a 5-page thought piece on the Manual--this was the result. I'm obviously responsible for any factual errors and, if as one comment suggested, I mischaracterized one of Col. Gentile's perspectives, I offer my sincere apologies--I'm a real admirer of his work.
The old saw about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin often comes to mind when the COIN "experts" roll out the theories.
I'm not aware of any true COIN "experts," but if anyone around here knows of one, please let me know. I don't know very much about COIN, but I will tell you this: the only "successful" COIN on the part of the United States was during the period 1861-1865. And the cleanup was a bitch; in fact, it's still ongoing.
Hate to say it, but if our best exemplar of successful COIN is in our own nation, with people who spoke the same language, and who shared a common heritage, and it still included absolutely beating the shit out of the insurgents--you are aware of the casualty figures and the scorched earth policies, etc., right?--just why in the world would anyone think we would be able to be particularly effective as outsiders in an alien culture? Especially when we don't include that, "beat the shit out of the insurgents."
Robert Jones: "Good COIN cannot be done by an intervening power. FM 3-24 lacks that understanding."
Bill M: "I thought his Vietnam experience may have soured his view of COIN irrationally, but with more age and more experience I now understand his message, and that we really can't do COIN (unless we're an occupying power), the host nation must do it. Our best role, if it is in our interest, is to conduct FID (as Bob and COL Maxwell have stated many times), and ultimately it is up to the host nation to win or lose the conflict. FM 3-24 is flawed not only due to its population centric view (although I support that the population is critically important, but not always the center of gravity), but its view that "we" develop and execute the COIN strategy (instead of support the host nation's strategy) and sort of pull our host nation brothers along for the ride. That is a plan that will almost always lead to failure."
What is there about history and common sense that COIN lovers don't understand? An anonymous guy thinks he refutes Gian Gentile by pulling up a paper by Paul and Clarke. Read what those guys say; look at the colors on their map. It doesn't support COIN as being practiced by the U.S. military. What it supports is COIN when it's being done by a nation that actually knows what it's doing and isn't fatally corrupt. A host country. Not an outsider. Check. But what's that got to do with Afghanistan?
And then Terry Tucker says "the military does not encourage intellectual rigor..." No shit.
Bin Laden is dead. The NCA, the spooks and the SOF dudes have taken everybody else off the hook. Time for the conventional forces to close down. COIN was never what was needed. What's always been indicated was an intel/SOF approach, more nearly akin to civilian policing than to conventional soldiering.
Sorry, generals. Wasn't really ever your kind of fight. Come home. Save some families. Take care of the troops. Lick your wounds. Help the budget problems.
The failure in the article, as well the critics of COIN, is that COIN is a "triology"; not in Clausewitz in a sense. Here is the conceptual flow. A hearts and minds strategy depends on the size and quality of your carrots and sticks. This is the "Social Capital" paragraph in 3-24 that NOBODY even bothers to read. Social Capital and how one uses all the elements of social capital is key to how you "design" and execute a carrots and sticks approach to your campaign plan of hearts and minds. A popultation centric approach is the use of social capital. SOCIAL CAPITAL key stone to Hearts and Minds. HOW you design and execute (no pun intended..well maybe)the operation is how you gain and lose social capital and traction on your LOO's.
I also happen to be from Texas and like we say; "Some Folks Just need Killin'" Translation: Kintetics are important in your precision tartgeting. This IS also how you gain or lose "social capital"; see where this is going ?? Our struggles over the last 5 years has been the "How to" part of all this. There is strong evidentary support for the doctrine in the April 2011 World Bank report on conflict and stability and also in the RAND Study "Victory has a Thousand Fathers" redacted in a small article in the 1st Qtr of JFQ. The military lacks "breadth" of expereince, thats why you need the input from your USAID, DAI and NGO's. If we could really get the linkage, the mental design with the skill and resources of the military the possibilities are endless. The doctrine is beautiful!! we are just a little shallow in how we nuance the "design and execution" and as retired soldier with 24 years of active duty i can still say that the military does not encourage intellectual rigour and that has been the real failure with our "how to"
Continuing my comment at 11:38AM above:
So, as an alternative:
a. LET US RETAIN the idea that many/most of the problems experienced by and re: less-integrated states and societies can be traced to the fact that their political, economic and social arrangements and underpinnings are so outdated as to no longer be able to adequately provide for their citizenry. This causing problems -- not only for these states and societies themselves -- but also for the rest of the world. However,
b. LET US REJECT the idea that the the proper time and place to address these difficiencies is exactly when such outlier states and societies are experiencing insurgencies, natural disasters, humanitarian crises and/or other significant state/societal difficulty. (Thus, we specifically reject the notion that the presentation of such difficulties represents a unique opportunity -- a magnificant opening -- which we must immediately exploit with our "instruments of power" so as to do "corrective actions" such as state-building.)
With this change made -- which specifically precludes attempting to deal with "root causes" during the time of acute state or societal trauma (and thus precluding us from using the crisis as means, motive and opportunity to impose our way of life on the indigenous populations) how then might FM 3-24 (and FM 3-07 for that matter) look?
The low priority given to external sanctuaries in FM 3-24 is evidence that the manual was an effort to resolve the crisis in Iraq at the time it was written. The Army will need different guidance for limited wars in countries with different circumstances, if it is necessary to intervene in such places in the future.
While a further debate over how to conduct counterinsurgency may have value, my impression is that the conditions or terms on which such commitments begin are so important to the outcome that they ought to receive most of the emphasis. They do not do so now.
Regarding the Joint Forces Quarterly article, a survey of recent insurgent wars has been long overdue. But testing FM 3-24 by listing insurgencies can only be meaningful if there are sufficient baselines in common across all of the cases to make a comparison of government policy in each case valid.
None of the successful cases cited in the article were resolved with persistently inadequate numbers of government or counterinsurgent troops facing well-organized insurgencies. This is what we have had in Afghanistan.
Whatever new guidance emerges after the current Afghan conflict will need to be conceived with a longer and broader view, with special attention to the terms under which the U.S. commits itself to foreign internal defense or limited war, and without the pressure of immediate events that shaped FM 3-24 to be the kind of document that it is.
Not sure I'd use a paper to attack someone that uses The Taliban's COIN efforts prior to 2001 as "proof" that Pop-centric COIN "works". I think what they were trying to say was that the Taliban didn't use the hearts and minds approach and that is why they lost power in 2001. If I mis-read that, then I'll stand corrected, but if not- then I'm a little skeptical of the rest of their "analysis"- as I am anytime anyone uses history (especially 30 years of it) to "prove" anything...
Posted by Bob,
""Talk of development vs counterguerrilla, populace "control" vs populace "separation", etc without bringing those tactical discussions of TTPs into a clear strategic context of the interests of the various parties and governments involved, and within an understanding of insurgency released from the shakles of centuries of foreign intervention perspective, are largely moot. FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.""
Once again I "mostly" agree, but also once again I think your proposal, while not unrational, is focused on resolving the issues driving the insurgency (which may consist of many drivers that are conflicting with one another, so there may not be a viable solution for the "current" State). I suggest also looking at it from the perspective of U.S. interests. Why are we involved? What are "we" trying to accomplish to achieve ou interests?
We may determine that addressing the underlying issues is not possible (for us), but we still need to suppress the insurgency (for whatever reason) to support our interests. In that the case the tactics you listed may very well nest nicely with our strategic objectives.
It is rarely black and white, and as both you and Gian state before we foolishly apply tactics, let's identify our strategic end state and then evaluate the alternative means (assuming alternatives exist) and ways to achieve them. FM 3-24's flaw is not necessarily the text itself, but its dogmatic readers and distractors (both want to throw the baby out with the bathwater). It isn't the end all be all to COIN, and the TTPs offered may in the long run largely be ineffective (one can interpret history in many ways). Still the debate shouldn't be over a text (hell we never follow doctrine anyway), but over the strategy, only then can we debate tactics.
I recall very clearly having a discussion over Vodka (it was the first glass) with a U.S. Army General (Vietnam Vet) that I respected immensely about COIN, and he said we should never do COIN again, yet he was a major advocate of FID and supporting peace operations. I pushed back arguing that we'll have to do COIN again and must train for it (before 9/11) based on my understanding of the world from the Cold War era (El Salvador, Philippines, etc.). I thought his Vietnam experience may have soured his view of COIN irrationally, but with more age and more experience I now understand his message, and that we really can't do COIN (unless we're an occupying power), the host nation must do it. Our best role, if it is in our interest, is to conduct FID (as Bob and COL Maxwell have stated many times), and ultimately it is up to the host nation to win or lose the conflict. FM 3-24 is flawed not only due to its population centric view (although I support that the population is critically important, but not always the center of gravity), but its view that "we" develop and execute the COIN strategy (instead of support the host nation's strategy) and sort of pull our host nation brothers along for the ride. That is a plan that will almost always lead to failure.
FM 3-24 would seem to have been developed to be consistent with and correspond to our current thinking and related initiatives, which suggest that we need to intervene in the less-integrated world so as to transform these regions such that they might (1) become less of a problem for us, (2) be more usable by us and, otherwise, (3) be better aligned with our interests.
Herein, the idea is to use the opportunity -- the opening -- presented by such difficulties as insurgencies, humanitarian crises, natural disasters, etc., as a means -- and a justification -- for achieving significant and fundamental state and societal change therein; via such things as "state-building."
All of this being based on the "root cause" theory which suggests that virtually all problems relating to outlier states and societies (to include insurgencies) is due to these entities (a) not being sufficiently like us re: their political, economic and social orientation and (b) not being adequately aligned with and incorporated into our system.
Thus, to change FM 3-24, the theories and understandings noted above -- which today seem to underpin and direct our thinking and our actions (and which, likewise, would seem to constrain/preclude other ideas and methods) -- would need to be re-thought and re-considered.
Anon (whomever you may be):
So I will see your JFQ article and raise you one with Bing West's new book "The Wrong War" which has as its main point that population centric Coin (aka 3-24) being used in Afghanistan does not work, hence his title the "wrong war," or in other words that by using 3-24--hearts and minds Coin--we are fighting the war in Afghanistan the wrong way.
I guess Bing is just "huffing and puffing" too as you say about me.
thanks
gian
Except that the case evidence over the last 30 years supports 3-24 pretty strongly, and takes most of the wind of out Gentile's sails (though it doesn't seem to stop him from puffing). See:
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_126-128_Paul-Clarke.pdf
Good COIN comes from a good understanding of insurgency itself, and FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.
Good COIN is in the relationship between a government and their own populace, and in the nature of the design and implementation of doemestic policies and how they are perceived by various distinct and significant groups within the larger populace. FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.
Good COIN cannot be done by an intervening power. FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.
Talk of development vs counterguerrilla, populace "control" vs populace "separation", etc without bringing those tactical discussions of TTPs into a clear strategic context of the interests of the various parties and governments involved, and within an understanding of insurgency released from the shakles of centuries of foreign intervention perspective, are largely moot. FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.
Most who throw rocks at the manual or at our various operational designs in places where we conduct operations that are guided by the thinking that shaped this manual are largely thrown for the wrong reasons at the wrong targets, IMO.
Cheers!
Bob
I like MF's last paragraph with his highlighting the differences between Sri Lank and Af/Pak; the former and its problem of insurgency could be isolated, the latter cannot. It reminds of similar comparisons often made between Malaya and Vietnam.
To Neil's point. Well we just did offer up a competing operational level method to population centric counterinsurgency (aka FM 3-24) and that was the good kill on Bin Laden just a few days ago. Counter Terror should be elevated to the same operational level for "countering insurgencies" as is FM 3-24. Dale Andrade keeps arguing that the two are intertwined and that one cannot separate them. I disagree, especially as a matter of operational choice for strategy to employ.
Until we deconstruct 3-24 and put it back together with more operational options for countering an insurgency we will be mired in a state-building approach to countering any insurgencies and instability in the world. And this state building approach as codified in FM 3-24 is premised on faulty and half baked theories of populations and the insurgencies that come out of them.
FM 3-24 and American counterinsurgency do allow for learning and adapting; but that adaptation is still confined within a very narrow operational framework of state building to counter an insurgency.
As I have argued before, a field army using 3-24 as its operational guide, by rule, cannot learn and adapt its way out of doing population centric counterinsurgency, hence its very restrictive nature. The successful Bin Laden raid may offer up a mechanism to force an operational change from armed state building in Afghanistan to CT, which then at some point may lead to a broader discussion in the Army about the narrowness and near irrelevance (at least as far as American strategy is concerned) of population centric counterinsurgency. Or to put it another way, where in the world is it in our vital interests to do long term, armed stated building (aka FM 3-24)?
But anyway, Neil, how goes it brother? drop me a line when you can.
thanks
gian
Your lit review is wanting on the LTTE. Might want to check out a contridictory viewpoint here:
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_40-44_Smith.pdf
However, I agree FM 3-24 does not include alternative methods. However, nearly all of those are unacceptable morally and ethically to become doctrine for the US Armed Forces. Doctrine isn't history, doctrine isn't an intellectual field study. Doctrine is the encapsulation of the approved commonly understood methods employed by the force. While I think the manual should briefly discuss competing viewpoints, its purpose is to guide commanders on how to approach a given problem set so all units employ a similar approach.
That said, doctrine isn't a suicide pact, and commanders are always empowered to alter and even reject the doctrinal approach whenever circumstances permit. Those kind of decisions are what we expect of thinking commanders, who make such decisions in accordance with guidance from their higher and advice from subordinates.
You could make similar critiques of the Army's maneuver field manuals, that they neglect discussion of subjects such as recon-pull and command-push in favor of a singular, U.S. Army approved method of maneuver. This too has been critiqued in the pre-OIF literature, and as COL Gentile often reminds us, the great debates over FM 100-5's AirLandBattle theory.
Niel
He lost me with his misreading of COL Gentile's article in footnote 7. Lebanon in 2008?
On the other hand, agree that clear and hold require far greater forces than special ops can provide alone. Fail to hold and you can clear all you want through raids to little avail. If you are going to hold you might as well build while training your replacements who hopefully will hold.
Fail to train your military replacements and the NGO and state department builders will need mercenaries. Hardly a good answer.
Of course it could be more helpful to have indigenous ANA "holders" who speak the same language as those in the territory being held.
The Tamil tiger analogy is a no go. They were a small Budhist minority on a smallish island with no nearby cross-border sanctuary to hide in and little hope of foreign fighter support. Afghanistan, in constrast has more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan and it is hardly the minority that the Tigers were.