Small Wars Journal

What Dien Bien Phu Can Teach the French about ISIS and Syria

Mon, 11/16/2015 - 6:23pm

What Dien Bien Phu Can Teach the French about ISIS and Syria

Kevin L. Parker

In relation to Syria and ISIS, contemporary France can learn much from their 1954 defeat at Dien Bien Phu.  At the time, the French did learn many lessons; however, the United States refused to recognize those lessons.  Instead, the hubris of the United States assumed their experience would differ from the French by sheer force of will and the sentiment of “yes, but we’re not French.”  Refusing to capitalize on the French lessons, the U.S. waded deeper and deeper into the Vietnam conflict with strikingly similar strategy and tactics, which resulted in an even more famous and costly defeat than Dien Bien Phu.  So the larger lesson from Dien Bien Phu is to not ignore the lessons learned by others.  Albert Einstein defined insanity as repeatedly trying the same thing and expecting different results.  Wisdom comes from learning from your own mistakes, but it comes much easier when you can learn from the mistakes of others.

In Syria, the roles have been reversed from Dien Bien Phu.  This time, it is for France to learn from the U.S. experience there.  It does not take a detailed review and list of lessons to say the U.S. strategy in Syria has not been effective to-date.  There are two readily apparent generalizations.  First, the lack of a Syrian government capable of providing internal security is empowering ISIS.  Second, air strikes against ISIS have not been sufficient to disrupt or destroy ISIS.

Having been ruthlessly attacked by ISIS on its own soil, it is more than understandable for the French people and government to want to strike back at ISIS.  There is value in striking back.  It shows that France will not stand for a disregard for the rule of law and sanctity of life within its borders, especially from terrorists.  The immediate military response in the form of air strikes on ISIS in Syria has effectively sent this message.  Accelerating air strikes on more targets risks more civilian casualties and feeding the ISIS recruiting narrative.  From this point forward, France should resist the temptation to follow a strategy centered on air strikes against ISIS in Syria.  Doing so would follow the U.S. strategy and tactics just as the U.S. followed the French in Vietnam.

Instead, France needs to take a long-term view while also capitalizing on the momentum of current events.  In response to the Paris attacks, the Western world, especially the sympathetic post-9/11 U.S., has rallied in support of the bloodied French people and in outrage against terrorism.  This creates a great window of opportunity on the world stage to create a change in Syria.  Since air strikes are unlikely to produce a long-term solution, the French approach should attempt to change the structure of the situation.

For an effective long-term solution, the structural factor that must change is the lack of a Syrian government capable of providing internal security and a legitimate rule of law.  The besieged Assad regime is too interested in staying in power to be a part of any effort to dull ISIS.  Direct support from Russia to the Assad regime—political and military—is in large part keeping Assad in power.  France should capitalize on its unfortunate moment in the spotlight to put international pressure on Russia to drop its support for Assad.  Experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere show that transitional governments have great challenges in providing internal security, but in Syria the alternative is an oppressive leader willing to shell his own cities or a continued stalemate in a civil war while ISIS grows within its borders.

If Russia is serious about defeating ISIS, as it has stated, then they must support creating a stable environment within Syria as quickly as possible.  Having been the target of a coordinated attack apparently planned within the terrorist incubator of Syria, France is in a unique position to point out the inconsistency in Russian policy.  Now is the time for France to not just learn, but also, and more importantly to lead.

Comments

It appears that "the kind of war one is embarked upon" matters.

For example:

a. A war between relatively equal great powers; both of whom are fighting for survival. Versus

b. A, more or less, "imperial" war between (a) much stronger foreign nations, seeking to gain/retain power, influence and control in various regions of the world and (b) much weaker local/indigenous populations seeking -- via various desperate ways and various desperate means -- to avoid/escape from such subjugation.

In case "a" above, these folks would appear to be embarked upon -- for both sides -- a "total" war.

In case "b" above, however, it appears that only the much weaker local/indigenous populations are embarked upon a "total" war.

(In stark contrast, and again in case "b" above, the much strong "imperial" nations would appear to be embarked upon only a "limited war for limited ends;" for example, and in the case of the U.S./the West, the transformation of other states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.)

In the type "b"/"asymmetric" wars noted above, the much weaker local/indigenous entities have learned that the best way to defeat their much stronger "imperial" opponents is by a strategy of "political attrition."

That is, to wage a war to determine whose population is willing to sacrifice the most -- and for the longest period of time -- so as to win these wars.

In this regard, the much weaker local/indigenous entities (who may believe that they are fighting for all the marbles) have a distinct and decisive advantage; this, over their much stronger imperial opponents (who, in sharp contrast, may believe that they are only fighting for a few more feathers in their cap).

Thus, what "asymmetric"/"political attrition" wars (such as those associated with Dien Bien Phu and Tet then, and indeed with Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, etc., today) can teach the French, the Americans, et. al, is that, to win these "long" (but, in truth, "limited") wars, one must:

a. Find a path which will allow the much stronger imperial power (who is at a distinct disadvantage in only fighting a limited war for limited ends) to continue to wage war indefinitely; this, against a local/indigenous opponent who is fighting what he believes to be a total war. (Q: How might the much stronger imperial power do this? A: By employing only its special operations and air forces.) And

b. Avoid falling into the enemy's "political attrition" trap. (As we did in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, by employing resources -- such as massive ground forces -- which were massively disproportionate to the "limited war for limited ends" job at hand.)

Conclusion:

As per the late 20th Century and the Old Cold War, it appears that the West ultimately learned (the hard way) the lessons outlined at "a" and "b" immediately above. Thus, we left our overextended war in Vietnam, employed only very limited resources to our less-important missions thereafter and concentrated, more, on our "total" war great power rivals and responsibilities.

Likewise today and in our New Cold War of the early 21st Century, the West appears to have, once again, and again the hard way, learned the "limited" war lesson outlined above. Thus, we have (rightfully?) in our case today (a) downgraded our involvement in the "limited-wars-for-limited ends" missions of the Greater Middle East and (b) returned our focus to our "total" war responsibilities and, associated, contemporary great power rivals.

Wolverine57

Mon, 11/23/2015 - 8:23pm

This author throws in Vietnam as though he knows something about what went on there. He must be writing to satisfy the liberal leaning, administration supporting, faculty of that once scholarly organization. We were winning when I left. Ninety two percent of the Vietnamese people were under government control. Attrition strategy was the name of the game. We kill more of them than they do of us. We engage in search and destroy operations supported by American firepower. When we find an enemy, we pile on. Got the picture? That is what should be learned. I am surprised that the author did not mention global warming, climate change, or the use of bio-fuel.

I must disagree with LtCol Parker: with regard to the Middle East, in my view, there are NO useful strategic lessons to be learned from Dien Bien Phu in particular, or Viet Nam in general.

Except perhaps: don't get in the game if you can't afford to lose.

In the USA, and globally, every single important geopolitical, military, social and economic issue is different today from those in 1954 and 1973.

The Daesh must expand or die, but in expanding will generate targetable nodes of supply, communications and logistics. We can do that, and stop the expansion.

BTW, Einstein's famous bumper-sticker definition of insanity has nothing whatever to do with politics, diplomacy or war. It refers to mathematics. That is, an unbalanced equation will always be unbalanced, no matter how many attempts are made to solve it---unless variables are changed.

The rationale for the U.S./the West using now primarily:

a. Only ground forces of the nations/population groups of the region and

b. Only our special operations and air forces; this relates primarily, I believe, to

c. Our wishing to defeat our current enemies' strategy; which is, much as was the case with our enemies in Vietnam, designed to attrite our "political capacity" to continue to wage war.

Herein to note that when the French and the United States employed large-scale ground forces of their own nations -- in the wars in Vietnam and/or in the wars in the Greater Middle East -- this played directly into our enemies' hands.

Thus to see -- re: the French at Dien Bien Phu and the Americans at Tet -- the moment-in-time in which our much weaker enemies in Vietnam, using the "political attrition" strategy outlined above, prevailed over the much more powerful nations of the West.

Adopting a similar strategy to that of our weaker enemies in Vietnam, our current weaker enemies, via 9/11, etc., were successful in goading the U.S. into employing large-scale ground forces -- of our own nation -- in the Greater Middle East.

Thus, the only mistake that France might make -- re: 11/13 -- is to follow our 9/11 example.

France, however, sending in only its special operations and air forces after 11/13 -- and much as the U.S. is doing today -- this would seem to defeat the enemies' "political attrition" strategy; this, by allowing that, much as with the U.S. today, France can (a) stay in the fight and (b) continue to wage war indefinitely.

The solution for Iraq is the same as the solution for Syria: both need to be transformed into non-unitary states along the lines of Lebanon.

Obviously, the armed camps of Shias, Sunnis, Kurds and others would remain, but it would be a preferable outcome to the current chaotic attempts to impose centralized rule.

Regardless, any foreign forces from Iran, Libya, etc. must go...

In some regard the roles of France and the U.S. in Syria vis-à-vis Dien Bien Phu have not entirely been reversed.

At Dien Bien Phu (Indochina) the French relied heavily on the U.S. for war material along with financial and political support . . . I would posit today that any protracted military operations by the French in Syria will to some extent require the same.

By the way, prior to Gen. Navaree arriving in Indochina, he understood the French would settle for a military stalemate (sans a significant military victory) to advance peace talks that had already been decided upon as a policy. In that regard I suspect the French see that as non-starter with ISIS in Syria?

Move Forward

Mon, 11/16/2015 - 9:35pm

<blockquote>Refusing to capitalize on the French lessons, the U.S. waded deeper and deeper into the Vietnam conflict with strikingly similar strategy and tactics, which resulted in an even more famous and costly defeat than Dien Bien Phu.</blockquote>

Which famous and costly defeat is the author speaking of: Khe Sanh or Tet? Khe Sanh was a much smaller defending Marine force than Dien Bien Phu and Tet was much larger/broader and an overall U.S./South Vietnamese victory. Is the author arguing that a small U.S. ground force and airpower/SF alone would have fared more successfully in Vietnam against hundreds of thousands of NVA and Viet Cong? Is he arguing we never should have gone in at all and risked an undeterred and still strong China and Russia turning its sights to Japan and renewed efforts against South Korea instead? After all, if a small Japan was able to conquer much of Vietnam and China, what was to deter a stronger China/Russia effort from looking for dominoes elsewhere?

One also could argue that a variety of technologies and TTP changed between 1954 Dien Bien Phu and 1968 Khe Sanh (helicopters and better airpower for one), let alone 1991 Desert Storm and 2003 OIF. In other words, few lessons <i>still</i> translate that could not in major part be overcome, if fought today from newly created coalition FOBs/COPs in Kurd areas of Iraq/Syria. From those safe areas similar to Vietnam firebases, we could launch air assaults/attack helicopters supporting today’s better infantry, indirect fire, and CAS weapons, using better day/night/all-weather sensors, helmets and body armor, and precision airpower/airdrop. No need to land or LAPES at Khe Sanh or drop unguided parachutes. GPS would get parachutes and bombs where wanted and radar would guide counterbattery fire with UAS/RPA and attack helicopter Hellfires helping all of the above, and C-RAM shooting down many incoming rounds.

Also, note the decade-plus differences between each earlier and later conflict with lessons of Korea still in mind for Vietnam and lessons of an undeterred Saddam Hussein still in play during OIF. In other words, the U.S. was using the lesson of Korea and attempted communist expansion in Vietnam---not that of the French. Likewise, the U.S. was using the lesson of Desert Storm for OIF---not historical COIN conflicts.

<blockquote>There is value in striking back. It shows that France will not stand for a disregard for the rule of law and sanctity of life within its borders, especially form terrorists. The immediate military response in the form of air strikes on ISIS in Syria has effectively sent this message. Accelerating air strikes on more targets risks more civilian casualties and feeding the ISIS recruiting narrative. From this point forward, France should resist the temptation to follow a strategy centered on air strikes against ISIS in Syria. Doing so would follow the U.S. strategy and tactics just as the U.S. followed the French in Vietnam.</blockquote>

As mentioned earlier, the U.S. appears to have followed a Korea-based strategy of mass against North Vietnam rather than following the French. Nor are today’s airstrikes ineffective against ISIL—they just are not sufficient. The primary failure in today’s anti-ISIL airpower strategy is the lack of credible ground forces to drive the enemy from cover where they otherwise can hug civilians. Kurd forces are effective but do not belong in Sunni areas nor should they be expected to seize them from ISIL. Iraqi Shiite militias and its Army likewise should not be expected to hold Sunni areas even if they somehow improved their ability to seize them. That leads to the author’s and current administrations next point of diplomatic failure.

<blockquote>For an effective long-term solution, the structural factor that must change is the lack of a Syrian government capable of providing internal security and a legitimate rule of law. The besieged Assad regime is too interested in staying in power to be a part of any effort to dull ISIS. Direct support from Russia to the Assad regime—political and military—is in large part keeping Assad in power. France should capitalize on its unfortunate moment in the spotlight to put international pressure on Russia to drop its support for Assad. Experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere show that transitional governments have great challenges in providing internal security, but in Syria the alternative is an oppressive leader willing to shell his own cities or a continued stalemate in a civil war while ISIS grows within its borders.</blockquote>

If U.S. and European pressure and sanctions as a whole have not deterred Putin in Ukraine and Crimea, why would he feel pressure from France alone? International focus is on ISIL, not Russia, and many (to include Presidential candidates) do not fathom that neither Russia nor Assad are targeting ISIL with many airstrikes or Syrian ground forces.

However, the government structure issue <I>is</I> the primary problem, yet it too is unfixable with the current strategy of maintaining a single Syria. Transitional governments were less the problem in OIF/OEF. Heck they had a decade in both cases to try and get it right. The problem was crappy colonial borders that created unavoidable haves/have-nots after <I>any</I> election. No single government could possibly pacify and placate a single Syria any more than it has worked to end conflict in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Elect an Alawite/Shiite/Non-Pashtun and Sunnis/Pashtuns will keep fighting. Elect a Sunni in Syria (assuming an unlikely clean election) and Alawites get the same genocide treatment they practiced on Sunnis. In addition, the Iranians and Russians would never except a Sunni-ruled single Syria (or Iraq) but might consider a partitioned Syria (and Iraq) with Sunni, Alawite, and Kurd areas if the Turks could be pressured to cooperate. Turkey, Egypt, and KSA want Assad gone. The world wants a safe area for its coalition to base to launch ground and helicopter attacks against ISIL. How about a swap with some occupying GCC/Turk/Egyptian Sunni forces training local Syrian Sunnis to control ISIL-controlled areas after the same air-ground Sunni coalition with U.S. help kicks ISIL out?

<blockquote>If Russia is serious about defeating ISIS, as it has stated, then they must support creating a stable environment within Syria as quickly as possible. Having been the target of a coordinated attack apparently planned within the terrorist incubator of Syria, France is in a unique position to point out the inconsistency in Russian policy. Now is the time for France to not just learn, but also, and more importantly to lead.</blockquote>

Russia has “stated” many things that did not reflect its actual actions. Why should they care about ISIL as long as it stays away from Alawite coastal areas and major cities? Only NATO Article 5 holds promise for a broader coalition air/ground force that would bring together external Sunni allies to fight ISIL, assuming they even want that given their suspected past aid to ISIL.

France alone, as much as we feel for their situation with 4.7 million Muslims in their midst (1.7 in Paris alone) and ISIL threatening more attacks is not going to be as powerful an influence as the 44 million Muslims living in Europe (19 million in EU) with many that could become or already are radicalized. Thousands of European Muslims have already gone to Syria to learn how to make trouble and many will return. Unless we make safe areas for Sunnis to live in the Levant and dull the ISIL propaganda success-claims, the recruits and refugees will keep coming and the ISIL problem will spread.