Thoughts from the Field on Kilcullen's 28 Articles (Pt. IV)

Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.

David Kilcullen intended his Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency as a guide for the company commander facing a COIN operation. Since the article first circulated, hundreds of officers have served as company commanders and in other positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this article some of those officers comment on how Kilcullen's thinking applied to their mission in theater. Other former or retired Soldiers measure Kilcullen's points against their own experiences in other countries, conflicts, and years. All -- including David Kilcullen -- are members of the community of interest at the Small Wars Journal and Council.

Part IV (Articles 21 -- 28).

21. Exploit a "single narrative". Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized. In most societies there are opinion-makers: local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions.

CPT Kranc on troop command: This goes right into the information operations (IO) plan. It must be tailored to fit your specific area. Again, this is something we don't train regularly and we learn by doing.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: A good S-2 section will be producing a steady stream of "talking points" for the guys on patrol. Be a team player, even if you disagree with it. Hit the talking points.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: Although you won't have a narrative to worry about, you will be expected to be in the know, based on your proximity to the unit's planners. Provide context on ops to your peers when appropriate, but if you simply don't know anything more that what you heard in the operations order. Don't embellish.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: Not all IO common themes are directly aimed at the populace. I spent a significant amount of time mobilizing opinion in favor of our IA battalion commander. At one time the 2nd IA Division had a commander who was not remotely in line with CF goals. The 1/2/2 IA Battalion Commander was pretty much in line with our goals. The 2nd IA Division Commander had relationships with some of the provincial sheiks that were counterproductive to achieving security. Progress achieved when the battalion detained or killed certain relatives or associates of the sheiks was reversed by external pressure from the division commander.

Since the battalion commander was in line with our goals I made sure everyone knew the risks (both professional and personal) the battalion commander was taking in doing in supporting CF goals. I also pointed out that we--the MiTTs and CFs commanders and staffs--should hold this man and his battalion up as an example of cooperation. We needed other IA leaders to know whom we considered a friend. This set off a running gun battle internally over the IO "fight". Our brigade MiTT chief backed me and mobilized CF support as well. Eventually it paid off; we had followed through on our promise to take care of those who support our goals. And others knew it: the division commander was fired and a new one with a strong allegiance to Iraq replaced him. This was a sustained effort. The point is that you need to understand that not all of the opinions you have to influence are external to the ISF and CF.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: This single narrative as an advisor is your FSF Commander. Whether you are on a battalion, brigade or division MiTT, you support that FSF Commander's intent, message and mission. You are not in charge of that unit, he is. As an advisor, you can try to influence his decisions and make recommendations. However, the ultimate decision lies with him. Do not publicly criticize or contradict the commander. Talk to him behind doors if you have an issue with a decision or action of his.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: To me, the IO campaign although often subtle is really the main effort. IO is not a single event. It is the sum total of the unit's culture. Our actions are our message. They must signal what we want them to signal. You must also constantly evaluate that message using input from your local sources, sector tempo and attitude, and cultural norms. Again, IO theme has to reflect your metrics and your "knowing your neighborhood".

LTC Odom on country teams: The Rwandan Genocide was the most lethal information operation since World War II. 800,000 died in less than 100 days directed through a single radio station and word-of-mouth communications. And the Rwandan Refugee Exodus was similarly a massive IO; an entire ethnic group numbering in the millions picked up in mass and walked out of the country, again based on a single radio station and word-of-mouth communications. In establishing the U.S-Rwandan Demining Office, we played close attention to the role of press, radio, and word-of-mouth communications in devising the mine and unexploded ordnance awareness program. We also pushed the UN to move on funding UN radio stations to counter extremist IO from and inside the refugee camps.

MAJ McDermott on company command: You have to translate often flowery thematic speeches into language that every soldier can understand. If you do this, you can help develop a narrative that soldiers not only understand, but also buy into. Once you do this, then you have a chance to begin to win some of the "war of ideas". This is more involved than just providing a 3X5 card with talking points on it.

MAJ McDermott on MiTTs: You have to try and find the common ground between what the USG themes and narratives are, and what your unit's government's themes are. As an advisor help your unit develop their talking points and be the sanity check.

22. Local forces should mirror enemy, not ourselves. By this stage, you will be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them, and building indigenous capability. The natural tendency is to build forces in our own image, with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. This is a mistake.

CPT Kranc on troop command: Further, they should mirror local operational requirements. What the use in providing the village doctor with an endocrinology lab that he doesn't know how to use? I don't know either, but some division surgeon thought it was a good idea. Additionally, just because we have bells and whistles for equipment doesn't mean our partnering Iraqi unit does to. We need to remember that. Often we don't.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: The local forces will always be far better at catching the bad guys then we will ever be. Their intelligence will be better, they know the language, people, and terrain better. Let them execute.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: If you don't know what coalition partners are doing within your AO or in adjacent battle space, you've violated Article 16. Fire yourself and seek a position monitoring the clearing barrel at the entry control point.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: There are certain considerations you must take into account when assisting a host nation develop its security forces. First they may already know what they need to win their fight, especially if they have been in the fight for several years. And their ideas in this regard may be better than yours. Second is not to assume they have the same strengths and weaknesses you do.

For example, the IA have it over us when it comes to HUMINT potential. If they develop that capability, it will allow them to infiltrate terrorist networks and play psychological havoc with the enemy and his trusted networks. We cannot do this very well. We can, however encourage and assist the Iraqis efforts on HUMINT.

On the other hand, we must guard against our own enthusiasm becoming over bearing and disruptive. Imagine trying to give an Iraqi patrol directions from a CF unmanned aircraft system using an analyst who sits in a CF brigade tactical operations center (TOC) talking to a brigade radio telephone operator (RTO), talking to CF task force RTO, talking to a MiTT advisor, talking to an interpreter, talking to the IA TOC who is talking to the patrol is ludicrous.

Partners also need to understand capabilities -- the CF one night got miffed that their helicopters could not see the IA patrol at the 10-digit grid the CF TOC provided for an IED. I had to explain to them that the IA patrol had no ground positioning system (GPS) in their truck, first generation night vision (if they were lucky and had batteries), no electronic countermeasures in their trucks to protect them, and only Level II armor on their vehicles. Moreover, as I pointed out, the IA were well aware of these shortcomings and were not so stupid as to drive up on top of an IED. They would in fact stop a couple of hundred meters short, and patrol up to it to investigate.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: You have to dance with the one that brought you. Your ability to influence how a FSF battalion or BDE is structures is probably outside your reach and not worth of a fight. There are some small changes you and your team can influence, however. Encourage your counterparts to train their units on COIN operations. However, do NOT teach classes yourself. Its their war, and advisors are there to help, not take the lead in teaching classes, instituting TO&E changes, etc.

Former Captain Bill Meara on the role of military advisor in Central America: We need to be aware of the institutional biases and shortcomings that make it difficult for us to deal with foreign insurgencies. We need to realize that our big, high-tech military machine—our big catapult—might not be much use against an insurgency built around people like Miguel Castellanos. I saw so many signs of our weaknesses in this area: the tank traps we were building in the "Choluteca gap," our big bucks, high-tech approach to support for the Salvadoran Armed Forces... I came to the conclusion that our powerful military is a blunt instrument, very capable of performing its primary mission (destroying enemy military forces), but poorly suited for cross-cultural battles for foreign hearts and minds. From "Contra Cross --- Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989" by William R. Meara Published by Naval Institute Press, 2006

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors- What works for us is not always the best course of action for others. We have to concede that sometimes ISF know how to deal with Iraqi business in the Iraqi way (or whatever country we are in). A different way of doing business does not necessarily mean it is the wrong way of doing business. We could and should learn a lot from our counterparts and host nation populace on cultivation of informants, social and economic projects, IO themes, as well as a few tactical tasks such as vehicle searches, and cache exploitation. They are after all (in this case) Iraqis and know where Iraqis hide stuff.

LTC Odom on country teams: In looking at assisting the Rwandan military, I always began by asking them for their assessed needs. They did not as is often the case look immediately for complex, high dollar systems; they first sought training and then logistics and communications. In contrast, the French and to a lesser degree Belgian build up of the former Rwandan military added light armor and other complex equipment that did little to halt the rebels. Sadly the most effective training and arming effort in the Rwandan tragedy were the massive importation of machetes and training of the killer militias to use them in the genocide.

MAJ McDermott on company command: Figure out how your unit can integrate with the locals. Plan on being proactive in dealing with them. You provide a mobile and lethal force that can provide the "muscle" to their intelligence feeds.

MAJ McDermott on MiTTs: You might not have a whole lot of input in what your unit is ging to look like, that might be decided by higher. However, you can be decisive in enaging with your counterpart and the unit's leaders in focusing their efforts on training the unit, and not getting wrapped up in technology wants. If the unit leadership understands the basics of shoot, move, and communicate then you are succeeding. If they get wrapped up in "where is our computer?", then you have to adjust the focus.

23: Practice armed civil affairs. Counterinsurgency is armed social work; an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought.

CPT Kranc on troop command: CMO can be a decisive operation depending on where you are. You must be able to transition from CA to combat operations quickly. Additionally, the CA bubba isn't the only one doing CA work; your 19D1O is probably doing more CA in a day than the Civil Affairs officer will do in 3 days.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: I used to like to work the hell out of my medics. It was standard for me to offer clean drinking water and a quick check up if anyone was having medical problems in a house. I pressed the medics to carry as much medication as they were qualified to use and the BN medical platoon was —to give. Dysentery and dehydration were common examples. Having our medic explain to them how to get better, and then providing the clean water that would make it possible, really put a lot of smiles on people's faces. Especially if it was a kid who was sick.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: Even if your unit doesn't have a supporting CA (Civil Affairs) element, or the one you do have is over-tasked, work the interagency theme and appreciate what the CA folks like to know. Try to glean relevant information during debriefs and make sure it gets to the people who can act on it. If you aren't sure if that's within your lane, clear it with the S-3, but don't sit on your thumbs and expect it to occur by magic.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: The IA has no civil affairs (CA) assets at the battalion level. They were attempting to establish a CA officer at the brigade level towards the end, but have no real resources to apply. The MITTs have no dedicated CA officer at the battalion brigade, or division level; you (or someone on your team) picked it up as an additional duty. To facilitate a better CA effort, we established ties to the closest provincial reconstruction team (PRT).

What the IA could do better than CF was offer CA insights of use to all; IA patrols were better at "atmospherics" or SWEAT-MS assessments than CF patrols. Discuss this with the various IA leaders and staff and report what they are saying. They can be a very effective weather vane for how the populace feels, what their concerns are, and where influence is needed. Discuss with your IA counterparts the possibility of getting to know local leaders and if possible addressing their problems. We made some money by obtaining supplies like water tanks and other resources then getting them in the hands of the IA so it became an IA effort. It did not matter to the people that it may have had US stamped on it, it came from the IA, and as such was Iraqi.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Every soldier is a CA officer. The ability to make a mature decision to go from non-lethal ops to lethal ops and then back to non-lethal ops -- all in the course of a single patrol-- are what we deal with in COIN. Lethal force is not always the answer and shouldn't be the first response to every situation. Rather a decision has to be made often in a very short period of time. That is why everyone must understand the IO theme depends on unit culture, use of rules of engagement, and considered escalation of force.

LTC Odom on country teams: You -- the individual soldier -- are a walking, talking CMO and IO, all wrapped into one. As such your actions or your inactions can have far reaching effects. In September 1994 I was on a road reconnaissance with a fellow embassy officer and a visitor to look at the influx of former Tutsi refugees back into Rwanda. I was driving and as we crested a hill, we ran up on a serious truck accident. We stopped, surveyed the casualties, and I drove back to the closest military checkpoint to get help. To make a long story short, we spent several hours doing our best to get the victims to the closest medical care. Several weeks later, I was meeting the Health Minister for the first time and I raised this incident proof for the need for better heath care. As it turned out members of the Health Minister's extended family had been in that truck accident and survived because we stopped and helped.

MAJ McDermott on company command: Best case, plan on allocating combat power to securing CA projects/initiatives. Worst Case plan on being the element that does both. Make sure the local CA leaders know who you are, and where you are located. Insist that they not make any local agreements without you being present at the negotiation because the CA team will obligate you to tasks without your input.

MAJ McDermott on MiTTs: You have to help your unit understand the important of providing a local solution to local problems. COIN is all about host nation government legitimacy. If your unit can help provide the local interface for the CA/developmental assistance, the people develop more faith in their government.

24. Small is beautiful. Another natural tendency is to go for large-scale, mass programs. In particular, we have a tendency to template ideas that succeed in one area and transplant them into another, and we tend to take small programs that work and try to replicate them on a larger scale.

CPT Kranc on troop command: Iraqis want to see results. The proliferation of small programs that work does wonders. Also, small is recoverable and cheap. They don't need to know that.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: Like I said in article 23: it's the little things that count.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: For the battle captain, small details are beautiful. Be the duty expert at conducting a good debrief.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs -- Understand that allot of small dents still have mass. If you make a big dent, be glad, but don't shoot for it on a regular basis at the sacrifice of the small dents you know you can make.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Small victories, small changes, shifting the direction a FSF unit is heading on 5 degrees pays big dividends later on. Do not expect to transform your FSF unit into the 75th Ranger Regiment in the year you are there. Look for those small victories, maintain some influence with your counterpart, and keep your unit improving steadily over time. Again, the marathon concept is very apropos in this case. Encourage small unit tactics, enhance the legitimacy of the FSF NCO corps and continue to move your FSF unit forward.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Small projects are easier and sow immediate results as well as long term "ammo" for those on patrol engaging the populace. As CPT Kranc stated, Iraqis want immediate results. We can keep our grand plan and massive, long term program. At the same time we need a few highly visible, well-placed projects that the community or sector we support actually wants (not what we think they need or want). Make it a media event and exploit it in our IO effort.

LTC Odom on country teams: As the Ambassador's military advisor and representative, I pushed establishing the U.S-Rwandan Demining Office as an achievable first step. It worked and it cemented relations between the U.S. and the new Rwandan government.

MAJ McDermott on company command: It comes down to managing expectations of the local populace. Execute what you know you can deliver. It is better to show many small successfully completed projects, then one massive partially completed project. It shows the locals that you can deliver, and that scope dictates time.

MAJ McDermott on MiTTs: See comment above but insert unit for local populace. Also MAJ Sullivan's comments hit the nail on the head.

25. Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces. At this stage, if things are proceeding well, the insurgents will go over to the offensive. Yes, the offensive-- because you have created a situation so dangerous to the insurgents, by threatening to displace them from the environment, that they have to attack you and the population to get back into the game.

CPT Kranc on troop command: The strategy is the iceberg and his forces are the tip. Ask Capt Smith from the Titanic what was more important. We often look for the 10-meter target and forget what's downrange.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: Don't go outside the wire looking to find, fix, and finish anybody. Go out looking to win the support of the people.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: The enemy's strategy is to wear you down. If you can implement elements of the points listed above, you will help the companies to get inside of his loop.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: You have to help you counterpart understand the enemy's strategy, then array the resources to match. This might be difficult in previous role of the indigenous was something along the line of mobility guarantor for CF. One of our biggest successes was convincing the IA it was alright to do what they knew needed to be done: they then moved out of the COPs that overlooked CF MSRs. They shifted into the neighborhoods and patrolled to contest the AIF's influence and deny them freedom of movement. This also goes back to points 1 and 2; you must understand the problem you have, not the one you want to have. The next step to this is to move past the security fight and linking security with stability. Then you can apply the other types of influence and debunk the AIF's claims of weak, ineffective government as you demonstrate the value of good government to the people.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Keep an offensive mindset and do not let your unit settle into a FOB mentality. The strength of the FSF units are their ability to interact with the population, gather intelligence and identify the sheep from the wolves. In order to capitalize on these strengths, maintain an offensive spirit and influence your counterpart to do the same. Rather than take a hit from the bad guys, go out and hit'em first. As the desk sergeant from Hillstreet Blues use to say, "Let's do it to them before they do it to us!"

LTC Odom on country teams: We knew that the former Rwandan government, military, and associated killer militias would indeed mount a sustained insurgency against the new Rwandan government. Our challenge as a country team was to push for international action to close the camps or at least control them even as we cautioned the new government against acting unilaterally. We ultimately failed. The new government cleared the camps and then took down the neighboring country of the Congo to break the hardliner threat from the camps. But the new government did not win until it convinced the Hutu majority that the hardliners could not win inside Rwanda. The key to that victory was that small victory in late 1994 in integrating former military officers into the new Army. Those former military officers were highly effective in COIN operations against their former comrades.

MAJ McDermott on company command: You have ensure that your unit and your unit's leaders understand what the enemy strategy is and who they "win". Then focus your unit's actions on not feeding his strategy. I.e. don't reinforce enemy talking points by actions you take.

MAJ McDermott on MiTTs: Your indigenous unit is going to have better idea of what resonates with the population and what doesn't. You have to engage with your counterpart and determine what is going to work, and what doesn't work. Help them reach that level of understanding.

26. Build your own solution, attack only when he gets in the way. Try not to be distracted, or forced into a series of reactive moves, by a desire to kill or capture the insurgents. Your aim should be to implement your own solution -- the "game plan" you developed early in the campaign, and then refined through interaction with local partners.

CPT Kranc on troop command: For a company, since combat operations are what we've trained for, they're our comfort zone. Civil-military operations), IO, economic development, and the sustainment of security forces are all bigger moneymakers in COIN than combat operations. It's tough to get to work, but more productive once you do.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: I agree with CPT Kranc. If you don't understand some of the finer points of non-kinetic ops, you may actually be a hindrance to the guys outside the wire. This should be part of your continuous professional military education), and actually long before you stepped in country.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: If you are doing this right the enemy will become disrupted and reactionary to your strategy. Your counterparts will seize and maintain the initiative. This causes the enemy to reallocate resources to try and counter your work. This is good: he must focus on deterring a better armed, trained, and equipped opponent instead of terrorizing civilians. In gunfights where both parties meet by chance, the IA wins 99% of the time. As an advisor one of the key things you can do is facilitate mutual IA and CF understanding of their strengths and weaknesses. This allows the two to augment each other towards building a holistically better force rather than detracting from each other through ignorance.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: This goes for working with your FSF units as well. Do not focus on problems or on what equipment you do not have. Remember, you are not in a U.S. unit so a lot of the "gee-whiz", high-tech stuff isn't going to be available (or necessarily beneficial) to your FSF unit. Work with your counterpart to utilize their strengths (HUMINT, dismounted patrolling) and harness your CF partner unit to build up weaknesses (Logistics, artillery, air support).

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Killing the enemy once he has engaged or we have acquired him is easy and we can usually do that when necessary. Destruction in COIN is not the main effort. Separating the enemy from the populace and his support is harder and gets more results in the long run than killing one or two here and there. Projects and improving the way of life, as well as the quality of life, gets the same results. Although such efforts may not put the populace on our side, they may move the population away from the insurgents. That is the same effect as killing the insurgents but risks no collateral damage and makes fewer insurgents in the process. We have to be prepared to conduct combat operations at the drop of a hat. But all operations are in fact combat operations, just with a method of engagement than we have traditionally used.

LTC Odom on country teams: The senior Rwandan military commanders learned from the massacre at Kibeho; the original objective of that operation was to clear the camps. When it changed to catching extremists, the operation turned bloody. When the new Rwandan military cleared the camps in the Congo in 1996, they did not bother with catching the extremists. Instead they made sure that the refugees went home and that no new camps sprung up as extremist enclaves inside Rwanda.

MAJ McDermott on company command: CPT Kranc summed it up. Just remember that sometimes your subordinate leaders will have very good ideas. Make sure look for ideas from your subordinates as well as your leaders.

MAJ McDermott on MiTTs: MAJ Sullivan said it all; I can't reiterate enough the truth of his comments.

27. Keep extraction plan secret. The temptation to talk about home becomes almost unbearable toward the end of a tour.

CPT Kranc on troop command: Everyone has a farewell tour with the sheiks, tribal leaders, political leaders, and others in the AO they've worked with over the year. That gets back to the insurgents. We need to watch it, but I was guilty of this too. It's where human instinct and developed relationships interfere with what is doctrinally right.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Insurgents know when the "new guy" is coming in town and will test them. There is usually a spike in attacks or their efforts in exploiting the seam between the populace and us. Making this as "seamless" as possible is key.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Even though you may be going back home to safety and family, your counterparts will remain in the fight until either they are killed or peace springs forth. Talk to home should stay within your own team, not around your counterparts. You will want to bid farewell to the men you have just spend a year in the mud with, spilling blood, tears and sweat. The bond you will most likely build with these "foreign" security forces will be stronger than most others you have experienced. As much as you will want to go home, a part of you will always stay with that unit. As far as your extraction plan goes, keep the details to a minimum and within your own team.

LTC Odom on country teams: The temptation to "leave" mentally before you leave physically is not only unbearably tempting, it is dangerous. You are not home before you get there. Stay focused and help your replacement dial in properly. Your sincerity in that process will reinforce your counterparts' faith in your assistance.

MAJ McDermott on company command: Always prepare your men for the worst case, emphasize that you are deploying for a conditions based redeployment, not a timeline. Also stress OPSEC so as not tip your hand to the enemy. You have to reach a careful balance against the need and requirement for soldiers to notify their families when they are returning home.

MAJ McDermott on MiTTs: Your unit is at home. Do not be vocal in when you are redeploying, if asked, be honest, but remember your client unit is fighting for their home. They do not have the luxury of leaving theater. Be sensitive to how the security situation is impacting them.

28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative. In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the population, you will win.

CPT Kranc on troop command: Insurgents are used to the initiative; our battle drills are all named "react to contact or small arms or whatever. But with good intelligence and planning, you can kick an insurgent in the teeth by making him react. Insurgents handle "initiate ambush" much better than "react to contact". In the latter game, they usually die in place.

CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: Keep patrolling, keep talking, keep listening, and keep making allies out there. If your living amongst them, that will go a long way to keeping the insurgents from erasing your gains. It's like a hearts and minds OODA loop.

MAJ Custis on battle captains: Collaborate with your counterparts, battle NCOs, and the Ops Chief to get better every day. If you think you've developed the smoothest COC going, remember that the day may come where all previous watch rotations pale in comparison to the hell that breaks loose. Do your best to be prepared for it.

MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: Help your partners recognize change and opportunity. Often windows of opportunity have a distinct time limit. Do your best to understand how long the window will remain open, where it applies, and what effects it may offer.

MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Keep the initiative and MAINTAIN INFLUENCE!!!! This is what advisors do, the influence their counterparts. You cannot command the unit; therefore maintaining influence is your key to not only bettering your FSF unit, but your own successful completion of your tour as well. Be there with your FSF unit, embed with them, develop rapport with as many soldiers as you can.

MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Keeping the initiative is impossible without a finger on the "pulse of your sector" or good intelligence. All this comes from your rapport with the locals and goes back to cultural awareness and fostering relationships. Lose the initiative and we are back to "reactive policing".

LTC Odom on country teams: I found that when I started to assume that I knew what was going on, I had already lost the initiative and risked surprise. This also played out in the information dominance struggle with Washington DC. In fast breaking situations like Goma, it was better to have the consuming agencies waiting for my call than to have them calling me. I was one and they were in a word, many. My solution was to set a pattern of routine updates via voice and message--and to offer no "off the cuff" updates in between. The same thing happened in the Kibeho massacre aftermath when after 30 hours on the road gathering information I tried to grab some sleep only to have an analyst call me demanding an update. I refused for two reasons: first and foremost I was too tired to give a coherent report and did not want to offer that classic "bad first report". Second, I did not want to surrender the initiative on when or what I reported to someone riding a desk thousands of miles away. "Wait out" is often the best response when dealing with higher.

MAJ McDermott on company command: Keep the initiative in order to keep the enemy reacting to you. Your activities can keep him off cycle and make him more vulnerable and less effective. A good offense is the best defense.

MAJ McDermott on MiTTs: Like MAJ Sullivan stated, don't lose your influence with your unit. Other than that, see above comment.