Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.
David Kilcullen intended his Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency as a guide for the company commander facing a COIN operation. Since the article first circulated, hundreds of officers have served as company commanders and in other positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this article some of those officers comment on how Kilcullen's thinking applied to their mission in theater. Other former or retired Soldiers measure Kilcullen's points against their own experiences in other countries, conflicts, and years. All -- including David Kilcullen -- are members of the community of interest at the Small Wars Journal and Council.
Part III (Articles 13 -- 20).
13. Build trusted networks. Once you have settled into your sector, your next task is to build trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase "hearts and minds", which comprises two separate components. "Hearts" means persuading people their best interests are served by your success; "Minds" means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.
CPT Kranc on troop command: May seem like common sense but many units think they can do it on their own. There are people in the community who want to help, despite great risk to themselves and their family. Taking them in and getting them to help your unit will make the unit successful. Goes back to the cultural advisor piece. If the tree branches are overt operations, the tree's roots are relationships with and in the local populace.
CPT Holzbach: The more time you spend with the locals, the easier and more natural this can be. Bend over backwards to protect the people, first and foremost. Go to ridiculous lengths to protect anyone who wants to give you info. Protect them like you would protect one of your soldiers. Keep your word. If you promise to do something or be somewhere, write it down and make it part of the mission for your next patrol. How much the locals perceive you as trustworthy is so important it should be right up there with how trustworthy your comrades perceive you to be.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: This goes back to Article 4. You are nothing more than a one-trick pony if you don't know what the current IO theme is, where CAG (Civil Affairs Group) elements are operating, or don't go down to the company areas every now and then to break bread. When you get the chance to go forward to "see" the battle space, try to discuss current ops with a squad leader. It's a little thing, but it goes toward building trust that you can get the dust-off bird in because you are not just another Fobbit.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: A MiTT must network with CF as well as with the IA. The IA was good at working snitches. They needed more money and flexibility to develop and compete with AIF cell phone and Internet snitches. It might be useful to assist your counterpart on building a network with an eye on the long-term goals. CF personnel may be uncomfortable with this. It is very subjective from our linear point of view; indigenous forces often deal in the subjective. Perception matters, and who appears to have good relationships is often as important (or more so) then a reputation built on good work. Networks are not just about informants reporting on enemy activity.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: You will develop these networks both within your FSF organization and your CF partners. Network with your brethren U.S. officers and NCOs. They will take care of you when no one else will. Teach your FSF leaders to do the same within their organization. I taught our Bn S-4 NCOIC how to network and "schmooze" with the Bde S-4 NCOIC. The other Iraqi Battalions never could figure out why MSG Raad and our battalion always got the best gear first!
MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: This is key in our success. Cultural awareness and sensitivity is key here as CPT Kranc says. Rapport and relationship building are critical. Nobody expects us to be powder puffs. Using "calculated brutality" -- force when necessary and only necessary and then only precise force when possible -- goes a long way with developing a relationship and trusted networks.
LTC Odom on country teams: As an intelligence operator I worked to develop trusted networks across the gamut of host nation, foreign presence, and international organizations inside Rwanda and on its borders. One of my first challenges was to establish contact with the new government, earn their trust, and understand their thinking. That challenge never went away. I also watched as the new government and military developed its own trusted networks using the "hearts and minds" approach described by Kilcullen.
MAJ McDermott on company command: Figure out how to protect information sources, how to receive tips from the locals without compromising them. If you can do this, you will develop a level of trust with the community. This is a huge success in COIN. There are many ways to go about this. We often faked detentions. Traffic Control Points also offer opportunities. You have to really evaluate what your interpreter is providing as well. Make sure he is translating and not "polishing" things up, the more literal the better.
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: You have to establish trust first and foremost with your interpreters. They are the ones who are caught in the middle between you and your client unit. You have to establish a relationship with them that makes them feel comfortable, safe, and secure in telling you information that the unit leadership might not want you to hear. You have to let them know that they work for you, not the HN unit. This will lead to the unit trusting the interpreter as an agent of the MiTT's, and allowing a better flow of information between the unit and the MiTT's. Once the leaders pick up on this trust, they will begin to trust you as well. This enables you and your counterparts to have very candid and necessary discussions about what is going on in the unit, real and perceived issues, and the teaching, coaching, and mentoring of your counterpart for viable and fair solutions.
14. Start easy. If you were trained in maneuver warfare you know about surfaces and gaps. This applies to counterinsurgency as much as any other form of maneuver. Don't try to crack the hardest nut first -- don't go straight for the main insurgent stronghold, try to provoke a decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that support the insurgents. Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outwards.
CPT Kranc on troop command: Some go in and try to take down the entire AQIZ network in Iraq in their first 48 hours. The easiest victories have very little to do with kinetic operations; SWEAT-MS victories, tribal engagements, and equipping of security forces are the easiest 3 things to focus on. The populace sees this and will warm to your unit quickly.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: The RIP/TOA will be the first challenge, but if you can hit a homerun there, you should be okay. There are really no easy and early victories, but rehearse your staff's actions so they flow like water when a casualty requires evacuation to a higher echelon of care. Be the smooth operator when you pick up the handset, and if you can handle the stress of a troops-in-contact situation like a radio DJ, you will instill confidence in the guys on the ground.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: You have to build credibility as an advisor. This may mean just letting them know you are not as smart as someone once told you. And that you know that in some areas you have to do much catching up. Where you can help -- like in the obtaining of CL IX and CLIIIB-- do so vigorously. Where you are weak -- understanding the local AOR--acknowledge that fact. Be careful how you reference and use your experiences from a previous rotation or life; just because it worked in one place does not guarantee its success in the new place.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Again, substitute "advisory work" for COIN. Look for quick victories and easy gains as you develop rapport. Eat in the Iraqi mess hall. Take time to understand their views on religion. Ask one of the soldiers to teach you just one new word in their language every day. These simple examples not only help build rapport with your new unit, they start you on a path to success early on.
MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: This goes back to campaign plan development, before the campaign and during the campaign. There are non-lethal engagements/victories that are just as important as lethal ones. Units must understand that and embrace it in order to be successful.
LTC Odom on country teams: When we reopened the embassy in Kigali, Rwanda the roof was partially blown off by a 120mm mortar round, the embassy communications gear was shot up, and 60 percent of the local staff was dead or missing. We kept things as simple as possible and we learned that the niceties could wait for more normal times. I used the same technique with my counterparts: I offered what I could deliver and I delivered it on time or ahead of time. Finally I tried always to keep the situation in mind when discussing events and policies with my counterparts. Broad sweeping statements about reconciliation were fine as long term goals; as short-term projects, they were irrelevant. We--the Rwandans and the international community--were better served when the new Army integrated one hundred former Army officers rather than waiting for the rest of the former military to return. Those initially integrated officers proved critical to winning the counterinsurgency against their former comrades in 1998.
MAJ McDermott on company command: You have to know your unit. That means you as the commander have to have an honest assessment of what your units capabilities are. Once you have determined that, you need to determine what missions will get you biggest bang for the buck. Smaller initial successes build confidence in individual, unit, and leader abilities. Build everyone's confidence in climbing a hill as a unit, before you take on a mountain. Success begets success!!
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: See above, and factor in interoperability issues.
15. Seek early victories. In this early phase, your aim is to stamp your dominance in your sector. Do this by seeking an early victory. This will probably not translate into a combat victory over the enemy: looking for such a victory can be overly aggressive and create collateral damage, especially since you really do not yet understand your sector. Also, such a combat victory depends on the enemy being stupid enough to present you with a clear-cut target, a rare windfall in counterinsurgency. Instead, you may achieve a victory by resolving long-standing issues your predecessors have failed to address, or co-opting a key local leader who has resisted cooperation with our forces. Like any other form of armed propaganda, achieving even a small victory early in the tour sets the tone for what comes later, and helps seize the initiative, which you have probably lost due to the inevitable hiatus entailed by the handover-takeover with your predecessor.
CPT Kranc on troop command: See #14.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: See # 14.
MAJ Thornton: See #14.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: See #14.
MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: The important term here is "victory". Every member of the command must understand that a victory, is not necessarily won through a lethal fight. Explain this to the troops and exploit this with the populace.
LTC Odom on country teams: Sometimes those early victories are painful. In April 1995, the new Rwandan government and military decided after months of ineffective UN efforts to close the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps inside Rwanda. The IDP camps protected concentrations of hardliner genocidal killers; they refused to return to their homes. As the new Rwandan military forcefully closed the last camp at Kibeho, a massacre took place as Rwandan soldiers, hardliners, and civilians exploded in a frenzy of killing. Some 2000 people died. But the remaining IDP camps closed quietly and 18 months later when the new Rwandan military finally moved against the extremist camps in Zaire, the closings were relatively bloodless.
MAJ McDermott on company command: See #14, and see Mark Leslie's comments on "victory".
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: See #14, and MAJ mark Leslie's comments above.
16. Practice deterrent patrolling. Establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy from attacking you. Often our patrolling approach seems designed to provoke, then defeat, enemy attacks. This is counter-productive: it leads to a raiding, day-tripping mindset or, worse, a bunker mentality. Instead, practice deterrent patrolling.
CPT Kranc on troop command: Firebase concepts, which conventional units were completely against initially, lend well to this. Dominating the environment through sheer presence to deter attacks goes back to reconnaissance and surveillance planning.
CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: This goes back to the concept of "being there". The point that is crucial to avoiding enemy attacks is to stay off the main roads. Because IEDs account for so many of our casualties, stay away from the areas where they are effective: major roads, access ramps, and intersections.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: Deterrent patrolling is high-level math, in terms of the battle tracking and coordination required. Check and double-check to make sure that adjacent units know what is going on. Sit down with the patrol leaders whenever possible, and don't just know what the route looks like, but ask him where he expects to make contact. Know what his SOP (Standing Operating Procedure) is for breaking contact or going firm, and how he would prefer to make link-up with the QRF. You owe him that much, so don't be the distant voice in a box that has to develop situation awareness through multiple radio calls.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: This is something we have struggled with on a day-to-day basis. There are several tactics our IA battalion used to secure its area and all required resources. Ambushes, over-watches and small kill teams require enough personnel to execute the actual mission, security elements, and a QRF on standby to extract them. Patrols require sufficient numbers of soldiers and survivable vehicles to ensure that the patrol can succeed if it has to react to new information, or has chance contact. Patrols have been the most critical component of the battalion's security plan because the influence and provide information on the population, disrupt enemy activities and provide flexibility.
The biggest question regarding patrols is selecting the right number. Without good intelligence, the number of patrols, their sizes, and their frequency must be increased. If the security force has good intelligence--either through the population or through its own ability to collect information and do timely analysis--then the number of patrols can be reduced. Valuable resources can be reallocated to other tasks. This is very much a chicken and egg issue. For the population to support the security force with timely information the security force must win the public's support and secure the public against retribution. For the security force to have enough resources to collect and analyze its own information it must dedicate a significant portion of its strength to those tasks, which takes away from its ability to patrol. In the latter it also assumes the requirements and risk of training and resourcing another capability while trying to sustain its pace.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Ok, deterrent patrolling but within your own battalion AO. Get out and walk around the battalion, just like you would do in a U.S. unit. This not only lets the FSFs see you taking an interest in their welfare, but gives you a good assessment on the morale, welfare and esprit de corps of your unit. Advisors need to be good leaders. Leaders take the time to interface with their people and assess unit morale. Your "walkabouts" keep you up to speed with how your unit is doing on its daily garrison activities and it also gives you the opportunity to see/interact with soldiers you may not normally see on a daily basis (i.e., someone other than your counterpart).
MAJ Mark Leslie on advisor: The COP concept is critical. "Little America" FOBs defeat our purpose. Patrolling just to patrol is like reactive policing, contributing only "after the fact". These patrols lead to reactive responses that are often not within our strategy. You must use IPB and war-gaming not only for lethal actions and engagements but also non-lethal and verbal engagements. What is our plan to counter negative effects of actions "outside the wire"?
LTC Odom on country teams: If you wait until someone declares an "emergency" is taking place to actually look at your own area of operation, you will at best not know what you are looking at and at worst run full blown into an ambush, riot, or some other extreme form of unpleasantness.
MAJ McDermott on company command -- A patrol serves a deterrent by itself. The key aspect to any patrol is its ability to deal with any enemy it encounters. At a bare minimum, a patrol needs to be able to destroy, fix, or secure. You must have a quick reaction force ready to rapidly reinforce your patrol. It also means that presence and deterrence are not necessarily the same thing. You can achieve deterrence by "flooding the zone" with a multitude of patrols. You get true presence when you conduct dismounted foot patrols. Dismounted patrols enable the patrol to engage with the locals and develop rapport. This is how you begin to win the battle of ideas.
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: See my above comments, but it also key to help your unit understand their responsibility to their people. HN forces on the ground interacting with their own populace does builds an incredible amount of legitimacy in the eyes of the populace bout their government.
17. Be prepared for setbacks. Setbacks are normal in counterinsurgency, as in every other form of war. You will make mistakes, lose people, or occasionally kill or detain the wrong person.
CPT Kranc on troop command: Things don't go perfectly, despite even the best of plans. Western logic doesn't always translate well. Despite your best effort to explain a specific COA to a sheik, he may not roll with it. If you've hinged your entire plan on the COA he's refuted, you probably needed to plan a bit better. Stuff happens. Deal with it.
CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: The local forces will disappoint you many, many times. And sometimes your own soldiers will too. Fix the problem, and keep going.
MAJ Custis on battle captains -- The greatest compliment I ever got as a battle captain came from the XO of the rifle company attached to us for Fallujah. He pulled me aside and said that whenever things got crazy, it was good to hear my voice on the net, because he knew things were going to be okay and that the COC wouldn't be imposing more stress on them, on top of the enemy friction. Bad things do happen, but the battle captain needs to internalize his emotions until he is off watch. It doesn't matter if you have a KIA who was your number one NCO when you were a company commander. You've got to help the company clear the contact. Take a deep breath, throw in a dip or light up a Marlboro... Do anything to stay focused until the patrol is back inside the wire.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: Absolutely! Persevere and don't take it personal. It is not. It is just that your "great idea" might work stupendously in the CF context, but given the resources available to the indigenous unit, may not remotely match reality. Check yourself into Betty Ford's clinic and come back to earth. Get over it and move on.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Setbacks as an advisor will happen all the time. What you cannot do, however, is lose your influence with your counterpart. Influence = Rapport x (credibility + value). If you have zero rapport, you have no influence. Do not make rash decisions, or try and force an issue to the point where you are sacrificing your rapport with your counterpart. There are times you will have to let your unit go forward even if you disagree with the commander. He is in command, you are not. Do everything you can to influence his decisions but do not think for one second that you command that unit. Roll with the setbacks but always strive to maintain influence with your counterpart. Some influence is much better than no influence
MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: I agree completely with MAJ Thornton. Nothing is persona. But for advisors, plans and success are often hinged on personal relationships. Always have a contingency, allow yourself and soldiers and decompress at least twice a week and have a plan to get them to "refocus" and get in the war mentality prior to rolling back out the wire. Patrol briefs are interactive. Getting your own game face back on and making everyone understand that nothing is routine is critical.
LTC Odom on country teams: You must allow yourself and your troops to decompress. Frustration can be relieved through anger or laughter. Sometimes it takes both. You cannot be "controlled serious" all the time. Neither can your troops. If you try, you will fail. If you try to make your troops "controlled serious" all the time, you will fail your troops. As for setbacks, it is not who gets knocked down; it is who is still standing.
MAJ McDermott on company command: Nobody wins every contest. What you have to do as a leader is maintain the focus of your subordinate leaders and elements so that you can work through any setbacks. Maintain your sense of humor.
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: You have to manage the expectations of yourself, your unit, and your partner units. Different cultures handle set backs differently. You have to meld your professional military ethic with your counter-parts and determine your way ahead.
18. Remember the global audience. One of the biggest differences between the counterinsurgencies our fathers fought and those we face today is the omnipresence of globalized media.
CPT Kranc on troop command: Perception is reality, even if it's wrong. The way this war is covered, a private flashing a group of kids with the muzzle of his weapon on routine patrol can be cut and spliced into a nasty IO message for the insurgents. We are always on stage and they have the benefit of the doubt globally right now.
CPT Holzbach: Some in the media will paint you as the bad guy no matter what. Stay informed, but don't take it too hard when you see all the anti-American, anti-war stuff that's out there.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: Nothing to add here, other than that this should be common sense. If you have greater access to the NIPRNET (Internet) in the COC, keep your peers informed.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: You have to sell your guys--warts and strengths--so the CF understands how best to work with them. We did get reporters and I talked about my patch. Understand that the people you advise may be tied to the local environment they are operating in.
MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors -- Perception is reality. Media is everywhere and a reality. Embrace them and use them as a way to get your message across. Local media or host nation media are a key tool. You may have to schmooze them but they are a combat multiplier and worth the effort. We used local media all the time, often with great effects.
Keep in mind how things look. Consider female soldiers searching females. The Soldiers may not look like females in body armor, helmet, and eye-protection to the local press. They roll by, photographs the searches and suddenly we have males searching females. Have the females let their hair down while outside the wire on these operations. Invite the local media and you have discounted that perception.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Everyone says our advisory efforts are the number one priority in theater. Do not shy away from media attention and do not have the "I hate reporters" attitude plastered on your forehead. You are a salesman. Just like a good commander, sell your unit. Give them credit for success, even if you planted the seed. Make your commander and unit look good, especially when the media is involved. If you get a chance to tell the advisors story, do not shirk away from it. Tell the media the truth about the hardships and the successes your team has experienced to date.
LTC Odom on country teams: You meet the media in the strangest places. I went out on a mop up tour of an attack against an insurgent base on Iwawa Island on lake Kivu. As I stepped on the island with my Rwandan and UN counterparts, a Belgian television reporter filmed us; the next day I was on Belgian television as the U.S. "advisor and planner" of the Rwandan attack. The strangest things can put you in the media glare; on December 1, 1995 I was on the front page lower half of the Washington Post, accused of holding a dog for ransom in Rwanda. Also be aware that media figures --like Soldiers and units--rotate. In Rwanda, those of us who were "old hands" from 1994 and the genocide saw the Kibeho massacre in 1995 in an entirely different light from those who had just arrived.
MAJ McDermott on company command: The "strategic corporal" is a reality. You have to set the tone for what is acceptable and what isn't. I am referring to personal conduct and the use of "new media" outlets. Web-based self broadcast/publication opportunities (You-Tube/Blogs), provide a an outlet that many soldiers to share their story with anyone who looks. This means that they have to be aware that enemy, host nation, US, and the inter-national community will be watching, so don't be a jackass. On professional media, reiterate to soldiers that they need to talk at their pay grade and not to speculate about things above it.
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: You are your unit's PAO, understand your unit, and understand that perceptions they create in media will be different between their populace and the U.S. population. Help them get their story out, and help them learn to get ahead of the media cycle. Often they are very skeptical of the media, more so than us. We have to help them work through it.
19. Engage the women; beware the children. Most insurgent fighters are men. But in traditional societies, women are hugely influential in forming the social networks that insurgents use for support. Co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually undermine the insurgents.
CPT Kranc on troop command: Iraq, despite the men's perspective, is a matriarchal society. Getting into the women's networks influences the family network and gets 14 year old Joe Jihadist grounded and beaten with a wooden stick by his mom. Aside from the pure comedic value of these types of events, the women's circles are often the untapped venues of success in this type of society. Conversely, the insurgents are more ruthless than we are. They use kids because they're impressionable and, to them, expendable. It's much easier, seemingly, to deal with the kids, but they're distracters and oftentimes scout for insurgents.
CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: I agree completely with CPT Kranc on this point. You can never be sure what the kids are up to. But don't neglect them entirely. Remember, COIN is a very long process, and the fight will be going on long after we're gone. Plant good seeds in the heads of the next generation. Give them good memories of the Americans that will make them hesitate to fight us down the road.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: When it's 2 am and you get a call from a company, reporting that their attached Human Intelligence Exploitation Team has an informer who is ready to give the 411 on a local and active IED cell, but she wants to be relocated or placed into protective custody with her four children, you need to have a script and plan or the moment will slip away.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: We tried to help the IA engage the family by providing something for the kids. The idea was to portray the ISF as the good guy who cared, but was strong enough to contest and win the area. Show strength first and then add sincerity.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Your FSFs do this, not you. Encourage your commander / counterpart to provide services for the community and to encourage contact between the soldiers and their fellow citizens. However, do not sacrifice the security of a unit to accomplish a small social interactive victory.
MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Women were often reluctant to approach us initially. But we often gave care packages out to families after a cordon and knock to the family. We took care to separate the bad from the good. This allowed us to cultivate many female informants and trustees this way. We did this on the sly and we usually let the ISF take the lead. It was their neighborhood and perception was pretty important for their security.
LTC Odom on country teams: The Rwandan civil war and genocide fundamentally altered to role of women in Rwandan society. First there was the number of widows after the genocide and second some 250,000 Rwandan women were deliberately raped as part of the genocide. Thirteen years later those "survivors" of the genocide are still dying from AIDS. In setting our goals as a country team, we deliberately sought to empower women through training programs, like criminal investigation. The new Rwandan government did the same; the Mayor of Kigali was a woman.
MAJ McDermott on company command: This goes back to familiarize yourself on the culture, and find out, if possible, from your predecessor how they engage with these different groups. Soldiers love children, and they love to give them candy and toys. While we might view this as totally benevolent, in some cultures this is seen as undermining the authorities of the male population. You have to know hoe to do this based on the culture. You also have to be ready to ask for assistance from higher as far as providing an element with female soldiers that in many cultures are the more acceptable group to "engage" with the local female population. Women often provide the most honets assessment of what the true needs of the community are (roads, schools, medical facilities, etc.).
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: Your unit will be more culturally attuned to how to deal with the women, and that is fine. However, this awareness can also hinder interaction in some cultures. You need to work with your counterparts in order to determine the best method guarantee a productive dialogue between the unit leadership and the local female population.
20. Take stock regularly. You probably already know that a "body count" tells you little, because you usually cannot know how many insurgents there were to start with, how many moved into the area, transferred from supporter to combatant status or how many new fighters the conflict has created. But you still need to develop metrics early in the tour and refine them as the operation progresses. They should cover a range of social, informational, military and economic issues.
CPT Kranc on troop command: It may seem like common sense, but after continuous operations for prolonged periods, it's tougher to do than you'd think. Determining the metrics of progress can change from week to week. But it lets us know where we are and where we need to go.
CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: At the platoon level, this article is more important for not getting complacent. Constantly re-evaluate how you operate. What routes do you use the most? What neighborhoods do you visit the most frequently? What times do you patrol at, and how long are your patrols? Which of the locals do you talk to the most? Which spots do you like to set up at for overwatch? When everyday is Groundhog Day, one of your hardest jobs will be to mix up the what, when, and how of your operations. If you can catch even a whiff of a pattern, you can bet the insurgents have noticed it before you, and are already planning to use it to attack you. IEDs are not the biggest killer of our guys. Patterns are.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: Regardless of what the battle captains and NCOs are doing, pull them in for a daily update brief. Too much gets lost between multiple changeover briefs. Ask the S-3 to attend and give his take on the current and future operations picture. Even better, invite the commanding officer. You may be surprised how much information he can confirm or deny based on his rounds outside the wire.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: One of the hardest things I think was to determine where resources could be redistributed based on success. There seemed to be no metric for transitioning from mostly "security " to stability. We were working with the PRT on this in the end. In the end a strategy that relies on solely security with no eye towards stability will result in either a heavy-handed dictatorship, or an attrition of security resources. You have to help the higher echelon elements with the resources to build capacity towards infrastructure and stability understand when and where to apply those resources based on a number of factors. Your input matters because you have a ground perspective.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Do this not only with your FSF unit, but within your own MiTT as well. Have a weekly meeting to determine how things are going. A daily azimuth check with your own team ensures everyone is on focus for the training/operations for that day. Take the time as well to have down time within your team. It is a marathon, not a sprint. You need all members of your team healthy and alert for 365 days. Set up a schedule to rotate days off, or half days off so every member of your team gets down time. And remember to get time for yourself as well.
MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Metrics of success vary from sector to sector. Tactical PSYOP teams are a good but often underused resource here. You have to use everyone: advisors, neighboring MiTTs, and local forces. Before you set your metrics make sure you understand the economic and social structures in your neighborhood.
LTC Odom on country teams: We met daily as a country team in Rwanda. And we knew what each other were doing. More importantly we shared information on what we learned in our daily contacts and followed up on the resultant leads.
MAJ McDermott on company command: Develop metrics that are not enemy centric. Things like an increase in the presence of children playing soccer, more shops selling goods, increased pedestrian traffic, women going to market are all great things to look at as far as measuring success. If the population feels more secure (a tactical military success), you will see more segments of the population "out and about", then you are winning in COIN. If you see the numbers go down, then you should re-evaluate what you are doing, and engage with your trusted network.
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: You are there for a year, and you are trying to build capability and capacity. You have to continually reassess what is working and what is not. Furthermore, you have to continually reassess if you are still on the correct glide path to success. It is very easy to draw the wrong conclusions from early small successes.