The Secret Life of Robert Gates by Philip Ewing, Politico
Robert Gates’s tenure running the Pentagon might go down as the greatest performance in acting history.
On the outside, he was an even-keeled, plain-speaking former college president, one who declared to Congress he hadn’t returned to Washington to be a “bump on a log.” He cleaned house at the Air Force after an embarrassing nuclear weapons scandal and, most of all, righted the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — as much as any secretary of defense could.
On the inside, according to an early copy of Gates’s new memoir obtained by POLITICO, he was apparently hating every minute of it. But he kept almost everything behind the poker face…
Also see: White House Rushes to Respond to Gates Book by Jonathan Allen, Politico
Comments
Madhu:
Those people inside the beltway, they ain't like you and me. They really believed that paying for both side's bullets would work.
You said "Mr. Gates is doing a nice job explaining the silliness of academia that the Obama administration brought in with it, about solving Kashmir and stabilizing Pakistan via aid and making the military and ISI feel more "secure" and grand regional plans that were bizarre in their ambition." and so we paid the Pak Army/ISI to kill us.
The only thing I can figure is it is like what the Amazing Randi said about people who believe no matter what:
"There exists in society a very special class of persons that I have always referred to as the Believers. These are folks who have chosen to accept a certain religion, philosophy, theory, idea or notion and cling to that belief regardless of any evidence that might, for anyone else, bring it into doubt. They are the ones who encourage and support the fanatics and the frauds of any given age. No amount of evidence, no matter how strong, will bring them any enlightenment. They are the sheep who beg to be fleeced and butchered, and who will battle fiercely to preserve their right to be victimized…"
That ain't so bad if you are dealing with things like crop circles. It is very bad if those kinds of people direct the foreign policy of the United States. Other people get killed, lots of other people.
It was exacerbated by the supreme arrogance of our Believers inside the beltway. They just couldn't believe that those cute as the dickens general sahibs in 'Pindi could be cold dead soul evil and twice as smart as any graduate of the right schools. So they got played like the marks they were, it's just that us flyover people are the ones who actually paid for their fools judgments.
Mr. Gates somehow thought that a heavy logistical foot print through Pakistan would allow us to crush the Taliban. How paying for both counterinsurgency and insurgency at the same time is supposed to work is beyond me.
As I said earlier, he has done a good job exposing the silliness of American South Asian academia that the Obama administration brought in with it. Yeah, in a few years we are going to solve India-Pakistan, solve Kashmir (the Anglo Americans have been involved since the beginning and won't be viewed as neutral by at least one major party, State Department types and Vali Nasr and Anne Marie Slaughter and Hillary Clinton or whatever, a third grader should understand that concept) and then crush the Taliban all while paying for their bullets and ours. Um, okay.
But Mr. Gates, when has a counterinsurgent ever won by paying for both sides? And if you knew a key ally was no ally, then, well, how do we justify paying for the bullets against our own when we are facing a threat, to be sure, but not an existential threat?
Seriously, how is this 'money skimming to be given the Taliban COIN' supposed to work?
Everyone is coming out with story now and that story is: it's your fault, not mine. Former Sec. State Clinton is not saying anything which is pretty smart or shrewd or just plain icky, depending.
Oh, and Joe Biden wasn't wrong about everything, according to your supposed world view. In the late nineties, he spoke up against sanctions against India because he pretty much figured they wouldn't really do anything anyway. Didn't Daniel Patrick Moynihan say the same thing? And the same vibe was extended to Pakistan by some, engagement was better. I dunno, maybe the Pressler Amendment guys were wrong, it's just that, the US can funnel money through the IMF and did. And Colin Powell was sent early on in the Bush administration to get mil-mil training back on track. World is good porous for some types of sanctions to work and engagement might be better than cutting off but it won't change basic regional calculus.
Nothing the US has ever done has worked in that region, changing regional calculus, I mean. Never. Not since 1947.
Since the Bush administration waived this stuff and you thought sanctions were waste of time too, how is he wrong about everything?
Nice playing to the domestic crowd though.
I don't get you Mr. Gates. You had to have known all along and, yet, you thought our logistical foot print through Pakistan would work? Why? How could it possibly have worked to "crush the Taliban"? It's completely illogical to pay for their bullets and imagine crushing them.
I don't mind you, I just don't get you. The system did a number on you, huh? The stuff you learned during the Cold War did not help us post Cold War. That is the great tragedy of the American win, post 90's. We blew it for our own people, that supposedly "glorious" win as you called it in your last memoir. Dirty, dark and difficult win. That kind of stuff, you don't do in this era. Don't work. An abomination.
As I said in another thread, I sort of pity your generation. The system really did a number on some of you guys, patriots and hard workers and all.
carl---seems that Gates felt the same way I do about the massive ops tempo on deployments being the cause of major issues currently in the Force ie PTSD etc .
By the way---that is one of the major differences between this generation and VN vets---the massive ops tempo since actually the surge cause by the having of a smaller Force due to the all volunteer concept vs a draft army of over 1M.
Taken from Tom Rick's blog today that he is running on Gates.
NOTICE how the Force has not done studies on the relationship of the ops tempo to major issues ie PTSD, sexual assault, domestic abuse and suicides.
"Gates came to believe that extending the tours of soldiers in Iraq carried a huge cost. "I believe those long tours significantly aggravated post-traumatic stress and contributed to a growing number of suicides." (This made me wonder if there has been a study looking to see if there is a correlation between Army suicides and the duration of tours. I asked around with some smart guys and couldn't find any.)"
carl---I am not alluding to the fact that they all will break down but there is something about this new group that is so different from the VN vet generation---a large number of the Force bought into the hero serve your country pay back AQ in ways one did not see in VN. They came willingly following 9/11.
They have in large numbers done repeated tours to Iraq and AFG especially the officers under the guise of this hero fight AQ concept. The tours have been grinding them down especially the last six years and the majority of Americans truly do not understand that grind---much as the author alludes to. Check the high PTSD rates, high disability rates, and related injuries---this group has been literally pounded into the ground.
I would argue as well that the current alcohol abuse, sexual assault, domestic abuse issues, high divorce rates, high suicide rates,disciple problems seen currently in the Force stem from this high ops tempo---also not understood by the general public.
Many Americans do not realize that if they deployed for four tours at 12 months per tour then they would send 6-8 months getting ready to deploy so there never really was a break for say six straight years. Most VN vets served at the most one or two tours in their careers as it was a draft army--not many Americans fully understood the treadmill it takes to deploy 18-20 BCTS every year as it takes that many preparing to replace them.
So in fact a larger than normal number think very similarly to the author now with the news coming out of Fulluja.
Actually this shift in thinking started long before Fulluja---especially in the last two to three years the Force has seen an internal shift and often openly questioned their service in AFG--but they still go when directed.
On a side note---check the climb in suicide numbers among young military members---not often spoken about outside the Force and not really known about in the general population ---why---because the greater population at large has no direct contact with anyone in the Force.
Outlaw 09:
Quick note 'cause I have someplace to go but it is about this statement of yours.
"My question now is how will these turned off vets act in the coming years--privately and publicly?
We are seeing some of their problems now--a recent example from 2012-- a senior NCO from a Cav unit who had fought in the Diyala river valley Thunder Runs in 2005/2006 comes home and after having alcohol problems suddenly shots and kills his wife and then kills himself in 2012."
That is basically the 'crazy Vietnam vet' updated and re-tuned. It is my view that the vast majority of people, vet and civilian, are extremely resilient and filled with that everyday courage allows people to get up in the morning and take care of business in face of the heartbreak and disappointments of life. Some don't or just can't. That is an ineffable tragedy. But to suggest that a group of hundreds of thousands will break down because things went south after they left is to deny that they have the strength they so obviously have.
Carl---if you think through the sentence he is totally correct---go back and look at all the "official" comments made since say 2003 for Iraq.
If then one "looks" at the surge and those senior leaders who then translated that into great paying jobs---we cannot admit that we "lost"--a myth was then created that the surge "worked".
If one then looks at the argument that we have setup for the follow-on in Iraq after we pulled out---we have constantly found ways of describing the issue without admitting we failed--and it goes through our Congress, both political parties and the senior leadership. Just look at comments now on the fighting in Falluja---"it is their problem"--last time I checked it was the US that tossed out Saddam and it was the US that allowed a Shia majority to now rule in a outspoken sectarian manner---and "it is their problem"?
As an example of this in another area---take the statements of our President as a young Senator concerning the threats of surveillance against the public and now how he supports with a determination that even worries Europeans surveillance against the public.
Now you have an entire generation of vets who fought for one thing and then at home "realized" reality---actually far different than say VN vets who "knew" the truth the moment they set foot in VN.
I recently saw a long film on a 2006 music tour done by Crosby Stills Nash and Young which was against the war---you should have heard the views expounded by those that were turned off by the messaging and left the concert---literally all the comments that the author alludes to.
This was 2006 when everything was going south in Iraq and the press was open about what was going on---it would be now interesting to re-interview those individuals and see now what they comments might be.
We as a population are quick to follow the Flag but really slow to challenge the Flag although foreign policy being carried is supposedly in our name.
I really do think the all volunteer force is the problem as a majority of Americans have simply no contact to the military thus do not have any "skin in the game" thus are willing to follow the Flag regardless what the Flag is saying---again this is what the author is really saying
My question now is how will these turned off vets act in the coming years--privately and publicly?
We are seeing some of their problems now--a recent example from 2012-- a senior NCO from a Cav unit who had fought in the Diyala river valley Thunder Runs in 2005/2006 comes home and after having alcohol problems suddenly shots and kills his wife and then kills himself in 2012.
What I think is that he fought for something as the author alludes to---came home and "saw" what the author is talking about and in private and in silence fell apart as it is hard as a professional soldier in the active service to actually "challenge" your own existence privately and professionally.
The military knows this issue and yet says and does nothing to counter it outside of mandated training classes which absolutely do not discuss what the author is writing about.
"We have lost our collective ability to win a war as well as the strength of character to accept defeat."
Outlaw 09:
That was a good article. But I think the question he asked is bigger than does it apply to this war or that one. It applies to all wars, victories or losses, especially on an individual level. Did my son, brother, husband, cousin, father, best friend etc die for something or for nothing? I don't think that question can ever be answered to full satisfaction. For example, RAF Coastal Command carried out an interdiction campaign against German coastal shipping from the beginning to the end of the war. At the beginning of the campaign they could just put up a handful of Blenheim bombers. Those guys got slaughtered and had just about zero effect on the the shipping. At the end of the war they were putting up flocks of Beaufighters and Mosquitos that ravaged the shipping. So were the deaths of those Blenheim crews in vain? Were the deaths of the Beaufigher and Mosquito crews in vain if they died when the war was near its end? I don't know. The best I think you can do is say they died doing their duty. And like the author said we have take care in sending them out.
The author also said this:
"We have lost our collective ability to win a war as well as the strength of character to accept defeat."
That is a very scary thought.
I think that everyone needs to read over on Tom Rick's Best Defense FP blog the following article written by a former Ranger officer who served a number of times in Iraq and THEN reread the Gates book from end to end.
The article should be mandatory reading for every American who did not serve in the military and who did not have the luxury of serving in Iraq or AFG---it should as well be mandatory reading by every member of Congress as well as it goes to the heart of what a number of writers here have said in varying ways over the last year here at SWJ.
This type of writing must come out of the Iraqi and AFG vets more frequently or the American population will never learn what their responsibility was/is in the actions taken by the US supposedly in their name since 9/11 in both Iraq and AFG.
One of the most heart felt personal critiques I have recently read and it goes back to many of the comments voiced here in SWJ by a previous SWJ Editor---Mike Few.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/15/yes_marcus_they_did_die…
Bill C:
I also said in the very next sentence after the one you quoted "Who we elect can influence the course of the country's actions in furtherance or in opposition to the President's wishes, which is exactly as it should be." Check it, you'll see it right there. Now given the structure of the sentence and its place in the paragraph I figured people would understand that I meant the mid term election in which we elect representatives and senators. But for those of you who didn't, I meant the mid term elections in which we elect representatives and senators.
So Mr. Gates gave us citizen voters some valuable information regarding the way the people in the executive branch are operating. We can use that information to make our decision on which candidate for representative or senator to vote for. We can ask them "Are you for or agin' what those guys are doing?". And depending upon how they answer and how we figure 'those guys' should be doing things we can decide how to vote. Representatives and Senators have some say in these matters you see. Maybe not a lot, but some.
Carl:
You said:
"Mr. Gates in my view is doing his fellow citizens a great service by giving us information that we need to make informed political decisions, one of which is whom to vote for in the next election."
I do not think that anyone can vote for President Obama in the next election, even if they wanted to.
So, by your comment here:
a. Are you suggesting that former Sec. Gates meant to blame, and therefore to tar, the Democrats as a whole for the President's actions/inactions? Or
b. Are you suggesting that these recent revelations by former Sec. Gates should be understood as his (Gates') opening gambit re: running for President in 2016 himself?
Bill C:
The authority of the office of the President is a constitutional authority. It resides in the office, not the man. As long as the Constitution holds, the authority holds.
That Constitution was created to serve us the people. By it we elect a fellow citizen to an office. This office is granted certain powers and privileges that that citizen can exercise while in office. One thing that is not a privilege is freedom from criticism or freedom from having actions, decisions and motivations questioned. Mr. Gates in my view is doing his fellow citizens a great service by giving us information that we need to make informed political decisions, one of which is whom to vote for in the next election. Who we elect can influence the course of the country's actions in furtherance or in opposition to the President's wishes, which is exactly as it should be.
We didn't elect a king that we must blindly follow for four years. We elected a citizen who gets to live in the White House for a bit. Mr. Gates did a good thing. He told the truth as he saw it. We need a lot more of that.
We should consider whether former Sec. Gates -- in revealing his observations and opinions sooner rather than later -- has potentially done much more damage to the military, their families and our country as a whole by (1) discrediting the Commander-in-Chief publicly and, thereby, (2) undermining his (the CINC's) authority before the nation, our allies, our enemies and, most importantly, our troops; this, while he (the Commander-in Chief) is still in office and must (somehow and in spite of these observations/revelations) continue to lead the nation and command the troops for the next three years.
One would think that such a patriotic, reasonable and intelligent person as former Sec. Gates -- clearly understanding the consequences of his actions -- would not make such a horrible mistake and, instead, would put the needs of the troops, their families and the country as a whole above his own self-interest.
(In using the term "mistake" here, I am being hopefully optimistic. I would hate to think that former Sec. Gates would undermine the authority of the Commander-in-Chief -- before his troops, his nation, our allies and our enemies -- by design.)
It now falls to former Sec. Gates to, somehow, rectify this matter and correct this horrible mistake; if this is, indeed, even possible now.
Lacking this, then former Sec. Gates must hold himself responsible for any and all difficulties, dilemmas and disasters which may befall our forces, their families and our nation which can be directly traced to this grossly ill-timed and grossly irresponsible publication of his opinions/observations.
So John McCain, the consummate DC insider, thinks Mr. Gates should have waited to release information about other DC insiders until those insiders and that particular insider were gone and the information couldn't reflect badly upon them. What a surprise that Mr. McCain disapproves.
Speaking as a flyover person and citizen of these United States, the things Mr. Gates says, now, will help me make decisions about how I vote, now and in the near future. Mr. Gates, a private citizen, in saying what he apparently actually thinks is helping me and perhaps millions of other citizens. If Mr. McCain is miffed that the rules of the club were violated, e'....err, I scorn him.
John McCain says that Gates should have waited.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/12/john-mccain-robert-gates_n_458…
Move Forward:
The article you linked to said this "...but the determination to kill the F-22 was driven by other factors, said Moseley." but then it didn't say what the other factors were. That was left hanging. What I am interested in is what Gates thinks of his decision now now that the F-35 program is such a wreck. We'll never know I think.
Millions of hours of combat flying over the past 50 or 60 years means nothing at all when it comes to winning air battles. What counts is how much the individual pilots have been flying lately and what kind of flying they have been doing. I've read that the flying hours our guys get per year is down to something like 120. It used to be much higher than that. And the type of combat flying the fast jets have been doing since 2003 will be of no value at all if we tangle with another competent air force. Shows of force and driving around on station waiting for somebody to call won't impress the PLAAF.
This article answers a lot of your questions.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=…
The end of the article implies that the firing mainly resulted from nuclear screw-up such as transporting live weapons on B-52s and shipping nosecones to Taiwan. However, this quote from the article kind of says a lot about the quality of USAF leadership at that level in those days:
<blockquote>Tight budgets were not the real reason why Gates terminated the program, he said. “The money was there...We spent $50 billion on MRAPs [mine resistant ambush protected] trucks. We spent a large amount on unmanned aerial vehicles for every private first class and corporal,” Moseley said, and immediately added, “I'm being a little facetious but not much.”</blockquote>
In other words, Gen Moseley contends that the theoretical and unlikely probability of F-22 dogfighting against China or Russia (each deterred by nukes and having a handful of stealthy fighters and minimal combat flying experience vs our hundreds of stealth aircraft and millions of hours of combat flying) was more critical than the very real death toll of Soldiers and Marines in two real wars. There is character for you.
Well I saw Gates' book on the stand today and I looked up what he had to say about the F-22. There is was, two paragraphs that didn't say much at all. Then I looked up what he had to say about the F-35. Again, nothing much at all and nothing at all about the tidal wave of problems that airplane has had in the last few years. I think the date of last mention was 2010. I guess somebody will have to ask him directly if he thinks he got snookered by the claims of the F-35 people. Then again why bother? Judging by the book, the answer is predictable.
Something that I haven't seen covered in the stories about Gates' book is his decision to limit production of the F-22 to 183 planes and shut down the production line. In the long run that may be as important or more important to the fate of the nation than what effect he had on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that decision can be laid almost entirely at his feet. It is incorrect to say Gates' strategy in this land or that, but not incorrect to say Gates decided about the F-22. Now the fate of American airpower rides squarely on the shoulders of one aircraft type, the F-35. Those shoulders appear to be sloped, narrow, afflicted with rickets and things aren't getting any better.
For some reason Mr. Gates seems to have been sold a bill of goods on the F-35 and believed all the claims. It would be fascinating to hear how he made his decision and if he still believes in it. Mr. Gates is nobody's fool and yet he got fooled. How did that happen?
Omitting Rumsfeld’s name was an error of omission Having been a previous Secretary of Defense not long after a rather trying time for the military, having been a Navy Officer (fighter pilot) and (in the Reserves) later commanded a VS Squadron common sense should have led Rumsfeld to have understood the logistical magnitude that would be incurred occupying a country the size of Iraq. The apparent fact that someone with his military, government, and business background didn’t understand that the occupying U.S. forces were going to face a rather negative and violent Nationalistic based response due to their presence in a foreign land borders on the unbelievable, except everyone witnessed it live on t.v. From watching him on t.v. it (at least) appeared that once he politically lost control over the course of the occupation to Bremer he simply gave up and lost interest in what was occurring in that country
.
I see no reason to disagree with your (and others) noting that in his management of DOD, Gates “demonstrated a high degree of character and leadership,” and supported the troops – his organization’s staff. That, generally, is what “most” (not all) Executives in the government, the military, and in private business rationally do. It serves a purpose. After all, no Manager or Executive wants to lead a disgruntled or untrained / incapable organization – it takes up to much of your time. A little time seeing that your people are well taken care of provides an Executive the time to worry about the operational and strategic level issues they are paid to develop and implement and to concentrate on the budgets they need to prepare and administer.
Perhaps it is unfair to assess someone’s performance based on excerpts from publicly unavailable books, but as you noted -– it is just an opinion. My concern with Secretary Gates is that he like others created a mission statement and defined accompanying results that could be achieved by the U.S. military to give the aura of victory, or as he addressed the issue, “Fortunately, I believe my minimalist goals were achieved in Iraq and remain within reach in Afghanistan.” Minimalist goals that were a collection of striven for tactical results that was never going to provide lasting strategic success. It fooled no one around the world who could be counted among our current or future opponents. The U.S. was / is departing both Iraq and Afghanistan and just spending a few hundred more billions and losing more lives on the way out to produce a show – but for which audience?
We are the products of a Western culture that has ingrained in us a need to win -- at some level in every contest or to give it our all no matter the cost. For the six decades after the Korean War we have been militarily intervening on the continent of Asia – which goes from the Levant in the so called Middle East to Japan and the Philippines, And, with the exception of 1958 in Lebanon and the 1990 / 1991 Gulf War, the results generally were strategic failures for this nation.We are culturally oriented towards short term tactical wins while Asian peoples are culturally oriented toward long term strategic success. They see no shame in tactical defeats if that brings them closer to strategic success. They have the patience for the long term and don’t concern themselves with the cost. And, to add economic injury to military insult, due to the economic policies of our nation’s leaders we have out sourced our industrial base to Asia – and are ruining our country’s economic future.
It is Gates “apparent” lack of strategic understanding and guidance that disturbs me. It seems we have entered into another era of conflict with “planned” tactical results being achieved leading to unintended strategic failure. How much more of such results can this country absorb?
I don't know the proper behavioral path when one in the military finds themselves tasked with carrying out a failed strategy. Sometimes I believe as I thought during the 1960's and 70's as a Navy Officer, that in the end you go along even if you believe the path is flawed because you agreed to follow orders, else discipline breaks down and the organization deteriorates. Much older, long retired, and certainly not in uniform anymore -- and while not necessarily wiser and perhaps more conflicted, given the freedom of expressing one's thoughts without being mutinous I am reminded of the career ending actions of Admiral James O Richardson in 1941. He commanded the Pacific Fleet when President Roosevelt ordered it to Pearl Harbor for the purpose of intimidating the Japanese. Admiral Richardson traveled to D.C., told FDR the Japanese were not going to be in the least intimidated by what they knew was a rather weak U.S. Fleet, and informed him that the Navy could not successfully defend Pearl Harbor against a surprise attack. FDR rejected the Admiral's arguments, so he went to Congress. FDR afterwards relieved Richardson of his command and the rest is history. I am not a conspiracy enthusiasts at all, but it is a factual story. Although, his story is known by Navy Officers, Richardson never went to the press and never wrote a book. He was of the Old School in one sense, but not in the other.
Bill M:
"In your view what would a win have looked like for us in Iraq?"
I've been thinking on this so it took me some time to get back.
First, an Iraq that won't threaten its neighbors as it used to. That we managed to do.
Second, an Iraq that can get back into the world economy in an important way. That seems to be getting underway though far later than it should have happened.
Third, some would say an Iraq that won't be a satellite of Iran. I don't say that because I don't think that can happen. (Settle down there girls, I'll explain.) Iraq is Arab and Iran is Persian. I don't think an Arab country will ever be content to be Persian satellite. That is not to say that Iran won't have some influence, especially if Shia Iraqis can get the Iranians to give them money to use to further their political ambitions in Iraq, but that influence can only go so far because they're Persians.
Fourth, and this is the one we fell down badly on, an Iraq where things are better economically, freer, safer and more secure for the individual Iraqi than before. Notice I didn't say a working western style democracy but richer, freer and safer. I think that was a possible outcome. Your comment about us wanting to be PC instead of correct applies here. It may still happen but the chances would have been much better if we had played our cards better. It would have been hard, for as you say, it was a sick, sick society and that is a low place to start from. I should add that for part of Iraq and some of the Iraqis, Kurdistan and the Kurds, we did win.
Whatever UW training we gave to the Saddam's forces meant nothing in my opinion. Those guys knew all about clandestine sneaking around, far more than us. I remember reading here on SWJ somewhere a while back about how after we came in the secret police, military and party guys just reoriented their activities and started up against us pretty quick. We didn't even know it. I remember reading in the first year all sorts of puzzlements about who were those guys and where did they come from so quick. They were guys like you who just did their jobs against different people and without the uniform.
Such a sad story about that guy you talked too. I always wondered about the people who actually pulled the trigger.
Carl,
We both have a passion for winning, and I hope most Americans do, especially when it comes to war. However, when President Bush shifted the goal from removing Saddam (fairly easy task) to establishing a democracy and a stable Iraq winning seemed to be beyond reach as local dynamics soon overwhelmed any larger idealist objectives. In hindsight I think we could have maintained a much higher degree of stability in Iraq if we established another authoritarian government, but we're too concerned with being politically correct versus being correct.
I do agree that once Bush reasserted his authority and directed more energy into Iraq the situation definitely got better (sad he never did that for Afghanistan), but it was nothing more than a temporary victory that could only be held in place with a considerable level of coercive power. As demonstrated, when that coercive power was removed local dynamics would again unfold in ugly ways that would result in a high degree of instability. I'm not convinced staying longer would have made much of a difference.
Yes you're darn right Saddam killed tens of thousands over the years, he also had to employ coercive power to hold the false nation of Iraq together. Yes we were initially welcomed, but that welcome faded over the years when we were seen as the source of the problems.
Unfortunately I did see some of the mass graves, and interviewed some of the Iraqis involved in the mass killings. Those soldiers, at least the ones I spoke to, carried a heavy sense of guilt for their acts, but they acted out of fear of what Saddam would do to them if they didn't do it. It was a sick, sick society. One particular story from a broken man on Quday ordering them to kill three kids in Shia village that ran through their lines was especially sad. One soldier refused and Quday had him killed, then shot the children himself. Suspect there wasn't much hesitation after that. Why the soldiers didn't turn their guns on Quday and kill him is and isn't hard to understand.
It is important to remember that we turned a blind eye in the 80s to Saddam's behavior, and in many ways encourage it because he supported our goal in the Middle East of containing Iran. Of course we also sold weapons to Iran to get the Hezbollah to release U.S. hostages in Lebanon. In hindsight our policy of encouraging Saddam to act as he did (oppressing his Shia population to check Iran, and targeting the Kurds because of them were supported by Iran) is a shameful part of our history, but I guess if you take the emotion out of it then it may be viewed as practical? I can't verify this, but there are open source reports that we even provided unconventional warfare training to Saddam's elite forces. Why? We were scared the Iranians were going to win, so if the government fell it was our hope the Iraqis would continue to resist using UW to limit Iran's influence. Makes you wonder if that training came back to bite us in the butt?
I think this video is a little over the top, but overall it seems accurate.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qkswer28xpk
In your view what would a win have looked like for us in Iraq?
Bill M:
Sorry Bill, my history isn't deeply flawed on this one. Before the takfiri killers made their way into the picture Iraq was run, as in they were the government, by Iraqi army, police and Baathist killers. They killed a lot of people, a lot of people. I talked to a guy once who worked as a forensic archeologist and helped dig up mass graves filled Saddam's victims. He told some heart breaking stories. You, I figure probably saw some of those sites. So when we showed up we put a stop to that and a very many Iraqis were glad that we came to do it. Then of course we proceeded to foul things up completely and in walk the takfiri killers.
I figure one of the reasons that happened has to do with your comment about Presidential leadership. I get that from reading an interview Joel Wing did with Peter Mansoor at Musings on Iraq and from something Joel said on the Council Iraq Catch-all thread under the Middle East category. From all that I got that there wasn't much Presidential leadership at all until things really fell apart in 2006. Mr. Bush thought he shouldn't micro=manage and leave it mostly to subordinates, the Pentagon and the services. The trouble with that was Mr. Rumsfeld and crew, and the multi-stars were fundamentally disloyal. Mr. Bush wanted to win and the Pentagon and the multi-stars didn't, they just wanted out. As long s Mr. Bush wasn't paying attention those two groups sort of went their own way, their hidden agendas driving their actions. Our policy and actions in Iraq just sort of drifted.
Than 2006 came and forced Mr. Bush to wake up and take charge. Which he did. He began to take charge, give orders, talk to Malaki, more troops came in, the Baghdad belts were recognized and the boffo team of Petreaus and Crocker was installed (notice I said 'team') etc, the etc to include Mr. Gates coming in. All sorts of things began to happen and the situation improved dramatically. So from this I conclude that getting wrapped around the axle over 'COIN' or 'CT' or 'cointras' or 'coindinistas' didn't matter much. What mattered was that strong was leadership finally exercised by Mr. Bush who knew what he wanted, to win. Things then improved.
All that stands to reason because when you think about it, the terrs in Iraq were actually pretty weak. They didn't have any strong unifying ideology, they had no contiguous sanctuary where they could operate openly, some of them wore out their welcome very quickly amongst the locals and there were huge forces arrayed against them, both Iraqi and American. Perhaps they did as well as they did for as long as they did because we bumbled around so much until Mr. Bush got his act together.
CBCalif,
I generally agree with the intent of your posts if not all the details, but find much to disagree with on this one. The last sentence first, why didn't you list Rumsfeld, a McNamara protégé, in your list of least competent SECDEF's? That provides the context, because Gate's inherited a crap sandwich from Don and Dick's arrogant beyond belief strategy for dealing with the Iraq problem. After we were in the throes of failure Gates stepped up to the plate, and agree or disagree with his support for the COIN strategy (I don't), he demonstrated a high degree of character and leadership. It is hard to assess his competence in my opinion when he is asked to support a policy that flawed from the get go, as you pointed out, but he did much to support the troops who were asked to do the impossible. As one of those troops I have a high degree of respect for him and his service.
We tend to agree that the COIN approach was flawed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, so in my opinion, and we all have a couple, I think the VP may have been right about pursuing more of CT focused strategy to protect our interests instead of spending billions and thousands of lives attempting to build nations in the image of the West. The fact that the President didn't have much faith in the Afghanistan strategy proposed by the military demonstrates leadership also. Since when do Presidents have to blindly conform to the wishes of their commanders? Lincoln sure as hell didn't.
Carl's history is deeply flawed when it comes to Iraq, the AQ killers weren't active in Iraq until we opened the door for them by removing Saddam who saw AQ as a threat as much, if not more, than we did. The same holds true for Assad.
The history of these conflicts will be interpreted in a hundred different ways, and each interpretation will be at least partially true.
CBCalif:
You sir, are a gentleman. You disregarded my sarcasm and penned a nice reply. Good job.
Sec Gates may indeed be like every other politically powerful leader, or not. And every politically powerful leader may not be at all like the others, or they may be. Yours is a blanket statement that has no basis at all in fact, it is just a string of suppositions tied together to form an opinion. That opinion may be perfectly true, or not.
There are people who like it when the Americans show up. In Vietnam lots and lots of anti-communist Vietnamese liked it and they were very sad when the Americans stopped helping them fight off the communists. Same thing in Afghanistan. Lots and lots of Afghans were very pleased when the Americans showed up and helped kick out the Taliban. They could fly kites again which is fun. (Anybody ever figure how Taliban & Co are sort of like General Order No. 1? Both prohibit fun.) Same thing in Iraq even. Lots and lots of people liked it when Saddam left. They didn't like it so much when we fubar'd the place though.
Gates had a hand in what happened in various places, but so did many, many others. It wasn't 'Gates' strategy', it was ours. Maybe Gates should have told Mr. Bush what you think he should have told him, if that was his opinion. But maybe it wasn't and he saw his duty differently.
I think perhaps many, maybe most parents who lose sons in wars figure their son's life was wasted. War is waste, almost by definition. The tragic sight of parents whose son's lives may have been wasted and who will never ever come back hasn't changed from the Battle of the Wabash to the Battle of the Crater to Task Force Smith to now.
I think you are confusing Asian wiliness with American stupidity. Defeats occur as much, maybe more because of one side's idiocy than the winning sides acumen. Our efforts of the past few decades are cases in point. In Vietnam we never cut the trail, allowed inviolable sanctuary to exist and never even mined Haiphong harbor till the very end. In Iraq we went in way too light and bumbled around for years until Mr. Bush finally decided to take charge. In Afghanistan we refused and refuse to see who the main enemy is, we finance the main enemy and allow inviolable sanctuary...again. You don't have to be very smart to beat the Americans it seems. And you are right about us underestimating our opponents. The genii inside the beltway act as if our opponents are stumps and we can get away with being impossibly stupid. Then they wonder why we didn't do so well. They never look in the mirror so they figure a. nobody on earth could have won that war or b. the opponent was just brilliant, brilliant. A. and B. keep them from having to face the fact that they were stupid.
Carl: sarcasm ignored, and one might try sunglasses or shaded lens if they are worried about facial lines -- or so I read.
Sec Def Gates is like every other (current or previous) politically powerful leader -- they want to go down in the history books as the great success story. That is what psychologically drives them, and the love of power. There is nothing wrong with that attitude as after all somebody has to take leadership positions. That is what motivates them, else why write books about oneself.
I spent a few minutes as a Navy Officer and witnessed this country's debacle in Vietnam first hand, more than on one instance. I spent (for whatever reason) time on patrol with the National Police of an Asian Nation. I saw first hand how they dealt with their people, but that was not my business -- it was their country and they weren't going to be interested in some Yank's opinion, nor should they be. Locals always tell heavily armed men in a dictatorship what they want to hear. They are not stupid. Ever witness the police of an American supported dictator torture someone because they didn't like their attitude? That is what motivates occupied people to tell you how much they like your presence.
As Gates is reported to have noted, his objective was to achieve minimal strategic success so the U.S. (in his opinion) looked good globally or something to that effect. Gates should have told Bush he created strategic disasters and it was time to go.
I haven't met a parent or sibling of an American KIA in Iraq (and unfortunately I know too many from where I live) who thought their sons lives were other than wasted. The parents of the dead do not worship at the alter of team spirit.
Too many Americans think we are superior, smarter, and more capable than the Asians -- when it comes to conducting war on their continent. That is why the West has consistently strategically failed in that arena post-WWII. It is their land and their culture, and yes Giap and Company kicked this country's butt -- not by winning tactical battles, but by being strategically smarter. We are loosing in (Southwest) Asia once again because one more (or two more) times we are underrating our opponent. We need to get out and stay the hell out of there. And whatever goes on between their various sects, peoples, etc is their business -- not America's. Unless we have another trillion dollars or two to waste.
Gates was politically powerful to all but Congressmen; but his approaches to conducting war in Iraq and Afghanistan produced / will produce strategic failures. Call my vision of that result truth or arrogance, but that won't change the coming end result. I know that upsets his supporters. If you have the time, I suggest watching "This is What Winning Looks Like" on YouTube. See what is really going on there.
CBCalif:
You do seem to know something about arrogance so I guess your comments concerning that subject should be heeded.
A couple of comments.
Maybe Gates had a very heightened sense of duty and he stayed on in a job he hated because he figured by doing so he could keep some guys alive who might otherwise have died. Come to think of it, he said as much. So maybe his motivations went beyond career satisfaction.
And from what I've read there were a lot of people in both Afghanistan and Iraq who were quite glad at times that heavily armed American troops were around, they figured apparently that they were less likely to have their throats cut by takfiri killers with those troops around. That of course doesn't conform with certain views delivered from on high but those people were sort of simple.
And then of course we have that old reliable, 'the wily Giap' argument. And a very powerful one it is too, if you overlook things like sanctuaries and copious amounts of military and financial aid provided by powerful nation states. But then life is much simpler if you don't see the sun in the sky, you won't get facial lines from squinting.
There are multiple comments purportedly appearing in Gate’s book (according to the NY Times) that indicate not only was he poorly suited for the Cabinet position of Secretary of Defense at the strategic awareness level, they also demonstrate he neither understand the cultural nature of the conflicts in which the US was engaged during his tenure nor understood this country’s [often chosen] opponents in Asia (sorry Captain Mahan) strategy for successfully competing militarily against the U.S. His comments show that while our selected opponents have taken our measure, many of our leaders such as Gates know not their opponents.
On the issue of mental suitability for the position, I am reminded of my father (who retired in 1967 after three decades in the Navy) once telling me that he knew the precise day he would put in for retirement. In response I asked him for that date. His response was that day would arrive when he began to question the bull…. he accepted and unquestionably put up with as part of the military, the day when he began to think why am I putting up with this nonsense instead of simply realizing it was part of life in that (or actually any) organization. Gates stayed too long, became an angry man, and his comments and (often poorly chosen) revelations, or perhaps just his visions or views of events, confirm that perspective.
Second -- and while some may view this as controversial, at least in my opinion, Gates does not realize that at the “strategic” level the U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan could not, would not, and will not produce any sustainable results worth their cost. And worse, the strategy and tactics the U.S. employed in those costly protracted efforts once again demonstrated to the world (“globally”) that “Giap and Ho Chi Minh’s” formula for strategically succeeding against the militaries of Western Nations such as the U.S. remains viable. As the pair realized, simply understand that while a weaker native people’s guerrilla force (now rather arrogantly called insurgents on the part of Euro-Americans) cannot at the tactical level successfully compete with the firepower of America forces, they can outlast them so simply be patient, accept tactical defeats, run up the cost in lives and dollars for the Americans, and keep your countrymen aware that the government and military being left behind by the Western occupiers is a “foreign created,” (i.e. in Western terms a Quisling) one; and one day U.S. forces will depart and the moral, strategic and tactical momentum will belong to the anti-foreign occupier “insurgents.”
There are political and military variations of the “Giap” approach to combating Western military interventions and occupations which we witnessed it in Iraq and are observing it taking place in Afghanistan.
Gates is reported as having written that, “But if I had learned one useful lesson from Iraq, it was that progress depended on security for much of the population. …. That is why I continue to believe that the troop increase that Obama boldly approved in late 2009 was the right decision —- providing sufficient forces to break the stalemate on the ground, rooting the Taliban out of their strongholds while training a much larger and more capable Afghan army.”
One need go no further than these arrogant views to realize why this country politically is so despised across the world. Anyone who believes inserting heavily armed foreign troops into another people’s country is going to be perceived by that population as providing them security understands nothing about how people view living under military occupation and the hostility it breeds. Anyone that believes that the American created Afghanistan Army is capable need only spend some time watch (on YouTube) the 90 minute of so presentation titled “This is What Winning Looks Like.” See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ja5Q75hf6QI.
Demonstrating the art of self deception, and indicating someone totally out of touch with reality, Gate’s is reported by the New York Time as Stating “Fortunately, I believe my minimalist goals were achieved in Iraq and remain within reach in Afghanistan.” True, he probably believes that, but that doesn’t make his belief anything more than self deception.
When it comes to defining and basing success on statistically reported strategically meaningless data and trends the Gate's / Petraeus Model is as invalid as was the McNamara / Westmoreland Model. It will produce similar strategic failures. If he doubted the Gate's / Petraeus strategy would not succeed.
President Obama was correct to doubt the viability of that strategy. However, by failing to NOT adopt it, by failing to fire those two and replacing them (at any point in time), he sadly demonstrated his lack of executive / management ability, and that failure requires that he also will carry the blame for this country’s strategic debacle along with Bush, Gates, and Petraeus. Further, that lack of executive ability also explains why this country’s economy remains a shamble – despite the [de facto misunderstood or perhaps more appropriately inaccurate] results reported from application of the Clinton created BLS U-3 statistical model.
Gates, McNamara, Louis Johnson were among the most incompetent Secretaries of Defense whom held that position.