Small Wars Journal

The Future of Counterterrorism: Fewer Drones, More Partnerships

Sat, 10/19/2013 - 12:47am

The Future of Counterterrorism: Fewer Drones, More Partnerships by Linda Robinson, Washington Post.

The use of drone strikes against terrorist targets has become one of the most controversial aspects of President Obama’s national security efforts. Critics on the left have called Obama the “drone president,” and even the celebrated 16-year-old Pakistani activist, Malala Yousafzai, chided him in the White House recently, telling him that “drone attacks are fueling terrorism.”

Yet drones are just one of three principal U.S. counterterrorism tools, and not necessarily the most important. Special Operations forces are now relying on a more balanced mix of tactics: Launching raids and developing partner forces offer more versatility than drone strikes and will probably become the wave of the future as America’s big wars wind down…

Read on.

Comments

Madhu (not verified)

Sun, 10/20/2013 - 11:55am

<blockquote>From September to December 2008, a team of US Special Forces trainers is based in Abbottabad, Pakistan, ironically less than one mile from the compound Osama bin Laden is hiding in at the time. The trainers are in Abbottabad as part of an unpublicized mission to train Pakistani Frontier Corps forces. The training takes place in Kakul Military Academy, Pakistan’s equivalent of the US’s famous West Point military academy. The training is later moved to Warsak, Pakistan.</blockquote>

http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=united_states_special_f…

Partnering is important and I think it's the right thing to do. Better than big occupations, anyway.

Just know your emotional and psychological Achilles heals and pay close attention to those within the American system that have curious reasons for promoting partnerships, especially contractors, government departments with funding needs such as intelligence agencies and USAID/State, ideologues, the naive and well-meaning, the military industrial complex, and so on. Goes for all of our relationships, the Saudis, the Chinese, the Atlanticists, Israel, the Indian diaspora, you name it, just so you don't think I'm singling out any one relationship. It's the balancing act that I am thinking about. Difficult, I know. Nothing can be perfect.

I can be as difficult toward the Indians as I am about Americans and our complicated foreign policy connections. Disclaimer because I know why people dismiss my arguments sometimes without realizing why they are doing it, immigrants are often judged in this way. I suppose we all judge each other, often without realizing it. I'm not complaining, I am trying to learn to be more analytical. That is why I like this site:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=150061#post150061

Dave Maxwell

Sat, 10/19/2013 - 11:43am

Terrorism is not the only threat in the world and the myopic focus on it will make us miss the forest for the trees.

But it is good of Linda to point out a key fact that there are 33,000 uniformed SOF rather the numbers that the press and pundits typically say that USSOCOM is 60,000 and growing to 71,000 personnel. But we should recall that the actual number of actual "operators" e.g., Special Forces (Green Berets) SEALs, Special Warfare Combatant Crewmen, Rangers, Marine Special Operations Teams, Combat Controllers and Special Tactics Teams, Special Operations Aviators (Army and Air Force) and the National Mission Force are far fewer than those 33,000 uniformed military mentioned below as a large number are so-called enabling capabilities and of course staff.

Quote: "Today, Special Operations forces are engaged in some level of partnering in more than 70 countries, with an increasing focus on joint operations — or even raids conducted mainly by partners with a supporting U.S. role — to capture or kill terrorists. The bulk of America’s 33,000 uniformed Special Operations forces, including the most elite units, will be engaged in partnering, but need time to develop their partners’ combat skills and intelligence capacity." End Quote

I reviewed a report recently that was all about "partnering." (it is just another example of our penchant for buzzwords and making up new terms.) I reviewed JP 1-02 (DoD Dictionary) and JP 3-22 (Foreign Internal Defense) and found that the only definition of partner is "partner nation:'A nation that the United States works with in a specific situation or operation. Also called PN.” I mention this because there are so many different uses of partner; from the official definition as stated above to the idea that partnering includes force ratios between US and partner units (e.g. some define "partnering" as a 1 for 1 ration of US to host nation unit while others say that an infantry unit must be partnered with an infantry unit and SOF unit partnered with only SOF units and many more). The use of partner is open to myriad interpretations.

Lastly, I have to continue to call attention to this:

Quote "Most significant, after years of focusing on unilateral drone strikes and raids, U.S. Special Operations forces have regained a critical skill set of working with local populations, as they did in Vietnam, where they raised thousands of civil defenders in the central highlands. This is a highly transferable tool; many troubled countries have vast rural areas where terrorists find ready sanctuary, and lending a helping hand to those who find the courage to fend off attackers is one of the most productive uses of our Special Operations forces. It relieves the United States of the burden of doing so or intervening abruptly in a crisis." End Quote

First, major parts of SOF, to include Special Forces have not solely focused on unilateral strikes and raids since 9-11 and have not had to "regain" this critical skill. That is a misrepresentation of major parts of SOF (to include Special Forces, Civll Affairs, and Psychological Operations forces both in Afghanistan and Iraq and around the world). Furthermore, although Linda does not specifically state this (though it is implied by the "highly transferable tool" comment) one of the explanatory comments in recent months about the Global SOF Network has been that we can establish Village Stability Platforms such as we have in Afghanistan in other countries around the world. I agree that the skills are transferable but it is a poor strategic communications message to say that we are going to do in other countries in Asia or Africa or Latin America as we are doing in Afghanistan. Many countries will be put off by and even very resistant to such proposals and it is not necessary because the regional SOF experts from the Theater Special Operations Commands already know what are the appropriate missions for US SOF in each unique country based on on the ground assessments of the situation and long time relationships. The idea that we will take what we have done in Afghanistan and simply transplant it to another country illustrates our "Jominian tendencies" that reside in some SOF HQ and organizations of trying to apply templates and checklists and the belief that the same principles apply universally in every situation. But I digress.