SOCOM at 30 Has Evolved Into a Small Command With a Big Global Impact
SOCOM at 30 Has Evolved Into a Small Command With a Big Global Impact by Howard Altman, Tampa Bay Times
It was born out of deadly failure and evolved into an organization that other nations seek to emulate, a command that accounts for a fraction of the Pentagon's budget but a large measure of how the world sees the U.S. military.
This week, U.S. Special Operations Command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, turns 30.
Created by Congress in the wake of Operation Eagle Claw, the disastrous attempt to rescue American hostages from Iran in 1980, SOCom opened its doors at MacDill on April 16, 1987. It was an attempt to coordinate the work of military services that all did things differently.
Up until the terrorist attacks of 9/11, SOCom was a relatively sleepy, train-and equip organization. In 2001, SOCom had about 43,000 people and a budget of about $3 billion. After 9/11, as the role of special operations forces in the fight against jihadis expanded, the command experienced dramatic growth. Today, it has 70,000 people and a budget of more than $10 billion.
About 8,700 commandos are serving in about 100 countries, with more than half of them — 4,400 — in the MacDill-based region that's the responsibility of MacDill-based U.S. Central Command. This includes Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Seeing the success of U.S. special operations, representatives from foreign militaries are traveling to Tampa to see how they can recreate such a powerful force. One that offers great bang for the buck. SOCom makes up just 2 percent of U.S. defense budget.
The symbol of commando success is the 2011 Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden. Yet every day, in ways unknown outside their secretive world, commando teams perform missions like building partner capacity and training foreign troops, hostage rescue attempts, humanitarian relief, tracking jihadi financing and coordinating efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.
Unlike any other military combatant commands, SOCom has the authority to spend billions of dollars each year on equipment and services tailored for commandos — the SEALs, Army Delta Force, Green Berets and Rangers, and Air Force and Marine teams. To help speed things along, the command created SOFWerx, a research and development effort in Ybor City…
Just as an aside a part of the history that is not reported is that in 2015 some 28 years after the establishment of USSOCOM the first unconventional warfare doctrine was published (which the Joint Staff promptly made it For Official Use Only (FOUO)). And of course there has never been a career Special Forces officer who has commanded USSOCOM. I only mention this since special operations evolved from the foundational mission of psychological warfare and unconventional warfare and Special Forces is the largest operational element in special operations. Just saying.
Given the failure of our “soft power” recently (the appeal of the Western way of life, way of governance, values, etc.), then might we say that THIS is the reason why (a) unconventional warfare, indeed, might be the order of the day going forward and thus why (b) a career Special Forces officer might, indeed, need to command USSOCOM?
Explanation:
First, from Bill M. below:
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The communists were more sophisticated in their use of UW. They focused on political organizing (setting conditions before they waged armed conflict) …
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As we know, during the Old Cold War, the Soviets/the communists were, much like the U.S./the West today, engaged in “revolutionary war.” That is, a war to transform other states and societies more along one’s own, unusual and unique (and thus often alien and profane), political, economic, social and value lines.
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Revolutionary warfare is never confined within the bounds of military action. Because its purpose is to destroy an existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new structure, any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social, and psychological.
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http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20… (See Page 6.)
Thus, it was as per their “revolutionary war” requirements (transforming other states and societies more along Soviet/communist lines), that the Soviets/the communists engaged in UW. (I guess the Soviets/the communists then, unlike the U.S./West recently, were not so naive as to believe in such things as “universal values?”)
In this regard, let us look at what, in order to achieve their ends (a) the Soviets/the communists actually did and, indeed, (b) what it appears we — with the obvious U.S./Western changes — must be prepared to do also?
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Among the techniques used to implement revolutionary warfare strategy and to attain their goals, the selection of cadre, organization, deification of the masses and psychological impregnation are the most important. Leaders, speakers, propagandists, activities, organizers, officers, volunteers and others are trained. Revolutionary cells are established to control different circles and organized groups in all sections of society. Parallel communists hierarchies are organized starting with the cell of a local committee to the central communist party. This becomes the party’s invisible machine by which unions, sport, and cultural associations, veteran societies and others are controlled. The conflict embraces all segments and groups of society and, in fact, is concerned with every single aspect of social activity. It is and must be a fight for the minds of the people. That side which is victorious in this aspect of the struggle is virtually assured ultimate victory.
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https://www.jstor.org/stable/1034145?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (See Page 79.)
Colonel Bjelajac, the author of the quoted item immediately above, thus noted:
“The offensive employment of unconventional warfare to extend political and strategic positions has been almost solely weapon of the Sino-Soviet bloc in the Cold War.”
Thus, to suggest that — should the U.S./the West wish to achieve its “revolutionary war” political and strategic goals today and in the future — in the “soft power deficit” conflict environment that we appear to be in now — then we will also:
a. Need to adopt the offensive employment of unconventional warfare –as per COL Bjelajac above? And, thus,
b. As per Bill M. above, better “set the conditions” for the political, economic, social and value “transformations” — of other states and societies — that we desire? All this suggesting that:
1. Unconventional warfare will play a much larger role in our strategic future and that, accordingly,
2. A career Special Forces officer may come to command USSOCOM?