By Andrew Exum
I have a few questions for the learned readership of Small Wars Journal. The first is, how many of you have ever looked up the official Department of Defense definition for 'Information Operations?'
According to JP 3-13, Information Operations, the term is defined as "the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own."
I am confident there exist more confusing definitions in the U.S. military lexicon, but surely there cannot be too many. In effect, the Department of Defense has taken the term 'information operations' as understood by cyberwarfare types and mashed it together with the term 'information operations' as understood by those of us waging wars of narratives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The resulting confusion has left us with a definition that tries to be everything to everyone while at the same time leaving us with a shoddy definition to communicate what we're talking about as counter-insurgency theorist-practitioners when we use the term.
As Frank Hoffman has noted, one of the deficiencies in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency is the lack of any real, in-depth discussion of IO. On the once hand, our operational designs imply that all lines of operations -- combat operations, the training of host nation security forces, governance, etc. -- rest upon effective IO. It follows, as Hoffman writes, that "something that is 'critical' should merit more than three pages of succinct comments."
I found it really interesting to note, though, the different ways in which IO are discussed in the old FM 3-0, Operations (from 2001) and the latest edition of FM 3-0 (published earlier this year). In the old manual, IO are discussed within the context of cyberwarfare and net-centric warfare, noting the way in which IO enhance our situational awareness and knowledge of what's taking place on the battlefield. In the new edition of FM 3-0, by contrast, an entire chapter is devoted to something called "information superiority." And though the chapter more or less follows the JP 3-13 definition and discusses everything from psychological operations to surveillance and reconnaissance (honestly, what does one have to do with the other?), the passage offered at the beginning of the chapter alludes to something much different than IO as they're discussed in the old FM 3-0:
Be first with the truth. Since Soldier actions speak louder than what [public affairs officers] say, we must be mindful of the impact our daily interactions with Iraqis have on global audiences via the news media. Commanders should communicate key messages down to the individual level, but, in general, leaders and Soldiers should be able to tell their stories unconstrained by overly prescriptive themes. When communicating, speed is critical—minutes and hours matter—and we should remember to communicate to local (Arabic/Iraqi) audiences first—U.S./global audience can follow. Tell the truth, stay inyour lane, and get the message out fast. Be forthright and never allow enemy lies to stand unchallenged. Demand accuracy, adequate context, and proper characterization from the media. (From Multinational Corps--Iraq Counterinsurgency Guidance, 2007)
This passage, of course, is drawn from the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq, and what it alludes to is our ability to control the narrative of the campaign and to counter the efforts of others -- the enemy; misinformed or biased media -- to do the same. But surely IO go beyond just that.
My challenge for this website's readers, then, is the following: what do we, as counter-insurgency theorists and practitioners, mean when we use the term "information operations?" Do we use IO as shorthand for psychological operations and message management? Obviously, our definition of IO is different from the definition officially in use. And I suspect our definition has more in common with the way Hizballah or the Taliban thinks about IO than the way in which the lexicographers of the Pentagon think about IO. (That, by the way, is a good thing.) So who out there can propose an alternate definition, and one which we can offer to those in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan? And is "information operations" even an appropriate term for that to which we're referring?
Andrew Exum is pursuing his doctorate in the Department of War Studies, King's College London. He served in the U.S. Army from 2000 to 2004, leaving active duty as a captain. He was decorated for valor in 2002 while leading a platoon of light infantry in Afghanistan. Subsequently, he led a platoon of Army Rangers into Iraq in 2003 and into Afghanistan in 2004. After leaving the Army, Exum earned a master's degree in Middle Eastern Studies at the American University of Beirut. In 2006-2007, he was a Soref fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he focused on contemporary Middle Eastern insurgencies and counter-insurgency strategies. He is the author of This Man's Army: A Soldier's Story from the Front Lines of the War on Terrorism (2005) and Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment (2006). Exum is also the founder of the counterinsurgency-related blog Abu Muqawama
Comments
an addition to the things mentioned above maybe to create a 1-hour per week radio and/or tv show that has americans and afghans interacting and talking, eating, dancing whatever...something showing the human side of all parties and interacting while being entertaining. i can guarantee you that if there was an insect eating competition in Dari afghan vs. americans - it would be very popular and a good laugh. i know this is not serious stuff and sounds ridiculous , but seriously think we have to invest in the lighter stuff as well.
Information operations abroad is all well and good and necessary, of course. But more fundamental to winning the war in Afghanistan, perhaps, is simply communicating well and accurately with the American people and with policymakers. The new Commanding General of Central Command, General James N. Mattis, made this point in a recent speech.
"The only way we can lose this war," he said, "is if we lose it in Paris and Brussels, in Berlin and Washington, if we lose it in the bars in Boston and the living rooms of Illinois. Thats where we would lose it."
So why not start with simply developing a coherent and accurate narrative for our own people? That might be the better place to start.
Hello Andrew,
Usually people tend to create definitions to "feel" their domain. According to me IO as a whole means that you are executing a behavourial approach toward an opponent. IO coordinates all kinetic and non-kinetic elements and relates them to the (very)short term effects and long term effects because all effects you like to achieve influences eachother.
According to me the intention of the IO officer is:
ââ¬Â¢ to bring all important members from the branches together on a permanent basis to discuss the input of information,
ââ¬Â¢ the fusion of this information with various subject matter experts,
ââ¬Â¢ to assess and analyze effects we like to achieve,
ââ¬Â¢ to provide recommendations on redirecting effects while performing,
ââ¬Â¢ to assess, analyze and measure effects and finally
ââ¬Â¢ to support decision makers with recommendations.
Let us say that an effect cycle represents:
- Short term: 2 months
- Mid term: 4 months
- Long term: > 4 months
Trying to create a better structure in which (recommendations for) decisions can be made, the IO officer coordinates recommendations to the chain of command related to the cycle as mentioned, and also to cover the very short term aspect. It answers the hunger for intelligence caused by an overload of information. The overload of information creates a lengthening in decision times. This overload creates confusion and friction. The coordination as mentioned can be excecuted in a Fusion Cell concept in which the IO officer will be able to mitigate the effects of an overload of information by coordinating the assessment of conflicts in a latent phase.
Members of a Fusion Cell should focus upon the end state and the objectives. The end state is a set of conditions that political/military leaders form the intervening powers and from the guest land want to achieve to resolve a conflict.
The Fusion Cell wants to coordinate and to synchronize effects on the (very)short term, mid term and long term.
The way how we like to do that can be a mix of kinetic and non kinetic.
The biggest challenge is the integration of the kinetic and the non kinetic part because, for instance, a gain on the very short term is of influence on the mid term.
In fact the biggest challenge in this is the military.
The military comfort zone is one of linear thinking and our eagerness to create visible achievements for we find changes in attitude and intrinsic motivation more the soft "tree hugging" side.
The mental change being the most important because mental changes within the population create reconsiderations on support for opponents. The operational environment has to be viewed in a behavioural context. The Fusion Cell members looks at all actors as complex, adaptive, interactive systems-of-systems in a behavioural context.
A behavioural approach in which the Fusion Cell relates to the population, the media and also to political, military, cultural, and economical aspects of a certain operational environment we are guests in or intervened in, considering:
1. The environment we operate in;
2. the (troop contributing) Western countries;
3. all countries which are in a certain way connected to the country we are guest in or intervened in.
One could say that pt 2 and 3 are not within our area of influence but they have to be taking into account as they form part of a chain reaction.
Also for these reasons it is important to have members of the non-kinetic and kinetic field being together on a permanent base in a Fusion Cell.
Effects are not stove piped they interact and are complementary to each other which is very much in contrast to the way linear military comfort zones are nourished. The very short term (< 2 months) can have a direct impact on the long term (> 4 months) so they have to be balanced related to a satisfactory end state.
Through interaction between the Fusion Cell members more sub effects and indicators will be derived from agreed lines of operation. "Out of the box" thinking will have to be encouraged at the expense of stove pipes, "fenced domains", personalities and comfort zones.
- All activities are connected to the several (non)kinetic delivering parts of our organization like Ops, InfoOps, PsyOps, Media, Plans, Intelligenge&Security, Cimic, the Visitors Bureau, Polad (combined homeland/guestland), Devad, Legad, IO, Tribal Expert (combined homeland/guestland), Cultural Advisor (combined homeland/guestland), Personal Affairs, Logistic Affairs, Engineers.
The visitors bureau also has an important task as they are related to the Triangle as mentioned in pt 1, 2 and 3.
In this way key leader engagements (foreign/national military/politicians), the leverage of key communicators (foreign/national military/politicians), ANSF, media, etc can be coordinated and synchronized in the latent phase so the challenge of influencing effects and the management of expectations can be coped with.
As we like to achieve as much as possible from a visit we need information about the agenda and the biography of the visitor.
As you see, in my opinion, IO is has to be seen in a broad context.
This is just a part of my vision about IO in an environment in which term like enemy, battlespace and line-staff are very discutable.
An out-of-the-box addition:
The current military organisation structure is tailored for symmetric warfare; equally organised elements (brigades, battalions, platoons) engaging each other according to a "military code". Essentially this is an old and symmetric way of thinking in which many of the military find themselves very comfortable. Conservative, dogmatic and stove-piped thinking is not related to rank, age or position.
An adapted way of acting asks for an adapted form of organisation. We have to relate to organisations as a system of systems, visualising synergetic effects by a balanced presence of sensors. An organisation where kinetic and non-kinetic elements are permanently joined together into a module gives input in the ability to learn (training, practising, performing their job) from each other. The effect will be complementary. Brigades, battalions and platoons are residues of the past, they relate to an enemy which we will not find at the coming battlefield in the potential conflict arena (republics bordering Russia - Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan - Middle East - Northern part of Africa). All these countries have the similarity that they are not able to withhold NATO forces for more than ten days. Up to ten days in the highest level of violence and after that in the dark space between peace-keeping and peace-enforcing with an undefined enemy, fighting in an arena without boundaries.