Former US Commanders Take Increasingly Dim View of War on ISIS
Former US Commanders Take Increasingly Dim View of War on ISIS by Mark Thompson, Time Magazine
It’s a most peculiar war: rarely has the U.S. been killing so many while risking so few. The U.S. is beating ISIS handily, judging by Vietnam’s body-count metric. The total number of ISIS battlefield deaths claimed by U.S. officials has jumped, from 6,000 in January 2015 to 45,000 last month—a bloodbath for an enemy force estimated to number about 30,000. Three U.S. troops have died. That’s an eye-watering U.S.-to-ISIS “kill ratio” of 15,000-to-1. “We’ve got good momentum going,” General Joseph Votel, chief of U.S. Central Command, who is overseeing the war, said Tuesday. “We are really into the heart of the caliphate.”
But some of his predecessors disagree. James Mattis, a retired Marine general who commanded Central Command from 2010 to 2013, says the war on ISIS is “unguided by a sustained policy or sound strategy [and is] replete with half-measures.” Anthony Zinni, a retired Marine four-star who held the same post from 1997 to 2000, says he doesn’t think he could do so today. “I don’t want to be part of a strategy that in my heart of hearts I know is going to fail,” he says. “It’s a bad strategy, it’s the wrong strategy, and maybe I would tell the President that he would be better served to find somebody who believes in it, whoever that idiot may be.”
Day after day, American warplanes, sometimes joined by allies, have been attacking individual ISIS targets, down to backhoes and foxholes. ISIS has lost 40% of its Iraqi territory, the Pentagon says, and 5% in Syria. It doesn’t seem to have lost any of the terrain it has staked out on the internet. That’s slow progress by a 27-state military alliance against a two-year-old rump state…
According to our own recorded count, which pales in comparison to that published by the North Vietnamese, we were responsible for the deaths of at least a million Vietnamese – and didn’t we once “pacify” most of South Vietnam when General Abrams was MACV. We certainly flew a large number of sorties over South and North Vietnam and dropped some rather large tonnage of bombs. We won didn’t we, just like we’ll win against ISIS – just keep those numbers coming – data counts in these types of wars, ask the loser Giap. He did loose, didn’t he.
It would be rather impressive to see an American General or Flag Officer actually turn down a command (which would end their career) because he (or now she) believes the strategy in place would fail. Given that with the exception of Gulf Wat I, Grenada, and the Panama Canal – almost every other military intervention we attempted strategically failed if that became the norm that would mean that the number of Flag Officers would drop radically. Oh, the side benefits.
All the dark humor aside, it is refreshing to hear even former Generals tell the truth and acknowledge that the Nation is on the course, once again, of strategic failure.
The distinction between the strategy employed in the Vietnam War then (the “more of almost everything” strategy?) and the strategy being employed in the Greater Middle East now (for the most part, the “less of almost everything” strategy?) would appear to be that:
a. Our “more of almost everything” strategy, used in Vietnam, looks to have PLAYED INTO our enemies’ “political attrition” strategy hand. Herein, providing that the significant losses that we would incur (blood, treasure, political capital, international reputation and support, public and politician support at home) — via such a strategy and over time — could not be sustained. This, providing that we:
1. Would have to leave the field of battle — and the fight — before the mission could be accomplished. And, ultimately, providing that we:
2. Would have to hand over these populations, and their lands, to our enemies.
b. Whereas our, now, for the most part, “less of almost everything” strategy, that we appear to be employing in the Greater Middle East today, this such strategy looks to be designed to DEFEAT our current enemies’ “political attrition” strategy. Herein, and in stark contrast to our “more of almost everything” strategy noted for Vietnam War above, our “less of almost everything” strategy looks to ensure that we will not — over time — incur anything near such significant losses as those that we suffered in the Vietnam War. (Again: blood, treasure, political capital, international reputation and support, public and politician support.) This providing that:
1. We might, THIS TIME — and via this “less of everything” strategy — be able to stay on the field of battle, and fight on there indefinitely, and until such time as the mission is accomplished. This, in turn, providing that:
2. We might, THIS TIME, not have to hand over these populations, and/or their lands, to our enemies.
Possible/Potential Bottom Line:
Immediate and decisive result? The winning of great battles?
Really not what our enemies’ — overall — “political attrition” strategy either envisions or is designed to achieve.
And, likewise, not our “anti/counter-political-attrition” strategy! (This, specifically, being what the American people, the pundits, the retired generals, etc., need to understand?)
Rather, both parties seek — via their respective strategies — to outlast the other; this, by retaining the support of their respective populations, and that of their allies and potential allies, over the significant term of this new “long war.”
(A war in which [a] the much more-powerful nations of the U.S./the West seek to transform the Greater Middle East — and elsewhere — more along modern western lines and [b] much weaker elements within the Greater Middle East — and elsewhere — seek to prevent this such transformation from happening/from occurring/from being realized?)
To Bill C:
Somehow I put this in the wrong place
The Less of Everything Strategy is rational and logical if “… we believe that the future security and prosperity of the U.S./the West actually depends upon the spreading, throughout the Rest of the World, of our unusual and unique way of life, our unusual and unique way of governance and our unusual and unique values, attitudes and beliefs,” with “we” being the elite running this country at the moment or a sufficient number of them. Although I am not sure I would include the current President in that “we.” Thus, his continued support for the small scale military commitments in a number of places must be for some other reason — or demonstrate his lack of political courage.
And, as a thought, if one were to have a conscript force that would be one thing, but to send them to fight somewhere is of a much different political nature than only using members of volunteer units — be they part of a draft based or volunteer military.
However, the current eco-political environment / the political attitude of the people of a land is a factor in any strategy for obvious reasons. Accordingly, the most potentially disruptive element (in this country) to a strategy of small scale protracted warfare (i.e. without end) is coming to life — because a substantial number of people in this country are suffering from truly poor economic conditions (i.e. insufficient jobs,low number of hours worked availability, and reduced wages) and they are beginning to politically coalesce under a number of aspiring political leaders. Political leaders raising the banner of political revolt against the spending of trillions for long wars rather than at home providing employment, etc. Its been one pillar of the Sanders, Jill Stein, maybe the Libertarian Party, and actually in Trump’s campaign. While Trump wants a larger military, he does not want to continue these endless wars for financial reasons. He needs the money to be spent elsewhere. Clinton may or may not be an exception, but if she is there is a significant probability she will be a one term President — if some Democrat can leverage the above growing anti-war costs attitude of many of the economic underclass in this land — or she may end up with a hostile Congress that will refuse to support such an effort — at least in the Budget they pass, presuming the Democrats have control of one or both Houses of Congress.
What appears to be a growing political contention in this land with our continuing low grade warfare is going to be interesting to observe. Perhaps I am wrong, or perhaps some event will change the political trend in the U.S., but I believe if no meaningful event forces a change in the political environment — the Nation’s executive will soon call and end to the endless wars.
That doesn’t mean that the”Less of Everything” strategic approach strategy isn’t a logical one, it would imply mean that protracted effort in today’s eco-political environment in the U.S. clashes with many members of our voting population’s concern about its costs — given their searching for political funding to be used to alleviate their economic difficulties — and the costs of wars seemingly never won are a magnet for their attention. Maybe that can be redirected by substantially taxing the very wealthy and using that funding for infrastructure jobs on a large scale. Perhaps unfair because so much of the cost came from the unnecessary Strategic debacle resulting from the truly unnecessary Iraq Invasion. But, the currents of eco-political situation are driving the nation in a different direction then our continuing conflicts– regardless of their costs.