On 22 March 2007, Inside the Pentagon published an article by Rati Bishnoi entitled "Army Officials Call DoD Models Insufficient for Modeling Unrestricted Warfare." The tone of the piece laments the lack of M&S tools to reflect what the Chinese have long called "unrestricted warfare," a meaning quite different than what many others might think it is--particularly if you are thinking of the Clausewitzian "absolute war" construct. No, here it means "anything can be made into a weapon" and is an approach favored by those who must rely on strategic (as well as tactical and operational) asymmetrical means to win over a militarily superior adversary. Of course, many have seen "unrestricted warfare" in this sense to be a key method in "small wars" and/or so-called "asymmetrical warfare."
There are a number of things that are quite striking in her article. For one, the problem is seen purely in terms of building a better mousetrap--er--database and processing capability. Army officials are quoted as saying the Pentagon needs an "unprecedented data enterprise" that would be accessed to "test hypotheses" so that commanders could make better decisions. The article ends with a warning that analysts need to "enlighten" decisionmakers on the need to gather such data and create such a capability before our adversaries do.
Even if we were to invest in such databases and capabilities, I doubt whether this could keep up with adversarial adaptability if the idea is to pre-empt their "unrestricted warfare" tactics. Our bureaucratic OODA loop will not keep up with those of nonstate "unrestricted warfare" adversaries. So it's hard to see how such an investment would pay off in this regard. It's also difficult to see which adversaries would want to make a similar investment and why. Applying "unrestricted warfare" techniques in the real world is so much cheaper.
Note that I'm not even addressing whether or not M&S can be used in a predictive sense. One must tread carefully here, for while there are success stories of tools being used in this way in other venues to solve other problems, for every one of those there are scores--if not hundreds--of failures. Godel's number theory has something to say about the ability of M&S to predictably model "unrestricted warfare" as practiced in the real world....
That said, there is still room for modeling "unrestricted warfare" at the operational and tactical level in such a way that will help educate minds to think more flexibly and rapidly. Seminar wargames work best to help create the environments where this can take place, but these are difficult to set up and run without devolving into a BOGSATT (Bunch Of Guys Sitting Around the Table Talking).
There have been some efforts in applying M&S to unrestricted warfare, but these are just initial, tentative efforts from what I can see. Interestingly enough, the commercial wargaming world hasn't done a whole lot on this front, either. Not a lot of excitement for the teen-aged males who like to blow things up on their PLAYSTATION 3 or X-BOX 360. Most attempts in the commercial world have been in simulating non-lethal means of coercion at the strategic level (e.g., diplomatic carrots and sticks, economic levers, etc.). But nothing really stands out in simulating the operational and tactical level problems "unrestricted warfare" poses for a state military force.