Civilian, Military Both Morally Obliged to Make War Work by Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, U.S. Army Retired, Army Magazine
Generals and admirals are mistaken if they believe their only job in war is to execute the policymaker’s war aims, requiring of them merely an “end state” and the time and resources to accomplish the job. Political leaders are wrong if they believe their job in war is to make policy decisions, getting only options from military leaders that are to be used in discussions from which military leaders are excluded. While convenient because each can “blame” the other when things go wrong, such attitudes are based on a false understanding of the civil-military relationship necessary to wage war successfully.
That relationship is not simply a forum to establish civil control and dominance over the military, a way to demand obedience—as some have suggested—to any policy decision regardless of how potentially ineffective it may be. Rather, it is a forum that should recognize the final decision authority concerning consequential strategic and operational matters rightfully rests with senior civilian leaders; and that the purpose of the relationship is to ensure those final decisions are the best, all things military and nonmilitary considered…
Comments
Warlock - The confusion you describe in DoD is probably the most pernicious one of all. I have no idea where anyone got the notion that DoD civilians, especially civil servants, are part of the ethos of civilian control of the military. They are entirely and unequivocally part of the military, not apart from it. And until you get to the UnderSecretary or the Service Secretary level, whatever power civilians have is almost entirely budgetary and not statutory. Anyone who professes that belief has to also believe that the act of putting on a uniform (as opposed to belonging to an organization like say the Army, as a DA civilian would) has a transformative effect on human beings that is beyond conscious control and renders them 1. dim 2. dangerous. I honest to goodness get the confusion at the gut level. What I don't understand is how one can remain confused after giving it any thought beyond the gut level.
That confusion exists within the DoD as well as without...over the years, I've run into more than a few non-uniformed residents of the Pentagon who believe politically-appointed executives are part of "civilian control of the military." The distinction is between the elected leadership -- the President and the Congress, responsible to the franchised population, and each with their respective roles maintenance of armed forces and the conduct of war -- and the rest of the machinery, whether in uniform or not. A civilian political appointment is just a different mechanism for assigning roles and authorities, no different in principle than a commission, which also has to be recommended by the President and approved by Congress.
I think it's worth making a qualitative distinction between senior political leaders and civilians in the government. The Civ-Mil relationship has both flavors...the hierarchical relationship with the former and the lateral relationship with the latter. Needless to say, I agree with the thesis in the article. But many in the executive branch get awfully confused about the two flavors of the Civ-Mil world, most importantly how they are not alike. I would go as far as saying that a non-trivial number of both civilians and military folks believe that civilian control of the military implies a caste system in foreign policy and warmaking where the uniformed folks are expected and permitted to only speak on matters logistical and combat, with the "higher caste" civilians endowed with the faculties to debate policy and other weightier matters, and that the lower one goes in the hierarchy the more pronounced the distinction should be. Alas, I would be hard pressed to say what makes a 28 y.o. FSO more capable than a 28 y.o. Captain...
The relationship between the political masters of the government and the military as a component of that government engaged in the gravest of all activities (war), is wrought with deadly chasms. So many that a breakdown of this relationship has probably caused or hastened the fall of more governments in human history than any other force. We have to get that relationship right. But I don't think anything as weighty applies to the relationship between the military and other non-military parts of the government or non-uniformed parts of the military. In a sense, being at the apex of the structure, the political masters are as much a part of the military as any uniform, while the other civilians are peers at best.
The Civ-Mil divide is theoretically there to prevent a political master from coming to office through the support of the military rather than of a civil political process, as the military support would always trump a civil process (see: human history). Once in office, however, the distinction is moot. The POTUS, SECDEF et al are part of the military as much as the POTUS, SecState et al are a part of the diplomatic arm of the government or the POTUS, AG et al are a part of the law enforcement arm. Each of those arms is staffed with career professionals, some of whom also hold delegated authorities under Art 2 of the Constitution (i.e. Commissions for FSOs, MilOFF, etc). Thus, when the political masters disregard the opinions of professionals, they are accepting the risk that they know better. While sometimes true, to proceed uninformed by the professionals, or to treat them as mere advisers rather than (unequal) stakeholders, courts bad strategies, poor execution, and general discontent. This is like hiring a mechanic and then overruling him on the work he recommends. Often it is wise to question the mechanic to make sure you aren't being sold an unneeded filter, but to disregard him completely and task him with exactly what he will do presumes an awful lot.
In any case, I do think that the starting point of any Civ-Mil discussion needs to be an explicit distinction of these two flavors...else confusion reigns as a whole lot of people think civilian and military are synonymous with civilian and uniformed, which couldn't be further from the truth.
We really do need to pay attention to this. This is probably the best description of how civil-military relations ought to be. And I think one of our biggest weaknesses among the three is our inability to "adapt decisions to the realities of war as it unfolds." I think we really need to understand our (civilian and military) functional and moral responsibilities in war. See last excerpted paragraph below.
QUOTE:
Some posit that in the civil-military relationship, senior civilian leaders have a “right to be wrong.” I disagree. War-waging decisions always put lives at risk: the lives of the innocent in a war zone as well as the lives of citizens who are also the soldiers who carry out the orders. In some cases, war-waging decisions may even put the life of the political community itself at risk. When the stakes of a decision are this high, no final decision authority has the right to be wrong. Rather, the decisionmaker has an obligation to be as right as is reasonable to expect, given the nature and realities of war. Those involved in the process leading up to a consequential decision—whether in uniform or in a suit, whether in the executive or legislative branch—have an obligation to ensure that any decision is as fully vetted as it can be.
Finally, civilian and military leaders have three further responsibilities. First, they are responsible for aligning the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. In this way, they help ensure that individual military and nonmilitary tactical actions are nested within an operational scheme that is tied to the strategic political aims the war seeks to attain. Second, they are responsible for making bureaucracies work well enough to execute decisions. Then, they are responsible for adapting decisions to the realities of war as it unfolds.
Execution of these responsibilities requires that senior political and military leaders establish some kind of reality-based feedback system and coordinative body (or bodies) to ensure they can constantly assess and adapt to the uncertainties, opportunities and obstacles that invariably arise in any war. Those who ultimately execute decisions on the battlefield that senior leaders make in the capital are owed this conceptual alignment and organizational coherence.
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The dialogue is unequal, however, because senior political leaders retain final decision authority. But the participants in the dialogue are functionally and morally equal. They are functionally equal because both civilian and military perspectives are necessary to ensure any final decision concerning aims, strategies, policies or campaigns has the highest probability of success, and because both are needed to execute initial decisions and adapt as the realities of war present themselves. And they are morally equal, for both are co-responsible for the lives that are risked and used in execution of war-waging decisions. END QUOTE