Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, the U.S. intelligence chief in Afghanistan, said the American intelligence effort in Afghanistan is under-resourced and requires more UAVs, intelligence analysts, and surveillance satellites to defeat the Taliban insurgency. According to a recent article in The Los Angeles Times, Flynn, who was sent to Afghanistan to improve the quality of U.S. intelligence gathering there, is said to be frustrated that other senior officers at home do not view the issue with the same degree of urgency. Originally ordered by Gen. McChrystal to lead an overhaul of how U.S. intelligence is gathered, analyzed, distributed, and employed by American troops in the field, Flynn joined McChrystal's inner circle from the Joint Staff at the Pentagon where he was the J-2 responsible for military intelligence. Flynn firmly believes in the military's need for a radically different approach to collecting intelligence on insurgent networks, their resources, movements, and whereabouts. To build a complete picture of the enemy, Flynn believes, the U.S. needs to do a better job at collecting and exploiting information on insurgents when they move, regroup, and communicate after an American or allied attack. In the past, the military primarily employed intelligence to plan and prepare for military operations, and to adjust its course of action during a campaign. Today, according to Flynn, "we do the opposite. We do the [operations] to get the [intelligence]." ...
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One of the most important…
One of the most important aspects of national security is information gathering and analysis. The Korean government has been investing heavily in this area, and as a result, there are now a number of excellent news sources that provide detailed and unbiased coverage of developments on the Korean peninsula. These news sources and such http://www.theupcoming.co.uk/2022/04/26/useful-tips-on-writing-a-good-college-essay/ websites can be an invaluable resource for anyone interested in staying up-to-date on the latest developments in this region.
I cannot speak to the asset requirements in Afghanistan but I can say that in Iraq we havent always synchronize them adequately. Understanding how two or more collection assets can be mutually supportive is key. I would also say that HUMINT is equally important to technical capabilities.
I definitely agree that we need to share intelligence more. You cannot build rapport to get additional intelligence withou it and you certainly cannot conduct a successful relief in place and transfer of authority with host nation forces without intelligence sharing. This sharing should involve technical capabilities to the greatest extent possible. Again, it builds an incredible amount of rapport to share our capabilities with host nation authorities and forces.
Regarding analysis, we do need to better educate our young analysts but part of that may also mean relooking our intelligence doctrine. For example, the phrase "measures of effectiveness" does not appear in FM 2-01.3, IPB, FMI 2-01.301 TTP for IPB, nor FMI 2-01 ISR Synchronization, despite the fact that one of two examples of an MOE is insurgent related in FM 5-0 Operations . The first three FMs touch on the subject but do not address it directly. I acknowledge doctrine is only a guide but if we depart from it, we need to depart from common ground.
In Iraq in 2005, then-LTC Erik Kurilla produced a 1-24 IN command brief slide deck that had two great points. One stated, "Intelligence Drives COIN" while the next slide was titled "Operations Drive Intelligence". 1-24 reorganized the battalion staff and conducted operations to develop intelligence internally.
Today we have an excess of collection; poor analysis of that collection; and, weak synthesis into operations. While its fun to make a piñata out of the intelligence officer, the commander/chain of command (from battalion to Commander-in-Chief) bear the lions share of the responsibility.
The military "system" will give the performance you demand. If the supplier cant meet the demand, get another source.
Having been in the community for nearly a decade while studying many aspects of the intelligence cycle, I feel that I MUST remind all readers of the primary purpose of the intelligence community. The IS is there to provide the best possible information available to the decission makers.
The community does need analysts. In order to get more analysts, we have to know that the administration (whomever is in office) is not going to throw us under the bus. While in Africa, I was told by the Department of State that I was raising hackles by callin al-Shaba'ab a terrorist organization. What? is that a bus backing up? I am NOT the only one who has met this situation. How many analysts have left the CIA, NSA, FBI DOS because they did not want to offend the thin-skin politically correct decission makers?
So far as using electronic intelligence and satelite as well as UAV collection, these are limited in capacity against a non-technologic society/culture. Sure, these wingnuts are more technologically capable than they were in 1978 Iran; however, they also use human networks for much of their work. It is these networks that we have to penetrate. Sadly, thank you to the Carter administration's gutting of the HUMINT networks across the middle east, leaving thousand of our supporters to be tortured and murdered, we are not going to be able to build raport and trust in the Afghan culture on a short term basis.
Yes, we need more analysts. Let's start by protecting the ones who are still working. Also, give them the best tools available AND train them properly in their use.
Are technical means useful? Yes, but let's not rely solely or too heavily on them.
Will HUMINT ever work in that region? It can work better if we find the right sources. For instance, if anyone the US helped against the Soviets in the 1980's is still alive (other than bin Laden) that is a great place to start.
Great points, especially by Nikki.
After three tours in DIA, I am convinced that the weakest link in the intel chain is the analyst link, because it does not receive the attention it deserves. They are the ones who, ultimately, accomplish the IC mission, because they turn collected information into intelligence products for decision makers to use. Yet, there is nothing sexy about spending days and nights hunched over a computer becoming a subject matter expert, assessing the credibility of sources, integrating reports from DIA, DoS, NSA, the Sith Lords and others, and finally producing a product as close to the ground truth as is possible. So, the link receives short shrift from everyone instead of having resources poured into it, career paths established to high levels, etc.
As with every other area: promotion goes to the operator, just as it goes to the combat arms officers/pilot.
I concur with Nikki on a few points, primarily the technical means comment. I am perhaps an old school analyst who believes his job is spent as much time behind his desk as well as outside observing. HUMINT or other reconnaissance teams cannot possibly be briefed on all IRs nor can they possibly fill all gaps. With prior experience in this arena, I have conducted numerous patrols, OPs and assisted with interviews of sources. The most active analyst gets the Target.
If you stay behind your desk and continue to hope for the information to come to you for your picture, then you will never get the full product. Get out and see the AO, even if only for one visit. It will give you an entirely new perspective and an insight you have never had. Get to know the people, you do not have to be a HUMINT collecter to talk with the locals and see what makes them tick. I'm sorry, but Harvard scholars spending three weeeks with a tribe and writing a book does not make them a subject matter expert.
I only utilize the technical aspects to confirm or validate information I have received from HUMINT or observations. Like my argument against the "NEED" for the Air Force, regardless of how many eyes or bombs in the sky you may have, you still need boots on the ground to hold or give you the ground truth.
I have seen many intelligence professionals who fit the 100 pound brain mold, however a shift should happen in regards to putting a smarter gritier analyst who is not afraid to get a little sweaty, dirty and get into a fire fight if necessary to accomplish the mission.
MG Flynns article is very comprehensive and forward thinking. However, I think many people have been banging this drum for a few years. In addition many of the better BCT Commanders have been implementing this approach in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but changing our culture in MI comes slowly. As an Instructor for TRADOC G2s ISR Mobile Training Team I have interacted with multiple BCTs that are preparing to go into theater, and I have seen multiple approaches to BCT Staff interaction, specifically as it pertains to Intelligence. My observations are not scientific, but I thought they were worth sharing.
1. Many successful BCT Commanders are imploding their Napoleonic staff structure and reorganizing along their lines of effort. I have observed several BCT Commanders taking Field Grade officers out of their normal duty positions and making them a full time LOE/LOO chief. Thus four or five Officers synchronize the planning and execution of the BCT Campaign Plan. They generate collection requirement to answer gaps in information, based on their running estimate of where their BCT stands for their particular LOE.
2. Many forward thinking BCT S2s are helping their Commander write Priority Intelligence Requirements that are focused on the full spectrum of BCT operations, not just the enemy. Many units nest their PIRs with their Lines of Effort, thus your PIR have a long term focus. This helps units avoid ISR "Schizophrenia" where the priority for ISR is the shiny ball of the week.
a. A PIR for each Line of Effort
b. A Specific Intelligence Requirement (SIR) for each task within that LOE
c. An Intelligence/Information Requirement (IR) for each MOE/MOP for those task
3. By completely nesting the Campaign Plan and the ISR Scheme of Maneuver BCTs are able to get that fidelity on the Human Terrain that MG Flynn discusses. However, we still see units that have a complete disconnect between their operations, and their intelligence collection efforts. For example, if your operations are 70% non-lethal, whey would your Intelligence Requirements be 95% focused on the lethal fight? The lethal fight is important, but if you just mow the grass, it comes right back. A corrupt local politician, an ineffective police chief, and extortion by criminal organizations will derail your plan just as quickly, if not quicker, than an insurgent group.
4. All of this requires not only a change in the focus of the S2 section, but the entire BCT Staff. Everyone has to be a pro-sumer of information. The S2 is not the only officer who should be doing a SITEMP (of the enemy in his case) and writing well thought assessments, in the form of running estimates, but this needs to be done for each LOE. Units that create a separate SITEMP for governance, IO, Essential Services, Economics, Security, and then lay them on top of each other find their tactical dilemma jumps right out at them.
5. Most of the maneuver officers I have talked to, especially BN and BCT Commanders, would agree with MG Flynns comments. Most of the resistance seems to come from the Intelligence community itself. While many National Agencies have moved mountains to support tactical units, we still have many folks that cannot grasp a bottom fed Intel fight (COIN), as opposed to our comfort zone, the top fed Intel fight (MCO). At one training event we had MI LTC, in Command of a Battalion, become incredulous that we even suggested that Intel should be focused on anything other than the enemy. Maybe he will meet MG Flynn one day.
What is missing from most of the Commenters is the simple fact that for a number of reasons Human Terrain Teams are slowly dying as they initially in no way wanted to be tasked by MI. And if one reads many of the HT analysis it reads just like the old Foreign Area Studies published by FAOs for the Special Forces, and CIA in the late 60s to early 80s.
Secondly, the concept from bottom up was to be solved by the CoIST (Company Intel Support Team) which has been lately given so many tasks to conduct-both lethal and non-lethal--
everyone forgot to add more intel manpower-which is leading many Company Cmdrs to just do the basics.
Thirdly, Gen. Flynn correctly pointed out the issue of anti-insurgency vs counterinsurgency as it is far easier to kill/capture and attack IED networks than it is to be a community policeman which requires listening in the face of IED attacks that are killing your soldiers.
Most Bn and BCT Cmdrs when faced with the killing of their soldiers by IEDs will take up the CIED fight and not focus on being a great community organizer and policeman. As an example look at the issues surrounding the high loss of personnel of the 1/17 Regt which is part of the 5/2 SBCT and how that unit stuggled shifting from the anti-insurgency fight to the counterinsurgency fight. Resulting in the Company Cmdr being replaced even though one could have predicted their problems based on the poor performance of their BCT Cmdr and the entire BCT during their NTC training rotation prior to deployment.
If the tenor of Gen. Flynn's article is that MI must now think out of the box then I would suggest many analysts read and understand John Robb's insurgency theory of "open source warfare" initally written back in 2004 and 2005.
Then they should read the recent release of the Nature magazine article "Ecology of Human Warfare". Their linked website has all of the research for those that are strong in math. They did though verify the veracity of the "open source warfare" theory and it appears that one could using their methodology test the impacts of an action on the insurgency ie limiting cell towers, killing a Taliban sub comdr, increased community focus etc. all without "boots on the ground".
At this stage of a full blown phase three guerilla war looking at a new way of viewing the insurgency might just go a long way especially in linking diverse information.