In war, the General Purpose Forces (GPF) and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) are needed in a sensible mix and they must work together. They do not now do that as well as they should. Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have not properly addressed that long standing problem; this one should do so by firmly allotting roles and missions to the GPF and SOF. Currently, long standing biases are in the way of proper task migration and allocation. The issue is the all important fight for funds, flags and spaces. That does the nation, the services and those who serve no favors.

That perspective is based on serving long ago on both sides of the GPF / SOF fence and on current conversations with relatives having recent multiple deployments on both sides of that fence today. My belief and their belief is that there is a problem, that it is significant and that it will take a major effort to fix. Some may differ; discussion would be welcome...

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Thanks to Colonel Bob Jones for his post on Small Wars Council on the topic of Mindset, which triggered some of my recollections oon the sort of allied subject of unintended consequences and their lingering effects. The Brigade structures he referenced were being adjusted for the Army National Guard and were being formed for the Active Army assistors at the time cited in the Post as a result of the activation of three Army National Guard Brigades for Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm in 1990-91. The activation of those three Brigades had been resisted by senior Army leadership but was forced by political pressure. In an effort to delay the potential dispatch of the Brigades to the operational theater, the Army elected to rotate all three Brigades through the National Training Center. In the event, the ‘war’ ended prior to their deployment.

One result of that failure to be deployed as a result of deferring to process as a forestalling tactic was an unintended consequence of little desired Congressional involvement. As I recall, the Defense Appropriation Acts of 1992 and 1993 dedicated 5,000 experienced Active Component soldiers. All captains had to be branch qualified and all NCOs, mostly SSG and above and had to have recent troop experience.

At the time those structures came into being, I was working in a large headquarters and happened to be in the Commanding General’s Office when he telephonically questioned a Senate staff member of his acquaintance as to why Congress had passed a rather convoluted law that led to the establishment of the Advisory ‘Brigades.’ The response was to the effect that Congress wished to ensure that in future wars The Army National Guard Brigades were deployed. The General’s response to the Staff person was “Well, you haven’t done that. There’s no assurance as I read this law that will happen and what you have done is create a bureaucratic nightmare that will waste Active Component Spaces and is likely to be a detriment to the Reserve Components…” or words to that effect.

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