The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration
The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration
by Scott Dempsey
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General Petraeus will be in Washington next week where he will inevitably continue to extol the progress of counterinsurgency (COIN) in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban’s heartland — and where our war to achieve sufficient stability to enable us to leave will be either won or lost. COIN doctrine argues that with the right combination of security, governance, and development, there will be transformational impact that can marginalize insurgents’ control over local populations. Combined with multiple external factors mostly beyond our ability to influence, COIN was indeed part of the transformational improvement in Iraq — and provided sufficient stability for American troops to withdraw in favor of Iraqi government forces. The Afghanistan surge seeks to create similar results– which would ultimately create conditions for transfer of authority and responsibility to the Afghan government and security forces. A key component to GEN Petraeus’s COIN talking points cites the Nawa District of restive Helmand Province as a “proof of concept” for counterinsurgency dogma, and that the “Nawa model” is durable. However, during my year in Helmand Province, including nine months as the U.S. development lead in Nawa District, I saw a variety of factors that led to Nawa’s success — none of which pass this test. Furthermore, to secure even the most basic degree of Afghan government-led stability will require a seemingly endless commitment to continue to fight and finance this effort.
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Until February 2011, Scott Dempsey was a USAID Foreign Service Officer, most recently with the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs in Washington. From July 2009 – August 2010, he served as a development officer in Helmand Province. He also previously deployed as a Marine on a civil affairs team in Fallujah in 2005.