Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach
Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach: Notes on the British Army Field Manual Weltanschauung
An Interview with Colonel Alexander Alderson
by Octavian Manea
Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach
Can you point out the purpose of the military and of the use of military force in countering an insurgency? After all, the classic counterinsurgency (COIN) arithmetic suggested by David Galula is now the conventional wisdom: 80% political action and only 20% military.
The principal role of the military is to provide security but it is often from ideal to use soldiers to provide civil security. In many countries, this is the role of the police force. Unfortunately, in many cases when an insurgency emerges, it often does so at a point beyond which the police force can contain the situation. If it could, presumably the problem would not have developed in the way it did. But let’s say that the government has not been able to stop the insurgency from developing and the insurgency goes on to challenge law and order and governance. Let’s say that the insurgents have got to the stage where they control an area where they actively challenge the rule of law if not overturn it. In such a case the government needs to act. At this point extraordinary measures are needed and this includes using soldiers to support the police to re-establish the rule of law, to protect the population, and to confront the insurgent.
Of course, this is not ideal. A soldiers’ principal role is to defend the state from external threats so their equipment, training and skills tend to be optimized for general war. That said, good professional armies should be able to rise to the complex challenges of a ‘war among the people’ by a process of adaptation and adjustment. Specialist training and some adjustment to organizations, equipment and tactics are generally required. The faster an army can do this, the more effective it can be. The initial advantage the insurgent has is that armies tend to be large and often conservative organizations. They can take too long to respond the general environmental challenges of COIN and the specifics of insurgent tactics and equipment. So unless the institutional mindset is attuned to adaptation, the insurgent will have the advantage. It is not for nothing that both US and British COIN doctrine emphasizes the need for adaptation, in fact ‘Learn and Adapt’ was made one of the British principles to highlight the importance of not getting stuck in one’s ways.
Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach
Colonel Alexander Alderson set up the British Army Land Forces Stability Operations and Counterinsurgency Center in 2009 and is now its director. He was the lead author for the British Army’s Counterinsurgency Doctrine (November 2009) and his operational experience includes Iraq, Bosnia, Northern Ireland and the 1991 Gulf War. He holds a Ph.D. in Modern History and is a senior visiting research fellow with the University of Oxford and at King’s College London.
While I respect Colonel Alderson’s point of view, he makes some of the same mistakes that other contemporary COIN believers make. The general theme he makes is “Insurgents, bad; governments, good” and “we must fix the underlying problems that cause this insurgency”. I am sorry to say that this isn’t always the case. In fact, I would posit that, in all cases of an insurgent movement, they have come about due to some flaw in the government. Whether it be wealth disparity, lack of security, corruption, or a combination of all, these movements don’t just spring from nothing and sometimes the government’s they oppose are evil. Merriam-Webster defines the military as “of, or relating to, soldiers, arms or war.” A military is designed to break things and kill people, plain and simple. Once you get off that track, it’s over. When you hear someone talk of COIN or unconventional warfare and how we should apply it, the first question you should ask yourself is “How much experience does this individual have, really, in COIN or guerrilla Warfare”. A few deployments to Iraq, Aghanistan, or Bosnia with the conventional military does not an expert in COIN or Guerrilla Warfare make, nor does reading about it in a book. Name one place in the last 100 years where the US has conducted COIN where it has been a clear success (nation that we are helping is no longer a third world basket case).
“When you hear someone talk of COIN or unconventional warfare and how we should apply it, the first question you should ask yourself is “How much experience does this individual have, really, in COIN or guerrilla Warfare”. A few deployments to Iraq, Aghanistan, or Bosnia with the conventional military does not an expert in COIN or Guerrilla Warfare make, nor does reading about it in a book.”
Chet,
If you are going to challenge Col. Alderson’s credentials to speak about COIN, you should do so directly, rather than by implication.
It would also help if you cited an example of someone who was, in your view, a COIN expert, so we can see what standard that you are using.
Thirdly, observations or arguments stand on their own merits, regardless if they are made my “experts” or “novices”. A priori dismissal based on fast and lazy stereotyping is not a good intellectual habit to cultivate.
Undergraduates,for example, or even high school students, annually make scientific discoveries or run experiments with results that get published in peer review scientic journals, despite being very far from experts. A private after one tour of Iraq might have learned quite a bit about COIN, or at least how COIN can be conducted in Iraq, that is worth hearing here.
I for one, would be very hesitant to dismiss out of hand the opinion on COIN of a full colonel in the British Army who heads a counterinsurgency center and wrote the British Army’s official COIN doctrine. That seems to smack of hubris.
I think by definition, Alderson is giving an “expert opinion” here.
Lets see if I can be evn more direct. With all due respect, Col Anderson and John Nagl, as expressed in our own FM 3-24, espouse a contemporary view that stresses a “resolve the problem” focus to COIN. Where has that ever worked? The Philippines? Iraq? Afghanistan? Somalia? The Balkans? Haiti? Colombia? El Salvador? Guatemala? Peru? Vietnam? I’m sorry, but those nations are all still basket cases.
I’m not sure either gentleman has expressed the view, here or in official doctrine, that COIN= immediate turnaround of fiscal and monetary policy or a legacy of FDI going back decades. I am however, willing to be corrected.
It is not that pop-centric COIN cannot or should not be criticized, it can and should, but if you want to do quantitative analysis of the effects of COIN in country X, there has to be a reasonable yardstick.
Chet… not sure if Vietnam is a basket case… but it is an example of a clear winner in an insurgency… Simply put… underground/auxiliaries and guerrilla action evolve into conventional warfare and ends with tanks of the Vietnamese Peoples Army pivot steering on the lawn of the presidential palace in Saigon.
Food for thought… David Galula is not the originator of the 80/20 rule. The 80/20 rule is a mathematical formula created by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto in 1906… You can apply the 80/20 rule to almost anything, from the science of management to explanations of the physical/political worlds.
Here are some of its uses…
Insurgency: 80% political action/20% military action.
How about 20% of the fighting creates 80% of the political solutions or…
80% percent of political solutions create 20% of the fighting.
Unequal distribution of wealth in a given country: 20% of the people control 80% of the wealth.
Defects: 20% of defects cause 80% of the problems.
Time management: 20% of the work (first 10% and last 10%) consume 80% of total time. But we all know that there is always time to do it again… and if it wasn’t for the last minute.. nothing would get done.
Productivity: 20% of the work force produce 80% of total output.
Problem children: 20% of population create 80% of the problems…
It is hard to disagree with conventional wisdom or the wisdom of crowds… but it is fun to spook the herd every now and then and watch it stampede…
r/
MAC
I have to admit to a bit of a perverse desire to stir the pot 🙂
I found the 1000 Fathers Report interesting. Conventional COIN wisdom is that the insurgent wins by avoiding defeat or basically outlasting the counterinsurgent. Therefore the insurgent should be more likely to win the longer the war lasts.
I tested this on the 1000 fathers report data. I grouped the data into wars of 0-2 years, 3-5 years, 6-10 years and greater than 10 years. In the 0-2 year group the insurgents won 100% of the time, in the 3-5 years group the insurgent won 87.5% of the time, in the 6-10 years group the insurgent won 80% of the time and in the greater than 10 years category the insurgent lost 55% of the time.
If I break up the data into four yearly groups the results are: 0-4 year group the insurgent wins 90.9% of the time, 5-8 year group the insurgent wins 100% of the time, 9-12 year group the insurgent wins 62.5% of the time, and 13 or more years the insurgent loses 57% of the time. The trend is the same – the longer the war the more likely the insurgent is to lose.
There are a number of possible explanations: an insurgent needs to raise substantial resources just to stay in the fight whereas the counterinsurgent has the resources of the state; the ability to recruit fighters to the insurgency might diminish over time; the counterinsurgent probably learns and becomes more effective over time; or the public might simply tire of war and resign itself to a government that keeps on surviving. There are plenty of other possibilities.
A linear trend line over the four yearly break up suggests that the odds of victory break towards the counterinsurgent in the 11th year.
With the Afghan War in its tenth year it is worth pondering that by this time next year ISAF will probably have a statistically better chance of winning than the Taliban. It might be unwise to start leaving in the 11th year after having spent so much blood and treasure to get to this statistically advantageous position.
Anton,
Did you differentiate between insurgencies aimed primarily at a government and those aimed primarily at a foreign occupying power? I doubt that insurgents would be able to easily outlast their own government, which has nowhere to go but exile and is usually deriving benefits from its position. A foreign occupying power, which has to deal with home-front political will and is spending large amounts of money to maintain a position of often dubious advantage, is in a very difficult position.
Not saying your analysis isn’t correct, but it may not be entirely applicable to, for example, the US position in Afghanistan.
Mac,
You actually bolster my point with the Vietnam case. It was a winner….for the insurgency. Which was, and is, my point.
Anton,
Coul you give a source location for your “assessment”. I would love to see where this “insurgents losing after after the ten year mark” comes from. I guess Afghanistan is in the bag now?
Here is something that gets lost on the chatter. Aside from the obvious, who is the counter insurgent, especially when America gets involved? The American soldier? The underlying thesis in FM 3-24, and the contemporary conventional COIN wisdom, is that the US can somehow get involved in another nations insurgency and “push them” into resolving it. I believe that to be nonsense and gave 11 examples of failure. Add Panama to the list and we make it an even dozen.
My question remains the same and no one, yet, has answered it. When has that worked and what would it look like if it did? Even if an insurgent movement goes away, if the nation is still racked by poverty, low GDP, high crime and corruption (look at Guatemala and El Salavador), what difference does it make if the insurgent movement is gone or not?
Chet:
You are right, it hasn’t worked; by that I mean hearts and minds, population centric counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) conducted by a foreign occupying power is unproven in history.
gian
…there has to be a reasonable yardstick.
I’m not trying to be a smartass, zen, but what is the reasonable yardstick and how are we to know it is reasonable?
Sorry about the frustration I’ve been expressing here and elsewhere recently but sometimes it feels like theory matters more than the specific application of it with regard to Afghanistan.
I mean no disrespect and am not referring to the author of the current article. It’s a general layman’s lamentation 🙂
Gian,
You are the man. And you will probably get allot of chatter about how we should do it (with no examples to support it).
I guess what I mean is this: how am I to judge what happens in the Spring? The public is asked for strategic patience because all the elements are finally in place.
Okay. I respect those in charge and I haven’t the background or education to really know what to think. But what if the violence doesn’t go down in the Spring? Will I be cautioned for more strategic patience? Perhaps this is a problem with discussing yardsticks and metrics instead of clear cut goals that anyone may recognize.
Sorry, I’m highjacking threads and misunderstanding again, aren’t I?
As Kitson said “the aim of the government when trying to counter such a campaign is to regain and retain the allegiance of its people”. – from the above article.
In a previous thread, commenter and blogger “Pundita” wrote:
I also think it’s playing ostrich at this to argue the questions of whether the U.S. can achieve victory in Afghanistan and what victory might look like. That’s because it’s obvious by now that until the Pakistan military’s modus operandi in Afghanistan is halted NATO is trying to empty the ocean with a sieve and making it impossible for Afghan self-governance.
Just to review: the MO is to use proxies to assassinate or intimidate every Afghan they neutralize who shows intelligence and skill as an administrator, and who’s not corrupt.
That’s the same MO the Pak military used in East Pakistan and in Kashmir. It’s the same MO they used in Baluchistan. It’s the same MO they used in Afghanistan after the Russian pullout.
In fact it’s the same MO they use against their ‘own’ people in the Punjab and Sindh who would seriously challenge the power of the country’s largest landholders.
So I don’t want to hear at this point about paths to victory in Afghanistan and nation building. First replace a sieve with a bucket.
My question to the others is this:
1. What do you think of the assessment?
2. How do you counter the above?
In the “Defining Sucess” discussion at AEI linked here at Small Wars Journal, Gen. Keane and others stated, if my memory is correct, that we can focus on disrupting networks in Afghanistan and this will make the sanctuaries less of a problem. Is this the answer to the questions stated by Pundita?
I guess I get confused when the same theories are bandied about without grounding them in specific questions and specific data. Again, not referring to this author or the current article.
Hi Doc Madhu,
you asked:
“I’m not trying to be a smartass, zen, but what is the reasonable yardstick and how are we to know it is reasonable?”
That is an excellent question.
While “reasonableness” is in the eye of the beholder, here’s what I mean:
Have we defined our terms with precision?
Have we clarified and made explicit the question we are asking?
(Starting with the above helps minimize the likelihood of shifting goalposts and analytical confusion)
Are we picking a metric that measures a variable that is central in terms of cause and effect? – i.e. a statistical analysis of race cars might note that the fastest race cars are red in color but the red paint is a correlation with, not a causation of, automotive speediness.
Are we mistakenly ascribing the effects of multiple-causation to the one cause we are measuring with our yardstick or are we disaggregating effects of multiple variables?
If we are looking to measure across multiple examples, are we comparing apples with apples?
That’s a start, but you get the idea.
Brother Chet… we have no disagreements…
… you are absolutely correct… the underlying thesis in FM 3-24, and the contemporary conventional COIN wisdom, is indeed that the US can somehow get involved in another nations insurgency and “push them” into resolving it. Pop-centric COIN was developed in the halls of academia versus historical experience…
… but then… Iraq and Afghanistan are actually insurgencies of our own making… are they not? Saddam Hussein had his own way of dealing with his insurgency… anyone remember why Saddam drained the marshes? It wasn’t to create more beach front property or to build more housing for the poor. The Taliban government in Astan remained firmly in power, even after years of harsh rule… how did the Taliban deal with potential challenges to their rule?
Before we discuss/argue the merits of this or that yardstick for measuring effort, effectiveness or success, maybe we should spend more time identifying and discussing the base assumptions upon which our pop-centric COIN edifice is built. I submit that there is a large disconnect between American assumptions about how things work or “ought” to work and Iraq or Afghan (world) realities… no matter how well structured the thought experiment.
What makes me an intellectual is that I make shit up… Like most of us, I study human behavior and dabble in the dark arts of psychology and the social sciences… What makes me a realist is the study of history and it is the study of history and its lessons (subjective learning) that keeps me within the lines of the reasonably possible… I actually spend more time studying Amir Abdur Rahman Khan’s approach to governance or the Taliban’s approach to coalition building and coalition management to get a feel for the normative order shared by the Karzai administration, government officials, Taliban, and local strongmen and their respective clientele…
r/
MAC
hi Mac
“Before we discuss/argue the merits of this or that yardstick for measuring effort, effectiveness or success, maybe we should spend more time identifying and discussing the base assumptions upon which our pop-centric COIN edifice is built”
That would be useful. What effective principles that might be generalized to…well…the whole world, would have to be a)very limited in number b) simple and c) starting points for an approach designed for local circumstances.
“I submit that there is a large disconnect between American assumptions about how things work or “ought” to work and Iraq or Afghan (world) realities…’
Agreed.
That’s where measurement is useful – it highlights gaps
Could the main problem with our approach to counterinsurgency be that our tactics, technics and procedures are not designed so much around the idea of defeating the insurgency as they are around the idea of (1) using the opportunity/opening presented by the insurgency (or some other form of state/societal difficulty) as a means of (2) breaching state sovereignty/intervening in the affairs of other states so as to (3) achieve our strategic objective of (4) establishing a new political and economic order therein?
In a test along these lines, could such things as WOG and pop-centric COIN score well when being measured against the strategic objective of establishing a new political and economic order within a state/society, but score poorly when measured strictly along the lines of whether they might quickly and decisively defeat an insurgency?
Brother Zen…
I personally am not searching for the philosopher stone of generalized COIN principles, best practices or a universally applicable recipe for action everywhere and anytime… I embrace specifics and subtle explanations…
There are some that would argue… and have argued that insurgencies are not unique… I am not one of those… COIN is an art… not a science or technical blueprint/checklist. By now you will have noticed that I am a liberal arts type… and mathematical magic frightens me…
Sun Tzu: There are no more than five tones in music, yet their combinations give rise to countless melodies. There are no more than five primary colors, yet in combination, they produce innumerable hues. There are no more than five flavors, yet their blend produces endless varieties. In military tactics, there are only two types of operations, orthodox and unorthodox, yet their varieties are limitless.
Here are a couple of questions I have asked myself and which have helped me develop my basic assumptions about pop-centric COIN in Iraq and Astan. What is the nature of the social system? What is the relationship between government, administration/local governance and governed/local population(s)? What are the prospects for government reform? What is the nature of leverage and its utility (behaviorant conditioning)? … and what can we do to influence any of the above?
The varieties are endless… but I also accept the fact that we must dumb it down so that big military can execute appropriately… or as appropriately as possible under the circumstances.
Man-hugs,
MAC
Okay, MAC, you are my hero now, too. I may not be the smartest guy around, but I have been involved in counterinsurgencies for over 20 years. People make this WAY more complex than it really is. A few tried and true anecdotes:
1. There is nothing new under the sun.
2. Human nature is flawed and people can, and often will, do very evil things
3. People seek power over other people (see number 2)
4. Most things are not fixable. The best you can do is police yourself and hope that your example does not go unnoticed.
Chet,
Reference hero talk… sarcasm or earnest man-love 🙂
… actually… you are pretty smart…
#1 – There is indeed nothing new under the sun, even nano-technology was stolen from mother nature…
#2 – Not sure if human nature is flawed… it is what it is… can’t have smart people without idiots and good people without nasty ones… I think extremes are a law of nature..
#3 – Not that there is anything wrong with the power over people thing… some people need to be controlled… while others need to be killed.
#4 – You can try to fix things.. but remember all of todays fixes are based on yesterdays failures… also a law of nature I think… evolution maybe?
r/
MAC
Dayahun,
I just ran the numbers straight through a spread sheet. I didn’t delve any deeper.
Chet,
I never said Afghanistan was in hte bag, rather that we are entering a point in time where we are statistically more likely than the Taliban to win. This fact should provide some sober optimism rather than generate complacency. The other guy still has a greater than 40% chance of winning.
The source of the data is page 10, table 2.1 of the One Thousand Fathers report.
The point is that a very common piece of convetional wisdom on COIN is wrong and that we should always check our assumptions.
Continuing in the vein of my 12:04 comment above (the strategic goal is not to — straight up — defeat the insurgency, but rather to use the opening presented by insurgency — or other state/societal difficulty — as an excuse/a reason/a justification for intervening in the affairs of other states, so as to establish a new political and economic therein), consider this from page 2, last paragraph, of Colonel Alderson’s interview above:
“Dealing with the insurgent alone is not going to solve the problem of why the insurgency emerged in the first place. The list of possible causes is large, but some critical underlying societal, political, or economic conditions are likely to be at the bottom of it all and the governments’s inability or (lack of) intent to deal with the root cause is the catalyst.”
Thus, we have determined that:
a. The root cause of insurgencies generally is that certain states/societies have a flawed social, political and/or economic model that underpins their society and that, accordingly,
b. The proper way to fix insurgencies generally (and other problems) is to establish — within these states and societies — a new societal, political and economic order.
Herein, might we be able to view what could be a problem:
If the methods used are designed — not to quickly, effectively and efficiently defeat the insurgency — but, rather, to cause the subject state/society to become re-wired so as to be a better “fit” for the modern world (the better peace theory?), then might such a roundabout approach have the potential to provide that neither goal is achieved?
Has anyone noticed that since Dec 2010 the term Whole Government Approach is being used by a number of the COCOMs in their formal briefings and or websites.
Might be a good idea to jump on the train that has already left the train station on DoD and interagency operations.
Uh, sorry Bill C., but I think the point is that we have not “determined that the proper way to fix insurgencies is to establish within these states and socities-a new societal, political and economic order.”
I’m sorry, and I don’t mean any disrespect (here it comes), but that is a bunch of intellectual mumbo-jumbo. I mean, forgive me for saying so (here it comes again), but that statement puts on display the arrogance that gets us into these messes to begin with.
Chet, et. al.
Consider this from FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency:
“COIN is a combination of offensive, defensive and stability operations.”
And then this from FM 3-07: Stability Operations:
Conflict Transformation:
1-23: “Conflict transformation focuses on converting the dynamics of conflict into processes for constructive, positive change.” Conflict transformation is the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful, alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations.”
1-26: “It (conflict transformation) exploits the opportunity within a conflict to achieve positive change … conflict transformation develops more attractive, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and economic goals.”
National Security Strategy:
1-53: “The most effective long term measure for conflict prevention and resolution is the promotion of democracy and economic development.”
Thus, it would appear that we are in the business of:
a. Exploiting the opportunities presented when states/societies are placed in weaker, more vulnerable positions; occasioned by such things as foreign invasions, natural disasters, insurgencies, etc.
b. Our job, during these times, is to use these opporunities to justify intervening in these states and societies — for the purpose of ridding them of their old political and socioeconomic models (which we feel are the source of all their problems and many of ours) — and replacing these outdated foundational underpinnings with a political and economic order that is more to our liking.
Because the primary objective of our efforts is not so much to defeat the insurgency — as it is to establish a new political and economic order within these states and societies (COIN, as pursued today, would seem simply to be a tool used in this process) — then the manner in which COIN can be pursued, within this framework, would seem to be limited, restricted and potentially compromised.
This begs the question:
Should these two efforts [1] to establish a new political and economic order within these weakened/vulnerable states/societies and [2] to defeat the insurgency) be so torturously and restrictively commingled? Or should these tasks be made separate and distinct — so that they might both be successfully pursued more effectively?
Bill C.
Is it possible that what is written in FM 3-24 is…..wrong? I worked at the Special Warfare Center writing doctrine where I retired from the Army. I was one of many who had to review that FM. I can tell you that there was a significant amount of disagreement on thei contemporary philosophy. Since the FM was being drafted by CAC at Leavenworth, we could only make comments and recommendations, many of which were not included in the final draft. That is the way it goes when drafting FMs, so no sour grapes. It is doctrine (for the Army), but it doesn’t mean that what is written in the manual is gospel.
Also, your statement from the National Security Strategy:
1-53: “The most effective long term measure for conflict prevention and resolution is the promotion of democracy and economic development.”
Key word “promotion” (furtherance or encouragement). How do you interpret this as “exploiting” and “intervening”? you are making my case for me.
Stated another way:
In very conservative and very different states and societies such as Afghanistan, do counterinsurgency approaches which are founded upon and depend on achieving rapid and complete correction of “root causes” (improper/outdated political and economic models); do such approaches make any sense, in that they seem to require relatively sudden, dramatic and comprehensive changes from entities (these very conservative, very backward and/or very different states and societies) that cannot reasonably be expected to implement, much less adapt to or tolerate, such dramatic changes?
Accordingly, should such a “root causes” counterinsurgency approach be considered as illogical, counterproductive and self-defeating in it requires, for its success, something that the state and society cannot provide?
Thus, when confronted with such an impossible task, should we not expect that the state and society will rebel even further; in that such approaches are more likely to scare, anger, alienate, confuse and frustrate the subject populations and governments — rather than win them over — and, thereby, fuel/strengthen rather than strangle the insurgency?
Bill C,
Yes
I’ll say it… FM 3-24 is wrong.
Pop-centric COIN is a pervasive, compelling, but distorted vision of the United States as the manager of modernization (indirect rule) and our clients as beleaguered modernizers. It is distorted because it is based on a number of faulty social premises and assumptions about governance, security and political/economic development in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Policymakers, academics, military, political and media pundits have consistently and fundamentally misperceived the cultural and political context of rebellion or revolutionary wars directed against our clients in both places. What makes this conflict/effort worse and very complicated is that it is religious in nature… and we all know how uncomfortable we get when religion raises its controversial head… There is no separation of warfare, mosque and state.
Chet is right… some things can’t be “fixed”… only endured and managed. The question is whether we want to manage the unpleasantness from near or afar.
r/
MAC
Mac:
I agree.
So here is my question (which by the way I have yet to get any kind of satisfactory or substantive answer) if it (FM 3-24) is wrong, why hasn’t it been revised?
Folks realized pretty soon after the release of Active Defense Doctrine in 1976 that it was wrong too, and then a vigorous process of revision of it occurred.
Why not that with FM 3-24?
Is it because perhaps that 3-24 has moved way beyond simple operational doctrine for countering insurgencies to the point where it dominates strategy and even policy? And if this is the case then to revise the doctrine would also mean to revise the strategy, namely in Afghanistan.
gian
gian,
Even though I believe Gen Petraeus is unfairly credited with the publication of FM 3-24 (trsut me, GOs don’t write FMs, they are VERY far removed from the process), he did bless it. Where does he work now and isn’t he a favored individual within the administration? If it is shown to be wrong, why, that would mean that we have been wrong for the last 10 years for sure and, maybe, even the last 70 or so. Can’t have that.
If my analysis above is correct, then one might suggest that the idea of using the opportunity presented by conflict, natural disaster, etc. — as an opening and justification for intervening in states and societies for the purpose of establishing a new political and economic order therein (deal with the “root causes” approach/achieve a “better peace” theory) — that this may be a deeply flawed and dangerous concept.
Why? Because this approach:
a. May not adequately take into account the extreme obsticles to and great difficulty with achieving such rapid and sweeping societal changes in such dramatically and distinctively different, and often very conservative, countries and
b. May (illogically?) subordinate the immediate requirement (for example: the defeat of the insurgency) to the attainment of factors that should understood as requiring a much longer period of time (for example: the successful implementation and adequate acceptance of a completely new, novel and often alien political and economic model — one which will dramatically transform not only these populations’ way of life but also the realms of power, prestige and influence existing therein).
Bottom line: Prior to proceeding along these lines (“root causes”/”better peace” approach), should not an adequate assessment and careful determination be made to determine (1) if the government will be both willing and able to implement the required changes and (2) if the population will be both willing — and unable — to accept and adapt to such changes.
Correction to last section of the last paragraph:
(2) if the population will be both willing — and able — to accept and adapt to such changes.
Seems like many of these arguments are based on a “progressive” view of knowledge — a Western idea predicated on the enlightenment.
Evidence of progressivism in our community:
–there are such things as “best practices” (TTP) that are transferable to other situations (what works in the Philippines should work in Vietnam; what worked in Vietnam should work in Afghanistan, and so forth)
–FM 3-24 can be rewritten/improved (belief that doctrine is a cumulative science–gets better)
–there can be principles of war
There are other views of knowledge…some might be considered by the progressivist as “pessimistic.”
While some knowledge may be cumulative (like the engineering sciences), I am quite skeptical about progressivism applying to complex war/operations (and what war is not complex?).
If knowledge about war is NOT progressive, then our dialog should shift significantly away from that paradigm.
The alternative may be a kind of idiographic form of knowledge (many anthropologists are comfortable with this view–their method is ethnographic — yielding “thick description”).
So in lieu of the never-ending quest for a context free science about war/COIN (or what ever category/taxonomy we make up to mimic a hard science), perhaps we need to concentrate on uniqueness, novelty, an locality.
Gian,
A very short attempt at an opinion why…
It isn’t just about FM 3-24… The development of counterinsurgency as a set of doctrines and a set of policies has received very little scholarly attention… This may be the reason why you have received little response to your inquiry. FM 3-24 is just the latest publication in a long line of doctrinal templates drawing on American counterinsurgency/irregular warfare operations along the Western frontier, operations in the Philippines at the turn of the century, expeditions into Mexico, Nicaragua in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Greece and the Philippines in the late 1040s, and Vietnam in the 1960s – 1970.
Why are the ideas found in FM 3-24 that actually distort reality and cripple efforts to respond effectively to cultural realities remain so appealing – even though wrong? The nature, popularity, longevity, and failure of the ideas underlying our pop-centric COIN doctrine can best be explained in terms of their familiarity, utility, and method.
Pop-centric COIN, like COIN doctrine before FM 3-24 is an expression of political development theory. I won’t bore you with a detailed discussion of the European tradition of social analysis exemplified by Hegel, Marx, Darwin, Weber, or Durkheim… nor eighteen-century histoire raisonnee or natural history and its nineteenth-century version, the Comparative Method. Suffice it to say, from these social theories we have assembled a smooth, universal, evolutionary continuum of logically linked stages through which we proceed, propelled by equally universal forces of change. All that is needed is a technical blueprint with which to manage change. Statistically speaking… we should have won years ago… The key assumption of the technical blueprint is that individuals are unified wholes whose values, attitudes, and behavior form a coherent system; that their societies are also coherent wholes of interdependent values and institutions; and that the values, attitudes, and behavior of individuals in a society and the values embodied in its institutions, replicate and reinforce each other… Simply put… a Sioux warrior is a Philippine, is a Nicaraguan, is a Greek, is a Vietnamese, is an Iraqi, is a Pashtun. As if the inhabitants of Fallujah or Marjah ever read Weber.
FM 3-24 expresses the main lines of traditional Western social analysis. Familiarity by most policymakers and military with traditional Western social analysis makes pop-centric COIN easier to peddle since the consumer (policymakers, military, media) immediately recognizes the product brand. It is brand recognition pure and simple. It doesn’t hurt that many of our esteemed academics are pushing the crack. Brand recognition turns into market shares and a high barrier to entry for truly new ideas irrespective of their quality.
The utility of familiar ideas offer a powerful and parsimonious explanation of the complex nature and politics of change. It explains, prescribes, and serves ideological requirements.
Lastly, we are now subject to the tyranny of method.
What fascinates me about it all is that we continue to give lip service to the doctrine while taking our cue from the locals so as to respond effectively to cultural realities and ground truth… Creating the conditions for an “awakening” in Anbar… or establishing the Sons of Iraq in Salah ad Din isn’t really in line with traditional political development theory now is it? Remember the gnashing of teeth and pulling of heir by the popular press when we decided to arm the locals?
🙂
r/
MAC
“MAC” McCallister: “I’ll say it… FM 3-24 is wrong.”
Chet: “If it is shown to be wrong, why, that would mean that we have been wrong for the last 10 years for sure and, maybe, even the last 70 or so. Can’t have that.”
Ask yourselves just how long it’s been since this nation has actually been smart in fighting a war. We’re coming up on sixty-six years since VE and VJ Days. Unless you want to count Desert Storm and those dandy little adventures in Latin America as wars.
You’re finally getting there. The emperor has no clothes.
Why not study Indian and Pakistani insurgencies given the current conflicts? Why so Eurocentric?
The participants, the ideologies, the terrain, the methods show some overlapping features. Does this happen but I don’t see it as a layperson? I mean in terms of doctrinal publications?
Madhu,
Do you believe it is possible that current Indian and Pakistani military doctrines express a British influence? If so, maybe some overlapping doctrinal features? If so… then India and Pakistan are also infected with the histoire raisonnee virus… not that this is necessarily a bad thing… I only submit that we should know what influences our present thinking.
Chet explained that there is nothing new under the sun… especially in terms of military operations… I submit that Joshua of Jericho fame would be able to hold his own discussing military strategy and campaigning with Muhammad Ghori or General Petraeus.
I don’t get the Eurocentric comment… I was talking about U.S. COIN doctrine and its historical lineage… what does this have to do with racism (eurocentricism)?
r/
MAC
So, COIN is when it’s gotten too big for the police? But is that because the police was no good or the enemy was too big? Imagine what an insurgency would have to go through to reach a point when only the army can deal with it. Is it like when a scalpel is no longer enough so you resort to an egg beater?
American troops commitment in Vietnam occurred when, in 1964, LBJ got word from the CIA that the guerrilla war changed into attacks by mobile regular units. At the same time, Le Duan informed his Southern Command that the goal was to organize regular units to destroy ARVN before the Americans could come in. Once the US got involved, the USSR insisted war was hopeless and Chicoms that small units using small arms could outmaneuver the Americans because the Chinese knew from Korea that Americans would prefer to use the egg beater on all “gooks” rather than stick to the scalpel. As a result, any hamlet knew that once VC units of any size came there, ordnance would rain upon it limitlessly as that’s how Americans fight: kill all, pulverize everything but don’t lose men. The “body count” came from reading the bone fragments.
Caught in the crossfire, the peasant “sea” ran off to the cities while Americans sent in platoons as bait to be reinforced by air mobile companies. This drove the war to the periphery. 70% of all contact was initiated by PAVN/PLAF. The VC served as logistic arm. By 1967 Westmoreland finally achieved his mission: destroying more PAVN men and supplies than could come down the trail. That won the war per Hanoi’s COSVN commanders.
But there’s that issue of casualties. By suffering 10:1, Mao told Le Duan, Hanoi could still make the cost unbearable to the Americans. And so it went, endless jungle warfare in which our casualties could never be reduced, only the enemy’s could be increased. We were thus exsanguinating domestic political support for the war as we were maintain Hanoi’s losses greater than its replacements. This Hanoi could afford as it had a million men distributed through the region.
What caused the Tet Offensive was indeed that, in this process, South Vietnam, instead of undergoing a revolutionary Maoist land reform, underwent a revolutionary American urbanization. The people became what Hanoi decried as “petites bourgeois” adapted to urban life while the countryside remained fallow, damaged by tons of Agent Orange. Hanoi was desperate for it had no urban infrastructure. So it attacked the cities and lost all that rural infrastructure that it had developed since the 1930s in the Southern countryside. Skilled operatives were lost pointlessly attacking Cholon. Unable to hold it, there later were no VCI to stop the rational repopulation of the countryside under ARVN control farming Miracle Rice, now with rural modernization spreading. The Mekong Delta proved to be Saigon’s ultimate “safe rear” when Hanoi’s tanks attacked the cities in 1975.
In Afghanistan and Iraq, we underestimated how many people were willing to die avenging the chaos and death resulting from mindless American invasion. All that insurgents had to do was mobilize and organize all that massive resentment. So the question is: what did we do to make the enemy so attractive to otherwise passive people myopic with localitis?
The idea was that we secure areas, hold them, develop them and pass them on to the native government. As Petraeus made clear to Obama, we never got past “hold” and what we had to hold with was so little that the idea became to show spot “presence.” In Iraq this meant driving around the cities in SUVs. We invited a high casualties rate from IEDs. In Afghanistan it involved calling in air strikes. That invited massive resentment and recruitment by the enemy. And so we went on the defensive, protecting our MRAPs in Iraq and our spotters in Afghanistan with constant fire.
We built very little. To date, none of the infrastructural “metrics” in Iraq on which our attractiveness depended ever reached much near the Saddam Era levels. In Afghanistan, population control consisted of disruptive interrogating through translators who could neither speak English nor/or the local language well. US intel was through a distorting lens. So it always saw a distorted picture without a background against which to adjust it, as admitted by Flynn. Shooting blind, we had to shoot plenty. That meant paying the Taliban 15% of our total logistic costs as protection. Supposedly, lesson No.1 from Vietnam was not to plot action against tactical objective unless its backdrop is fully appreciated. Yet, once again, it was tactical objectives that became meaningless because there was no strategic tapestry against which to measure them. In contrast, British tactics in Malaya were always planned in context of an intel grasp of the enemy’s strategy and British counter-strategy. Had the military not been given a blank check by Congress, it would never have treated those two theaters as roulette tables where they could play any number blindly, any number of times, for any amount because the purse was limitless and so for sure we’ll eventually hit the big jackpot that more than makes up for all the blind losses.
Publius:
True but in their defense, we were probably close to their age when we figured that out… 😉
“MAC” McCallister:
He meant Eurocentric in the sense that we westerners tend to — logically if not wisely — restrict our doctrine and its lineage to the western experience. A few study Eastern warfare but the practice is not widespread, it’s not racist but it is probably intellectually lazy — and I’m as guilty as most…
Even here on the Small Wars Council where some do post accounts of Eastern operations, past and current, the threads are generally short and do not attract much comment.
@”MAC” McCallister
Oh no. I picked the incorrect word in using eurocentric. I don’t think the doctrine is racist and did not mean to imply that it is.
I meant roughly what Ken White stated in his comment @ 9:39.
It isn’t just about FM 3-24… The development of counterinsurgency as a set of doctrines and a set of policies has received very little scholarly attention… This may be the reason why you have received little response to your inquiry. FM 3-24 is just the latest publication in a long line of doctrinal templates drawing on American counterinsurgency/irregular warfare operations along the Western frontier, operations in the Philippines at the turn of the century, expeditions into Mexico, Nicaragua in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Greece and the Philippines in the late 1040s, and Vietnam in the 1960s – 1970.
This is very interesting. In fact, the entire thread is very educational. I’ve learned a lot.
Does American counterinsurgency doctrine have to be drawn from the template of American operations or can it be drawn from other operations too?
Are doctrines routinely examined at periodic intervals in order to incorporate the latest knowledge and is this appropriate or in the context of operations would this lead to too much confusion?
If I am trying to study a particular disease process I would want to collect as many patients for a study as I am able so that the power of my study is stronger. I am, perhaps, too concrete a thinker for some of this stuff.
That is what I meant by my comment above but didn’t state my point well.
Regarding the following comment by Chet:
While some knowledge may be cumulative (like the engineering sciences), I am quite skeptical about progressivism applying to complex war/operations (and what war is not complex?).
If knowledge about war is NOT progressive, then our dialog should shift significantly away from that paradigm.
The alternative may be a kind of idiographic form of knowledge (many anthropologists are comfortable with this view–their method is ethnographic — yielding “thick description”).
So in lieu of the never-ending quest for a context free science about war/COIN (or what ever category/taxonomy we make up to mimic a hard science), perhaps we need to concentrate on uniqueness, novelty, an locality.
In the first example, cumulative knowledge, shouldn’t we study as many examples as possible in order to develop the largest body of knowledge? Even if such knowledge is not cumulative, wouldn’t this give you more “options” to examine?
In the second example, one way to look at locality is to look at insurgencies in the region and that have some of the same “players.”
Anyway, that is what I meant but I am probably misunderstanding a lot.
Oops, forgot to thank zen for his response to my comments. Thanks.
Have we defined our terms with precision?
Interesting,zen .
“Whole of Government” is a pretty big and wide-ranging idea, isn’t it? I suppose there is potential for confusion if not carefully defined.
(RegardingPundita’s
Here is the news article:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110129/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan
Apologies for the improper html above.
Mahdu:
One way to perhaps think about the term “whole of government” is America’s conflicted view of empire and our role in it. One could argue that in pursuing “whole of government” by making all of the institutions of the American nation-state integrated and actionable in foreign lands we are actually talking about nothing more than establishing imperial institutions.
But of course in the American tradition, using the “I” word is politically incorrect, but that is essentially what “whole of government” is trying to achieve.
gian
darn it, so sorry Madhu, i spelled your name incorrectly in the above post.
sorry
gian
Much in PARAMETERS does an excellent job of describing what was in plain sight in all American COIN encounter, reiterating Col. Alderson’s prespective: US forces go in big, hoping to get a lot done in a little time. But the issue is one of topology, as made obvious in McChrystal’s map of blue dots for Obama. Commanders seem to have a hard time realizing that insurgents have legs and won’t stay put… indeed, like Mao, pre-plotted their escape route. And so, when we go in all guns blasting and leave, what have we done from the point of view of the passive “collaterals” we damaged? Doesn’t bigger firepower do bigger damage, surgery with an egg beater instead of a scalpel?
We always assumed that by rebuilding inanimate entities we get another chance, uor past bloody mistakes wiprd clean. But hate does not resolve like grief. It is stubborn and motivates and spreads like a virus, especially among co-ethnics. It’s then up to us “occupiers” to raise the ante (Hollywood’s productions more than make that case from history, over and over again– too often making us look like the good guys) which only means control through fear of retribution. Couteraction of the flea: an IED most often is without a signature; and if we take retribution on the basis of proximity to the blast, we’re sure to serve as the insurgent’s recruiter. It is then up to the insurgent to show that he can cause us damage that will be satisfying. We’re then left treating locals as bacteria, seeking to use our firepower as anticeptic. In the end, bacterias become ever “resistant”– the Taliban is a hell of a lot more resistant than were the Mujahidin– so that we exhaust ourselves killing insurgent that cost $2 to create with $2000 worth of resources (never considering how our Muslim “friends” fund the $2 cost of making an insurgent). Screwed from the rear by Wall Street, what’s the Pentagon to do?
No worries about the spelling.
Thanks for addressing my questions.
Brothers Madhu and Ken,
Apologize for the delay in responding to both your posts…
Thanks for the clarification…
Madhu… I definitely agree with your point that we should study other cultures and historically relevant operations other than Mao’s revolutionary warfare approach… as I make that same point more than most…
… but the point isn’t really studying other cultures and historical/relevant operations… the point, in my opinion, is to recognize the ideological and academic foundation of COIN… namely… political and economic development theory and its impact on execution. If social development, as I propose, is thought of as progressively linear (European tradition of social analysis, histoire raisonnee) then studying the Amir Abdur Rahman Khan’s approach to governance, Muhammad Ghori’s approach to coalition building and management or Joshua’s (of Jericho fame) approach to military campaigning is a waste of time… especially since we are now being told that we have finally found the philosopher’s stone for COIN… a universally applicable technical template to fix all that ails any given society, anywhere… anytime…
Many thanks for the conversation….
v/r
MAC
The Cause of All Problems: Certain states and societies do not have the correct political and economic framework with which to provide for their populations and with which to support the international community. This is the root cause of virtually all their problems and ours.
The Solution to All Problems: The United States must help these states and societies get rid of their old, outdated, obsolete and now harmful political and economic systems and, simultaneously, help them install a new political and economic order which we believe will better service and support, not only their states and societies, but also the United States and the international community generally.
State Difficulty, Conflict, Natural Disaster, Etc.: Magnificent opportunity — that the United States military and WOG organizations must be prepared to exploit — which we will use as a means/justification to help breach state sovereignty and intervene so as to cause/help these states and societies transform their economic and political models as we require.
United States Approach to COIN: Designed — not so much to quickly and effectively defeat the insurgency and then move on (leaving old political and economic order still in place and, thus, not dealing with “root causes”) — but rather to (1) exploit the opportunity presented by the conflict to (2) help states and societies get rid of their now-harmful political and economic models and help them install a political and economic model which we feel will better serve their and our interests. (And, by this specific action, achieve a “better peace.”)