Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula
Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula
Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse:
Understanding Them to Counter Them
by Colonel David S. Maxwell
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What is going to happen on the Korean Peninsula? This is the question that plagues policy makers, strategists, and military planners in the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States (US) and in Northeast Asia (NEA).
If this question can be answered, the next question is: How will the ROK, US and the international community deal with what happens on the Korean Peninsula?
The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the potential outcomes on the Korean Peninsula following either collapse of the Kim Family Regime or following conventional and unconventional conflict with north Korea as well as to examine some of the possible ways to prepare for and deal with those outcomes. While optimistic planners and policy makers hope for a co-called “soft landing” and peaceful reunification of the Peninsula, prudence calls for planning for the worse case scenarios. This contradicts the current focus of the United States on having to “win the wars it is currently fighting” as stated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). However, the worse case scenarios are, in the author’s opinion, at once both the most dangerous and the most likely threats in NEA and they should be considered. Therefore soft landing and peaceful reunification scenarios will not be addressed. (however, the author hopes they would become a reality). This paper is intentionally provocative, yet only focuses on one of the many complexities of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, namely Irregular Warfare.
Download the Full Article: Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula
Colonel David S. Maxwell is a US Army Special Forces officer with extensive experience in Asia to include Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, and the National War College, National Defense University. He is currently a member of the faculty at the National War College. The opinions expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not represent National Defense University, Department of Defense or U.S. Government positions.
Note: This paper will appear as a chapter in an upcoming book to be published by the Marine Corps University Foundation, edited by Dr. Bruce Bechtol.
A briefing that accompanies this paper can be found at the following link: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6891151/nK%20IW%20Threats%20Brief.pps
