Psychological Operations by another name are sweeter

by Christopher Paul

The Department of Defense has decided to change the name of military
psychological operations (PSYOP) and this is a good thing.  I make this
assertion despite concerns about the name change raised by others in this space
(See

The Branch Formerly Known as PSYOP and

PSYOP: On a Complete Change in Organization, Practice, and Doctrine).  

Although most psychological operations are no more than messages and
broadcasts aimed at changing the opinions, attitudes, or behavior of foreign
citizens, officials or troops, they have come to have a sinister connotation in
the minds of U.S. citizens and policymakers alike. The very term PSYOP summons
dark thoughts of orbital mind control lasers, dastardly propaganda, or
deception.

In truth, the vast majority of contemporary PSYOP are based on wholly
truthful information. PSYOP personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan prepare
air-dropped leaflets, develop posters and handbills, make radio broadcasts, and
operate loudspeaker trucks. They carry messages ranging from what enemy soldiers
should do in order to safely surrender (dropped as leaflets during the opening
days of the war in Iraq) — to posters or radio spots with the phone number for a
tip line Afghan citizens can use to report Taliban activity.  Changing the name
of these useful efforts is good; eliminating the possibility of them including
falsehood would be even better.

Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan show that the U.S. military needs
credible capabilities with which to inform, influence, and persuade foreign
audiences.  Popular support is essential in order to prevail in
counterinsurgency.  Effectively combating violent extremism requires changing
the attitudes of potential recruits and supporters along with arresting or
killing terrorists.  Psychological operations have made valuable contributions
in these areas, but not as much as they could have.

The misperception of PSYOP as deceptive and nasty has impaired Department of
Defense efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. This negative
attitude is held even within parts of the military itself.  Troops from public
affairs or civil affairs have sometimes been hesitant to work with PSYOP
personnel for fear of being tainted by their (imagined) black arts.  PSYOP are
most effective when fully coordinated with all the actions of friendly forces,
including maneuver and displays of might, but also with other communicators
(like public affairs), and doers of good deeds (like civil affairs).

Public and congressional support for PSYOP has lagged because of the
incorrect assumption that these operations are inherently insidious. Changing
the name from the menacing “psychological operations” to the more benign
“military information support operations,” with the friendlier acronym MISO,
should go some ways toward fixing the problem. As proof, note that PSYOP
personnel have been operating in support of U.S. embassies for several years as
Military Information Support Teams (MIST), receiving high marks from both
ambassadors and foreign service officers.  All these MIST activities are subject
to the approval of the ambassador, and are all required to be completely
truthful in both content and attribution.

However, there is more to be done beyond changing the name of psychological
operations. There is a reason that PSYOP has a sinister connotation.  Sure, some
of the distrust stems from the term itself, but some stems legitimately from the
range of capabilities and operations described in PSYOP doctrine and training,
and from things that may or may not have been done in the past.

While the U.S. military has never had mind control lasers, current PSYOP
doctrine does allow for the possibility of products and messages that are not
wholly true, or are made to appear as if they were written or published by
someone else.  Again, the vast majority of PSYOP are and have always been
completely truthful, but the possibility of them being otherwise is
there, which means that any PSYOP product could be less than wholesome.
That leads inexorably to mistrust of PSYOP.

The solution is simple. To protect military information support operations
from developing the same sort of taint that psychological operations now have,
they should be made unambiguously truthful.  PSYOP (now MISO) doctrine should be
rewritten to ban misleading or false content or disseminating messages with
false attribution.  Clear (and publicly stated) policies prohibiting falsehood
and MISO doctrine that is free from “black” tools and approaches will signal to
U.S. allies and target audiences alike that MISO personnel are honest, credible
and trustworthy sources of information. Credible sources are, after all, the
most persuasive. 

Of course, there may still be times when the Department of Defense wants and
needs to mislead or manipulate an enemy.  Most of these will be tactical and
short-term needs, and either directly protect the lives of U.S. forces or trick
adversaries into exposing themselves to harm, or both.  To preserve U.S.
credibility in those cases where “black” tools are necessary, they should be
separated completely from military information support so that MISO is never
touched by the taint of falsehood.

Commanders who desired such capability could employ it, but the “black” tools
would be separated with a policy firewall from truthful efforts to inform,
influence, and persuade.  This would promote greater collaboration with public
affairs and civil affairs, and would facilitate the realization of strategic
communication principles.  And, to keep things honest, the residual “black
toolkit” could be called something evil-sounding, like “deceptive manipulation”
or even…PSYOP.

Dr. Christopher Paul is a social scientist at the RAND Corporation, a
nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision-making through
research and analysis.  He is the author of
Whither Strategic
Communication?,

Information Operations – Doctrine and Practice, and co-author of
Enlisting Madison Avenue.