Luttwak’s Lament
I’d like to follow up Dave Kilcullen’s commentary about Dr. Luttwak’s specious article. Dr. Kilcullen is too much of a gentleman to suggest that someone has not taken their medication, yet he was far too gentle with the insidious notion that the writing team was advocating the moral equivalent of medical malpractice. (Full disclosure, I had a minor part in the production of the manual.) The new FM is a welcomed step forward, reflecting our current understanding of an increasingly complex and lethal mode of conflict. Dr. Luttwak may long for the gruesome effectiveness of “the Roman model,” but he has badly misdiagnosed the disease and his overemphasis on kinetic solutions reflects poorly on his grasp of history and a bad use of history out of context. The Romans were smart enough to minimize their footprint and maximized local leadership and control over government, taxes, and religion. The benefits or “carrots” of Roman rule were more obvious than its costs, but clearly the “stick” (more accurately the gladius and pilum) was available when necessary.
But to overlook the lessons of Algeria, Vietnam, and various Middle East conflicts is remarkably selective use of history. Now that’s malpractice in my book.
As Dr. Kilcullen noted, the field manual recognizes the increased requirement for discriminate force to remove irreconcilable extremists. What is does not do is justify the need to “out terrorize the terrorist” because we recognized that such an approach is utterly incongruous with modern environmental conditions, in particular, a global media presence and an enemy that is facile enough to exploit even the perception of excessive violence to its twisted ends.
There is much in the manual to discuss, while extremely useful is it not without shortcomings. Here I will part with David and argue that one issue that the manual does not satisfactorily address is the influence and impact of religion in today’s global insurgency. No one argues that religion is something entirely new as a factor in war. But present day Western societies seem to have lost any understanding of its influence on their own history, or how it may affect the behavior of other communities. I suspect that some of us too breezily see it as a proxy for a political ideology, while others are uncomfortable with the subject and ignore it. Others simply dismiss the theological or spiritual beliefs of others as an irrational element that cannot be accounted for.
But its rather difficult to over look religious influences today. Certainly, Islamic fundamentalism and an ongoing schism within Islam makes religion a relevant factor today. In fact, some feel like Col Mike Morris of the Marine Corps University faculty believe that “the rise of Islamic fascism, championed by groups such as al-Qa’ida, is the central strategic problem of the age.” Vali Nasr’s brilliant book The Shia Revival focuses useful light on the issue. Of course, authors and terrorism experts including Bruce Hoffman, Jessica Stern and Mark Juergensmeyer have been studying this issue for some time.
A number of studies at RAND and at Harvard have attempted to come to grips with what appears to be an important cause or influence in human conflict. The literature on terrorism clearly documented a dramatic rise in the religious affiliation of terrorist organizations. A generation ago none of the eleven international terrorist organizations was religiously oriented. By 2004, nearly half of the world’s identifiable and active terrorist groups are classified as religious. Today, the vast majority of terrorist groups using suicide attacks are Islamic, displacing secular groups like the Tamil Tigers. Furthermore, religiously-oriented organizations account for a disproportionately high percentage of attacks and casualties.
History suggests that religious influences can escalate the forms, levels, and types of violence. Religion lowers inhibitions and reduces moral barriers to violence, including suicide terrorism. This results in more frequent attacks, greater and longer battles, and more casualties. Religious-based conflicts tend to made it difficult to attain any political compromise or settlements. Not surprisingly, according to a detailed analysis by Dr. Monica Duffy Toft at Harvard, religious civil wars last longer (roughly two years longer) than the average intrastate conflict, and produce four times as many total casualties.
But for all the discussion about religion today, the new manual misses out on the influence of the subject. The introductory chapter mentions religious identity and “religious extremism” as a modern day complication. But the manual offers few indications that our Classical approach, the product of the anti-colonial Revolutionary War ere remains just as valid without any change. The manual alters its emphasis on non-kinetic factors and its numerous admonitions about violence with the admission that “killing extremists will be necessary.” This does not satisfy the blood lust of Dr. Luttwak apparently. But I am concerned that our fundamental approach, based on Western rationalism and material or economic considerations, is not as universal as we think and may have to be altered in some way when we are competing for perceptions, legitimacy and populations against religious-based groups or among a population that is significantly represented by and identifies with a specific religion.
The new manual’s operational approach never deviates from the classical era. Galula, Templar, Thompson and Kitson would be right at home. It never acknowledges that these guidelines blithely assume a population whose value systems are like ours, whose fundamental concepts about political order are consistent with representative democracy, universal individual rights and free market economies. But if the population’s belief system is opposed to our approach, or longs for a return to the 7th century, is Galula still relevant or do we need to listen to Dr. Luttwak with more than a curt dismissal?
Religiously inspired or influenced conflicts may alter our usual prescriptions for counterinsurgency. Economic inducements and marginal material gains may not overcome someone’s sacred faith, grasp of life’s meaning, or strong sense of identity. School houses, soccer balls and smiles are not enough. Far too much of our theory is based within a Western mindset and assumes the existence of some cost-benefit calculation of self-interest that may not transcend all civilizations and cultures. Indeed, unconventional warfare theorists like Steve Metz of the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute have noted that traditional “hearts and minds” approach may pertain only to national insurgents, and could be irrelevant or even counter-productive to postmodern global insurgents.
Whatever we chose to call it, the Long War has a religious element that is powerful. We need to better understand when and under what circumstances our comprehensive approach works and where it does not. The new Field Manual is a long series of strides forward, but it does not address this contemporary element satisfactorily in my opinion. I look forward to this forum’s commentary to see if additional light can be shed on this issue.
