Why This Is Not A New Cold War

Ruben Velez

During the 52nd Munich Security Conference on February 13, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev stated recent international developments have pushed the United States and Russia “into a new cold war”. The alarmist statement reflects the deterioration of the relationship between Russia and the West, which has accelerated in recent years due to disagreements over the future of Ukraine and Syria, the US development and fielding of Ballistic Missile Defense systems, and nuclear force modernization in both countries. Given these are some of the most complex challenges currently facing the world, some may find it easy to agree with Mr. Medvedev’s statement. But those with a deeper understanding of the Cold War will not buy into this proclamation so easily. Today’s strategic stance between the United States and Russia is different, by an order of magnitude, from that of the Cold War years. While during the Cold War years the United States and the Soviet Union enjoyed similar levels of international influence, economic power, and military might, today’s Russia pales in comparison to the former Soviet Union, especially as it now relates to the United States. 

There are those that may interpret Russian military adventurism in Ukraine and Syria as proof that we are in a new Cold War environment. Looking back at the Cold War, however, we can see the struggles between the superpowers were greater in scope and farther in reach. Except for the non-aligned movement that took hold in the 1960s, a large number of countries around the world fell under the influence of one of the two blocks. A government that proclaimed itself democratic would almost immediately fall into the fold of the United States, and could reasonably expect to be supported economically and in some cases militarily by it. The opposite holds true for the Soviet Union and communist states. Today’s Russia hardily has the wherewithal and influence to influence states at the same level that its predecessor did. Moreover, the titanic clash of communism versus democracy no longer exists. In Ukraine, Russia may seek a buffer zone from the West on its borders, while also attempting to bring ethnic Russian populations under its umbrella. In Syria, Russia’s aim may be related to preserving access to the Mediterranean Sea and maintaining a loyal ally in the region. While these actions have understandably placed Russia at odds with the United States and other Western nations, they hardly compare with the placement of short-range nuclear missiles 90 miles from United States territory or the carte blanche support of communists in Latin America, Africa, and Europe. To elaborate this further, let’s look at how both countries compare in some key aspects both then and now.

In terms of territory, the Soviet Union may have been considered the largest state in the world. Now, not only has Russia lost de facto control of 14 other states, but the United States and its allies at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have grown from 16 states at the end of the Cold War to 28 now; 10 of those were previously part of the Soviet Union. Population increase in the United States—a key component of economic growth—has risen from approximately 158 million in 1950 to over 324 million now, or over a 105% growth. In contrast, Russian population has grown from about 103 million to 143 million, or approximately a 38% increase. Worse for Russia, its population has stopped growing since the year 2000 and it’s expected to shrink for years to come. Also striking is the current economic picture between both nations. In 2015, US Gross Domestic Product stood at 28% of the world economy, while Russia’s stood at a significantly smaller 3%. The Russian economy is suffering from the double whammy of extremely low energy prices, which account for the majority of the country’s export revenues, and Western sanctions.

A country in the midst of a severe economic downturn with little relief in sight, dwindling material resources, and a reduced sphere of influence at the international stage can’t expect to replicate the bi-polar power relationship that existed in the latter half of the previous century, as much as its leaders want to proclaim so. One area that may support the Russian leadership “new Cold War” narrative, however, is that of nuclear strategic weapons. Thanks to the various arms control agreements, strategic nuclear arsenals for both states are much lower than they were in the midst of the Cold War. Throughout these arsenal reductions, Russia and the United States have maintained strategic parity in numbers to maintain the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. That said, Russia’s nuclear arsenal has not been able to escape the systemic economic problems outlined above. While the United States is pressing forward with the biggest nuclear weapon systems buildup since the Cold War, Russia has cancelled its feared rail-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) weapon system project due to budgetary pressures. The revival of Russia’s rail-mobile ICBMs would’ve complicated the United States’ targeting solutions in the event of nuclear conflict. Moreover, Russian leaders have expressed grave concerns about the US’ development of ballistic missile defenses, and will feel obligated to develop weapons systems to counter them. These ambitions, nevertheless, as those of the rail-mobile ICBM before it, are poised to crash against the wall of economic reality. In spite of these difficulties, it would be unrealistic to expect Russian strategic and conventional forces to undergo severe atrophy. After all, Russia has historically prioritized its defense budget over other types of spending, and its military forces remain a focal point of national pride. But for its leaders to declare that a new Cold War is upon us is more than a stretch. If that was the case, this new Cold War is over before it began. With his statement, the Russian Prime minister may have sought to link current Russia with Soviet Russia to influence the narrative and modify Western actions. Western nations may face new challenges with regards to Russia and its current geopolitical ambitions, but equating these to the trials of the Cold War would only feed the desire of the current Russian leadership to feel they are as mighty and influential as they once were. His statement is politically clever, as it’s doubtful that many in the Western world yearn to return to the high-tension years of the Cold War era. For the informed, however, this is little more than verbal aggrandizement shrouded in nostalgia.