Did Obama Lay the Path to Afghanistan Peace Talks?

Gary Anderson

In 2012, I was talking to the American and Afghan commanders on our forward operating base in western Afghanistan where I was the senior American civilian advisor. I observed “you guys ban dogs, sex, and booze (referring to the military’s General Order Number One which prohibits all three). The Taliban don’t like sex, alcohol and dogs either; what are you fighting about?” The question was only partly tongue in cheek, and given President Obama’s recent decision to keep 8400 troops in Afghanistan for the remainder of his term; it is still relevant. The recent ISIS bombing attack in Kabul that killed scores should give Afghans on both sides of the conflict pause to ask what the fighting is really about.

Until September 11^th 2001, we considered the Taliban regime that was running Afghanistan at the time to be distasteful, but their religious approach to Sharia Law was not all that dissimilar to that of our Saudi allies; there was no hue and cry for a Taliban ouster. It was not until we discovered that the 9/11 attacks were conceived and organized from al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan that we decided that the Taliban had to be deposed to deny such sanctuaries to al Qaeda in the future. Fifteen years later, our rationale is the same, and we believe that propping up the marginally democratic regime in Kabul still requires our presence.

The Taliban for their part demand that all foreign military forces leave the country, conveniently ignoring the fact that their former leader’s invitation to foreign jihadists was what started the war in the first place. Perhaps it is time for all parties to the conflict to revisit the causes for war and chart a possible path to peace. ISIS is as much a threat to the Taliban as it is to the Afghan government.

At the present time, we are at an impasse. The Taliban are not strong enough to take the major cities such as Kabul, Herat, and Mazar al Sharif. Likewise, Afghan government forces, even with American airpower and commando support, cannot take back the Pashtun majority border areas that still may shelter foreign jihadists. Ironically, the only people who can accomplish our original aim of getting rid of the foreign jihadists are the Taliban themselves. It would seem to me that there is room for compromise here.

The fly in the ointment is money. The reality is that U.S. military presence has become a “for profit” enterprise for senior Afghans on both sides of the conflict. American money encourages corruption that helps grease skids among politicians, generals, and warlords; while the war gives cover for the drug trade which enriches senior Taliban operatives, corrupt police, and the above mentioned warlords. Peace does not have a lot of senior Afghan advocates on either side of the battle lines. Without us, the war will be a lot less profitable for Afghan elites on both sides.

That does not mean that there is no room for a peace settlement that calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces; that is because both sides could claim some form of victory. By leaving a residual American force in the country, President Obama has given his successor a bargaining chip for future negotiations. There will still be fighting, but the opponents will be different.

What might such an agreement look like? It would be one that gives the Taliban status of a legal political movement in return for their help in expelling foreign jihadists. In turn, we would agree to the withdrawal of American and NATO forces. That is about the best the Taliban can hope for. They will never be able to retake the major cities or the northern and western lands controlled by the warlords of the old Northern alliance. However, it is entirely possible that many of the Pashtun districts, perhaps several provinces, of the southern border regions would vote for Taliban style Sharia rule.

The Afghan government would no doubt demand some kind of assurance of American support if the Taliban renege on the agreement and that is something we are capable of promising. The irony here is that the Taliban might not object to the possibility of an American return. The presence that the Islamic State has established in the country will likely not go quietly into the night. American support to roust the Islamists might eventually be welcomed by the anti-foreign Taliban. Americans may despise the Taliban but ISIS makes them look like choirboys.

Can Putin's Aircraft Carrier Stay Afloat on Its Syria Mission? By Paul McLeary, Foreign Policy

The last time Russia’s sole aircraft carrier sailed into the Mediterranean Sea, five years ago, the U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet kept a close eye on its progress. The concern among American officers wasn’t the ship’s contingent of fighter planes; instead, it was the very real worry it would sink and necessitate a potentially risky rescue operation.

The 26-year-old Admiral Kuznetsov made it through that 2011 deployment without sinking and is now headed back to the eastern Mediterranean this fall as part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s effort to use Syria as a showcase for his new model military. But the earlier worries were plenty valid: On a 2009 Mediterranean transit, one sailor died when the vessel caught fire, and the ship accidentally dumped tons of fuel into the sea in a refueling mishap. And those accidents aren’t outliers. The problems with the ship are so widespread, and so expected, that the flattop has to be shadowed by tugs to tow it to port when it predictably breaks down.

But now the Kuznetsov has a slate of different objectives in mind. The ship will begin launching airstrikes on behalf of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a Russian ally. It will be the carrier’s first-ever combat deployment and the first combat test of its MiG-29K fighter jets. It will also offer the first and perhaps best chance to showcase the carrier-based fighters’ capabilities to potential clients such as India, which already operates a Russian-built carrier and which has purchased dozens of MiG-29s over the last decade…

Read on.

How Defense Dollars Are Wasted on Security Assistance

Current U.S. security assistance programs are ineffective, and often undermine American security, according to a new report from National Center for Policy Analysis Senior Fellow David Grantham and Research Associate Braxton Clark.

The Defense Department alone administers over 60 different security assistance programs totaling anywhere from $1 billion to $10 billion in the proposed FY2017 NDAA. Giving the Pentagon greater control might “add clarity to an otherwise murky disbursement process shared between the State and Defense departments,” write Grantham and Clark.

“The real concern is U.S. defense spending in areas where the costs clearly outweigh the benefits,” says Grantham. “Given the growing threats and financial constraints of the military, Congress should consider reallocating those billions of dollars spent on training and equipping other countries to mission-critical areas within the U.S. military.”

The bottom line: Money can – and should – be spent more wisely. Congress should consider reallocating the money elsewhere in the cash-strapped U.S. military by:

• Trimming money given directly to Somali and Nigerian forces;
• Encouraging greater reliance on U.N. Peacekeeping Operations — of which the United States funds nearly 30 percent, or $8.27 billion in 2015-2016; and
• Conducting an audit of existing programs.

“The proposed changes to the National Defense Authorization Act would give the Pentagon greater control over security assistance program it shares with the state department,” says Grantham. “The latest iteration of the NDAA is a welcome change and a step in the right direction.”

Read the full report.

Leaving the “Gray Zone”: The U.S. Need to Fight Aggression Below Conventional War

 Lauren Fish

The Commander-in-Chief Forum featuring Secretary Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump’s thoughts on national security missed an opportunity to engage the candidates on the gray zone tactics China and Russia are using to advance their agendas. Gray zone tactics represent asymmetric actions of many forms that do not trigger a robust adversarial response while still generating strategic gains. These states have acquired territory and expanded their influence, both politically and the physical range of their advanced weaponry, using “salami slicing” in recent years. Deterring these tactics requires comprehensive strategies. Gray zone tactics will be one of the most daunting policy challenges facing the next President of the United States. The next President, regardless of party, must have a plan.

Increasingly, Russia and China are making major strategic shifts using incremental gains without triggering conflict. Russia’s annexation of Crimea demonstrates their effective use of gray zone tactics, to include incremental paramilitary advances and political messaging. Chinese land fortifications in the South China Sea also followed a pattern of incremental advance, and responses after the arbitration ruling will be critical in setting precedents. The fielding last month of Russia’s modern S-300 air defense system (sold to Iran in 2007 but initially cancelled in 2010) to Iran’s Fordow nuclear site and in Syria demonstrates similar piecemeal advances that could become a headache for the United States in the future. Both states have increased their military aggression, recently conducting dangerous air and sea maneuvers close to, and at times directly over, U.S. planes and ships.

If the next President lacks a clear vision of how to deter these types of gray zone tactics, there is risk for policy failure. Determining future policy options requires assessing the increasing use of these tactics by China and Russia, who have both demonstrated a propensity to make incremental gains that stay beneath the threshold for a U.S. military response. Successes of this type are not new to military history but the recent and increasing trend in frequency requires a framework for response.

Gray zone tactics are intended to operate below the threshold for retaliation, utilizing incremental advances to gradually degrade an opponent’s ability to respond. The tactics’ intentionally ambiguous nature are exacerbated by a U.S. military culture that operates best in decisive conventional warfare, known in military circles as “Phase III operations,” and struggles to operate in an ambiguous game of competition at a level below outright conflict. Gray zone tactics also encompass a range of activities including economic, political, and information operations reflecting a whole-of-government effort to create a narrative. Organized Russian propaganda campaigns demonstrate the complexity of this challenge.

Staying below the threshold for response can be done by either taking small actions that do not necessitate responses or creating justifications for behavior out of alignment with international norms, including through nonmilitary means such as political messaging. By ignoring their behavior, the user of these tactics can make advances at no cost.

These tactics embody Thomas Schelling’s “game of chicken” that is tempting to ignore but ultimately unavoidable. The United States cannot guarantee we will determine the timing of escalating tensions or dictate the terms under which other states operate. Potential adversaries will always take actions that are in their interests, and the strength of the U.S. military nearly ensures other actors will seek to challenge asymmetrically instead of running into the buzz saw of American conventional power.

In international relations, appearance is a big part of reality. Tepid responses indicate acceptance of the other’s actions. The Obama administration has failed to clearly respond to salami slicing by opponents. A weak U.S. response to the Russian land grab in Crimea benefits Russian narratives and expansionist aims while degrading a long-held international norm of sovereignty. Similarly, conducting “innocent passage” instead of Freedom of Navigation exercises can de facto authenticate Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea. It is not surprising the Assad regime in Syria is using chemical weapons again after providing a get-out-of-jail-free-card in response to the violated “red line” in 2013. Policy decisions matter to potential adversaries and have significant effects on constraining future choices.

Today’s most powerful adherents to a gray zone strategy, China and Russia, are also those most likely to pose a possible high-end fight. Maintaining a strong conventional military will remain important in the event deterrence fails or miscalculation occurs and conflict breaks out. This does not mean, however, that each undesired action is met with the whole force of the U.S. military. U.S. responses can take many forms, all of which should focus on enforcing international norms and maintaining U.S. credibility. This complexity increases the need for well-considered policy from our Presidential candidates.

Gray zone tactics only work as long as we are willing to look the other way. Sweeping a potential adversary’s actions under the rug is the exact opposite of the desired response. The new President will need to have a plan to address these tactics without unnecessarily escalating tensions – a tightrope, to be sure, but a necessary one to avoid conflict.