The existing literature tends to characterize proxy warfare as a form of warfare exclusively employed by states, in particular, global powers and regional actors. Today, however, proxy warfare is conducted not only by states but also by politically motivated non-state armed actors. Therefore, current understandings of proxy warfare do not provide a sufficient framework to explain this non-traditional form of proxy warfare. This article examines and analyzes non-state-led proxy warfare. Thinking about non-state-led proxy warfare matters because it reveals that non-state actor can attain their political objectives without carrying out terrorist or guerilla-style attacks. This may necessitate reviewing current strategies used to negate non-state threats, which are quite counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency-centric. The main purpose of this article is to explore some patterns regarding non-state-led proxy warfare, and so, to find out whether, and if so, how it differs from state-led proxy warfare. For these purposes, this paper uses two case studies: al-Qaeda’s sponsorship of the Caucasus Emirate and Hezbollah’s support of Yemeni Houthis. This article argues that although there are significant differences between the capabilities, organizational structures, and organizational cultures of state and non-state actors, and thus, how they use these to carry out proxy warfare, non-state-led proxy warfare is, in substance, not that different from state-led proxy warfare.