Journal

by Tristan Abbey and Scott Palter

Download The Full Article: Turmoil in North Africa: Lessons for European Defense

That the second decade of the 21st-century will end with neither Ben Ali in charge of Tunisia nor Hosni Mubarak ruling in Egypt should come as no surprise. After all, the former was born in 1936, the latter in 1928. The ancient Roman poet Horace reminds us: "Pale death, impartial, he walks his round; he knocks at cottage-gate and palace-portal." Whether by revolution, orderly succession, or a knock at the door, both men were bound to pass from the scene in the near future.

Amid all the analysis and projections--about the Muslim Brotherhood, the potential domino effect throughout the Muslim world, prospects for Israel and the United States, and so forth--recent events should also provide a warning to European defense planners. The scenes on the streets of Cairo could be repeated across the Maghreb in the coming years. Given global economic turbulence and volatile commodity prices, buying off the huddled masses in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya may prove beyond the power of those regimes. Political collapse in those countries--or in Tunisia and Egypt, down the road--could spark an exodus of refugees heading north, far worse than the present situation in places like Malta, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Imagine hundreds of thousands of desperate people setting sail in anything that floats and heading for the nearest European shore.

Download The Full Article: Turmoil in North Africa: Lessons for European Defense

Tristan Abbey, a graduate of Georgetown's Security Studies Program, and Scott Palter, president of Final Sword Productions, are senior editors at Bellum: A Project of The Stanford Review.

Why Democratic Realpolitik is Essential

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Download the full article: Realism, Idealism, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Islamic World

Enough comment and critical debate has been generated by the essay Why We Should Support Democratic Revolution in the Islamic World to warrant further elaboration on the themes it contains and why support of the despotic status quo in the Islamic World is not only morally unacceptable but, more importantly for many of the Small Wars Journal readership, no longer rational from the perspective of realpolitik and purely selfish U.S. interests at home and abroad. The latter concern shall be addressed first since those who are presently students of insurgency and foreign policy tend to focus on realism— how things really are— over idealism—how things can or should be. The elements of national power and morality should be complimentary to one another in U.S. foreign policy but for many reasons, including our increasing loss of political and economic dominance, the balance has overwhelmingly shifted to the primacy of retaining power, ultimately coercive military capability, coupled with that of promoting corporate profit and the American standard of living.

The prevailing foreign policy lesson learned over the last half-century is that a friendly despot in control is worth far more than a potential democratic leader (representative of a free and open society) waiting to arise because of the high political risks involved. The potentials for a belligerent Ayatollah (representative of a hostile theocracy) replacing an allied Shah are simply too great to accept. This is representative of the basic cost-benefit foreign policy calculation that now dominates. We have been conditioned to participate in a long running zero-sum game. In this game, the U.S. people and its government benefit as do our autocratic client states, including the foreign despots, and elites and cronies who surround them. The fact that we damn the peoples who live under these friendly despotic regimes to a form of governance devoid of our basic freedoms and political rights is viewed as an acceptable form of collateral damage. Many would say these peoples—such as the Egyptians— are better off under such 'fatherly and benign rulers' as Hosni Mubarak. Far better him and his cronies than the monster hiding in the closet—the Muslim Brotherhood— who would not only make life worse for the common Egyptian but would immediately renounce peace with Israel and would also put the U.S. in its gunsights. From a status quo U.S. foreign policy perspective, things have pretty much been figured out—U.S. interests are best served by this method of cost-benefit analysis.

Download the full article: Realism, Idealism, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Islamic World

Dr. Robert J. Bunker is a frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal. He has over 200 publications including Non-State Threats and Future Wars (editor); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (editor); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (editor); and Narcos Over the Border (editor). He can be reached at bunker@usc.edu.

by Michael Horowitz

Download the full article: Maintaining American Military Power In an Age of Uncertainty

2011 is a critical year for the American military. With President Obama's original July 2011 deadline for assessing American progress in Afghanistan rapidly approaching, it makes sense to take a step back and think about the next steps for the American military. Sharp disagreements exist between those who believe that the United States should optimize its military for future counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns like Afghanistan and Iran, and those who believe the United States should focus instead on its conventional capabilities. The decisions the United States makes now will influence its defense posture and military capabilities for the next generation.

This dialogue is taking place under the shadow of growing national debt and a lagging American economy, which will make the decisions taken over the next few years all the more important. Yet at the same time, the future is extremely difficult to predict. Predictions about the future of warfare are much more likely to end up in the dustbin of history than to accurately inform policy makers and planners.

One way to think about how the United States can position itself in future security environments and maintain operational flexibility involves understanding the financial and organizational requirements for adopting new military innovations, an approach called adoption capacity theory. In combination with the security environment, the adoption capacity constraints associated with potential changes in the character of warfare shape the costs and benefits of different response strategies for both state and non-state actors. We can predict the choices states make in response to a new innovation and the likely implications for the international security environment by focusing on the capacity of states to successfully meet the resource mobilization challenges and the organizational changes required to adopt a new innovation.

Download the full article: Maintaining American Military Power In an Age of Uncertainty

Michael Horowitz is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. This article is drawn from his book, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). Thanks to Frank Hoffman, Michael Noonan, 1st Lt Frank Furman (USMC) and 2nd Lt Nicholas Francona (USMC) for their excellent suggestions.

Interview with Jeffrey Dressler

An Interim Assessment on the Campaign

for Regaining the Momentum in Helmand Province

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: 

Interview

with Jeffrey Dressler

Jeffrey Dressler is a Research Analyst at the

Institute for the Study of War

(ISW) where he studies security dynamics in southeastern and southern Afghanistan.

He has previously published the ISW report,

Counterinsurgency in Helmand: Progress and Remaining Challenges (January

2011). Dressler was invited to Afghanistan in July 2010 to join a team conducting

research for General David Petraeus following his assumption of command.

How would you diagnose the COIN efforts and the on the ground developments

before summer 2009?

Primarily, I would say that the effort was under-resourced from the beginning

of 2006 up until 2009. I would also point to a lack of strategic clarity in terms

of the objectives that were being pursued. The forces, lacking the resources and

the mandate to really operate in an aggressive manner, were unable to address the

enemy situation and instead were focusing on reconstruction and development as the

means to win over the population.

Download the full article: 

Interview

with Jeffrey Dressler

Improving Combat Advising to Strengthen Partnering with Afghan National Security Forces

by James Cowan, Nengyalai Amalyar and Mohammad Mustafa

Download The Full Article: Motivational Interviewing

Standing up a professional Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is central to establishing a secure and more stable Afghan nation, and combat advising, as provided by US and coalition forces, is foundational to establishing a strong partnership with our ANSF brethren. Effective partnering, in turn, is critical to developing a capable and enduring ANSF. Given historical and evolving challenges and the contemporary importance of combat advising across US military operations, continuing efforts are necessary for further strengthening and preparing combat advisors to advise, coach, mentor, teach and partner with host nation security forces most recently in Afghanistan.

It is well understood that a strong partnership between combat advisors and their host nation security forces advisee is indispensable to supporting the ANSF's readiness, willingness and ability to ac-complish their security mission. During the U.S. Army Foreign Security Forces (FSF) Combat Advisor Course and through the literature, advisors assigned to Afghanistan are told anecdotally that establishing an effective partnership depends on a number of essential elements such as developing rapport and respect, building trust, sharpening skills of persuasion, exercising patience, effecting empowerment, learning some Dari or Pashtu, and employing cultural awareness and competency while advising, training and conducting operations.

Download The Full Article: Motivational Interviewing

Lt Col James Cowan, United States Air Force, is assigned to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan as a Medical and Preventive Medicine Combat Advisor to the Afghan National Police 606th Zone Headquarters and Afghan National Army (ANA) Herat Regional Military Hospital, respectively. In 2005, he served as the Preventive Medicine Advisor to the ANA Office of the Surgeon General, Preventive Medicine Directorate. Lt Col Cowan is a graduate of The University of Tennessee-Knoxville College of Veterinary Medicine with a Doctorate of Veterinary Medicine and an Air Force Institute of Technology Scholarship graduate of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill UNC Gillings School of Global Public Health with a Masters of Science in Public Health in Health Behavior and Health Education.

CPT Nengyalai Amalyar, Afghan National Army, is assigned to the Herat Regional Military Hospital and has served for the past two years as Chief, Preventive Medicine Department and as an internal medicine physician. He graduated from Nangarhar Medical School with a Doctor of Medicine (MD) degree.

1LT Mohammad Mustafa, Afghan National Army, is assigned to the Herat Regional Military Hospital where he has served as Deputy Chief, Preventive Medicine Department for five years. He is a graduate of the Medical Intermediate Institute, Ministry of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

A Threat to ISAF COIN Implementation

by James Sisco

Download The Full Article: Karzai's Governing Strategy

Karzai's initial governing strategy, focused at centralizing power within the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), has failed. He perceives that US and international com-munity support for his regime is eroding. Therefore, Karzai is systematically build-ing a coalition of regional powerbrokers in preparation for a post-American Afghanistan. By strategically reshuffling provincial, district, and ministerial positions, Karzai is gradually reproducing the powerbrokers' political and economic patronage structures he tried for seven years to displace with his own. He is doing so to create the political space required to maintain his family's influence beyond the 2014 elections or to exit the presidency intact.

Implementing this strategy allows President Karzai to achieve his objectives due to three effects. First, and most importantly, he begins to break his dependence on the international community for his administration's survival. Second, he is able to leverage remaining international assistance to secure continued powerbroker interest in the short-term viability of GIRoA. Finally, Karzai can choose to reconcile with the Taliban to reinforce his bargaining position. This new Karzai governing strategy mitigates the conse-quences of the impending decline in international support, though at the expense of the Afghan population and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counterinsurgency (COIN) implementation.

An effective counter to Karzai's power sharing strategy is a bottom-up, grass roots COIN implementation that directs international resources toward village-level and civil society capacity. GIRoA, the Taliban, and local powerbrokers have very little legitimacy with the population. Building legitimate, accountable governance capacity at the village level buys ISAF valuable time for reform efforts to take hold. Rebalancing Afghan society, so that the local areas exert more influence and checks on powerbrokers and GIRoA, stands to make the entire political structure more accountable.

Download The Full Article: Karzai's Governing Strategy

LCDR James Sisco is an Afghan Hand currently serving in Afghanistan at ISAF HQ within the Force Reintegration Directorate. He previously serviced in Afghanistan in 2005-2006 as the military liaison for President Karzai. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of ISAF, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Necessary Exclusion of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

by Adam E. MacAllister

Download The Full Article: Unnecssary Evil

The policy of reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan is not a new concept, but in 2010 it has received renewed emphasis. This, in large part, is due to NATO's acceptance of President Hamid Karzai's withdrawal timeline -- a timeline that advocates 2014 as the final year of Coalition occupation. Focusing on Afghanistan's future takes the casual observer in many directions that includes an analysis of economic matters, geo-political alliances, and the daunting potential of a reinvigorated extremist presence inside of the country. Additionally, given the importance of cultural geography, it can be argued that another significant factor is being purposefully overlooked. The critical factor in question is the close examina-tion of the key players associated with the current Afghan reconciliation and reintegration program. And yet, it is believed that "absent a viable, broad-based reintegration and reconciliation plan, the Afghan conflict will not end within a politically acceptable timeframe."

Well articulated by Dr. Amin Tarzi, director of Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University, the current reconciliation and reintegration program, originally articulated in the Bonn Agreement of 2001, has suffered continuous ambiguity, an absence of clear objectives, and competing, if not contradictory, efforts by ISAF and Afghan Government officials. This point is made even more salient by the recent imposter who posed as the number two Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, who received an audience with the Afghan President and intelligence officials. Consequences of events such as these could precipitate the undesired movement towards personali-ties for which we are historically familiar. Specifically, a reliance on the personality of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar could be a par-ticularly fateful decision by Afghan and ISAF leaders.

The reintegration and reconciliation process is a critical element in the long-term success of Afghanistan. The process relies upon prudent decision making, which potentially runs counter to a socio-political environment that is seeking immediate successes to bolster its strength and legitimacy. The purpose of this paper is to inform the reader of the historical role that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has played in the history of Afghanistan and demonstrate why his exclusion from the current reconciliation and reintegration efforts is absolutely critical to the long-term objectives of Afghanistan and the region. This is a matter of pragmatism and not one of social relativism or mirror imaging.

There are many who believe that as a foreigner it is our obligation to appreciate and accept the cultural norms in Afghanistan that cater to survival and the attainment of power. In 1857, Joseph Ferrier described this pension for reinvention best when he said, "they will change their protectors as often as it suits them; for fear and the greed of gain are the only motives which influence their conduct, but they rarely pay their tribute to whichever suzerain they attach themselves for the time." He then continued, saying that this trait "has existed from the earliest times, and will certainly be the same a thousand years hence."

Download The Full Article: Unnecssary Evil

CPT Adam MacAllister is an Active Duty Infantry Officer currently assigned to the Institute of World Politics and has served in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Small Wars Journal's

January 2011 issue (Vol. 7 No. 1) is

now available. Click

here for the full issue, or directly on the titles below for single

articles.

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download The Full Article: The Closers (Part 1): How Insurgencies End

In my last experience in Iraq, I was one of the civilian closers who participated in the turnover of primary responsibility for counterinsurgency operations to the Iraqis. This series is based on my observations, and experience as well as research and comparison of notes with other veterans of the transition.

Download The Full Article: The Closers (Part 1): How Insurgencies End

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Counterinsurgency from 2003-05. He served on an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq in 2009-10, and is currently an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Relations.

Below and Beyond the State: Incorporating Non-State Systems to Build Stronger States

by Mark Massey

Download the Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (III)

This series urges a fundamental reconsideration of traditional state building approaches. As the second article argued, these traditional approaches perpetrate two fundamental mistakes: 1) they reproduce centralized, top-heavy states when they should cultivate decentralized, local governance; and 2) they ignore the very systems that millions of Africans choose over the state. This third article expands upon this by exploring the implications of "non-state systems," i.e. non-state structures, networks and complexes that provide economic, social and/or political services in cases of state collapse/failure. The emergence of such systems is an overlooked and under-researched trend. Analysts typically dismiss them as temporary, criminal offshoots of anarchy. But this is premature and erroneous. These systems are often emerging orders that challenge fundamental assumptions about state-society relations. The article identifies a number of non-state complexes across Africa, with a focus on Somaliland in Northern Somalia. Though Somalia is assumed to be a vacuum of violent anarchy, Somaliland's extra-state "governance without government" is organically evolving from the bottom-up and is surprisingly peaceful and democratic—especially when compared to conflict-torn Southern Somalia. This article hopes to highlight both the dangers and potentials such systems hold. Thus far we have ignored these non-state complexes to our own detriment. However, they could greatly facilitate effective, bottom-up, decentralized state building.

Download the Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (III)

Mark Massey, Jr. works for The Louis Berger Group, Inc., an engineering and economic development firm focusing on stabilization and reconstruction programs in conflict countries. He holds an MA in International Conflict Studies from the University of London's King's College and a BA in Political Science and History from McGill University.

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Download The Full Article: Why We Should Support Democratic Revolution in the Islamic World

Recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen have caught senior U.S. policymakers off guard like a herd of deer frozen in the headlights of a big rig barreling down the highway. The State Department contingency plan now appears to be to pretend to play the middle in the media—between the democratic yearnings of the mob and the longing looks of friendly despots— while privately clinging to principals of realpolitik. Calls for democratic freedoms and reforms to be implemented in Egypt, the true center of gravity for the Arab region, are being made but they are no more than hallow exaltations.

The U.S. has the bad habit of backing corrupt despots and the ruling families and elites that support them. Who can forget the Ngo family in South Vietnam, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, and General Manuel Noreiga in Panama? As long as this general or that ruler is —to back our foreign policies in the region of concern, we turn a blind eye to inequality, authoritarianism, torture, rigged voting, and other abuses. If they should dare to cross us, however, then all bets are off and they may just find themselves dead or rotting in a jail cell for the rest of their lives. International relations is much like a knife fight— outside help is always welcome, little thought is given to the baggage that may come with offers of support, and you had always better watch your back. Ultimately, these friendly despots and their cronies are 'not our friends' and definitely not 'legitimately elected leaders'. We also tend to get morally tainted by our relations with these types; not that our silver-tongued diplomats would give this a second thought. Realpolitik requires sacrifices and morality quickly becomes relative and squishy to the policy being implemented or crisis now at hand.

Download The Full Article: Why We Should Support Democratic Revolution in the Islamic World

Dr. Robert J. Bunker is a frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal. He has over 200 publications including Non-State Threats and Future Wars (editor); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (editor); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (editor); and Narcos Over the Border (editor). He can be reached at bunker@usc.edu.

The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict

By Dr. Russell W. Glenn, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions.

This study, sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular Warfare Center, has been approved for public release. To the best of our knowledge, Small Wars Journal is the first organization to publish this study on the Internet. This material is based on work supported by USJFCOM and the JIWC under Contract No. N00140-06-D-0060/065. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USJFCOM or the JIWC.

From the preface:

Glory Restored?: The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict

During his 22-year career with the U.S. Army, Dr. Russell W. Glenn served in Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom, and locations throughout the United States in addition to a combat tour with the 3rd Armored Division during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq. Dr. Glenn was a senior defense analyst with RAND from 1997 to early 2009 after which he joined his current organization, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions.

An Interview with Colonel Alexander Alderson

by Octavian Manea

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach

Can you point out the purpose of the military and of the use of military force in countering an insurgency? After all, the classic counterinsurgency (COIN) arithmetic suggested by David Galula is now the conventional wisdom: 80% political action and only 20% military.

The principal role of the military is to provide security but it is often from ideal to use soldiers to provide civil security. In many countries, this is the role of the police force. Unfortunately, in many cases when an insurgency emerges, it often does so at a point beyond which the police force can contain the situation. If it could, presumably the problem would not have developed in the way it did. But let's say that the government has not been able to stop the insurgency from developing and the insurgency goes on to challenge law and order and governance. Let's say that the insurgents have got to the stage where they control an area where they actively challenge the rule of law if not overturn it. In such a case the government needs to act. At this point extraordinary measures are needed and this includes using soldiers to support the police to re-establish the rule of law, to protect the population, and to confront the insurgent.

Of course, this is not ideal. A soldiers' principal role is to defend the state from external threats so their equipment, training and skills tend to be optimized for general war. That said, good professional armies should be able to rise to the complex challenges of a 'war among the people' by a process of adaptation and adjustment. Specialist training and some adjustment to organizations, equipment and tactics are generally required. The faster an army can do this, the more effective it can be. The initial advantage the insurgent has is that armies tend to be large and often conservative organizations. They can take too long to respond the general environmental challenges of COIN and the specifics of insurgent tactics and equipment. So unless the institutional mindset is attuned to adaptation, the insurgent will have the advantage. It is not for nothing that both US and British COIN doctrine emphasizes the need for adaptation, in fact 'Learn and Adapt' was made one of the British principles to highlight the importance of not getting stuck in one's ways.

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach

Colonel Alexander Alderson set up the British Army Land Forces Stability Operations and Counterinsurgency Center in 2009 and is now its director. He was the lead author for the British Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine (November 2009) and his operational experience includes Iraq, Bosnia, Northern Ireland and the 1991 Gulf War. He holds a Ph.D. in Modern History and is a senior visiting research fellow with the University of Oxford and at King's College London.

Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations

by Robert Culp

Download The Full Article: Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations

The Mexican Army's counter-drug (CD) operations are making a limited impact on narco-trafficking in Mexico. If they continue their current CD tactics, they will not be effective in the long run because SEDENA is not approaching CD operations like a counter-insurgency (COIN) mission, nor are they effectively attacking the Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) Center of Gravity (COG). SEDENA operations are currently centered along two principal lines of operation - source control (drug eradication/seizure) and HVI interdiction (arrest). By weighting these two lines of effort, SEDENA operations are not focused on what is the key terrain in any counter-insurgency environment - the population. Additionally, SEDENA targeting efforts are not focused on attacking the critical vulnerabilities that directly affect the DTOs strategic COG -- the revenues derived from drug sales.

Download The Full Article: Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations

LTC Robert Culp is a career Officer in the US Army with extensive experience in special operations and low intensity conflict. He is currently in battalion command at Camp Zama Japan.

The Unbearable Lightness of Governing: Over-Centralized and Decentralized Governance

by Mark Massey, Jr.

Download The Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (II)

The first article in this series, "Begin by Rethinking State Collapse," argued that traditional theories of state collapse perpetuate errors that hinder our state building missions. Their state-centric dogmas and great power bias distort our understanding of state collapse, over-simplifying it as merely a technical/administrative problem and narrowly locating blame within the country at issue. One should not equate governmental collapse with societal collapse, lest one overlook the "non-state systems" that often emerge to replace the state. But what does this reconsideration of state collapse imply for state building?

Download The Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (II)

Mark Massey, Jr. works for The Louis Berger Group, Inc., an engineering and economic development firm focusing on stabilization and reconstruction programs in conflict countries. He holds an MA in International Conflict Studies from the University of London's King's College and a BA in Political Science and History from McGill University.

by Carl Anthony Wege

Download The Full Article: The Hizballah-North Korean Nexus

A significant relationship between Hizballah and North Korea, facilitated by Iran, has developed over the last two decades. This relationship has changed the configuration of Hizballah and shaped it into a more formidable military entity. The famed Hizballah Model now includes a North Korean flavor.

In the early twentieth century Paris sought to create a Christian-Arab state in the environs of Mt. Lebanon to further French political objectives. Lebanon was established with a confessional system dominated by a Maronite-Sunni axis to the disadvantage of the Shi'a.

This confessional system stratified Lebanese political institutions and society in a way that became increasingly untenable precipitating a civil war in 1975. The Lebanese fratricide included Palestinians, Israelis, and Syrians. Clan, tribe, and confessional association became more important than any intermediating Lebanese political institutions. The outbreak of the war in the spring of 1975 was followed by a Syrian intervention in 1976 and Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982.

Among the Shi'a the 1982 Israeli-Lebanon war catalyzed the emergence of Islamic Amal (Amal Al-Islamiyah), led by Hussein Musawi when he and hundreds of followers from Musa Sadr's original AMAL organization streamed east to Baalbek in Lebanon's Bekka valley joining Sheikh Subhi Tufayli's cadre from Lebanon's al-Dawah (the Islamic Call). A coalition developed between the Musawi organization, the followers of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, and other Shi'a factions. The Sepahe al-Quds (Jerusalem) elements of Iran's Pasdaran (Padan-e Inqilal-e Islami or Revolutionary Guards) in coordination with the Iranian Embassy's in Beirut and Damascus, deployed in the eastern Bekka in July of 1982, built on this and Hizballah was born.

Download The Full Article: The Hizballah-North Korean Nexus

Carl Anthony Wege is a Professor of Political Science at the College of Coastal Georgia and has previously published a variety of materials on Hizballah.

by Matthew Ince

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Falling Short of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan

As we enter into a new year of conflict within Afghanistan, NATO must seek to work alongside its partners to overcome failures in the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach to COIN operations. At present the political and economic pillars of such an approach continue to be overshadowed by their own shortfalls and a disproportionate emphasis on the military dimension of the campaign. If left unaddressed this will critically impact upon the ability of the international community to address key grievances within Afghanistan and will further perpetuate a situation whereby political objectives will become increasingly unattainable.

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Falling Short of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan

Matthew Ince has an MA in Geopolitics and Grand Strategy, and a BA (Hons) in International Relations from the University of Sussex. In February 2011 he will begin an internship at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI).

Discussions on the Complexity of

Diverse Sunni Islamic Interpretations:

History and Islamic Argumentation

al-Qaida Chooses to Neglect

by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein,

MSC, USN

Download the Full Article: 

Discussions on the Complexity of Diverse Sunni Islamic Interpretations:

Islam has within it an emphasis to moderation, which must be contrasted

against militant Islamist interpretations regarding violence, extremism,

defeats, and a plea for patience to await a notion of victory.  It is a

narrative that can be rendered unacceptable to most Muslims and non-Muslims.  To

accomplish this we must synthesize militant Islamist narratives and deduce which

fragments of Islam they emphasize while discarding whole swaths of Islamic

theology.

Download the Full Article: 

Discussions on the Complexity of Diverse Sunni Islamic Interpretations:

Commander Aboul-Enein is author of "Militant

Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat," published by Naval

Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland.  He teaches part-time and is Adjunct

Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in

Washington DC.

by Mike Fowler

Download The Full Article: Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now

Shortly after the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, an insurgency campaign began against the US occupational force in the Philippines. In less than four years, the counterinsurgents were able to claim victory as the last of the major insurgent leaders surrendered. As of 2010, an entirely different insurgency campaign in the Philippines dragged into its fifth decade. This analysis provides fresh insights into effective counterinsurgency strategy while offering a heavy dose of caution to the transferability of lessons learned from one counterinsurgency to the next. While this study confirms many key factors of a successful counterinsurgency strategy, the findings of this study also indicate that lessons cannot be universally applied in all counterinsurgencies due to wide variations in insurgent strategy.

Download The Full Article: Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now

Lt Col Mike Fowler is a 17-year Air Force intelligence officer. He received his Master's Degree in International Relations from Troy State University and his PhD in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is currently researching the effects of violence on state political development.

Evidence of Effective Approaches to Counterinsurgency, 1978-2008

by Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill

Download The Full Article: Victory Has a Thousand Fathers

Contemporary discourse on counterinsurgency is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the various counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches advocated by various discussants. This analysis is based on all insurgencies worldwide begun and concluded between 1978 and 2008; 30 insurgencies in total. Among other things, the analysis offers strong support for 13 commonly offered approaches to COIN, and strong evidence against three. Further, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts insurgency outcomes. Data confirm the importance of popular support, but show that the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success.

Download The Full Article: Victory Has a Thousand Fathers

Dr. Christopher Paul is a Social Scientist at the RAND Corporation. Colin P. Clarke is a doctoral candidate at the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and is a Project Associate at RAND. Beth Grill is also a Project Associate at RAND.

The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN

by A. Lawrence Chickering

Download The Full Article: The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN

In a series of short reflections, Tom Ricks neatly summarizes major themes in current thinking on how to strengthen COIN. Sharing a trait that is evident in most current theoreticians, he omits serious discussion about how to recruit the populace of countries threatened by insurgencies to play an active role in COIN. This failure has several dimensions. I want, in this short essay, to address one of the most interesting of them, which relates to the importance of basic principles in physics to counterinsurgency warfare. I will focus, especially, on the difference between the "old" (Newtonian) physics and the "new" physics of quantum mechanics and relativity theory.

Download The Full Article: The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN

A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur and writer who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.

by Jeffrey Reeves

Download The Full Article: US Cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges and Opportunities

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) stands alone as an organization positioned to address the aforementioned challenges. It is indigenous in conception and construction and contains both China and Russia as member states. As opposed to NATO, the UN, or the EU, the SCO does possess the necessary cultural understanding to implement a successful regional solution to the United States' Central Asia challenges. The United States would benefit from closer cooperation with the SCO in its struggle to bring security to Afghanistan, to maintain its political and economic influence in Central Asia, and to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear program.

Download The Full Article: US Cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges and Opportunities

Dr. Jeffrey Reeves is currently Director for Culture and Conflict Studies and Chinese Studies Center at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington, DC.

by Joshua Thiel

Download The Full Article: COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges

"Conventional wisdom holds that a government must expend ten times as much as insurgents in their efforts to contain insurgency" (Mataxis, 1994, p.7). Authors, experts, and military historians establish a variety of ratios for military engagements as a way of forecasting requirements and predicting outcomes. The U.S. Army teaches Second Lieutenants that three to one numerical superiority is the planning factor for a successful attack. However, in order to account for shifting demographics and various operating environments, the U.S. Army established five to one as the tactical number for an urban attack. Similarly in the Department of the Army's Handbook on Counter Insurgency, produced in 2007 under the direction of General David Petraeus, references the mythical ten to one force ratio prescribed for counterinsurgency (Department of Defense [DoD], 2007, p. 1-13).

Download The Full Article: COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges

Major Joshua Thiel is a United States Army Special Forces Officer and graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis and a graduate of American Military University with a Masters of Arts in Low Intensity Conflict.

Non-State Systems, Decentralization and Refounding African Statehood

by Mark Massey Jr.

Download The Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (I)

State building is asserted as the remedy to state collapse. It is heralded as both an immediate solution to contemporary collapse and the preventive medicine against future collapse. It has ascended to a new level of importance in the post-9/11 era. Analysts deem failed states more of a threat to international security than powerful, hegemonic ones, reflecting one prominent scholar's observation that "chaos has replaced tyranny as the new challenge" of the 21st century. Yet, state building is exceedingly difficult and complex; its track record is mixed at best. This series of four articles, under the heading of "Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa," aims to provide a reconceptualization of state building. This introduction lays out the arguments to follow in the proceeding articles, in order to provide a roadmap connecting the arch of the overall series.

Download The Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (I)

Mark Massey, Jr. works for The Louis Berger Group, Inc., an engineering and economic development firm focusing on stabilization and reconstruction programs in conflict countries. He holds an MA in International Conflict Studies from the University of London's King's College and a BA in Political Science and History from McGill University.

El significado espiritual de ¿Plata O Plomo?

por Pamela L. Bunker y Robert J. Bunker

Transfiera el artí­culo completo: El significado espiritual de ¿Plata O Plomo?

La sabidurí­a convencional sostiene que la violencia de narco pandillas y los carteles de drogas son primordialmente seculares en su naturaleza. Este punto de vista asido recientemente retado debido a las actividades de La Familia Cartel y algunos de los zetas, al igual que algunos otros carteles allegados al culto de la santa muerte. Por medio de principios religiosos de "justicia divina'' en instancias donde ví­ctimas de tortura y ritual de sacrificio humano ofrecido a una deidad obscura, respectivamente ocasiones donde manos mutiladas han sido lanzadas en los pisos de discotecas en Michoacán en el 2005, también huellas de un cráneo quemado fueron encontradas en una parcela de un rancho en la pení­nsula de Yucatán, solo sirven como algunos ejemplos sobresalientes de dichos hechos ya ocurridos. Considerando que el infame incidente de el "cuadron negro'' ocurrido en Matamoros en 1989, donde el cerebro de Mark Kilroy un estudiante universitario Norteamericano fue encontrado en un lugar perteneciente a una Padilla local, fue considerado una rara excepción, dichas actividades espirituales, y similares a estas ya son muy frecuentes.

Este tipo de actividades sirven para corroborar lo que los eruditos, incluyendo a Sullivan, Elkus, Brands, Manwaring y los autores sobre la Guerra social moviéndose a través de las Americas. Este tipo de Guerra social se manifiesta sobre asimismo en "insurgencias criminales'' las cuales se derivan de grupos criminales tales como. Pandillas, carteles, y redes de mercenarios. Los cuales promueven una nueva forma de organización criminal. Basados en normas y comportamientos polí­ticos y sociales. Estos incluyen un sistema de valor derivado del uso ilegal de narcóticos, donde se mata (comete homicidio) por deporte o placer, al igual que tráfico humano y esclavitud, perspectivas disfuncionales en las mujeres y vida familiar, una orientación así­a la violencia y una completa falta de respeto las libertades democráticas de estos tiempos modernos socio-civiles. Esto se remota a los pensamientos de Pedro sobre 'una nueva clase de guerreros emergentes', anteriormente a esto las proyecciones de Van Creveld's de la guerra 'no trinitaria'.

Transfiera el artí­culo completo: El significado espiritual de ¿Plata O Plomo?

Pamela L. Bunker es un oficial de alto rango de la corporación Counter-OPFOR. Intereses de investigación incluyen las armas menos letales (LLW) y CONUS OPFORs (los grupos radicales del medio ambiente y la franja y los cultos religiosos). Su trabajo ha sido presentado en conferencias policiales y académicas en Alaska, Australia, y Alemania. Fue colaboradora de la Enciclopedia de la Primera Guerra Mundial (ABC-CLIO, 2005), ha escrito sobre armas menos letales para un proyecto NLECTC-West, y ha disparado LLW en el Rango de la Policí­a de Australia del Sur (SAPOL). Se gradíºo de la Universidad Pomona de el Estado de California Polytechnic con una licenciatura en antropologí­a y geografí­a y también un una licenciatura en ciencias sociales y de la universidad Claremont Graduate, con una maestrí­a en polí­tica píºblica con trabajo adicional de postgrado completado en polí­tica comparativa y gobierno. Experiencia profesional del pasado incluye investigación y coordinación de programa en la Universidad, Organización No Gubernamentales (NGO), y lugares de Gobierno de la Ciudad.

Dr. Robert J. Bunker asistió a la Universidad de California State Polytechnic, Pomona y la Universidad de Claremont Graduate. Tiene un doctorado en ciencias polí­ticas y una maestrí­a en gobierno y bachilleratos en antropologí­a y geografí­a, ciencias sociales, ciencias de la conducta, y la ciencia histórica. Dr. Bunker es Profesor Adjunto, Programa de Estudios de Seguridad Nacional, Universidad del estado de California, San Bernardino, y Profesor, Guerra no Convencional, Universidad Militar Americana Manassas Park, Virginia. Se ha desempeí±ado como consultor de las comunidades militares y policiales. Su investigación se centra en la influencia de la tecnologí­a de la Guerra y la organización polí­tica y sobre las implicaciones de seguridad nacional de las nuevas formas de guerra. Las obras del Dr. Bunker's han aparecido en Parameters, Special Warfare, Army RDA, Military Intelligence, Red Thrust Star, Airpower Journal, Marine Corps Gazette, Institute of Land Warfare Papers, Institute For National Security Studies Occasional Papers, y en varias publicaciones de aplicación de la ley, enciclopedias militares, y en libros de capí­tulos.

The original SWJ article, "The Spiritual Significance of ¿Plata O Plomo?", in English, can be found here.

Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico:

Web and Social Media Resources

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker and Lt. John P. Sullivan

Download The Full Article: Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico: Web and Social Media Resources

The authors of this piece, individually, collectively, and in cooperation with other scholars and analysts, have written about the criminal insurgencies in Mexico and various themes related to them in Small Wars Journal and in many other publications for some years now. The Small Wars publications alone include "State of Siege: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency," "Plazas for Profit: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency," "Cartel v. Cartel: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency," "The Spiritual Significance of ¿Plata O Plomo?," "Explosive Escalation?: Reflections on the Car Bombing in Ciudad Juarez," and "The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift From Iraq/Afghanistan to Mexico/The Americas and the Stabilization of Europe." Certain truths have become evident from such writings and the raging conflicts that they describe and analyze.

First, the criminal insurgencies in Mexico have been increasing in intensity since the formal declaration of war—penned with the initial deployment of Army units into Michoacán and Ciudad Juárez against the insurgent gangs and cartels—by the Calderón administration in December 2006. Over 30,000 deaths in Mexico, just over ten-times the death toll from the 9-11 attacks, have now resulted from these conflicts with 2010 surpassing the earlier end of year tallies with almost 13,000 total killings. While most of these deaths have been attributed to cartel on cartel violence, an increasing proportion of them include law enforcement officers (albeit many of them on cartel payroll), military and governmental personnel, journalists, and innocent civilians. While some successes have been made against the Mexican cartels, via the capture and targeted killings of some of the capos and ensuing organizational fragmentation, the conflicts between these criminal groups and the Mexican state, and even for neighboring countries such as Guatemala, is overall not currently going well for these besieged sovereign nations. Recent headlines like those stating "Mexico army no match for drug cartels" and "Drug gang suspects threaten 'war' in Guatemala" are becoming all too common. Further, it is currently estimated that in Mexico about 98% of all crimes are never solved—providing an air of impunity to cartel and gang hit men and foot soldiers, many of whom take great delight in engaging in the torture and beheading of their victims.

Second, Small Wars Journal readers, especially those in the United States, need to appreciate the strategic significance of what is taking place in Mexico, Central America and in other Latin American countries, and increasingly over the border into the United States itself. War and insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan, Western Pakistan, and in other distant OCONUS locales ultimately represent much lower stakes than the high levels of strife, establishment of criminal enclaves and depopulated cartel security zones, and rise of narco-cities—such as Nuevo Laredo under the Cártel del Golfo (CDG)—now taking place on our Southern border and extending down through Central America. A chilling example of the criminal insurgencies being waged is the fate of the contested city of Ciudad Juárez—over 230,000 people have fled, primarily the business elite and skilled workers; 6,000 businesses have closed, and tens-of-thousands of homes now stand vacant or have been abandoned. While Ciudad Juárez may represent an extreme form of urban implosion, this pattern is being repeated in numerous towns throughout Mexico with many such towns and small villages in Northern Mexico now partially or fully abandoned and, even in some instances, burned to the ground. To add insult to injury, some of the cartel conflict now taking place in the urban plazas and rural transit routes is being described in an almost post-apocalyptic manner with make shift armored pickups and even a ten-wheeled armored dump truck able to carry ten enforcers and with the combatants engaging in firefights with high caliber and anti-tank weapons. It must now be accepted that the cartels and gangs of Mexico, Central America, and increasingly South America have morphed from being solely narcotics based trafficking entities to being complex, diversified criminal organizations. These criminal enterprises are increasingly politicized and armed with military grade weaponry, backed up with the training and esprit de corps necessary for them to make war on sovereign states. This asymmetric war now being waged is derived from their unique and evolving criminal insurgency tenets using not only the bribe and the gun but also, information operations, and increasingly, deviant forms of spirituality in order to further dark and morally bankrupt agendas.

Download The Full Article: Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico: Web and Social Media Resources

Dr. Robert J. Bunker holds degrees in political science, government, behavioral science, social science, anthropology-geography, and history. Past associations have included Futurist in Residence, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA; Counter-OPFOR Program Consultant (Staff Member), National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center—West, El Segundo, CA; Fellow, Institute of Law Warfare, Association of the US Army, Arlington, VA; Lecturer-Adjunct Professor, National Security Studies Program, California State University San Bernardino, San Bernardino, CA; instructor, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA; and founding member, Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Group. Dr. Bunker has over 200 publications including short essays, articles, chapters, papers and book length documents. These include Non-State Threats and Future Wars (editor); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (editor); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (editor); Narcos Over the Border (editor). He can be reached at bunker@usc.edu.

John P. Sullivan is a regular contributor to Small Wars Journal. He is a career police officer and currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010). His current research focus is the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty, intelligence, terrorism, and criminal insurgencies.

by John D. Johnson

Download The Full Article: Root Causes of Islamist Extremism: Nine Years Later

The 9/11 attacks showed to the world that Islamist extremism presents a significant threat to international peace and security. Following the attacks, the 9/11 Commission issued a thorough report that considered all aspects of attacks, tried to answer the question of why the terrorists conducted the attacks, and made many important recommendations on ways to improve U.S. security against terrorism.

Nine years later, the U.S. is probably safer due to the implementation of many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report (e.g., the establishment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center, and the improvement in interagency and international intelligence sharing), but it is not clear that our collective understanding of the grievances or root causes of Islamist extremism or that our counter-terrorism strategies have resulted in an environment where Islamist extremists are any less likely to attack the U.S., and the West more broadly.

This article considers the grievances of Islamist extremists involved in several recent terrorist attacks, presents an overview of the root causes of Islamist extremism and draws several analytical conclusions looking to the future.

Download The Full Article: Root Causes of Islamist Extremism: Nine Years Later

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson is a U.S. Army Fellow assigned to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

by John Cochran

Download The Full Article: The Need to Create an Unconventional Warfare Advanced Studies and Training Center

Unconventional Warfare or UW is the most difficult and complex of any form of combat. UW's complexity lends itself to the salient fact that it is not a straight on fight; instead it is a method of warfare that employs psychological warfare, subversion, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and intelligence operations. Its very nature is to attack from the inside of the enemy and through the use of a disenfranchised section of society force the enemy to acquiesce and capitulate. It requires its soldiers to meld into the sociological and physical environment, apparently a farmer or banker one moment and conducting a direct action or kinetic strike the next. UW is not just a slugger's war or a thinking man's war; it requires a mental and physical decathlete whose sole devotion is mastering its complexity. Assurance that the specified soldiers can conduct this successfully requires both continual exercises and a devoted education system which focuses solely on this multifaceted form of warfare. These facts necessitate the creation of an Unconventional Warfare Advanced Studies and Training Center whose sole responsibility is the advanced training and continual education of UW to facilitate the tactical, operational and strategic needs of the US military's only force with UW as its fundamental mission: US Army Special Forces.

Download The Full Article: The Need to Create an Unconventional Warfare Advanced Studies and Training Center

CW2 John D. Cochran is a US Army Special Forces Warrant Officer currently assigned at Naval Postgraduate School pursuing a graduate degree in Defense Analysis. CW2 Cochran has had Command and Staff assignments in Iraq, Europe, Afghanistan and Africa. He holds a BA in Intelligence Studies/SOLIC and a MA in Military Studies/UW from the American Military University. The opinions he expresses in this paper are his own and represent no U.S. Government or Department of Defense positions.

by Shaun A. Reynolds

Download The Full Article: SOF Detachment Civil Military Operations in Iraq

"All the air conditioners are gone," said the interpreter. The Special Forces Operation Detachment-Alpha (ODA) team leader forgoes the niceties that usually accompany the first few minutes of most meetings with Iraqi citizens. "Ask him where the air conditioners went," he tells the interpreter, maintaining a no-nonsense look at the boy's elementary school principal. The principal, through the interpreter, explains that due to the threat of theft the air conditioning units were removed and locked in storage for the summer months. Despite the locked security gate and posted security guard, the possibility of losing them when school is out of session is too great a risk for the principal. After a few minutes the ODA is led to a locked class room where the units are stored. A quick count by the team leader ensures that all the units are in fact present, two months after he and his team supervised completion of this major school renovation project.

Download The Full Article: SOF Detachment Civil Military Operations in Iraq

Captain Shaun Reynolds is a U.S. Army Civil Affairs officer previously assigned to Special Operations Task Force Central, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula as Civil Affairs planner. He is currently assigned to 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

The Merida Initiative: A Flawed Counterdrug Policy?

by Philip K. Abbott

Download The Full Article: The Merida Initiative: A Flawed Counterdrug Policy?

Economic integration and dependency under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) successfully paved the way for improved cooperation between the United States and Mexico on a wide range of issues. However, in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the focus of this relationship suddenly shifted from social-economic prosperity to border security issues as U.S. politics became increasingly more polarized concerning homeland security. As U.S. national security, NAFTA and immigration became more and more intertwined, there was growing concern in Mexico.

Download The Full Article: The Merida Initiative: A Flawed Counterdrug Policy?

Colonel Philip K. Abbott, U.S. Army, is currently the Chief, Americas Division on the Joint Staff, J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate.

Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008

by David Hollis

Download The Full Article: Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008

The Russian-Georgian War in August of 2008 represented a long history of geostrategic conflict between the two nations and was based on many complex factors: ¬geopolitical, legal, cultural, and economic. The 1992 South Ossetia War and the 1993 Abkhazian War resulted in the loss of the regions from Georgia to internationally unrecognized, pro-Russian local governments. Tensions had been building in the region for several years prior-to the initiation of conflict in August 2008. The war officially started on 7 August 2008 after several weeks of growing arguments over the future of the South Ossetian territory. Georgian troops initiated a military attack against South Ossetia and began a massive shelling of the town of Tskhinvali in response to alleged Russian provocation. Russia deployed additional combat troops to South Ossetia and retaliated with bombing raids into Georgian territory. Russia deployed naval forces to formally blockade Georgia and landed naval infantry (marines) on Abkhaz coast (near Georgia). The decisive ground combat operation of the campaign resulted in mechanized Russian military and Ossetian militia forces defeating the more lightly armed Georgian military forces in the only large-scale major ground combat of the war (battle for the town of Tskhinvali). Georgian tactical military defeat at the battle of Tskhinvali, operational defeat via Russian uncontested invasion of the western part of Georgia, unchallenged naval blockade of Georgia, and Georgian difficulty getting their media message out to the world, led to Georgia's strategic defeat in the war. The conflict forced approximately 25,000 Georgian residents to flee from ground combat as refugees into internal displacement. The two countries signed a ceasefire agreement a week later but tensions remain high to this day. Russia has failed to implement some of the terms of the ceasefire agreement, resulting in further loss of Georgian territory to Russian occupation.

Download The Full Article: Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008

David M. Hollis is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).

The Case for Decentralized Thinking

by Benjamin Summers

Download The Full Article: Widening and Flattening: The Case for Decentralized Thinking

The "fog of war" has thickened over the past decade. Dynamic operating environments and information overload are two unique challenges that strategists face as we approach our tenth year of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. In our operating environment, blurred lines of distinction and sensitive battles of perception have shrunk the gap between tactics and strategy, increasing the risk of "tactical victories" turning into "strategic defeats." We face these tactical and strategic challenges in an era where information is so readily available that finding relevance is becoming increasingly difficult. While these two layers of fog hinder visibility for strategists, the Army turns towards our junior leaders to provide new viewpoints and effectively process information. By incorporating more young minds into our problem framing and solving processes, the Army has moved towards decentralizing the way that we think as an organization. Decentralized thinking works because it widens our perspective and flattens the way that we process information.

Download The Full Article: Widening and Flattening: The Case for Decentralized Thinking

Ben Summers is currently serving as an assistant operations officer in the 159th Combat Aviation Brigade.

by Anton Kuruc

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Domestic Politics by Other Means

Clausewitz describes war in a foreign policy context that needs to be adapted to insurgencies. This paper discusses insurgency in the context of domestic rather than foreign policy. It discusses the aspects of domestic politics that help define the role of violent coercion in domestic political discourse. This paper discusses the role of a political campaign to win domestic political competitions. It identifies key assumptions that underpin demographic planning and applies some typical political campaign planning methods to better analyze the human terrain. It also explores how the military campaign should support the overarching political campaign and to better incorporate domestic policy expertise into the whole of government counterinsurgency effort.

Clausewitz's general theory remains very useful, but it needs a different context - that of domestic politics.

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Domestic Politics by Other Means

Lieutenant Colonel Anton Kuruc is an infantry officer in the Australian Army who graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1986 with a Bachelor of Arts degree with a double major in Politics and History.

Drafting the U.S. Civil Service for Counterinsurgencies

by Michael A. Clauser

Download The Full Article: Not Just a Job, an Adventure: Drafting the U.S. Civil Service for Counterinsurgencies

It's become trite to state that the solution for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is "political," and not solely "military," in nature. Both Presidents Bush and Obama made the case that the purpose of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was to provide a security space allowing for national and local governance to take hold and grow. But while President Bush found five brigades to surge into Iraq and President Obama committed 30,000 additional forces to Afghanistan, neither President could find adequate numbers of —foreign and civil servants to accompany our men and women in uniform. U.S. non-military civilian numbers in both countries remain low. One senior official estimated that U.S. civilian personnel in Afghanistan total around 1,000 strong, just one percent of the military footprint in that country. Even now, most of these are found in the crowded embassy in the capital. If the U.S. is serious about winning the war in Afghanistan through a political solution, Congress should change current law and begin to draft civil servants with the right skill sets and training for national objectives abroad.

Download The Full Article: Not Just a Job, an Adventure: Drafting the U.S. Civil Service for Counterinsurgencies

Michael A. Clauser served as the National Security Legislative Assistant to a senior Republican member of the House Armed Services Committee and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He previously served in the Bush Administration in the Pentagon. The views expressed in this commentary are his own and do not reflect that of the United States Government.

Small Wars Journal

Vol 6, No. 12 is

now available. Click

here for the full issue, or directly on the titles below for single articles.

by Thomas Kirk

Download The Full Article: Afghanistan: Reconciliation plans, tribal leaders and civil society

A reading of the Afghanistan's troubled history against recent explorations of the contemporary conflict question the wisdom and trajectory of the current peace talks for creating a lasting end to the violence. Current efforts at reconciliation should carefully pinpoint the country's powerbrokers and uncover Afghanistan's voiceless civil society.

Download The Full Article: Afghanistan: Reconciliation plans, tribal leaders and civil society

Thomas Kirk is a researcher with Global Governance and PHD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Thomas' work investigates the role of civil society in creating the conditions for peace in contemporary conflict with particular reference to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

by Michael J. Faughnan

Download The Full Article: Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program

As the December review of our strategy in Afghanistan nears, one program that shows significant progress and will have a far reaching impact on this war torn nation is the Afghan National Security Force Literacy Program. This program's objective, overseen by NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), is to provide every member of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), composed of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), a third grade level of literacy. To accomplish this, we employ more than 1,000 Afghans to teach Dari and Pashto the two dominant languages in this nation.

Download The Full Article: Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program

Dr. Mike Faughnan is the Chief of the NTM-A / CSTC-A Education Division.

What Happens When We Lose the COG

by Jeremy Kotkin

Download the Full Article: The Strategic Risk versus Tactical Safety

GEN Petraeus' COIN Guidance is published and on the bulletin boards in hundreds of staff offices in Kabul. As the vanguard of this new policy, Afghan Hands have a charter to operate under the COIN Guidance in concert with the mission statement developed for the program: "to build long-lasting, positive partnerships with GIRoA, Afghan entities, and civilians, in order to demonstrate the long-term commitment of ISAF to build capacity and capability within Afghanistan and deny support among the Afghan people to insurgents." These two concepts, the COIN Guidance and the Afghan Hands Program intent before it, should operate in perfect harmony, each reinforcing the other. Afghan Hands, through eyes unencumbered of 9 years of standard operating tactics and procedures, should be allowed the professional scope to "get the job done" in ways which no other individual augmentee can.

Download the Full Article: The Strategic Risk versus Tactical Safety

Major Jeremy Kotkin is a Functional Area-59, Strategist, and assigned to ISAF through USFOR-A.

by Colonel Lawrence Sellin

Download the Full Article: Is Our Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Approach Irrelevant?

"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield", said the American colonel.

His adversary pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."

That conversation occurred on 25 April 1975 in Hanoi between Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., then Chief, Negotiations Division, U.S. Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team and Colonel Tu, Chief of the North Vietnamese Delegation.

Colonel Summers is now best known as the author of a powerful critique of the Vietnam War titled, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. It analyzed the reasons behind the US tactical victory, but strategic defeat in that conflict.

Download the Full Article: Is Our Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Approach Irrelevant?

Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D. is a recently retired colonel with 29 years of service in the US Army Reserve. He is a veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Helmand and Farah Provinces, Afghanistan

15 February -- 15 March 2010

by Commander Philip Pelikan, CHC, USN

Download the Full Article: Mullah Engagement Program

"By order of the Commanding General, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), Afghanistan, the Command Chaplain and a Muslim Chaplain (if obtainable), along with appropriate political specialists, governance advisors, and necessary security, were to engage with Islamic leadership in Helmand and Farah Provinces in discussions to enhance the relationship with key religious leaders and the communities in which they serve in order to convey the good will and otherwise positive intentions of U.S. Government and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)/NATO forces operating in the region in conjunction with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and its military and police forces."

This was the basic premise for the operation which subsequently took place between February and March 2010, and for which I was responsible to organize and carry out. Additionally, my responsibilities as the MEB Command Chaplain were to provide religious coverage, general pastoral care for the Marines and Sailors of 2nd MEB, and supervision of 15 chaplains.

Download the Full Article: Mullah Engagement Program

Commander Philip Pelikan is a prior-enlisted ('71-'75) U.S. Air Force Intelligence Analyst. He has been a U.S. Navy Chaplain for 21 years; 10 of which have been with the U.S. Marines. He is a priest in the Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America and currently serves as the Command Chaplain for U.S. Naval Support Activity, Naples, Italy.

by David B. Edwards

Download the Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Cultural System

Beginning in 2008, when news of the development of the Human Terrain Systems (HTS) program first came to public attention, a number of anthropologists began a systematic campaign to dismantle the program or at least ensure that it would never receive the imprimatur of legitimacy from professional organizations. Since the premise of HTS was that it would bring the insights of academic anthropology to the practice of military counterinsurgency, what might normally have constituted an irrelevant gesture (like the shy 9th grader deciding that she simply would not to go to the prom with the football captain, even if he asked) had some clout, in that many anthropology graduate students and unemployed PhDs who might otherwise have considered joining the program chose not to join for fear of being black listed and never landing a job in academia.

Download the Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Cultural System

David B. Edwards is a professor of social science at Williams College, Williamston, MA.

An Operational Perspective

by Tim C. Leival

Download the Full Article: Combat Advising the ANA 205th Commandos

One of the goals of the Operational Art is to effectively translate the expression of national will, in the form of strategy, into concrete tactical tasks; preferably ones that can be assigned metrics to mark progress. This paper reflects the application of the Art in the small example of the Afghan National Army 205th Commandos and Special Forces Operational Detachment A 2132.

ODA 2132 received the mission to Combat Advise the 205th Commandos at literally the worst time imaginable. We had just lost our Detachment Commander to an IED attack that also gravely wounded our Junior Engineer. We were down to eight personnel, one of whom, our Intelligence Sergeant (18F), would be serving as escort for our Commander and would be gone for almost a month. Our pre-mission training had been focused on the more usual ODA mission set. We were grieving and dispirited, but eagerly looking to get back into the fight.

When we received our change of mission brief from LTC Heinz Dinter (Task Force 32 Commander), he made it very clear that he was assigning us to the CJSOTF-A Commander's (COL Haas) designated Main Effort not because of our limitations, but because of our strengths. As a National Guard Detachment, we have a collection of experience and education of unusual breadth and depth as well as a wealth of time spent working with indigenous soldiers in many venues. Events proved his concept to be correct and, more germane to the thesis; we had already demonstrated an adherence to the principle of Cognitive processes in prosecution of Irregular Warfare. This principle is commonly and incorrectly expressed as "putting an Afghan face" on tactical operations. Because of our life experiences, our detachment was able to correctly interpret this principle into the action of avoiding creating dependencies at any level. Properly expressed by our Junior Communications Sergeant, "An Afghan Solution to an Afghan problem" became our mantra and rallying cry when less flexible minds tried to make the Commandos into institutional mirror-images of their own light infantry organizations.

Download the Full Article: Combat Advising the ANA 205th Commandos

CW3 Tim Leival was the Detachment Commander on SFODA 2132, Co C, 1/20th SFG(A). He has served as Executive Officer, Commander, Junior Weapons Sergeant, Intelligence Sergeant and Assistant Detachment Commander on 2132, as well as XO, S4, S3, S2 and Assistant Training NCO in the same Company over the last 26 years. Prior to that, he served as Mortar Platoon Ammo Bearer and Platoon Leader in various Reserve Component Infantry units.

Readings for the Counterinsurgency Commander

by Joshua Thiel, Bryan Martin, William Marm, Christopher O'Gwin, Christopher Young, Gabriel Szody, and Douglas Borer

Download the Full Article: Beyond FM 3-24

Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, United States (U.S.) Army Green Berets were active in the international sphere. Organized in small, twelve-man teams known as Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA), these specially trained soldiers were primarily engaged as teachers of Counterinsurgency (COIN) to Host Nation's (HN) military forces during Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions. They were expected to not only add value to the capacity, professionalization, and operational capabilities of the HN forces, but were also expected to be the COIN subject matter experts within the U.S. military. However, ODAs rapidly evolved from teachers of COIN to practitioners of the art during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Download the Full Article: Beyond FM 3-24

Joshua Thiel, Bryan Martin, William Marm, Christopher O'Gwin, Christopher Young, and Gabriel Szody are Majors in the United States Army Special Forces. Douglas Borer is an instructor in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.

Che Guevara: An Exploration of Revolutionary Theory

by Jamie E. Hill

Download the Full Article: Che Guevara: An Exploration of Revolutionary Theory

During the mid-20th century, a number of revolutionary movements were being conducted throughout South America. Some of which applied the theories developed by Che Guevara during the Cuban Revolution in the 1950's. This paper will analyze Che Guevara's 'Foco Theory', from his work Guerrilla Warfare, in relation to the revolutions in Cuba and Bolivia. The comparison will be made to determine what methods worked in Cuba, which led to the revolution's success, and then determine to what extent the 'Foco Theory' was actually employed to reach that success. In addition, other South American dissident groups attempted to use the same theory and did not achieve the same results. As a result, there will be an analysis of the events that took place in Bolivia to determine the contributing factors to the revolution and what may have caused its failure. The end result will provide a comparison of the revolutions and determine what led to certain successes or failures and why. It will also provide an assessment of Che's theory to determine if it is useful, and valid, to the events that inspired and supported its creation.

Download the Full Article: Che Guevara: An Exploration of Revolutionary Theory

Jamie Hill grew up in Barrie, Ontario and joined the Canadian forces in 2007. He is currently a 4th year Officer Cadet at the Royal Military College of Canada and hopes to graduate in May 2011 with an Honours degree of Political Science. He is an armour officer awaiting phase training after graduation.

A Strategic Analysis of Sri Lankan "Kinetic" Counterinsurgency and its Theoretical Implications

by Christian Chung

Download the Full Article: The Killer Tiger Roared

Conventional wisdom and recent developments in the study of the art of conducting "traditional" counterinsurgency (COIN) has defined the importance of a population-centric approach to COIN in which a "whole of government", integrated political component is central to an effective partnership with the host nation in ultimately defeating the insurgency.

Download the Full Article: The Killer Tiger Roared

Christian Chung is a high school senior attending a full time dual enrolled college program, at The College Academy at Broward College. The article is part of an independent original research project conducted with the Social Science department at BC on COIN.

An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile

I've carefully read your commentary concerning David Galula's work on counterinsurgency and its applicability for today's COIN campaigns and you seem to identify a special kind of lesson or warning than the ones that influenced the development of FM 3-24: "its tactical brilliance was divorced from a strategic purpose. So don't repeat the same mistake. After all, France lost Algeria". So, why do you think that by embracing Galula's tactical brilliance, we tend to lose sight of the art of strategy?

That has been the whole problem with the COIN narrative that developed at least in US Army circles since the end of the Vietnam War. It was, and is, premised on the idea that the Vietnam War could have been won by better counterinsurgency tactics and operations. This is the basic nugget of an idea that had a snowball effect; in the 1980s with Andrew Krepinevich' The Army and Vietnam, then in the 1990s with John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and Lewis Sorley's A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam, and more currently many of the writings of Colonel Robert Cassidy and others.

The idea of a better war through improved counterinsurgency tactics has come to define causation in the Iraq war too. Recent books like Tom Ricks's duo of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq and The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq and Linda Robinson's Tell Me How this Ends: General Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq offers the notion of a bumbling, fumbling conventional army that is doing counterinsurgency incorrectly, but because a better and enlightened general comes onto the scene combined with a few innovative new officers at the lower levels who figure out how to do counterinsurgency by the classic rule and voila the operational Army is reinvented and starts doing the things differently. And it is because the Army does things differently on the ground that it produces a transformed situation, as the narrative states. It's the idea that better tactics can rescue a failed policy and strategy.

Download the Full Article: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile

Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

Relooking French Encounters in Irregular Warfare in the 19th Century

by Michael Few

Download the Full Article: A Conversation with Dr. Douglas Porch

To complement the recent interviews conducted by Octavian Manea, we reached out to the defense analysts experts at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. In the first interview of this series, Dr. John Arquilla described how he felt that French Encounters with Irregular Warfare in the 19th Century can inform COIN in our time. This rebuttal comes from Dr. Douglas Porch, a historian in the National Security Affairs (NSA) department. This department specializes in the study of international relations, security policy, and regional studies. NSA is unique because it brings together outstanding faculty, students from the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, National Guard and various civilian agencies, and scores of international officers from dozens of countries for the sole purpose of preparing tomorrow's military and civilian leaders for emerging security challenges. Notable alumni from the NSA department include LTG William H. Caldwell.

Download the Full Article: A Conversation with Dr. Douglas Porch

Douglas Porch earned a Ph.D. from Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University. Currently, he is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Small Wars Journal Vol 6, No. 11 is now available.

Click here for

the full issue, on titles below for single articles.

by Major General Nick Carter, British Army

Download the Full Article: 800 Words on the Last Year in Afghanistan

The last year has seen significant change in southern Afghanistan. An uplift of over 20,000 US troops, and more importantly, a huge increase in Afghan security forces has more than doubled the number of forces in Helmand and Kandahar. When I arrived in southern Afghanistan last October there was one weak Afghan Army brigade in Helmand and one in Kandahar, the original capital of Afghanistan. When I left a year later these had increased to nearly six. The Afghan Police has also been uplifted by 30%. These reinforcements have made possible the disposition of our forces to be realigned so that our counter insurgency strategy can focus on protecting the population.

Download the Full Article: 800 Words on the Last Year in Afghanistan

Major General Nick Carter was ISAF Regional Commander South until November 2010. He assumed command of 6th United Kingdom Division in January 2009 and was responsible for the preparation and training of the Task Forces deploying on Operation Herrick. The Division then became a CJTF and assumed responsibility for RC-South in November 0f 2009

by Tal Tovy

Download the Full Article: Airborne Troops as a Tactical and Operative Military Revolution

In 1898, Jan Bloch published six volumes dealing with future warfare entitled The Future of War in its Technical, Economic and Political Relations. The book examines military technological developments and the techno-tactics at the end of the 19th century. As we know from history, about 15 years after the publication of the book the First World War broke out and Bloch's predictions about future warfare were almost exactly realized. But his perceptions regarding this were not accepted by his contemporaries, especially not by the senior military officers in Germany and France.

The character and range of the war surprised the higher military command of all the countries that participated in the war, which led especially on the Western front to a state of immobility.

Bloch was not the only one who foresaw the changes in the future battlefield. For example, already in the 1880s, General Sheridan, the commander of the American Army, envisioned the new character of war operations that would constitute the main methods of warfare on the Western front in Europe during the course of the First World War. From an analysis of the American Civil War (1861-1865) in which he had participated, and of the Franco-German War (1870-1871) in which he served as an observer, Sheridan claimed that the rival armies would protect themselves in dugouts and that any side that tried to go out on a direct frontal attack against enemy lines would be destroyed. Sheridan's estimate was derived from the understanding that improvements in firepower, in the rate and precision of firing, made war far more lethal and destructive.

As said before, most of the senior officer rank in Europe failed to understand the changing nature of warfare as a result of technological developments at the techno-tactical level. The immediate intellectual challenge was to comprehend the future aspects of warfare in connection with the rapid technological changes. Today the commonly accepted term for this process is Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Research in military history has proved that in many cases it was these new technologies that changed the nature of warfare. Whichever side was wise enough to develop new technologies and to integrate them into new warfare doctrines had a decisive advantage. This article attempts to claim that the operation of airborne forces during the Second World War was a military revolution at the tactical and operational level. The basis for this claim is that the activation of airborne forces led to an essential change in the perception of the concept Line of Communication (LOC). The article will first examine the sources for the use of the concept RMA and the classical aspect of the concept LOC. This is in order to provide a theoretical dimension for the examination of historical test cases. Following this, through a discussion of a number of airborne campaigns that were conducted during the Second World War, the article will exemplify these tactical and operational changes in the LOC concept.

The geophysical nature of the LOC concept constituted a paradigm for thousands of years. From the middle of the 18th century extensive theoretical literature on the subject began to be written. By an analysis of paratroop operations during the Second World War we shall try to determine whether this new operational perception was able to undermine the basic foundations of the classical LOC paradigm.

During the war, a number of airborne campaigns were carried out in all the war arenas and in the various forces. A study of geographical distribution shows that most of the campaigns including the largest ones (at the division level and above) were carried out in the arena of Western Europe first by Germany and later by the United States and Britain, and therefore the article will be focused on an analysis of the campaigns in this arena.

Historiography concerning the operation of paratroop forces during the Second World War deals mainly with the military dimension. This means their practical activation in the various battlefields and an analysis of the success or failure of this or that operation. Therefore one may divide the research literature on paratroop forces into two main groups. The first group consists of discussions about those operations in the framework of a general discussion about the military history of the Second World War. The second group consists of studies that deal only with a discussion and analysis of operations in books that are focused only on paratroop operations. This literature does not take into account the activation of paratroops during the Second World War as a tactical revolution. An additional group is the memoirs of paratroopers at all levels of command. In this literature one can find in greater detail the training techniques and battle tactics of the paratroop forces and are therefore of great value in understanding the operational nature of those units.

Download the Full Article: Airborne Troops as a Tactical and Operative Military Revolution

Dr. Tal Tovy is an assistant professor at the history department of Bar Ilan University, Israel.