Journal

Fourth Generation Warfare advocates propose a tactical shift in how operations are conducted to defeat an insurgency. This paper explains why, from a legitimacy standpoint, 4GW will lead to a strategic failure.

Jack Midgley considers how the Army should prepare itself to accomplish partner nation capability-building missions.

With the UN Security Council closed for business, the international community is clamoring for a way to increase the costs on President Bashar al-Assad.  Here are some of the options that western and Arab diplomats are looking at.

As Yemen faces presidential elections on February 21, for which only one candidate is standing, Robert Sharp and Fahad Malaikah ponder what is next for the country.

Michael V. Rienzi lays out possible Iranian responses to a U.S. attack.

Richard Dixon provides a much needed look at the issue of suicide and military leadership.

COL David Glaser lays out suggestions for selecting and properly training the right people to serve as advisors to senior foreign officials.

Joseph Collins reviews All In and finds that it lives up to the man that it is about.

Lionel Beehner explores the paradox behind terming a conflict a civil war, with an eye to events in Syria.

Stemming from the Occupy and Indignados movements, as well as the London riots, John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus look at the complex disorder of riots, their types, and the challenges they present.

Dan McCauley urges us to consider strategic thinking and apply it in considering our complex problems.

Alex Verschoor-Kirss provides an interesting look at a case of cultural insurgency: the Estonian Forest Brothers movement.

Adam Ahmad evaluates the prospect of Bashir al-Assad's survival in Syria.

COL Greg Grimes considers the value of civil affairs in a constrained budget environment.

Matteo Scianna suggests a heightened role for European forces in "smart defense" in the near abroad.  Is this the wave of the future, or a concept doomed by European economic troubles?

Robert Sharp takes a look at the war rhetoric and the youth of Iran and America and urges us to give peace a chance with Iran.

Niels Vistisen argues that the command structure and focus in Afghanistan results in a missing operational level.

Octavian Manea offers an interview with John Nagl who opines that "the savage wars of peace are still going to have an interest in us."

As the Arab Spring moves east, Fahad Malaikah reminds us not to forget where it started.

Patrick Truffer explores the inclusion-moderation theory as it pertains to Hamas, an important subject given the transitions of the Arab Spring.

The world must focus on strengthening institutions as it sets about withdrawing from the Afghan conflict.

Brad Fultz offers a qualitative tool to help commanders understand actors in their area of operations through a lens of locally defined legitimacy.

F3EA and D3A are great for what they do – but a flexible plan across all echelons for all planners may be a way to go, especially in a military where manpower could be severely limited in the coming years.

The authors propose implementing F3EAD methodology, which has met with success in the SOF community, across the force.

Adam Elkus explores the role of drones in battle and warfare and concludes that the moral concerns are nothing new to military history.

David Walker argues that the successes of the Af-Pak Hands program could be better managed by Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development.

Steven Metz writes about the psychology of insurgents. It is not mirror-image political concerns that they are after, but psychological needs.

Mike Few interviews civil war historian Mark Grimsley, research affiliate at The Ohio State University and author of several books, about reconstruction and insurgency.

American defense planners must consider what an era of persistent conflict will require of them.  Will the dictates of the Powell Doctrine or the imperatives of "human security" win out?

Pierce and Zanol offer a concept for maneuver in n-dimensional terrain.  Does this provide the conceptual basis to combat "wicked" problems?

Jeremy Gwinn focuses on the "transition" phase of security force assistance in Afghanistan.

Clausewitz's conception of fog and friction in warfare remains as relevant in ever.  Are you prepared to operate in an environment of uncertainty?

To defend her position, 21st Century America and western powers must seek out and create opportunities for advancement.  To do this, we must change the way we think.

The insurgents have adapted in their ability to deny space to the adversary; rather than settling to eat soup with a knife they attempt to recast the knife as a spoon.

These powerful criminal organizations leverage their competitive advantage to further corrupt the Afghan government possibly creating an endless cycle of dependency.

Chavez undertook a classical Maoist political campaign on Venezuelan society using the military as his modus operandi

It is essential to understand that everything of importance in Afghanistan happens in the village, not in Kabul, or even at the Provincial headquarters. Historically, Afghanistan has always been driven from the village up, from at least the time of Alexander the Great to the present time.

In today’s environment, the United States conducts security cooperation efforts to build partnerships and partner capacity in an attempt to “further the U.S. objective of securing a peaceful and cooperative international order.” To prove successful in this strategy, the US Air Force must demonstrate to partner nations how developing a strong aviation enterprise lays the foundation for the economic and security benefits that airpower can provide.

A Neorealist Perspective of Iraq after the American Exit

Limiting the definition of insurgency, can limit the military response

Self-organized civilians' activities against the military in war are neither a theoretical assumption nor NEW in history. Today and tomorrow, armies will have to contend with the phenomena.

How do you ensure you have the right amount of junior leaders (rank of sergeant to major) where you need them, when you need them? 

As the withdrawal of US and allied forces continues, the post-2014 allied manning and assistance levels in Afghanistan have yet to be defined.  The absence of a plan, inadequate media coverage, and our upcoming presidential election have created ambiguity, confusion, and drift, harming the war effort and giving comfort to our adversaries.

A Case Study of the American Experience in Iraq in the Pillar of Justice

Policy analysts question conceptual failure (ends), intellectuals want to know why, and the analysis of organizational and operational lessons learned (ways and means), will shape outcomes for years.

Kaplan builds a case for the growing importance of the Indian Ocean and its perimeter states as the new geopolitical center of the developing world

Uribe COIN model: Interview with Dr. Thomas A. Marks

Leading thinking about counterinsurgency misses the relevance of religious freedom.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan – What is Being Done Wrong and What Could be Done Better

Non-Commissioned Officer's masters thesis