Simply put, interagency reformists have failed to understand the environment within which they are proposing change.
Journal
Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog.
We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.
Time now for a return to the basics if the organization is to endure well into the current century.
A warning and call to action from the French criminologist.
Understanding the great paradox of the U.S. military: the better our conventional capabilities, the more likely we are to face increasingly irregular and asymmetric threats.
Policy implications from Stathis Kalyvas’ concepts of attitudinal and behavioural support.
Beware the experts, expats, urbanites, and a host of other easy routes.
The “Red” element can enhance analytical products, challenge critical planning outcomes, scrutinize the viability of source reporting, and assess potential attacks or responses.
The subject of Israel’s relations with Iraq does not make for headline news. If Israel attacks Iran, that could quickly change...
As some try to connect the dots of recent events, is there an Iranian role in what appears to be Stage 2 of the Arab Spring?
One of the reasons, if not THE reason, that we struggled to accomplish our objectives in Afghanistan is that we applied an industrial-era approach to the way we conceptualize planning and operations.
In assessing our “lessons learned” it is vital that the service look forward and not just retrospectively so it does not learn the wrong lessons.
Multi-national corporations--particularly from the extractive sector with long project life cycles, access to capital, and attractive return on investment--could act as a new phase in civil-military operations.
The Syrian regime’s use of shelling and aircraft are now being complimented with wholesale executions in rebel-controlled neighborhoods.
Water scarcity is an increasingly dangerous problem in the USCENTCOM AOR.
The prevalence of PTSD and mental disorders in weak and failed states is exacerbated by insurgencies, defying efforts break the cycle.
Pershing's leadership attributes and willingness to understand and work through the Moro culture achieved success in a complex operational environment.
Without international intervention, Syria will continue to slip into deeper sectarianism, which is the worst case scenario for Iraq.
“Afghan Led” is a critical aspect of our counterinsurgency operations that we must grasp to enable ultimate mission success.
The uniformed analytic community largely lacks institutional expertise and struggles to provide commanders with meaningful intelligence products.
A scathing and scholarly critique of the impact of De-Ba’athification on the America’s efforts to stabilize Iraq.
Further thought is required if this concept is going to succeed in the future.
Historians often turn wars and battles into linear sequences outlining casual chains for which the mind has a natural bias.
Transition can’t simply be, “We are leaving...good luck.”
The barbarians have come and the rules of war and peace stand transformed.
Cyber warfare isn’t hype; it’s real.
“We’ve won the war,” General Dan Halutz boasted.
What began as an Israeli air campaign rapidly evolved into an extensive ground war of bloody house-to-house battles that the Israelis were ill prepared to wage.
Iranian inroads in Africa present a potential new front in the Iranian-US cold war.
An autocratic Iraq will probably be happier doing more business with China and Russia. But the idea of a Sino-Russian strategy in the Middle East is far from simple.
Using security cooperation to prevent, shape ... and win.
The conventional approach taken by most aid programs has been a counterproductive disaster.
Looking to Plan Colombia to create a Plan Yemen.
Or how to shatter organizational stagnation and identify critical tensions preventing creative thinking and improvisation.
The authors lay out the “courses of action” available to Iran at sea, air, ground, in other countries and by conducting terrorism around the globe.
The killing of this (unprivileged, unlawful) combatant enjoyed ample legal authority under both international and domestic law, and is, as a matter of law and policy, uncontroversial.
A look inside the increasingly pivotal nation.
Lebanon has a political system, security force, and national memory to weather the current storm.
Guadalajara could lose its protected status among drug lords and become the next epicenter for drug-related violence.
Developed to streamline and expedite the orders process, the CONOP has forced leaders to expend time, effort and energy to push the CONOP through the approval process from the lowest to the highest levels; time that should be spent on mission planning.
A look at the war and how the administrations have prosecuted it.
There is a danger in the empirical mode of reasoning that it will lead us to think of a thousand locals or twenty counterinsurgents as homogenous units of human being.
America’s maritime and amphibious capabilities are pivotal to the nation’s future ability to deter and defeat adversaries, strengthen alliances, deny enemies sanctuary and project global influence.
As the US Treasury imposes sanctions on an Iraqi bank, what defines our relationship with friendly autocracies?
Could a conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan lead to tactical nuclear weapon use?
Life-saving training for deploying forces.
An edited volume by Williamson Murray and Peter Mansoor.
The post-Westphalian world must understand the pre-Westphalian one.
Observing how the Afghans develop intelligence and seek creative means to support their operations is vital to Afghans owning the security.
The current US/EU two-track policy on Iran, which includes the imposition of an oil embargo, is not sufficient to break the current nuclear stalemate.