Introduction

In an era of globalization that defines the current international environment, the lines of economic, political, and social dependence have become increasingly interwoven outside a nation’s borders. In many cases, these boundaries have become increasingly difficult to identify.  It is in this environment that the U.S. government has increased its efforts to recognize and establish relationships with partner nations that will help to solidify our national interests across the world.  While there are many avenues of approach to increasing and improving these relationships across all aspects and functional areas of a nation’s governmental and non-governmental organizations, the paper focuses its aperture and attention on the institution the Defense Department refers to as security cooperation.  Per the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, security cooperation is:

Security cooperation comprises DoD activities, including DoD interactions with foreign defense and security assistance programs, to encourage and enable international partners to take action in support of U.S. goals; provide the United States with access to territory, information, and resources; and develop and apply capability and capacity consistent with U.S. defense objectives.^[1]

Of consideration is if the DoD can conduct successful security cooperation engagements and establish partnerships on its own.  The same way that one nation cannot survive in isolation, neither can one government institution’s policies nor efforts succeed in isolation.  Under this assumption, it is necessary to utilize a case study method of analysis to determine what other whole-of-government avenues security cooperation relies on for success if any. 

An analytical framework that relies upon the instruments of national power: Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) is applied to the examples provided to show how engagements with partner nations across all involved government and nongovernment institutions lead to security cooperation success.  Case Studies of Thailand, Columbia, and the Philippines provide examples of successful security cooperation partnerships.  Through case study analysis of partnerships with these countries, the recurring theme of efforts across the DIMEFIL is highlighted in each case as characteristics that lead to security cooperation success.  Country selection criteria included a sampling of recent and longstanding partnerships as well as the criteria that at least two different global regions were represented by the three countries.  This was necessary to show that the DIMEFIL framework is an effective analytic tool that can be applied to any future security cooperation planning regardless of in what region of the world the partnership will exist.  To conduct successful security cooperation, the United States must implement all elements of national power throughout the planning and execution of the partnership. 

To provide a thorough analysis of the security cooperation partnerships, challenges to the success of U.S. security cooperation engagements with each of the countries will be identified.  In every case, it is also assumed that some of these challenges will continue to tear at the very core of the partnerships and require flexible application within the DIMEFIL framework to improve stability and secure our vital U.S. interests in the respective region when these challenges arise.  Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO’s) and national and trans-national criminal organizations seek to expand their recruitment, funding sources, and operations through exploitation in many regions of the world that are dominated by weak or little governance, corruption of government officials, displaced migrant populations, or humanitarian disasters.  Some of these enablers are present in all three of the countries chosen for analysis and their impact on security cooperation will be addressed.

Case Study #1

Security Cooperation with the Philippines

U.S. security cooperation with the Philippines dates back to 1951 when the two states signed the Mutual Defense Treaty.[2]  The signing of Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1953 further developed and consolidated the security cooperation efforts between the two states.[3]  In 1992, U.S. military bases in the Philippines were closed due to the shift of Filipino public opinion that created an environment unfavorable to having such a large contingent of U.S. forces permanently stationed in the Philippines.[4]  Fortunately, these changes like the relationship between the two nations did not impede the overall result of security cooperation efforts.  Since that time, security cooperation activities such as joint military exercises and military assistance have continued, and the Philippines is a significant partner in conducting global counterterrorism operations.  In addition to U.S. military assistance, Figure 1 represents the total U.S. assistance from 2008 to 2014; the Philippines received $1.05 billion across DIMEFIL.^[5]  The sustained support from the U.S. to the Philippines across all elements of national power is a successful example of security cooperation.^[6]   

Figure 1.  U.S. Assistance to the Philippines, FY2008-FY2015

(U.S. dollars in thousands)[7]

Analysis

The success of U.S. security cooperation in the Philippines is based on shared security interests and helped them become a reliable regional partner in Southeast Asia.  The two states are aligned with each other in pursuing the defeat of terrorism and the achievement of broader regional security.  One example of this joint effort between the two nations is seen through the operations conducted to neutralize the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization and al Qaeda-linked militants within Filipino national borders. Success in these endeavors not only served U.S. core strategic and security objectives but also helped to eliminate a persistent threat to security and stability within the Philippines.^[8]  In addition to shared security interests with the United States, active diplomacy in Southeast Asia, relatively stable governance, and capable economic power are positive characteristics of the Philippines that enable security cooperation activities.

U.S. military assistance and security cooperation engagements with the Philippines contributes to the increase of U.S. influence in the Southeast Asia region.  This increase is due in part to the Philippines’ effective diplomatic relationships with various regional states.  Through positive messaging regarding the United States, the Philippines plays an important role as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to help the United States secure its interests in the region.^[9]  Active diplomatic relations with the Philippines have also turned existing bilateral military exercises into platforms for broader regional cooperation with the United States.  A good example is the annual combined military exercise ‘Balikatan,’ which focuses on foreign humanitarian assistance.  Showcasing the potential for future expansion, what started out as a two-country exercise has grown and, in 2013, the 29^th annual Balikatan included eleven regional nations.  As evidence of an increase in efforts with the Philippines, even further widening the scope of the exercises has been discussed.^[10]  The more diplomatically active the Philippines becomes, the more opportunities for multilateral cooperation will be created for the United States. This means that as long as the Philippines keeps its diplomatic and economic power, it will remain as a valuable security cooperation partner for the United States. 

Stable governance of the Philippines is one of the key factors responsible for the successful results of U.S.-Philippine security cooperation.  Even though the Philippines has experienced political turmoil, corruption, coup attempts, and Muslim and communist insurgencies, it has maintained a relatively stable political system throughout its recent history. The Philippines’ level of democracy has been improving (e.g. from 75^th in 2012 to 69^th in 2013 according to the Economist Intelligence Unit) and Filipinos experience a society where they have the right to exercise civil rights with few restrictions, freely criticize national leaders, and enjoy academic freedom and religious liberties. ^[11]  Security cooperation in the Philippines has been successful because its government has been capable and sustainable.  However, there are still more areas for the Philippine government to make improvements and focus its efforts to reach the desired level of stable governance.  If the United States keeps providing the Philippines with necessary assistance for the improvement of governance, it will become a more credible partner capable of contributing even further to U.S. security interests.

Christopher Paul argues that states with relatively strong economies have historically produced more positive outcomes in security cooperation.^[12]  The Philippines’ stable economy has played a significant role in contributing to the success of security cooperation.  The Philippines is ranked 30^th regarding GDP, and economic growth has continued, increasing an average of 6.1% per year from 2011 to 2016.^[13]  Also, the Philippines has maintained over 1% of GDP on military-related expenditures since 2011 and continues to seek ways to increase its annual budget for the modernization of its military.^[14]  The sound economic policies practiced by the Philippines is one of the reasons the Philippines was rewarded with a 5-year contract worth $434 million by the Millennium Challenge Account in 2010.^[15] The U.S. military assistance given to the Philippines has brought prominent developments to their military since its relatively stable economic system could prevent potential misuse of financial assistance, and deviation from initially scheduled programs. The Philippines will continue to increase the growth rate of the military as an institution on a consistent basis as the United States continues to increase the role of security cooperation partnership.

Summary

     The Philippines is an example of how enduring U.S. partnerships demonstrate the success of security cooperation when all of the all the elements of national power are brought to bear.  Successful security cooperation can increase stability within a country and also within a region.  Over the course of the United States’ engagement with the Philippines, the emphasis on each particular element of the DIMEFIL has ebbed and flowed.  What has remained constant is the commitment that each country has maintained to ensuring security cooperation through sundry challenges.

Case Study #2

Security Cooperation with Colombia

In the late 1990s, Colombia was on the verge of failed state status.  The cocaine cartels that had run the country into the ground were leaderless, largely due to help from the United States, but demand for the drug was still high.^[16]  Into the vacuum stepped the various leftist and paramilitary groups that populated the hinterland.  The greatest among them was the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaras de Colombia, FARC, a half-century old Communist insurgency, which had expertise in the Columbian drug industry due to a long history of extorting coca growers in the territory it controlled.^[17]  The money financed their war against the Colombian government, contributing to the destabilization of nearly every aspect of society.  In Colombia, murders, disappearances, kidnappings, extra-judicial killings, extortion and, of course, drug trafficking were the worst in the world.^[18]  So in 1998, the Colombian president, Andrés Pastrana, approached President Clinton with a plan, Plan Colombia.^[19]  The plan detailed how the United States would provide security cooperation across the DIMEFIL spectrum to terminate Colombia’s (and America’s de facto) drug problem.

Analysis

Perhaps the single most vital contributor to Plan Colombia had happened before it was even conceived.  In 1997, the United States designated the FARC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.  This critical designation set in motion the mechanism through which the government of the United States was able to dramatically increase funding for security cooperation across all elements of DIMEFIL.  In 1998, the government of Colombia lacked presence in 169 of its 1,099 municipalities (each municipality is the equivalent to a county in the US).  By 2007, all 1,099 municipalities in Colombia had state representation and presence.^[20]  The longevity of Plan Columbia’s diplomatic influence cannot be undervalued.  Plan Colombia has now outlasted three Colombian and four U.S. administrations, a sign of the positive effects of a U.S. policy of long-term and consistent diplomatic engagement.

Informational longevity is just as important as a diplomatic engagement to security cooperation success.  The battle over the narrative has been critical to security cooperation success in Colombia.  In October of 1999, over 1 million Colombians marched against the FARC in a “No Mas” nationwide protest.^[21]  A politically active, vocal population is necessary to support security cooperation activities.  It is not difficult to determine the motivation for why the Columbians became active when it is revealed that Colombia became “the home to the world’s largest internally displaced population—4.7 million people by 2012—a distinction it has only recently ceded to Syria.”^[22]  Key indicators of violence, including kidnappings, homicides, disappearances, and forced displacement, have declined over the past 17 years, increasing the positive effects of the narrative.^[23]  Colombia has not always won the battle of the narrative though.  Evidenced by Colombia’s hardline stance against narcotraffickers, many in the international community to refused to engage in security cooperation activities with the Colombia.  By reaching out to the FARC, the current president, Juan Manuel Santos, has effectively switched the narrative about Colombia in the eyes of the international community.^[24]  Additionally, the FARC abandoned its leftist ideology and ramped up kidnappings, murders, and drug trafficking, which ultimately led to its loss of popular support.^[25]  When the military launched multiple campaigns against the FARC and like-minded groups, the population supported it despite rumors and evidence of human rights abuses.

Perhaps the most visible form of intervention through security cooperation is the military function.  In 1999, the FARC controlled an area the size of Switzerland, had 20,000 fighters, oversaw over $400 million in the drug business and earned $500 million from other illicit activities.^[26]  Through the years of Plan Colombia and fighting the FARC, the Colombian military has become the most professional in Latin America.^[27]  With the capability to use all of the most advanced technology, the Colombian military can deploy quickly to rugged and isolated jungle areas in U.S. provided Black Hawk helicopters and confront the FARC.  They advanced over the course of several years during President Uribe’s “Democratic Security” offensive that drove the FARC from populated areas to where they could be more easily targeted by the superior tactics and capability of the military.  The greatest indicator of the military security cooperation success, however, is the ability that Colombia has to export security cooperation.  Colombia has established security cooperation with a multitude of nations, but its primary partners are Mexico, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, Peru, El Salvador and Costa Rica.  At this point in the maturation of its military, as seen in Figure 2 below, Colombia is a “net security exporter.”^[28] These arrangements are beneficial for each country due to Colombia’s trainers costing nations receiving their assistance up to four times less than the use of U.S. asset.^[29]

Figure 2: Police and Military Personnel trained by Colombia from 2009-2013[30]

As insecurity grew, Colombians faced an economic recession.  In 1999, Colombia had a deficit of 5.2 percent, and the nation’s economy dropped by 4.5 percent.^[31]  Recession further exacerbated inequality, unemployment grew by 100 percent, and more than half of the population lived below the national poverty line, with 23 percent living in extreme poverty.^[32]  As a result of the comprehensive approach to security cooperation, Colombia became, “the largest recipient of American assistance in Latin America and one of the top ten worldwide.”^[33]  That fact is slightly misleading, however, as the US spent $10B on security and development-based stability in Colombia by 2010, compared to $1.6 trillion combined in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2014, an average of 10 billion every 29 days.^[34]  Perhaps one of the best signs of the success of Plan Colombia is the bipartisan recognition that it has received domestically in the United States as a U.S. foreign policy success.^[35]  Finally, for the past several years economic support to the Andean nation has declined.

Figure 3: US aid to Colombia during Plan Colombia[36]

The financial contribution to the security cooperation plan is one of the most interesting parts of Plan Colombia.  95% of the financing for the strategy came from Colombia’s economic elites, who agreed to higher taxes because it was better for their long term interests.^[37]  Poverty dropped nationally from 64% in 1999 (before Plan Colombia) to 28.5% in 2014, and extreme poverty dropped from 23% to 8.1% over the same period.^[38]  The country has made significant strides to recover financially, in large part due to the security provided by the country and because of the population’s willingness to contribute to their security financially.

Unlike the financial contribution, Colombia was not able to contribute very much to the intelligence portion of security cooperation for quite a while.  U.S. intelligence intervention provided the capability that Colombia needed to tip the scales of the insurgency.  Many agencies, including the CIA, gave the country a vast, sophisticated intelligence-gathering system to hunt the rebels, as well as the lethal hardware to strike them from the skies.^[39]  Intelligence successes do not typically make it into unclassified records, but what will be regarded as one of the best intelligence coups of Plan Colombia was the rescue of fifteen FARC hostages in 2008, including former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three Americans who had been held captive for more than five years.^[40]

Strengthening Colombian rule of law and improving law enforcement was a major focus of the financial contribution to Colombia.^[41]  The investment proved worthy.  From 2000 to 2014, kidnappings dropped from the high of nearly 3,000 in the year 2000 to 288.^[42]  The country now has the second largest police force in South America.^[43]  The growth and professionalization of the units have had similar benefits to exporting security as the military.  The International Affairs Office of the Colombian National Police (CNP) reports that between 2009 and 2013, it provided police and military training to 21,949 individuals from 47 different countries in such skills as ground, air, maritime, and river interdiction, police testimony, explosives, intelligence operations, psychological operations, and Comando JUNGLA, the U.S.- designed signature elite counternarcotics police program.^[44]

Summary

Plan Colombia was not an unmitigated success.  The security cooperation plan was built to eradicate or at least reduce cocaine and other drug production in the country.  It is far from accomplishing that mission.  On the other hand, Plan Colombia has undisputedly contributed to strengthening Colombia’s state apparatus, economic growth and a major drop in violence, even if it failed its initial objective to seriously disrupt the country’s flow of cocaine to the United States.^[45]  Crime is still high, displaced personnel need to be repatriated and reparations need to be made, criminals need to be reintegrated, coca is still a viable commodity and rural areas are in dire need of demining.  However, like most security cooperation successes, time is necessary for change and security cooperation in Colombia will continue to improve as long as U.S. engagement uses a comprehensive DIMEFIL approach.

Case Study #3

Security Cooperation with Thailand

The United States has a well-established relationship with Thailand beginning in 1833 with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and reinforced with the Manila Pact of 1954.^[46]  These agreements had proven to stand the test of time, when, in 2003, the United States designated Thailand a Major Non-NATO Ally.^[47]  The United States has relied on Thailand to enhance stability within the region and has provided security assistance across all instruments of national power along the spectrum of DIMEFIL.

Analysis

Through diplomacy, the United States has focused efforts along the lines of reforming criminal justice systems, promoting good governance through democracy and civil society activities, and providing humanitarian assistance.^[48] An excellent example of diplomatic success is the implementation of USAID’s health program in Thailand.  This project targets HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis identification and addressing the needs of most-at-risk populations while developing replicable models for HIV prevention and care.  By providing government-to-government assistance, Thailand increased its ability to conduct infectious disease-related research, tracking the spread of such diseases, and training researchers and caregivers.^[49]  The United States has also provided assistance and partnership to bolster Thailand’s law enforcement capability.  Through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok continues to fund activities to combat trafficking in illegal drugs, terrorism, and transnational organized crime.  Specifically, INL has partnered with U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force-West to construct an indoor tactical training facility at the Royal Thai Police Tactical Training Center in Nong Sarai.^[50]  Facilities such as these provide the critical infrastructure for the Royal Thai Police force to effectually train their personnel and further institutionalize their tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure their forces can safely execute their missions.  Additionally, these projects demonstrate the United States’ commitment to promoting the rule of law and good governance through deliberate diplomacy. Finally, the United States has encouraged Thailand to assume a regional role in security cooperation, and in 2009 the Lower Mekong Countries (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam) joined to enhance the practice in the areas of environment, health, education, and infrastructure development.^[51]  Initiatives such as these have given the United States a means to promote international norms, a platform to work cooperatively on regional issues, and give neighboring countries an avenue to solve common challenges.

Prior to 2014, the United States enjoyed over six decades of military security cooperation with Thailand.  However, due to a historically unstable political system, there was a military coup which restricted how the U.S. military could partner with their Thai counterpart.  Those restrictions have slowly been pulled back and through the Joint United States Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI) the United States aims to enhance interoperability between militaries.  Through approximately 85 exercises a year, International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales, de-mining, and military medicine exchanges, the United States will increase interoperability through training and equipment.^[52]  Specifically, Thailand and the United States hold exercise Cobra Gold on an annual basis, which works on both interoperability and joint doctrine.  Additionally, the Thai-U.S. Defense dialogue provides a forum to coordinate security policy and security cooperation on issues based on shared priorities and mutual respect.^[53] As important as the United States’ military alliance is with Thailand it is equally important not to forget their history of military coups.  The military must carefully coordinate with the diplomatic instrument of power to ensure the Thai military adheres to a non-military political structure and serves to provide for the defense of their country in the event of external aggression and humanitarian support during times of natural disaster.

The United States’ economic partnership with Thailand is a testament to the success of long-term initiatives.  Agreements such as the Trade and Investment Framework (updated in 2016) address the sales of agronomy and have led to Thailand enhancing its ability to maximize agriculture exports.  From an economic standpoint, the United States and Thailand conduct over $37 billion in two-way trade annually.  The United States continues to make significant investments, over $11 billion in foreign direct investment in 2015, into petroleum and chemicals, finance, consumer products, and automobile production sections.^[54]  In 2013, both countries signed an additional agreement on science and technology cooperation that enshrines robust protections for intellectual property and increases research programs, collaboration, private investment, and technology transfer.^[55]  It remains important to continue to revisit these types of agreements from the U.S. perspective to ensure Thailand’s advances are not only economically advantageous but promote good and responsible governance.  By providing government-to-government assistance, the United States positions itself to be a valuable mentor in a fast-growing economy where it is not the top trading partner (#3 trade partner behind China and Japan).^[56]

Summary

It remains evident that to build a country’s capability and capacity successfully, the United States must be willing to exert all instruments of national power and implement a mentality of enduring partnership as compared to short bursts of support.  In the case of Thailand, the United States has provided almost a century of support and has seen Thailand go through peaks and valleys, but when one avenue of support was forced to slow due to changes in the environment, different instruments of national power were accelerated to maintain the strategic relationship.  Having the ability to balance efforts of how the United States engages with partner countries reveals hidden opportunities to continue engagement and promote long-term goals.

Discussion

Security Cooperation is critical to the success and attainment of the United States’ national strategic security efforts.  As stated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR):

Security cooperation activities include bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales (FMS) and financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at professional military schools, technical exchanges, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in building competency and capacity. In today’s complex and interdependent security environment, these dimensions of the U.S. defense strategy have never been more important. U.S. forces, therefore, will continue to treat the building of partners’ security capacity as an increasingly important mission.^[57]

However, the question was asked if the U.S. military can succeed through the implementation and efforts of those items listed above in isolation from the other institutions of national power.  Through the analysis of our security cooperation relationships with the Philippines, Colombia, and Thailand, three countries with whom the United States has achieved abundant success, it is determined that the military cannot achieve their objectives without the abilities and inclusion of the other institutions of government contributing their portions of national power.  Through this unity of effort, and utilizing the DIMEFIL framework for analysis, it was determined that the successes of security cooperation engagements could be replicated in new partnerships and expanded in those existing.  Achieving these types of results in future engagements across all regions of the globe will ultimately result in a security environment comprised of a network of partnerships more closely aligned with the national security interests of the United States.

While outside of the scope of the DIMEFIL framework, two factors were evident from the research that could predict the likelihood of a successful security cooperation partnership, time and partner nation willingness.  Each of the partnerships analyzed demonstrated a generational commitment to security cooperation, spanning multiple administrations.  In addition, the Philippines, Colombia, and Thailand’s willingness to accept support across DIMEFIL was a critical factor in security cooperation success and also enhanced stability within the region.  Ancillary for further and follow-on study is the optimal timeframe and the degree of partner nation willingness to execute a successful security cooperation partnership within a DIMEFIL framework. 

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