The Russo-Georgian War: Russian Influence

The Russo-Georgian War: Russian Influence

Contributing Authors:

SFC Adam DeKraker, MSG Christopher Hinen, SFC Bernard Iatauro & SSG Patrick Barense

Edited by:

SFC Charles Reno

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

About this case study:

This case study is part of a larger body of work researched and produced by the students of the Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Program Design and Assessment Course (MPDAC) at Ft. Bragg, NC.  This body of work examines conflict scenarios with emphasis on determining the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) efforts and activities employed by the various competitive actors in the area of operations.  Each case study follows a basic format of presenting the relevant stakeholders, their goals, and the PSYOP or other influence activities they used to achieve their goals.  Each case study examines the PSYOP efforts under the framework of U.S. doctrine concluding with a brief statement of comparison between the historical vignette and current doctrine to offer opinion where current U.S. doctrine has either strengths or weaknesses.  The comparison, though based primarily on opinion, is opinion offered by U.S. PSYOP NCOs and Officers with first-hand experience under contemporary doctrine.

Introduction

            In August 2008, the Russian Federation executed a full-spectrum display of military dominance in defense of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Transcaucasia region of Georgia to protest them from an army assault and probable genocide at the hands of the Georgian army and its President, Mikheil Saakashvili (Ko, 2012).  At least, that is the narrative that the Russians would prefer the world to believe while attempting to dominate the information space during the incursion of Georgia.  However, Russia successfully synchronized the diplomatic, information, and military variables of its instruments of national power across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of its operation before the world could understand the territorial grab and disruption of jointly held North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and Georgian security goals.

Fig. 1 2008 South Ossetia War (Nacu, 2008).

            Russia launched a military campaign in August 2008 that lasted for five days as Georgia attempted to assert control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia's military attack commenced in synchronization with a cyber-assault that targeted Georgian media and government-run websites (Kirk, 2009).  Georgian banks, transportation companies, and private telecommunications providers were targeted and attacked during the cyber-assault, resulting in disrupted services (Connell, 2016).  A total of 54 websites were targeted, most of which were beneficial to Russia during the denial of service attacks (Kirk, 2009).  The combination of kinetic and non-kinetic strikes quickly overwhelmed the Georgian army and government.  The attack would serve as Russia's first attempt in using proxies, criminals, and supporters to augment military actions to achieve both a military and a strategic advantage.  Russian proxies integrated what Western entities would consider a cyber-attack into broader information and military operation (Blank, 2017).  This was a historically unique and strategically important aspect of modern warfare, the emergence of synchronized cyberspace actions as an intelligence indicator for strategic, operational, and tactical military operations.

            The ensuing cyber-war between Georgia and Russia focused on shaping and maintaining public opinion on the internet.  Russia and Russian supporters used various cyber techniques, including Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and the creation of fake web sites to control how their version of the truth was delivered to the public (Thomas, 2009).  By controlling the narrative through cyber, electronic, and traditional dissemination platforms, Russia attempted to shape popular opinion and sway the global audience into adopting a pro-Russian attitude.

            On July 20, 2008, Saakashvili's official website came under a DDoS cyber-attack.  The attack shut down the website for more than 24 hours and was a precursor to the impending cyber-attack that would come less than a month later.  Nearly 35% of Georgia's internet networks suffered decreased functionality during the attacks.  The most significant and damaging online activity coincides with the Russian invasion of South Ossetia from August 8^th – 10^th, 2008 (White, 2018).  On August 8, 2008, a coordinated DDoS attack was conducted against a myriad of Georgian government websites while Russian and Georgian forces were engaged in ground combat, and as the ground attacks increased, so did the cyber-attacks (Ashmore, 2009).

            The synchronized attacks perpetuated the Russian interpretation of cyberspace as a tool for holistic psychological manipulation and information warfare. Further, they highlighted the role of a proxy force on the modern battlefield.  Leveraging traditional sources of state powers and coercion, Russia's control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be seen to project power through puppet states and align with Russia's desire to be perceived as a geopolitical superpower once again (Nilsson, 2018).

To understand the planning and execution of Russia's influence strategy, it is imperative to examine the stakeholders involved, their objectives, and to define a holistic view of the operational environment before the incursion to understand the conditions of the operational environment.  Additionally, to explain the lessons learned from the attack, an analysis will follow using two frameworks from the lens of a Psychological Operations (PSYOP) practitioner.  First, the framework of the Russian influence strategy will be compared to the components of a Military Information Support Operation (MISO) program.  Second, the Russian influence strategy will be compared to the current U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine to determine if it would have assisted or hindered the operation.

Stakeholders and Objectives

            The primary stakeholders in the Russo-Georgian War were the United States of America, NATO, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Georgia, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Abkhazia, and the Republic of South Ossetia.  Each stakeholder maintained individual and collective objectives that carried a great deal of influence over the war's outcome.

            The Western-Democratic entities focused on maintaining regional stability while preventing the expansion of the Russian Federation.  With U.S. assistance, Georgia sought an expedited Membership Action Plan (MAP) from NATO early in 2008. Georgia's western leaning government was an ally of the U.S. during the conflict and was the third-largest provider of manpower in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Additionally, Georgia's proximity to the Middle East was of strategic value to NATO (Farhadian, 2010).  The EU, which relies on Russia for a considerable share of its energy resources, desired a peaceful resolution to the war to maintain European stability and effective trade relations with Russia as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline flowed through the region (Farhadian, 2010).

            Russia viewed and continues to view NATO expansion into former Soviet Republics as a provocation of Western ideals.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's strategy in the early 1990s was to establish separatist regions in former Soviet Republics, such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, to act as a security buffer between Russia and the West.  Those separatist regions would ultimately serve to prevent those countries from obtaining NATO membership.  Russia has provided 'peacekeeping' forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for several years to provide the region with legitimacy and quasi-sovereignty.  Abkhazia and South Ossetia are particularly susceptible to separatist narratives because both have strong ties to Russia, with many citizens believing they were forced to become part of Georgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

            The Transcaucasia region serves as a buffer between Russia and the Middle East.  If Russia could gain control of this region, it would influence Western relations with the Middle East.  Additionally, the annexation of Abkhazia would add to Russia's strength and ability to project power by solidifying Russian control of the Black Sea region. Russia's short-term and mid-term influence objectives were to disrupt Georgian membership in NATO and to send a message to other former Soviet Republics who seek NATO membership, specifically Ukraine. Russia's long-term influence objective is to ensure that the Russian occupation of former Soviet Republics is perceived as legitimate and in the best interest of that state.  Ensuring legitimacy is not only external to Russia but also internal to maintain support for the Russian government.

            Georgia's primary objective was to maintain sovereignty and gain stability in the disputed regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to facilitate the MAP process for NATO membership.  Abkhazia possesses a large portion of the Georgian coastline on the Black Sea and provides vital maritime access to sea trade (Farhadian, 2010).  In 2008, Georgia was on the path to NATO membership. Still, both the Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Russian President Vladimir Putin warned NATO against cultivating closer ties with Ukraine and Georgia, stating such a policy was irresponsible and would have unspecified consequences for the alliance.  Russia maintains the stance that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are independent states, knowing that nations locked in territorial conflict cannot join NATO.  The Georgian President during the war, Saakashvili, knew that becoming a member of NATO meant that he had to establish control in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  However, Georgia's attempt to stabilize the region and strengthen its ties with the West was perceived as an aggressive advance towards Russia.

            Abkhazia and South Ossetia both have large populations of ethnic Russians.  Both territories have struggled for autonomy, independence, and sovereignty since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's primary objectives were to gain independence through the Russian Federation's support.  Because both regions have diverse populations, various groups had competing and conflicting internal objectives, which ultimately led to the displacement of nearly 135,000 citizens during the war (Farhadian, 2010).

            The U.S., NATO, and the EU jointly desired stability in the Transcaucasia region and prevented Russian expansion.  The U.S. advocated for Georgia to receive an expedited MAP early in 2008.  The EU, in particular, which receives over a third of its energy from Russia, desired a peaceful end to the conflict to ensure its economy and foreign trade would remain stabilized (Farhadian, 2010).

The Operational Environment Framed Using PMESII

            Without a robust understanding of the operational environment's conditions, it is impossible to understand the Russian influence apparatus used during the Russo-Georgian War.  Using a systems approach, the operational environment is broken down into the following variables: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII).  The PMESII variables are later applied to the MISO program to explore Russia's influence to achieve its objectives.

Political

            Conflict and strained diplomatic relations existed between Russia and Georgia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Regime changes due to the Rose Revolution and an increasing shift towards Western ideals by the government of Georgia further exacerbated those tensions (Ko, 2012).  Moreover, Georgia's desire to join NATO, a maneuver the U.S. supported with remarkable commitment, increasingly served to strain the Russo-Georgian relationship (Farhadian, 2010).  Adding fuel to the fire, Abkhazia and South Ossetia requested that the Russian Duma formally recognized their independence, shortly after Kosovo had received its independence.  Additional diplomatic and political tensions exist because European nations viewed overt assistance to Georgia in its struggle with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a provocation of Russia (Cohen & Hamilton, 2012).

Military

Leading up to the war, Russia was gradually increasing the number of peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Ko, 2012).  Additionally, several reports surfaced that Russia was building irregular security forces in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and that Russia was employing air incursions into Georgian airspace as a means of intimidation (Donovan, 2009).  Tensions between Georgian and Russian soldiers occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia were at an all-time high. Georgia took the first step by conducting combat operations in South Ossetia to quell unnecessary violence.  Just before the Russian incursion, Russia conducted a military exercise on the Russian border with South Ossetia, using the liberation of South Ossetia as a script for their training.  As it unfolded, the military exercise on the border was practice for the real thing, and Russia invaded Georgian territory nearly a week after the exercise's conclusion (Donovan, 2009).

Economic

            The BTC pipeline is an oil pipeline that flows from Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to Turkey is a primary revenue source for Georgia.  However, it serves as another point of contention between Russia and Georgia because it excludes Russia from the revenue stream of oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean (Ko, 2012).

Information

Russia controlled the information environment within Russia but also used their influence to control it outside of Russia.  The state-sponsored broadcast company Russia Today (RT) promoted the Russian version of the Russo-Georgian War narrative regionally and provided the narrative to third party news organizations to rebroadcast.  Russia also used embedded journalists to report the 'atrocities' that the Georgian military allegedly conducted before Russia's incursion.  Additionally, Russian and Russian backed hackers conducted cyber-attacks on the Georgian President to sway public opinion.  In one ineffective cyber operation, the Russian's placed pictures of Adolf Hitler on Saakashvili's official website so that viewers would compare the two's actions.  To prevent the malign Russian narrative from permeating the information space in Georgia, the Georgian government in Tbilisi blocked Russian state-sponsored television and websites throughout Georgia.

Infrastructure

Just before the war, Russia deployed railway troops to Abkhazia to repair a large railroad section leading to Sochi. While this is important in the context that the International Olympic Committee awarded Russia the 2010 Olympics that would be hosted in Sochi, the railroad was ultimately used as a primary means for transportation of military equipment during the Russo-Georgian War (Cohen & Hamilton, 2012).  Additionally, as Abkhazia maintains most of the Black Sea coastline, the loss to Georgia would be detrimental to its economy (Cohen & Hamilton, 2012).

MISO Program Summary

            The primary components of a MISO program are MISO objectives, target audiences, themes to stress and avoid, means of dissemination, the attribution plan, the designated approval authority, a general concept of operations, a concept for assessment, the assessment of the potential for collateral effect and exposure to unintended audiences, the assessment of risk by the execution of the planned MISO, and proposed public affairs guidance.  To understand Russia's use of influence during the Russo-Georgian War, the components of a MISO program can be utilized to reverse engineer a MISO program from the perspective of Russia's influence strategy and employment of psychological warfare to determine its effectiveness.  While all of this information is not readily available, this paper will explore Russia's MISO objectives, target audiences, themes to stress and avoid, the means of dissemination, the attribution plan, risk, a concept for assessment, and the varying forces and assets that Russia employed.

MISO Objectives

Russian objectives were:  increase support for Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; increase support for the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; increase international support for Russia; increase global paralysis; disrupt the commander's decision making process; decrease the legitimacy of Georgian government; decrease support for Georgian NATO ascension; decrease support for NATO and international intervention.

            The objectives of the cyber and influence operations during the war were executed to confuse enemy forces, disrupt command and control nodes, and to control the narrative.  According to John Bumgarner, a research director for security technology, the "first wave of cyber-attacks launched against Georgian media sites were in line with tactics used in military operations" (Prince, 2009).  Augmenting military actions with cyber and influence effects provided the Russian military a pliable target to execute a full operational strategy.  Based on Russia's efforts, it is safe to assume that future military objectives will involve similar tactics to produce similar results.

            Looking at Russian objectives from a strategic, nation-state perspective, the situation becomes more complicated. Russia's influence operations have multiple objectives, including "inducing paralysis, strengthening groups that share Russia's point of view, and creating alternative media narratives that match Russia's objectives (Helmus, 2018).  Messages and narratives that infiltrated and polluted the operational environment influenced the available data to policymakers and reduced overall trust in institutions, such as the Georgian government and related media outlets, by merely introducing multiple false narratives.  Russian political content also aimed to "tarnish democratic leaders or undermine institutions through allegations of voter fraud, election rigging, and political corruption (MacFarquhar, 2016).  Another theme of Russian influence is to show the weakness of the Western world and to emphasize the divides existing there (Rogoza, 2008). Russia's control of the narrative by using multiple dissemination platforms acting in concert ensured consumer saturation.

            An enduring narrative used during the Russo-Georgian War both before and after the conflict was the complete discrediting and delegitimizing of the Georgian government.  Russian journalists shared with domestic and international audiences the progress of Russian soldiers in protecting ethnic Russian's while at the same time propagandizing Georgian atrocities.  Russia painted Georgia as a subordinate to the U.S. and framed their military intervention in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as genocide; this narrative was shared globally and was focused on influencing the decision to admit Georgia into NATO.

            The strategic, operational, and tactical implications of Russia's robust weaponization of the information environment and product dissemination necessitates an equally vigorous counter-campaign.  By controlling the narrative, disrupting communication, and flooding the global environment with pro-Russian narratives, Russia's expansionism becomes a more credible reality.

Target Audiences

            Russia's target audience included: key leaders and decision-makers, Georgian nationalists; Russian nationalists; Russian diaspora; the NATO member state; Europe, North America, former Soviet Republics.

            During the Russo-Georgian War, Russia targeted the above audiences to persuade, influence, and deny freedom of the informational environment.  The primary target audience involved those with access to the Georgian government infrastructure, which was targeted through DDoS attacks to limit the effectiveness of communications and other control nodes during the military attack.  That initial targeting in preparing the information space was as effective as the kinetic strikes Russia carried out in Georgia.

            The influence campaign supporting the military assault was to frame the intervention and allow the first-strike narrative to be told from the Russian perspective.  The narrative that Russia perpetuated was that they arrived in response to ethnic cleansing and genocide. They alleged that Georgia was committing it against ethnic Russians living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The Russian side "justified their military intervention by their intention to stop an allegedly ongoing genocide of the Ossetian population by the Georgian forces" and to also "protect Russian citizens residing in South Ossetia and the Russian contingent of the joint peacekeeping forces deployed in South Ossetia" (Traynor, 2009).

            Several target audiences existed for the 'Russia as the protector narrative.  Internal to Russia, this narrative is used to help solidify the Russian image as a defender of its people, either at home or abroad.  That narrative also played out in Western media outlets.  Original reports from Russian news sources was that Georgia was destroying Abkhazia and South Ossetia and targeting the ethnic Russians living there.  Indeed, it was Russia's initial control of that narrative that forced Georgia's information operations into a perpetually defensive posture.  Russia can leverage Russian populations to amplify their message, pressure those populations' host government, and incite unrest in their given region or nation.  Further, the mere existence of these compatriot populations can legitimize Russia's status as a global leader who's "protection is not only needed but welcomed outside of its border" (Zakem et al., 2017).

Themes to Stress and Avoid

            Russia's themes to stress included: Russian intervention legitimacy; Georgian genocide; atrocities targeting Russians; Abkhazia and South Ossetia's claims of autonomy are legitimate; Russia's commitment to protecting all Russians; Western democratic states are providing Russia; fortress Russia. Russia's themes to avoid included: Russian occupation of former Soviet Republics; Russian reestablishment of the former Soviet Union; Russian staging of military forces for operations.  In a greater context, the 'fortress Russia' theme began to emerge and take shape during the Russo-Georgian war.  Additionally, the Russian occupation of former Soviet Republics was countered with a 'Russian occupant' theme, which Russia later owned in a state-produced YouTube video.

            As discussed earlier, the central theme Russia supplied during the war was they it was preventing the genocide of ethnic Russian's living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  This theme was exercised before Georgia could produce any counter-messaging, which gave Russia a first-strike advantage at controlling the narrative.  The overarching theme that Russia was preventing genocide was disseminated internationally to garner pro-Russian sentiment.  A secondary effect could have been painting Georgia as the aggressor to reduce the chances of being admitted into NATO. 

            In the messaging addressed to audiences abroad, Russia was trying to prove that its activities complied with international law and that the actions taken by Russia were in keeping with those that the West has taken in the past (Rogoza, 2008).  For the domestic audience, Russian media created a unilateral and overly emotional message that emphasized humanitarian issues (Rogoza, 2008).  Russia is adept at creating messages, products, and themes customized for their specific target audience.  A singular narrative can be made to achieve a strategic, operational, and tactical effect, with multiple themes to address secondary and tertiary effects.  In this sense, Russia is playing a long game in the context of psychological warfare.

Means of Dissemination

            Russian dissemination methods included: Traditional media (television, radio, newspaper, etc.); mobile devices and towers; international news outlets; cyber assets; psychological actions (military staging, military exercises, cyber-attack).

            Russia engaged a proactive global propaganda campaign utilizing traditional and contemporary dissemination methods.  Products and messages targeted geographically disconnected Russians living abroad, the internal Russian population, foreign actors, and great power competition adversaries.  Russia has used this outreach to create and cultivate negative sentiments against foreign governments and NATO and the EU (Helmus, 2018). RT, the state-funded and controlled Russian television network, broadcasts internationally in English, Arabic, and Spanish.  State-controlled news websites, such as Sputnik, disseminate news in nearly 30 languages.

            Russia also uses complex social media campaigns that include news tweets, non-attributed comments on web pages, troll and bot social media accounts, and fake hashtag campaigns on Twitter (Helmus, 2018). Russia's digital approach is augmented through civil organizations, ideologically aligned political parties, and churches.  The combination of digital and relevant actor dissemination platforms increases the credibility, legitimacy, and saturation of messaging.  Some of the distinctive features of the contemporary model for Russian propaganda that enable Russia's influence campaigns are that the operations are: "high-volume and multichannel, they are rapid, continuous, and repetitive, they lack the commitment to objective reality, and they lack a commitment to consistency" (Paul, 2016).

            It is difficult to differentiate what dissemination methods were used during the Russo-Georgian War.  All external influence products, either narrative-based or DDoS, were conducted in the cyber domain.  Internal to Russia, all dissemination platforms were exploited for their population's consumption

Attribution Plan

            For Russia to reassert its regional hegemony, its messaging and related products during the war required Russian attribution.  However, Russia uses surrogate and target media to get a narrative into legitimate and trusted news sources worldwide.  It is likely Russia used those means during the Russo-Georgia War to reach specific target audiences in other regions.  In that instance, it would be imperative that those messages are not attributed to Russia, and they were likely not attributed at all.

            Russia blends Russian attribution, partner attribution, and non-attributed elements while exploiting new realities of online and social media to conduct information warfare at perhaps an unprecedented scale and level of complexity (Helmus, 2018). Russia's first level of attribution involved overtly attributed products, messages, and outlets, including official Russian government agencies and a myriad of Russian state-controlled, state-affiliated, and state-censored media and think tanks such as RT, Sputnik, the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK), Channel One, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. 

            Russia's second level of attribution was comprised of content producers and circulators who were either partner-attributed or carried a level of uncertain attribution.  This attribution plan covered conspiracy websites, far-left and far-right websites, news aggregators, and data dump websites (Weisburd et al., 2016).

            Russia's third level of attribution involved both clandestine and covert means of influence and was non-attributable to Russia.  Russia utilized criminal organizations, intelligence services, and non-state actors to carry out psychological actions and influence activities that are extremely difficult to link directly to Russia

Risk Mitigation

            Russia has the luxury of not having the approval and permissions hurdle that U.S. PSYOP forces encounter when formulating and disseminating products and messages.  With the Georgian cyber-attack, as with most nation-state cyber operations, Russia denied involvement.  There are no current provable direct links to Russia that the cyber-attacks directed at the Georgian government sites originated from Russia.  The Shadow Server Foundation, a nonprofit group that tracks criminal activity on the internet, said that ordinary Russian citizens were helping attack the Georgian government websites with programs distributed through friendly sites (Menn, 2008).

            An ordinary Russian method is to employ proxies, ideologically aligned hacktivists, supporters, criminals, and sympathizers to achieve cyberspace effects.  Hacktivists and cyber-criminal syndicates have been an integral part of Russia's offensive cyber operations.  These non-government and non-military entities provide anonymity, plausible deniability and can be mobilized quickly.  These actors are instrumental in furthering state aims in cyberspace while limiting the government's attribution risk (Madiant, 2015).  However, the crowd-sourced approach that has typified how Russia has utilized hackers and criminal networks in the past is likely to be replaced by more tailored strategies, with government agencies playing a more central role (Connell, 2016).  It appears that Russian criminal organizations "made no effort to conceal their involvement in the cyber campaign against Georgia because they wanted to claim credit for it" (Kirk, 2009).  Cyber hacking groups, or Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups, have become a central part of Russia's cyber information operations toolkit (Connell, 2016).  While direct links to the Russian government are difficult to prove, there are groups whose activities closely align with Russian military objectives.

            Russia's reliance on third-party actors to achieve cyber effects and propaganda distribution allows plausible deniability and maintain a façade of nation-state legitimacy.  Russia appears to be leveraging civilian nationalists, diasporas, separatists, and geographically disconnected supporters ready to execute Russian influence programs and DDoS attacks coordinated to complement national objectives.  As with most nation-state cyber operations, Russia has denied involvement in the cyber-attacks against Georgia. 

Concept of Assessment

            The Russian method for assessing their influence program during the incursion is unknown.  The influence strategy was synchronized with kinetic efforts, and its assessment likely included intelligence assets, battle-damage assessments, cyber assessments, and third-party polling.  Although the hostilities only lasted five days, many of the Russian objectives were strategic and provided lasting effects in the Transcaucasia region, the Middle East, and Europe.

Russian Forces and Assets

            Russia employed numerous forces and assets in the Russo-Georgian War, including Russian air and ground forces; Chechen Spetsnaz, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU), and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB); Russian state-owned media; Russian military embedded journalists; cyber assets; Russian diaspora.  As discussed earlier, the first wave of cyber-attacks against Georgia mirrored tactics used in military operations, and augmenting those actions with kinetic operations provided the Russian military with a pliable target.  Based on Russia's efforts, it is safe to assume that any future process would involve similar tactics.

            The most apparent and coercive tool that Russia possessed to project power through kinetic operations was its military presence and the credibility it gives to threats of deploying the force.  In August 2008, Russia demonstrated that ability by quickly establishing military superiority on the ground by "deploying 20,000 troops to Georgia and taking control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as large segments of undisputed Georgian territory within five days" (Pallin, 2009).  The Russian military presence on sovereign Georgian territory and near Georgia's borders overwhelmingly demonstrated the potential for conventional military power projection (Nilsson, 2018).

            Georgian and Russian forces competed to control the flow of information to the global community during the war.  However, Russia's employment of kinetic conventional military strikes and troop movements, DDoS, propaganda, and deception offensives identified the level of coordination and planning that Russia had conducted before engaging in direct conflict with Georgia (Iasiello, 2017).  Controlling the information presented throughout the war was vital to both sides, developing, shaping, and persecuting their narratives.  Unfortunately for Georgia, Russia demonstrated superiority in delivering its narrative through robust planning, dissemination, and timely execution.

Program Analysis

            Understanding the effectiveness of the Russian influence efforts during the Russo-Georgian War is essential in applying that knowledge to the current U.S. PSYOP doctrine and planning for or evaluating the current Russian influence strategy.  Evaluating the effectiveness of the influence operation can be summarized into four key points.  First, as of 2020, Georgia is still not a member of NATO, and both Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain autonomous regions of Georgia.  Second, similar tactics employed in Ukraine remain effective and resulted in the Russian annexation of Crimea.  Third, Russia continues to occupy or directly leverage influence in most former Soviet Republics, minus the Baltic region and Nordic countries.  Finally, the international community has questioned NATO support, aside from a breach of Article 5, to Eastern and Southern Europe.  Overall, Russia's employment of influence activities remains successful throughout Eastern Europe, and efforts to counter it have been slow and imprecise.

            Russia has presented an intricate, rigorous, and enduring campaign of information and psychological warfare that demands an equally dynamic response.  Russia has mastered the ability to quickly release messages and products which keep countermeasures in a perpetual reactionary posture.  As evident during the Russo-Georgian War, Russia continues to develop ways to effectively influence populations and leverage cyber effects to enhance full-spectrum military operations. Russia's use of proxies, criminals, and Russian diaspora allows it to circumvent international law, provides plausible deniability, and enables instant effects across multiple domains.  Russia enjoys a full-spectrum influence capability that is not restricted by authorities and permissions and can be executed much faster than opposing narratives, products, and related messages from those who seek to counter it.  By controlling the narrative, disrupting communications, and flooding the global information environment early with pro-Russian messages and propaganda, Russia continues to be a viable threat in the information domain.

Application of Current U.S. Doctrine

            Current U.S. and NATO doctrine serve to deter or disrupt future incursions by Russia; however, such authority's application remains to be an issue, especially in Georgia.  The implementation of Operation Atlantic Resolve and enhanced forward presence forces would not have deterred the kinetic fight on the ground in Georgia. Nor was it likely to deny the cyber and influence assets that were present.  Current MISO programs and authorities that can combat Russian influence are watered down or rendered ineffective. A lack of permission from the Department of State and their application in contested environments is equally ineffective.

Conclusion

            In August 2008, Russia launched a unilateral attack against the sovereign nation of Georgia with little resistance from the international community.  While Russia's influence campaign against the international community that promoted the narrative of Russian legitimacy was mostly fruitless, their strategic objectives in destabilizing Transcaucasia was successful.  The operation was not only a proof of concept for future frozen conflict areas. Still, it was also a demonstration to the world that Russia is capable of creating and maintaining instability and willing to do it to meet their national objectives.  By analyzing the Russian influence strategy of psychological warfare used during the Russo-Georgian War through the lens of current MISO doctrine and MISO programs and assessing its effectiveness in achieving primary objectives, the application of PSYOP becomes evident.

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