Small Wars Journal

The Impact of Funding Methods on Insurgency Outcomes: A Comparative Case Study of the M-19 and the FARC

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The Impact of Funding Methods on Insurgency Outcomes: A Comparative Case Study of the M-19 and the FARC

By Tyler Bandini

Introduction

            Views on the relationship between insurgent funding methods and insurgency outcomes are polarized. People generally conceptualize this relationship as too detached (funding is purely a means to an end) or too deterministic (the type of funding in and of itself can transform the essence of an insurgent group). Both of these explanations are reductionist and not conducive to understanding the funding-outcome nexus; a more comprehensive, nuanced understanding is necessary. This essay argues that by augmenting the strength of an insurgent group’s financing method vis-à-vis other sources of power, the degree to which the group’s dominant source of financing is embedded in the local social and economic fabric determines the extent to which it influences the group’s long-term outcome. A group’s funding method will strongly influence the insurgency’s long-term outcome when the method is embedded in local economic and social structures. In contrast, groups which fund themselves through disassociated methods will not be influenced by funding methods to the same degree. This is a distinct position from both the detached and deterministic schools of thought on the insurgent funding-outcome nexus. This essay holds that the link between insurgent funding methods and insurgency outcomes can indeed be causal but only when the funding method sufficiently impacts the power balance between itself and other sources of insurgent power.

            The funding-outcome nexus is surprisingly unexplored in academic literature. Scholarship on insurgent funding tends to fall into three categories: (1) the interaction between criminality and insurgency, (2) the impacts of funding on an insurgency’s capabilities, and (3) the impacts of funding on insurgent behavior. Saab and Taylor’s study on criminality and insurgency found that an insurgent group’s inherent characteristics strongly impact which avenues of criminality it pursues;[1] another study by Jonsson, Brennan, and O’Hara has found that participation in criminal activities does not necessarily alter the insurgent group’s ultimate aim.[2] Investigations into how funding impacts an insurgency’s capabilities have argued that certain methods of funding can better strengthen rebels’ operational capability,[3] smuggling provides more operational capability than resource extortion,[4] and the methods (gray economy vs. dark economy pursuits) by which groups fund themselves affect their operational and organizational capabilities.[5] The link between funding method and insurgent behavior is the most studied, containing investigations into social network theory,[6] the economic loyalty of workers to the insurgent,[7] forcible child-labor recruitment and resource exploitation,[8] the links between terrorism and natural resources,[9] the nexus between natural resources and civilian mistreatment,[10] how ideology impacts funding method,[11] the impacts of resource wealth and insurgent social disengagement,[12] and even how funding type affects the frequency with which insurgents commit sexual violence.[13] Despite the extensive sub-topics already covered on insurgent financing, no study has explicitly investigated the funding-outcome nexus.[14]

            In making its argument, this essay relies on a comparative case study of two Colombian insurgencies: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC) and the 19th of April Movement (the M-19). This essay uses these two groups because they each had similar ideologies, operated in the same country under the same political and economic conditions, utilized different funding methods, and ended differently. By tracing how each group responded to key inflection points during its insurgency, this essay will demonstrate that the type of funding pursued by an insurgent group impacts its long-term outcome.

The Colombian Situation

            During the 1960s, Colombia’s political and economic situation was characterized by severe economic inequality, the repression of marginalized groups, and the effects of a period of internal conflict known as La Violencia. La Violencia was a direct result of the legacies of Spanish colonialism and the severe economic inequality fostered by decades of landholder-benefitting policies.[15] When the peasant-benefitting Liberal Party leader was assassinated in 1948, conflict between the Conservative Party and Liberal Party devolved into violence. By the time La Violencia ended in 1958, roughly 200,000 people had died.[16] In 1958, the Conservatives and Liberals ended hostilities by creating the National Front, an arrangement in which Liberals and Conservatives would share power for the next 16 years. While this put an end to La Violencia, it did not legitimize communist or agrarian movements, and as a result, political repression against these groups persisted.[17] The pact institutionalized oligarchic power, neglected peasant grievances, and failed to reform the existing land distribution.[18] In the end, La Violencia trapped Colombian political resistance in “forms of impotence” and “in a political labyrinth with no way out.”[19]

After La Violencia had ended, many marginalized peasants remained in crushing poverty. Many lived in the agricultural frontier areas, which were characterized by land insecurity, limited state presence, social instability, resource conflicts, and cultural conflicts.[20] Facing a dismal economic and political outlook, peasants turned to cultivating coca in the agricultural frontier zones. For thousands of peasants during this period, coca cultivation provided access to the Colombian market and often paid higher wages than other types of rural labor.[21] The impacts of these factors would be crucial, especially for the jungle areas where the FARC’s southern stronghold would later be.[22]

It is in this political, economic, and social context that the M-19 and the FARC emerged. The FARC traces its founding to 1963 when existing left-wing guerilla and peasant self-defense forces in Colombia’s eastern and southern frontier jungles consolidated.[23] The main issues for the FARC were related to struggles for the land.[24] Indeed, its goals of agrarian reform remained paramount throughout the insurgency.[25] The FARC adopted a “people’s war” doctrine which was a “symbiotic combination of all forms of struggle” in line with Mao’s doctrine of a People’s War,[26]  though the FARC strayed from this doctrine later in its insurgency.

The M-19 was part of the second generation of Colombian guerilla movements and adopted a nationalistic flavor.[27] Created in 1972 after an allegedly fraudulent presidential election, the early years of the group were marked by “audacious actions that had a strong impact on public opinion.”[28] The M-19’s goals were not much different from existing movements, arguing largely for better living conditions, redistribution of wealth, and enhanced democracy.[29] Differing from the existing Colombian insurgent groups, the M-19 was primarily an urban organization, though membership still required one to “sacrifice everything.”[30] This urban focus meant that while the M-19 would be incapable of controlling territory and population,[31] its response to Colombian conditions was unique and allowed the M-19 to “[become] a seductive access of the radicalized middle classes to the guerillas, and vice-versa.”[32]

The M-19

            From its inception to the collapse of its political party, the M-19’s evolution consists of four unique phases: (1) its creation and fight for socialism, (2) its fight for greater democracy, (3) its transition to a peaceful movement, and (4) its legitimization as an official political party. The M-19 was never well-funded, and its main financing method was kidnapping for ransom.[33] As this section demonstrates, the lack of stable, significant funding methods severely constrained the ways that the M-19 could respond to critical issues, resulting in the phases detailed above.

            During its first phase, M-19 members embraced socialism and advocated for “Socialism Colombian-style”- a nationalist, Bolivarian, anti-imperialist, and anti-oligarchic politico-economic model.[34] Before its official announcement of existence, the group limited its activities to small-scale bank robberies.[35] After the group famously stole Simón Bolívar’s sword in 1974, its activities expanded into kidnappings for ransom and extortion, often targeting the heads of multinational corporations and local embassies to make a political statement in the process of raising funds.[36] During this phase, the M-19 promoted a new way of politics, often carrying out “Robin Hood-like deeds” aimed at spreading the M-19’s socialist message.[37] During this phase, the M-19 failed to understand that Colombia’s inequality did not mean that it was ripe for a socialist revolution. Most Latin American states of the period, and Colombia is no exception, presented united fronts between the bourgeoisie and the political leaders, precluding a multi-class urban insurgent alliance.[38] As a result, the M-19’s socialist message was rejected. The M-19 needed to change to survive.

            During the transition from its first stage to the second, the M-19 relied on its greatest strength to guide it- its locally-resonant communication capabilities and the symbol of Simón Bolívar which “served as a comprehensible embodiment of the M-19’s societal vision for the masses.”[39] In 1979, the M-19 reoriented itself to be a “democracy in arms” after realizing that change in Colombia must be democratic in nature.[40] For the leaders of the M-19, the most important task was to strengthen Colombian democracy beyond the ceremonial, oligarch-dominated system that existed at the time.[41] This transformation is important because it shows that the M-19 was dynamic in its goals; it was willing to adapt to Colombian preferences and respond to political contexts. The M-19 mutated from one political organization to another, not from a political organization to a profit-seeking one. It did not change its funding strategies, and its financing capabilities remained weak throughout this period as well.

            Waning popular support for war, the deaths of important M-19 leaders, and the continued weaknesses of M-19 funding methods drove the M-19’s transition from violent insurgency to a group seeking a peaceful solution. In 1985, the M-19 executed a deadly assault on the Palace of Justice in which dozens were killed, including nearly half of the Supreme Court Justices. This was viewed as a terrorist attack by the Colombian people, and this action lost the M-19 a great deal of support.[42] The M-19 felt the pressure from two sides: the public began to support a definitive peace process with the guerillas, and the Colombian government neutralized multiple important M-19 leaders.[43] Once again, the M-19 needed to change, and absent any stronger alternatives, it relied on its ideals. The M-19 adopted a strategy of peace and even took part in constructing a new Colombian constitution in 1991 as part of the peace deal. However, the peace and disarmament processes were not easy nor straight-forward. Congressional opposition to extradition meant that the constitutional reform process was jeopardized,[44] and the transition from guerilla fighter to legitimate political actor was not simple nor lucrative for many in the M-19.[45] At this point, the M-19 had to take a “leap of faith;”[46] it could not go back to war, nor could it continue to finance itself as it had in the past and still retain its political ideals. The public was tired of violence, and the M-19’s funding relied exclusively on violence. Its only choice at this point was to stay the course and hope the public would “break their fall.”[47]

            The initial transition to political party was extraordinarily successful for the M-19, and for a brief moment, the M-19 emerged as the third-most significant force in Colombia behind the two traditional parties.[48] However, this initial success was not to last. Inappropriate leadership and internal organization, combined with the co-optive behavior of the Liberal party and the success of neo-liberal economic programs, meant that after roughly three years, the M-19 had lost almost all of its political capacity.[49] The M-19 leaders who continued political operations either joined other parties or participated at local levels.[50] Economically reintegrating the rank-and-file demobilized force also proved challenging; until new negotiations were opened in 1993, many ex-combatants had social and familial obligations but no economic support.[51] Despite these challenges, the M-19 did not backslide into criminality or illicit economic activity largely because there was no strong, existing precedent for such within the organization nor within the surrounding economic and social contexts. The M-19’s kidnapping for ransom funding tactics were political, and the M-19 had already achieved its political goals.

            The way in which the M-19 evolved from a socialist guerilla group to a failed but legitimate political party over four phases demonstrates that the lack of strong funding methods closely connected to existing social and economic structures severely constrains and shapes the final outcome of insurgencies. The combination of weak financing methods and strong ideals meant that the M-19 was heavily influenced by public opinion regarding its long-term strategic goals and tactical use of violence. The M-19 could not chart its own course independent of public pressure because its strongest source of power was directly rooted in public ideals.

The FARC

            The FARC’s history, like the M-19’s, can be broken up into four distinct phases: (1) formation and coca opposition, (2) coca regulation, (3) coca control, and (4) decentralization and coca-dominated fronts. While these phases heavily center around the FARC’s involvement in the cocaine trade, the FARC did not engage in such activity for economic activity alone. There is no doubt that the vast majority of the FARC’s funding was directly related to the cocaine trade, but FARC involvement in the drug trade was also shaped by political and military threats;[52] indeed, the nature of the FARC’s involvement in the cocaine trade was inherently political.[53] However, as the FARC became more ingrained in the drug trade over time, the cocaine industry influenced its strategy, tactics, and even structure, thereby influencing the FARC’s final outcome.

            The FARC began as a weak guerilla group in the jungles of the most marginalized Colombian frontier areas. Initially, the group was not a serious threat to Bogotá,[54] and it suffered from poor funding and strong government repression. In fact, in the 1970s, the Colombian government nearly eliminated not only the FARC, but several other insurgent groups as well.[55] No doubt the group’s poor funding methods contributed to its weakness. Like the M-19, the FARC never enjoyed significant foreign support;[56] during the 1960s and 1970s, the FARC collected revolutionary taxes from landowners and peasants in its areas,[57] which, as mentioned earlier, were extremely poor. While the cocaine boom of the 1980s had not yet occurred, coca production was already popular in the areas where the FARC operated. Despite being located in the prime coca-growing region of the country, the FARC did not prompt nor did it support coca cultivation during this time.[58] Instead, it rejected the production of coca for the drug markets as a manifestation of “savage capitalism.”[59] The FARC leaders perceived coca production as facilitating capitalist greed, chaos, and social turmoil.[60] As a result, the FARC adopted prohibitionist responses towards coca, though these quickly proved to be problematic and deeply unpopular with the local peasants – the FARC’s core base of social support – who depended on coca cultivation for their livelihoods.[61]

            By the early 1980s, the coca boom in Colombia was in full swing. The growing influence of coca growers and peasant opposition to the FARC’s policies of prohibition forced the FARC to adapt to the situation. In 1982, the FARC held its Seventh Guerilla Conference in which the FARC decided that it would become the principal regulator of coca cultivation in exchange for taxes and fees on the product.[62] This decision, more than any other, would lay the groundwork for the FARC’s ultimate trajectory. It is important to note that while the FARC accepted coca cultivation, it did not support the industry itself. For instance, the FARC did not permit recreational drug consumption in its strongholds, and it even supported coca eradication/substitutions on several occasions.[63] The FARC accepted coca cultivation mainly to assuage peasant grievances and solidify security.[64] However, the long-term impacts of narcotics-based funding on the FARC are significant for three reasons. Firstly, the increased financing and territorial control that came with involvement in coca cultivation transformed the FARC from a small, rural movement to a powerful insurgency with the capability to severely challenge the state.[65] Secondly, the funds gained from the cocaine trade “supplanted access to the population as the critical source of support” for the FARC.[66] Put another way, the funds gained from its involvement in coca cultivation became the FARC’s dominant power source at this point. Thirdly, the FARC’s involvement in coca cultivation provided an effective fallback mechanism. When the peace process between the government and the M-19 broke down, the M-19 had little choice but to stay the course and hope the population would “break its fall.” In contrast, the uninterrupted financing provided by the coca trade allowed the FARC to return to the battlefield when the 1984 Uribe Accord cease-fire broke down two years later.

            Coca transformed the FARC’s operational capabilities, but it also created new conflicts with other coca producers, narcotraffickers, and right-wing paramilitaries. The threat posed to the FARC’s funding method, its dominant source of power, by these groups demanded that the FARC adapt. In response to this challenge, like the M-19’s responses, the FARC relied on its greatest strength. For the M-19, this was its ideals, but the FARC’s greatest strength was its financing method. To combat the security threat posed by the aforementioned groups and to evict traffickers and hostile agents more easily from its territory, the FARC decided to participate directly in the commercialization of coca, cocaine production, and smuggling operations.[67] In addressing a threat to its financing method, the FARC chose to involve itself even more in its financing method, highlighting how the coca trade had become indispensable for the FARC. During this phase, the FARC held its Eighth Guerilla Conference, giving its blocs more independence in determining their financial strategy.[68] This increased independence meant that the FARC’s organizational structure and activities began to resemble criminal drug cartels more closely;[69] the very structure of the FARC was being mutated by its funding method. Shortly after this conference, the FARC’s 16th Front was operating as little more than a cartel.[70] While the experience of the 16th Front is not wholly representative of that of the other fronts, it reveals the extent to which the coca-based funding method had influenced the FARC.

            By 2000, the FARC continued to fragment and deepen its involvement with the drug trade; it had become a “full-service” guerilla organization, involved in the production, processing, and trafficking of illegal drugs.[71] In response to an increased counterinsurgency campaign initiated by the Uribe administration in 2002, the FARC decentralized its command structure to allow its front commanders to operate with more autonomy.[72] In the past, a top-down authority structure instilled discipline that prevented members from taking personal advantage of the FARC’s coca involvement. With decentralization, the group became susceptible to criminal influences as a result of its involvement with the drug trade.[73] Following significant leadership losses from 2008-2011, some FARC regional bloc commanders began to pursue their own financial interests in the drug trade.[74] Whereas the M-19 transitioned to seeking a peace deal after many of its leaders were killed, when the same happened to the FARC, it was able to fall back on its involvement in the narcotics trade to prolong its insurgency.

In the end, while the FARC’s involvement in the coca trade prolonged its insurgency, it could not sustain it forever. The FARC’s funding methods had inadvertently sowed the seeds of the insurgency’s destruction. Reliance on criminality to sustain the insurgency meant that the FARC eventually became more focused on using violence to sustain its funding rather than on achieving legitimacy.[75] As a result, when Bogotá concentrated its operations on the FARC’s center of gravity (its funding), it shattered,[76] and unlike the M-19, the FARC had no population base to “break its fall.”

            In contrast to the M-19, the FARC’s funding method was deeply embedded in the social and economic fabric of its operational areas. While it initially opposed coca cultivation for the drug markets, the FARC eventually conceded and accepted it based on popular support for the industry. This acceptance transformed the FARC into a powerful insurgency, with the bulk of its power coming from its involvement in the coca trade. Crucially, the FARC’s relationship with coca prolonged its insurgency well beyond its point of near-defeat in the 1970s. When the FARC faced challenges throughout its lifetime, like the M-19, it relied on its greatest strength to combat them. Because the coca trade was so deeply ingrained in the contexts in which the FARC operated, the FARC’s funding method grew more powerful vis-à-vis its other capabilities the more it relied on it. In the end, the FARC’s chosen funding method, because it was such a powerful societal and economic force, would grow to dominate the FARC’s operational capabilities and strongly influence the group’s structure, operations, and its eventual outcome.

Conclusion

            By comparing how the funding methods of the M-19 and the FARC influenced key transitions during each group’s existence, this essay has demonstrated that funding choice does indeed impact an insurgent group’s final outcome by augmenting the relative strength of funding compared to other sources of insurgent power. Because the M-19 lacked a strong funding method rooted in the social and economic fabric of Colombia, its funding was always tenuous and not as powerful as other aspects of the M-19 were. As a result, when faced with challenges, the M-19 relied on other elements of power (mainly its ideals) to guide its responses. The FARC’s primary funding method was deeply embedded in the economic and social fabric of the regions in which it operated, and as a result, its funding was more consistent and much stronger than its other operational elements of power. The FARC’s funding method guided its responses to the challenges that it faced. The decisions that each group made in response to either the lack or presence of powerful funding methods directly impacted each group’s duration and final outcome, demonstrating that the link between insurgent funding methods and insurgency outcomes can indeed be causal.

 

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[1] Saab, Bilal Y., and Alexandra W. Taylor. “Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 6 (2009): 455–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100902892570.

[2] Jonsson, Michael, Elliot Brennan, and Christopher O'Hara. “Financing War or Facilitating Peace? the Impact of Rebel Drug Trafficking on Peace Negotiations in Colombia and Myanmar.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 6 (2016): 542–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2015.1124628.

[3] Jonsson, Brennan, and O’Hara, “Financing War of Facilitating Peace,” 555.

[4] Conrad, Justin M., Kevin T. Greene, James Igoe Walsh, and Beth Elise Whitaker. “Rebel Natural Resource Exploitation and Conflict Duration.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 3 (2018): 591–616. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718755853.

[5] Clarke, Colin P. Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2015.

[6] Staniland, Paul. “Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia.” International Security 37, no. 1 (July 2012): 142–77. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00091.

[7] Estancona, Chelsea L. “Banditry or Business? Rebel Labor Markets and State Economic Intervention.” International Interactions 48, no. 1 (October 12, 2021): 139–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1973454.

[8] Haer, Roos, Christopher Michael Faulkner, and Beth Elise Whitaker. “Rebel Funding and Child Soldiers: Exploring the Relationship between Natural Resources and Forcible Recruitment.” European Journal of International Relations 26, no. 1 (2020): 236–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119850622.

[9] Fortna, Virginia Page, Nicholas J Lotito, and Michael A Rubin. “Don't Bite the Hand That Feeds: Rebel Funding Sources and the Use of Terrorism in Civil Wars.” International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 4 (November 6, 2018): 782–94. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy038.

[10] Walsh, James Igoe, Justin M Conrad, Beth Elise Whitaker, and Katelin M Hudak. “Funding Rebellion.” Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 5 (2018): 699–707. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317740621.

[11] Breslawski, Jori, and Colin Tucker. “Ideological Motives and Taxation by Armed Groups.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 39, no. 3 (2021): 333–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211033229.

[12] Sarkar, Radha, and Amar Sarkar. “The Rebels' Resource Curse: A Theory of Insurgent–Civilian Dynamics.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 10 (2017): 870–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2016.1239992.

[13] Whitaker, Beth Elise, James Igoe Walsh, and Justin Conrad. “Natural Resource Exploitation and Sexual Violence by Rebel Groups.” The Journal of Politics 81, no. 2 (April 2019): 702–6. https://doi.org/10.1086/701637.

[14] This statement is true to the best of the author’s knowledge after extensive research on the topic. The piece of literature most relevant to the funding-outcome nexus is Paul Staniland’s “Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia.” Staniland’s paper argues that there is no single effect of resource wealth, and that other social and organizational factors determine how these resources are used. While helpful to understanding how different factors affect the ways in which insurgencies use their resources, it does not attempt to determine if funding methods themselves can impact the final outcome of an insurgency.

[15] Bruce-Jones, Tobias, and M.L.R. Smith. “Coca, Clausewitz, and Colombia: The Inadequacy of Micro-Level Studies in Explaining FARC Violence against Civilians during the Colombian Civil War.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44, no. 12 (May 2019): 996. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2019.1616927.

[16] Bruce-Jones and Smith, “Coca, Clausewitz, and Colombia,” 996.

[17] Serres, Philippe. “The FARC and Democracy in Colombia in the 1990s.” Democratization 7, no. 4 (2000): 193–194. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340008403689.

[18] Norman, Susan Virginia. “Narcotization as Security Dilemma: The FARC and Drug Trade in Colombia.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41, no. 8 (2017): 640. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2017.1338052.

[19] Luna Benítez, Mario. “El M-19 En El Contexto De Las Guerrillas En Colombia.” Revista Sociedad y Economía 10 (April 2006): 185.

[20] Serres, “The FARC and Democracy,” 200.

[21] Gutiérrez D., José Antonio, and Frances Thomson. “Rebels-Turned-Narcos? the FARC-EP’s Political Involvement in Colombia’s Cocaine Economy.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44, no. 1 (2020): 33. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2020.1793456.

[22] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 641.

[23] Marks, Thomas A. “FARC, 1982–2002: Criminal Foundation for Insurgent Defeat.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 28, no. 3 (2017): 491. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1307612. Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 640.

[24] Serres, “The FARC and Democracy,” 194.

[25] Bruce-Jones and Smith, “Coca, Clausewitz, and Colombia,” 997-998.

[26] Marks, “FARC, 1982–2002,” 492.

[27] García Durán, Mauricio, Vera Grabe Loewenherz, and Otty Patiño Hormaza. The M-19's Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic Politics. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2008, 8.

[28] Forero, Giraldo, and Juan Fernando. “Colombia in Armed Conflict? 1946-1985.” Papel Político 18 (December 2005): 64.

[29] O’Connor, Francis, and Jakob Meer. “The M-19’s Ideological Sancocho: The Reconciliation of Socialism and Colombian Nationalism.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 32, no. 1 (May 2020): 142. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1829861.

[30] Florez-Morris, Mauricio. “Why Some Colombian Guerrilla Members Stayed in the Movement until Demobilization: A Micro-Sociological Case Study of Factors That Influenced Members' Commitment to Three Former Rebel Organizations: M-19, EPL, and CRS.” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 2 (March 9, 2010): 225. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546551003590167.

[31] Le Blanc, Joerg. “The Urban Environment and Its Influences on Insurgent Campaigns.” Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 5 (November 25, 2013): 807. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.700656.

[32] Leon Palacios, Paulo Cesar. “El Espectacular Lanzamiento De La Guerrilla Urbana En Colombia, El M-19 En 1974.” Historias 83 (December 2012): 103.

[33] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 15.

[34] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 10-11.

[35] Mapping Militant Organizations. “April 19 Movement.” Stanford University, August 2015. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/april-19-movement#highlight_text_14501.

[36] Mapping Militant Organizations, “April 19 Movement.” Florez-Morris, “Why Some Colombian Guerrilla Members Stayed,” 223.

[37] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 11.

[38] Serres, “The FARC and Democracy,” 195.

[39] O’Connor and Meer, “The M-19’s Ideological Sancocho,” 142.

[40] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 15.

[41] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 15.

[42] Le Blanc, “The Urban Environment,” 808. García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 16.

[43] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 13, 16.

[44] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 28.

[45] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 27.

[46] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 28.

[47] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 28.

[48] Chernick, Marc. “Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia.” Essay. In Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, edited by Cynthia Arnson. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999, 165.

[49] Boudon, Lawrence. “Colombia's M-19 Democratic Alliance.” Latin American Perspectives 28, no. 1 (January 2001): 85. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582x0102800105.

[50] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 32.

[51] García Durán, Grabe Loewenherz, and Patiño Hormaza, The M-19's Journey, 31.

[52] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 642.

[53] Gutiérrez D. and Thomson, “Rebels-Turned-Narcos,” 27.

[54] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 640.

[55] Serres, “The FARC and Democracy,” 196.

[56] Serres, “The FARC and Democracy,” 204.

[57] Eccarius-Kelly, Vera. “Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK.” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (March 2012): 240. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.651182.

[58] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 641.

[59] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 641.

[60] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 645.

[61] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 645.

[62] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 646.

[63] Gutiérrez D. and Thomson, “Rebels-Turned-Narcos,” 38, 43.

[64] Phelan, Alexandra. “FARC’s Pursuit of ‘Taking Power’: Insurgent Social Contracts, the Drug Trade and Appeals to Eudaemonic Legitimation.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44, no. 12 (May 22, 2019): 989. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2019.1616928.

[65] Bruce-Jones and Smith, “Coca, Clausewitz, and Colombia,” 949

[66] Kilcullen, David. “Guerrilla and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Colombia.” Essay. In A Great Perhaps?: Colombia: Conflict and Convergence, edited by Dickie Davis, Greg Mills, David E. Spencer, and David Kilcullen. London, UK: Hurst & Company, 2016, 70.

[67] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 639.

[68] Gutiérrez D. and Thomson, “Rebels-Turned-Narcos,” 34.

[69] Bruce-Jones and Smith, “Coca, Clausewitz, and Colombia,” 1014

[70] Bruce-Jones and Smith, “Coca, Clausewitz, and Colombia,” 1015

[71] Eccarius-Kelly, “Surreptitious Lifelines,” 240.

[72] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 652.

[73] Norman, “Narcotization as Security Dilemma,” 653.

[74] Eccarius-Kelly, “Surreptitious Lifelines,” 250.

[75] Marks, “FARC, 1982–2002,” 511.

[76] Marks, “FARC, 1982–2002,” 511.

 

About the Author(s)

Tyler Bandini is a Global Security Studies student at the Johns Hopkins Zanvyl Krieger School of Arts and Sciences. He has previously studied International Affairs and Mechanical Engineering at the Georgia Institute of Technology.