We Americans tend to invent for ourselves a comfortable U.S.-centric vision with an enemy who looks and acts more or less as we do, and a situation in which the fighting is done by conventional military units.
This SWJ article compares the British handling of the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) with that of the French in Algeria (1954-1962).
Avoid the Charlie Wilson complex: guilt over the cries of ‘abandoning Afghanistan’ and deciding not to spend billions more of taxpayer’s money on a hop-scotch of social development programs.
As Iraq appears to unravel, it is only right to continue the debate about counterinsurgency, the appropriate application of landpower, and the expanding role of Special Operations in the US military.
Beware the lure of "credibility."
Counterinsurgency is often a small-unit battle, with company-sized elements requiring organic intelligence capabilities to leverage information into tactical success.
The Eid statements demonstrate an increasing sophistication in strategic messaging and understanding of international politics.
In civil wars like Syria’s, strength is not necessarily a product of popularity; often strength actually produces popularity because compliance is more important than winning hearts and minds.
The outcome of the fighting in this part of the country will greatly influence the outcome of the whole conflict.
Some of the major “lessons learned” by ISAF while conducting Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations in Afghanistan
