Perspective: El Mayo, Los Chapitos and the Kingpin Strategy
Perspective: El Mayo, Los Chapitos and the Kingpin Strategy
Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
This article is available in Spanish here
The formal arrest (according to official versions) or “agreed” surrender/betrayal (according to ‘other’ versions) of two important leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel—Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada and Joaquín Guzmán López, one of the sons of “El Chapo” Guzmán—on Thursday, 25 July 2024 in the border city of El Paso, Texas, has sparked a series of speculations and unverified stories that have captured the attention of much of the media and social networks in Mexico and the United States in recent days. Regardless of the actual facts behind this story, the arrest of the co-founder of the Sinaloa Cartel along with one of Los Chapitos will surely have relevant effects on the politics of both countries, as well as on the bilateral relationship.
Wanted Poster of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada and Joaquín Guzmán López
Disinformation and alleged testimonies from unidentified official sources have dominated the discussion on Mexican drug trafficking and organized crime issues in the public space. The contradictions and political use of this story have not been long in coming. It is virtually impossible right now to know with certainty what actually happened. The details of this event obsess the press and the commentariat focused on drug trafficking and organized crime in our continent. There is an increasing number of (self-proclaimed) “experts” on the Sinaloa Cartel and US judicial processes, as well as unsubstantiated speculation. The explanation of what happened is becoming quite confusing.
The details of the arrest or surrender of the notorious “Mayo” Zambada and one of the Chapitos become irrelevant in the overall context of a key phenomenon that transcends borders and has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people from drug overdoses or drug-related violence in the United States and Mexico in recent years. Following the events of 25 July 2024, according to “experts,” an escalation in the levels of violence in Mexico is expected, mainly in the territories dominated by the Sinaloa Cartel and in those regions in dispute between that organization and the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). It is also expected that the two drug traffickers in US government custody will become protected witnesses and reveal important information about the operations of the criminal organization and the protection networks of Mexican authorities and politicians.
In general, a bloody period is anticipated in Mexico as a result of the dismantling of one of the two most violent criminal groups in the country, both of which allegedly represent one of the greatest public health risks in the United States in the context of the so-called fentanyl crisis. The arrests of El Mayo and one of Los Chapitos—along with the arrest in Mexico and subsequent extradition of another Chapito, Ovidio Guzmán López, to the United States in 2023—are part of the so-called kingpin strategy of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Despite the fact that this strategy has proven to be completely futile in confronting drug trafficking and limiting the entry of drugs into the United States, the U.S. government insists on applying it, strengthening it and exporting it to other countries through its main security agencies.
The arrest in El Paso of two leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel and the subsequent discussion in the public arena reinforce and vindicate the kingpin strategy and place it at the center of U.S. counter-narcotics actions, despite its null results, as well as the enormous amount of material resources expended and the loss of human lives derived from its implementation. The insistence on applying this failed strategy by the US government, mainly through the DEA, is surprising. This can only be explained if the relevant actions are not focused on a real fight against drugs. Sometimes it seems that they are based on geopolitical agendas or geostrategic control in the Americas that ensure a significant territorial presence of U.S. agencies outside its borders, control of strategic natural resources and factional pressure from foreign governments through unverified testimonies of cooperating witnesses and protected witnesses. It should be noted that the most high-profile cases of alleged involvement of top Mexican officials (such as Genaro Garcia Luna, General Salvador Cienfuegos and the investigations into the 2006 campaign of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador) are based primarily on testimony from confessed criminals seeking to reduce their sentences. Hard material evidence of alleged collusion between figures at the highest levels of the Mexican government and drug traffickers has been virtually absent from DEA trials and investigations.
In the case of Mexico, the insistence on the failed kingpin strategy on the part of US security agencies—especially the DEA—makes us think of a non-transparent objective, which is justified in a show that distracts attention from what is essential: the real fight against drug trafficking and the reduction of drug consumption. The structure of the drug trafficking organizations targeted by the US government appears to be much more decentralized than what security agencies, think tanks and the media in general report. A rigorous analysis of the criminal and drug trafficking context in Mexico would suggest that both the Sinaloa Cartel and the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación are not organizations that operate at the national level under the specific leadership of “drug lords” such as El Mayo, El Mencho or Los Chapitos. Rather, if we attend to the local dynamics of violence in Mexico, we would understand that focusing on capos or narcos is a futile task. The dynamics of operation of the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG are better understood through an analysis of social networks, since in reality we are talking about complex criminal networks that operate locally, connect under certain circumstances and adapt to market circumstances and government anti-narcotics strategies of the moment. Likewise, we can think of a criminal franchise model with multiple heads or local cells that don’t really serve a central leadership represented by a narco or capos-those depicted in Netflix series.
Drug trafficking has by no means been dismantled through the kingpin strategy. More and more drugs are entering the US, no matter how many kingpins are arrested and tried by US authorities. So why focus our attention on “Narco Lords” comics? A thorough investigation of the local dynamics of organized crime and differentiating between drug trafficking and criminal paramilitarism would be more appropriate. Also, a focus on the demand for narcotics and in particular on the dynamics of drug reception, distribution and consumption within the US, not only in Mexico, is recommended. It is crucial to attack the root causes of drug supply and demand at the same time. Focusing on the details or puerile speculation about the arrest or rendition of El Mayo and Los Chapitos seems futile in the context of an addiction crisis and failed counternarcotics policies.
