Post-Empire Nostalgia
In “Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia” Yegor Gaidar writes “[w]e are not the first to suffer post-empire nostalgia, which permeates the Russian consciousness today. It has occurred in history more than once. The Soviet Union was not the first empire to collapse in the twentieth century, but it was the last. … The problem for a country dealing with post-imperial syndrome is that it is easy to evoke feelings of nostalgia for the lost empire.”[i] It is easy to see the effect of the “post-imperial syndrome” in how the Russian population supports Putin’s actions in the Crimea. What may be less easy to see is how that syndrome is affecting us.
When the Soviet Union fell apart the United States was an unchallenged military leviathan; the only superpower on the planet. Our military divided the earth into sectors of military control overseen by geographical combatant commanders. We projected power across the globe, and we still do. However, since we won the Cold War the U.S. military has been involved in two less than totally successful campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. In those wars we fought an enemy who did not use the conventional tactics and systems that we had perfected over the last half of the twentieth century. As those counterinsurgency operations come to a close the military today looks to regain its past prominence as a conventional fighting force.
Russia’s land grab has offered us that opportunity. This new confrontation in Europe comes complete with convenient historical examples. Russia, with its quasi-dictatorial leadership, makes the perfect enemy. We can see the long shadow of Hitler in his actions, replaying the events of Czechoslovakia in 1938, only the first steps in his quest for German “living space”. Further, this is the Soviets, … err, … I mean, the Russians we are talking about. It was not that long ago that they were a threat to capitalist societies around the world. History dictates that we must act now. There is the added bonus of the Russians being a conventional force. We know how to fight them. Most of the equipment we now have was designed in the era where BMPs, T-90s, and Hind-Ds were the threat to defeat.
But before we jump into this with both feet, perhaps it is worth considering Sun Tzu’s advise to know not just your enemy, but yourself. How much of our interests in re-engaging Russia in a battle of wills is an attempt to regain our own former military glory? Secretary Gates characterizes Putin’s actions this time around as a direct challenge to America – Putin had “thrown down a gauntlet.”[ii] Putin’s action is not about Russians in Crimea or even Russian territorial and military interests there. In reading blogs on places like the Small Wars Journal one would believe that the Ukrainians are simply caught in the cross-fire between Russia and the United States, helpless pawns in the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R., Round Two. Why do we choose to characterize the situation this way? Perhaps it is because we are also trying to regain our former military glory. Here is an enemy the entire country can fear. Putin is Stalin and Hitler all rolled into one. Here too, is a military we can confront on conventional terms where we have the clear advantage. This is the perfect combination to provide us the opportunity to reassert our dominance and regain our status as the undefeatable military leader of the world!
So before we turn the Kremlin into radioactive ash, we need to consider that the world is no longer a bi-polar place. This is not capitalism versus communism. Putin is not after “living space.” He has extra-territorial aspirations, but he is probably not looking to invade France. Our allies in Europe have their own interests in how this confrontation plays out that may not align with our need to beat Russia into submission. More important, we need to understand how our own recent history is affecting our decision making process. We should not let nostalgia motivate our response; two former enemy’s both attempting to regain past glory is a recipe for disaster.
If we recognize how our history is affecting how we view this situation, then perhaps we can make some rational long term decisions on how to deal with a leader trying to regain his nation’s former status. If we fail to recognize our own nostalgia, then we are likely to see only what we want to see, and make the kind of mistakes reminiscent more of WWI than of WWII.
End Notes
[i] Gaidar, Yergor. “Collapse of an Empire: Lessons from Modern Russia.” Translated by Abtonia W. Bouis. 2007. Washington, D.C.; Brookings Institution Press. P.
[ii] Gates, Robert M. “Putin’s Challenge to the West: Russia has thrown down a gauntlet that is not limited to Crimea or even Ukraine.” The Wall Street Journal. March 25, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303725404579460183854574284 (accessed April 15, 2014)
We know how to deter them: armored boots on the ground on a border. That tripwire effect worked for nearly 70 years without blood shed. That tripwire was lost by downsizing our Army in Europe of any realistic mechanism to deter. Stateside heavy armor and a larger reserve component do not deter Russian armor, particularly in an era where we claim A2/AD threats exist that slow and endanger months of deployment.
The first sentence is both the crux of the problem and the solution. We have and must back allies against aggression. We know that we would never launch a nuclear attack against the Kremlin, and they know it too, as evidenced by this article where a nuclear exchange could have occurred in 1983 were it not for good judgment.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/04/the-slaughter-bench-of-history/360534/
We know that no matter how many nuclear weapons the Russians or Chinese possess, they won’t launch a nuclear strike either. What is left is the possibility of conventional attack from China or Russia against neighbors other than “France.” Little guys don’t matter to us, right? Except that when lots of little guys band together with the U.S., conventional deterrence is achieved. If we fail to place credible ground forces in NATO countries near the threat, no tripwire or true deterrence exists. If we put all our eggs into the AirSea basket coming up with all kinds of plans to penetrate adversary airspace to target their mobile/tunneled missiles, the rational decision-maker with access to nukes may become less rational.
If there really is a nostalgic group within the military, it pretty clearly is the USAF and Navy. The USAF has not had a major air-to-air engagement since Vietnam as evidenced by the lack of any aces for decades. The Navy has not had a major sea battle since WWII, which leaves them itching for a threat that does not exist…another nation’s blue water navy. Meanwhile, countless active threat armies exist that outnumber our own, yet we plan to downsize our active Army to levels not seen since before WWII and leave them stranded in the U.S. where they deter little to nothing. We managed to afford a forward deployed Army for decades that prevented incidents such as we see now. Why is it too costly now? Could it be the increased costs of naval and airpower that hasn’t been required in overwhelming numbers in decades?
What’s wrong with this picture? Ukraine is only a symptom of the illness that led to insurgencies during stability operations. An argument could be made that parts of the Ukraine should be Russian just as parts of Afghanistan should have been a newly-created Pashtunistan, and parts of Iraq should have become independent of Shiite-government direction. That is the major lesson we should have learned from the insurgencies that followed Iraq and Afghanistan. Ill-conceived boundaries left intact lead to more problems during an occupation.
The Syrians and Russians know how to deal with such insurgencies. They smash them using barrel bombs in Syrian neighborhoods and level Grozny in Chechnya. We won’t do that. Instead we must rely on allied relationships honored with “little guys” that are neighbors of those who would engage in aggression. Ukraine is not our ally but you can speculate how effective their insurgency could be against all those pipelines heading east should Putin threaten more than just Croatia and Eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, the addition of even a single spread out armored BCT in countries neighboring the Ukraine would create a line in the sand sorely missing in Europe today. Why is that lesson of the Cold War so hard to understand and thought to be so costly?
Brilliant. Utterly brilliant. Gates last memoir ended with something like “it was a glorious crusade.”
The DC consensues is incompetent, many military leaders just want to protect their jobs until they can cash out in the private sector, and many Americans view war as a video game and diplomacy as social engineering with American PhDs as gods. I could post a million more things around here but what is the point. FID and Munich is everything. Nuclear doctrine? That is the not in the Barnes & Noble WW2 nostalgia section.
And the leadership all knew and still fronted in AfPak for their old cold war proxies and pets. Protectors my a$$. They are stupid enough to turn it all radioactive.
Note the commonality of “post-empire nostalgia” in both the current Islamic and Russian worlds.
Should this similarity be seen in the same light as other similarities I have noted re: the context of modern (post-Cold War) conflict, to wit:
a. The West’s efforts to transform other states and societies more along its (the West’s) political, economic and social lines and, via these efforts, to incorporate these transformed states and societies more into the western sphere of influence,
b. The resistance of various population groups (examples: the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and the ethnic Russians in Ukraine) to these efforts, and
c. The assistance rendered to these resisting population groups by neighboring nations and like-minded/related peoples (example: the assistance offered — by both the people and the states — of Pakistan and Russia respectively).
Given this additional commonality, to wit: that of “post-empire nostalgia;” should this be rightfully added — as item “d” — to support my theory of the overall context of modern conflict (offered at “a” – “c” above)?
The author forgets the simple core problem—what happens when the population of a country identifies with their leader and accepts the concept of ethnic nationalism?
What happens when that leader convinces the population that the coming economic difficulties are the “fault” of the West thus they must tighten their belts and push for the greater empire. What happens when the entire population pines for a “lost empire”.
What happens when history repeats itself as in 1905 when a Russian leading politician spoke about “we need a nice small war to win” and what did it get Russia in 1905?
What happens when a country armed with nuclear weapons rewrites the international rules of engagement/law meaning one country can take territory of another due to ethnicity, language and or culture.
The second core problem is how does one respond to ethnic nationalism that is accepted/expressed by a majority of the entire population of a country?
Do we now go back and redraw the existing territorial boundaries of all countries if there is a dispute concerning ethnicity, language and or culture which was settled in Europe with the Treaty of Westphalia and the falling of the Wall.
This really has nothing to do with how we view WW1 and 2- but it has a lot to do with how a population views the rule of law and good governance as defined by themselves and not by others.
A Russian business person told me today here in Berlin—we had big dreams after 1995 about our own economical development, how we could build new businesses and how our children would someday have good jobs and a better way of life and now…….? That is why he has never returned to Moscow and will never return.
Remember in the 1995 elections to the Duma— a rather large number of former Communists lost their jobs in the first time ever democratically held elections.
The Germans had a saying in the late 30s “Heim ins Reich” and Putin is implementing that German idea.
Again I think it is important to reflect on the commonality of “post-empire nostalgia” that is found in both the Islamic and Russian worlds.
But are we focusing here, too much, on the notion of “nostalgia” only and not, as we should, on the political goals and objectives to which the appeal of “nostalgia” is being used?
In this regard consider, for example, this offering (which appears to discount the idea of “nationalism”):
http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-continental-drift-turkish-and-russian-talk-of-old-empire/
Thus:
a. As the West seeks, post-the Cold War, to expand its informal empire (by transforming and incorporating other states and societies more along its [the West’s] political, economic and social lines),
b. Other states and societies (specifically those that formed the nucleus of other cultural/civilizational empires) strategize — and act — so as to resist the West’s warm embrace.
Modern conflict (as per Huntington?) to be found at the fault lines of these competing agendas. (Or, should we say, competing cultures/civilizations/ways of life.)
So: How to see the West’s (and, indeed, the “Rest’s) actions here?
Not as relates to “post-empire nostalgia,” per se, but, rather, as relates to strategy, tactics, etc.
And these?
As relate to the opposed (see “a” and “b” above) political goals and objectives of different states, societies, civilizations and empires (former and present).
This goes to my previous comments about the article—yes it great to understand ourselves and even criticize the past ideology but unless we are truly ready to analyze what is now developing and or has developed in Russia and how it is driving their foreign policy then we cannot even begin to develop a strategy for the coming years as the Russia trend is not going to go away anytime soon.
There is a group of “realists” who claim that we have no strategic interest in the Ukraine, Ukraine is not a NATO member and why do we need to support the Ukraine– built on the idea that US FP should be realistic about the world around them. But then was it not the US FP that has shouted out into the world the terms Rule of Law and Good Governance since 9/11 raising the expectations of many populations in other parts of the world.
This was taken from Putin’s long TV marathon yesterday and goes to the heart of his new FP. We in the West really do need to understand this ethnic nationalism that is driving him and Russia and how does it tie into the four pillars of Russian national FP.
Also notice the reference to Odessa.
1. the military
2. the security services
3. the oligarchs
4. the Russian gangs
Taken from the Kiev Post online today.
What Ukrainians and the rest of the world see as Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin sees as Novorossiya, or New Russia.
That Novorossiya is Ukrainian is a historical injustice, Putin said, in his hours-long live television question-and-answer session on April 17.
“I will remind you, using the terminology of the czarist times, this is Novorossiya: Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Mykolayiv, Odesa were not part of Ukraine in czarist times. These are territories that were passed on to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government.” Putin said. “Why did they do it? God only knows.”
After comments like these and others dismissing Ukraine’s sovereignty, is there any wonder why Ukrainians fear they will soon face a full-scale military invasion from the east?
Edited.
The author, above, suggests that we recognize “how our history is affecting how we view this situation.”
Herein, I do not see the United States/the West acting from the perspective of “post-empire nostalgia.” Far from it.
Rather, I see the United States/the West continuing to act in accordance with its historical (then, imperial; now, neo-imperial) political objective, to wit: the transformation and incorporation of outlying states and societies (more into its [the West’s] sphere of influence).
These actions, I suggest, being what got us into trouble in days past and again today.
Looking, once again, to history and how it may be affecting the present situation, let us propose that — in both the Islamic and the Russian worlds (where the phenomenon of “post-empire nostalgia” is, indeed, present) — the populations of both these regions (1) continue to blame their loss of their power and prestige on Western imperialism/neo-imperialism and (2) continue to feel threatened by same.
To sum up:
a. Concern that the United States/the West might act on the basis of “post-empire nostalgia?” This concern would seem to be misplaced. The West retains its imperial status and continues to act accordingly. That, it would appear, is what got us into our current predicaments in both the Islamic and Russian worlds.
b. Concern that the people in both the Islamic and Russian worlds are acting — via post-empire nostalgia — to counter what they see as continuing Western expansion/imperialism? This idea would seem to have legs.
Here is a current history “mistake” that is interesting in that the Russians are issuing a new medal for “the Return of the Crimea”.
Check the dates on the medal which are actually important as Russians tend to wear them on their civilian clothes for all kinds of official events.
The date of the campaign begins on 20 Feb which was one day before the EU brokered agreement on 21 Feb and the then president fled on 22 Feb so did the Russians slip up in the hectic to get a medal issued or is it the actual date of their true military campaign if one remembers the Maidan on 20 Feb with all the killing going on.
Slip up and or actual information on the actual start date for the Crimea operation?
http://inforesist.org/experts-named-12-facts-about-the-medal-for-the-return-of-the-crimea-which-are-stitching-russia-up/?lang=en
Now we know what those supposedly not close to the Ukrainian border Russian troops are doing. Is this the beginning of the slow west ward movement by the Russian Army in order to not to have to dash into the Ukraine or a simple show of force—tend to go with it is the beginning of movement into the Ukraine under the guise of an “exercise”.
during the Cold War this was the standard fear and what was watched like a hawk—war starts out of an “exercise”. So much for the good contacts between SecDef and the Russian Defense Minister.
Catch the second press release “flight activities near the State Border”—State Border to who would be the next question.
What happens if the pilots “accidently” land combined arms troops on the wrong side of the border?
Taken from Interfax today:
16:48 RUSSIAN BATTALION TACTICAL COMBINED-ARMS GROUPS FROM SOUTHERN, WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS START DRILLS IN RESPONSE TO SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST UKRAINE – SHOIGU
16:48 SHOIGU: IN FRAMEWORK OF DRILLS AVIATION TO CARRY OUT FLIGHTS TO EXERCISE ACTIONS NEAR STATE BORDER
This discussion has been a bit of a departure from reality. Firstly, the United States is not going to engage the Russians in conventional combat. The American people will not accept that as an outcome. And even more so our most important European allies in NATO such as Germany and the UK are adamantly opposed to such a course of action.
Russia is a nuclear-armed country and there is no reason to believe that either the Russian or American governments could contain such a conflict to just conventional weapons. When national pride and political ego’s are on the line there is no guarantee that conflicts can be restricted and escalation is a distinct possibility.
The only real option available if we want to influence events in that part of the world is to resort to diplomatic action and economic sanctions similar to what we impose on Iran. Even with that option Europeans may not willingly follow our lead since they realize that we have nothing at stake in the issue in comparison to them. One can hardly expect Germany to wreak its economy at the bidding of Washington.
Finally, Ukraine is not Belgium or Denmark. Kiev is just as corrupt with a criminalized oligarchy as is Moscow. They are hardly a worthy cause to kill American, German or British soldiers.
Many here seemed excessively focused upon the military dimension of the problems between Russia, NATO and the USA. That to me seems backwards. It is politics that drives the issue not military readiness or deterrence.
If we had a large number of heavy armored divisions on NATO’s eastern front they likely still would not act as a plausible deterrent to Russia because Moscow fully appreciates that they would never be used to defend non-NATO Ukraine. The military deterrence of NATO in this case is incapable of being convincing.
In fact, if the US tried to forced such military action upon its western European allies that could actually drive a wedge between us only to Russia’s advantage. Military deterrence is only effective if the other side believes that you would fight. In this case Russia knows that NATO would not go to war for Ukraine a non-NATO country nor would the American or European public’s accept such a war.
Our recourse is not to rebuild and redeploy the US Army to Europe but to engage Russian behavior with serious economic and political consequences. Just doing that will be difficult enough.