Small Wars Journal

HTS member kidnapped in Iraq

Sun, 02/07/2010 - 1:55pm
John Stanton has just released a story at Cryptome that Issa T. Salome, a 60 year old HTT member, was kidnapped in Iraq by insurgents in January. John argues that this shows that the HTS is failing to find qualified candidates, train them properly and, then, guard them. Personally, I am not so sure about that given the lack of details surround how the kidnapping took place, but it certainly does highlight that being a member of an HTT is not a secure, restful and relaxing position.

Cross-posted from In Harmonium

Comments

The article Anonymous is referring to is <a href="http://www.defense-update.com/analysis/2010/coin_09042010.html">Afghani… COIN and the Human Terrain</a> by Mike Costello at <i>Defense Update</i>.

The first two paragraphs follow:

"After spending 5-months in southern Afghanistan on a Human Terrain Team (HTT), I learned that utilizing basic COIN practices is a very viable CIED strategy that is easy to learn and implement. In fact, the COIN strategies covered in this paper are measurable and can be taught in a 1-hour block of instruction together with a few squad or platoon size patrols into an Afghan village. Its that simple."

"In October of 2009, our three-man human terrain team accompanied a platoon of infantrymen on a routine patrol west of Kandahar City. Our mission entailed walking one half kilometer from an American Strong Point into the nearby village of Sanjeray. When we arrived at the village, our thirty-man patrol walked into Sanjeray and back to our FOB without holding one conversation with the Afghans - not one conversation! What was the purpose of our patrol?"

Brett Patron

Wed, 02/17/2010 - 4:40pm

Couple of things to add here:

I disagree that HTS, to be effective, has to be more "intel" or "HUMINT". Otherwise, why do you need HUMINT? Human Terrain can be effective remaining essentially agnostic to the "blue vs red" fight and provide a commander with an unvarnished view of the environment as viewed by the populace. It would be an -INT, but more "Cult-INT" than anything.

Leading to my second point: Proponency.
For the uninitiated, it is essentially who "owns" the capability doctrinally, developed the tactics, techniques, and procedures and formalizes the training. Fact is you can make a strong case for Proponency by MI, Civil Affairs, Information Operations/Psyop, Special Operations, and probably a couple of others. This is the essential problem. The idea, sound as it is, does not fit neatly into any one box. Since no one really owns it, who's going to properly fund, train, and lead it?

The Price ("Counterpunch") article was a lot more of the usual anti-military crap that damns most of the HTS counterargument. It is no more alarming then any of the Stanton stuff, found in such notable publications as PravdaOnline. So it is not that compelling.

The ethics argument continues to be one that does not resonate. HTS was never proffered as a pure research function, so the ethics premise fails. It is different; that is the appeal to those academics looking to do something different. The AAA's positions are so nakedly pacifist that there are no circumstances that would satisfy them. They are as clownish in this as the HTS leadership.

HTS is bad because it is poorly lead, with no real Branch/Functional proponent and no guiding doctrine. Good idea; bad execution.

Outlaw 7 (not verified)

Wed, 02/17/2010 - 2:38pm

Marct:

Based on this below do you think that social scientists could contribute by further on the ground research that would not necessarily contribute to "targeting" the very population that the information is being collected from?

Just a thought.

"Schematic of the insurgent ecosystem. The insurgent model shown here is driven by a combination of group dynamics, competition, and repeated decision making. The cycle of violence allows for strategies to evolve and update over time. The group dynamics of coalescence and fragmentation generate a fluid non-hierarchical network structure that defines insurgent groups across multiple conflicts. (the Fig. references in the schematic refer to the Nature paper)

Outlaw 7 (not verified)

Wed, 02/17/2010 - 2:14pm

Marct;

The reason I push the founding issue is that is what caused the core critical problem to begin with---how to get the concept accepted as a BCT enabler when a BCT Cmdr has 12 other non Program of Record enablers bidding for his attention. You had initially a few people competing for the HTS start-up ideas/money, but who had no experience in the integration of an BCT enabling process or who had been previously been a successful BCT Cmdr or for that matter were HUMINT SMEs.

Since it is just another competitor for a Cmdr's time and a Cmdr cannot see that HTS will drive his targeting AND along the way he has to provide manpower for security-which he has precious little of too begin with---thus in his eyes HTS brings little of value to the table---which is were the HTS project is stalled right now.

HTS successes must be repeatable over and over and over--not just one or two events passed on by press releases or word of mouth.

Once it is repeatable then a BCT Cmdr will pay attention until then the project is actually dead but no one wants to be honest about it, call a spade a spade and start over---why not start over?-- then the hugh amount of USDs spent already would be openly discussed and AAA would take a hard look at it and it could cost people their high paying positions.

marct (not verified)

Wed, 02/17/2010 - 1:17am

Outlaw7

You know, I've now heard four (I think) "creation stories" of the HTS. One of these days, I may just write up a paper analyzing them ;-).

Okay, IF the HTS had been set up as a project along the lines of what you are saying, then you are quite right, it would be tied into the ecology of warfare stuff. Unfortunately, it wasn't sold that way for, I suspect, some very good bureaucratic reasons.

Regardless of where it could have been, we really have to do two things now. First, look at where it is, and second see what the effects of the current program are on other stakeholders. I know that one, totally unexpected, effect has been the re-creation of some really good (read effective) 1930's, British Social Anthropology in at least one service without drawing on Anthropology.

I'll track down the Jacobson article and take a look at it. Thanks for the ref.

Outlaw 7 (not verified)

Tue, 02/16/2010 - 7:52pm

Marct---

This is where HTS should have gone and should go---this is where I tried to push the discussions in late 2005.

"Terrorist Dropouts
Learning from Those Who Have Left"
Michael Jacobson
Policy Focus #101 | January 2010

Outlaw 7 (not verified)

Tue, 02/16/2010 - 7:22pm

Marct---

The original drivers/thoughts behind the HTS concept was initially pitched mid 2005 as an attempt to understand the tribal concepts and cultural drivers of both the Sunni and Shiite tribes---as a way of verifying what detainees were telling interrogators and screeners who had no way of verifying anything being told to them--it was virtually a wing and pray and gut instincts that really good screeners/interrogators were relying on. There were no FAO provided Human Terrain Studies on Iraq in 2005 through 2007.

The second need for HTS was the need of understanding the drivers of the various Sunni and then Shiite insurgent groups- ie motivations, why support, how does that cultural support drive the groups, how do groups organize and cross pollinate each other as that infomation was simply not available through mid 2007.

If one would have taken that view point at the beginning one would be able now to tie that information to the major research recently released in Nature magazine "Ecology of Human Warfare".

Then one could get into a discussion of HTS information being tied to the research involved in "Ecology of Warfare" tied to the "open source warfare" theories by John Robb then every BCT Cmdr would sit up and work extremely close with HTS as they are answering the targeting needs of a BCT.

AND HTS would in fact not be actually targeting the population they seek to assist---they would in fact only be targeting the elements in a population that uses the population to screen their activities as Mao suggested.

Just a thought.

marct (not verified)

Tue, 02/16/2010 - 9:25am

Outlaw7, I agree, it is a must read article for any number of reasons (see <a href="http://marctyrrell.com/2010/02/15/some-more-hts-news/">here</a&gt; for some of them.

While I certainly agree that the paragraph you note is one key, I don't think it is the only one. Much more disturbing, to my mind at least (and remember that I am an Anthropologist), is that the entire story is extremely good as a cautionary tale that will, IMO, do more to cause social scientists to reconsider working with the military in any country. The budget turf wars may be the proximate cause of many of the problems with the HTS, but how that turf war has been handled and how this has helped to construct a possibly inadvertent image of what working with the "military" is like is the truly dangerous issue.

Outlaw 7 (not verified)

Mon, 02/15/2010 - 6:25pm

The referenced article should be a "must read article" as it relates to the project from someone who really wanted to participate based on his prior experience---his comments should be taken seriously!

HTS and a number of other "JIEDDO" funded organizations were actually when one looks at the make-up of the ex military involved in the "start-ups" a wayward home for retired full COLs ie HTS and the former TK Tory Cmdr.

HERE is the core comment out of the entire article that underlines the above comments:

"the program is still in the status of a Project. Projects are funded from year to year as non-recurring line items. They are trying to get the status of 'Program, which is a recurring budget line item. So, all these articles that are published in the military press and in public media, are attempting to influence both the military budget decision-makers and anyone in the civilian sector who might be able to influence the military decision-makers. That is what it is all about: budget turf wars."

One could potentially trace the articles on the released news concerning effectivess and necessity of HTS to the Lincoln Group.

marct (not verified)

Mon, 02/15/2010 - 4:39pm

The "John" in the story is John Allison. Personally, I find the story excellent but very disturbing.

Anonymous (not verified)

Mon, 02/15/2010 - 3:37pm

Sorry, not John Stanton

Outlaw 7 (not verified)

Sat, 02/13/2010 - 3:58pm

Anonymous:

A bulk of the problems began indeed with the pushing of the idea by Andrea Jackson of the Lincoln Group in late summer 2005 while in Diyala province and who later pitched the idea to TF Tory. The initial idea suggested to A. Jackson who by the way initially did not fully understand the suggestions was to tie ethno intelligence to the screening and interrogation processes as it was virtually impossible to confirm or deny tribal/family/subtribe information gained during screenings, MSOs, or interrogations--it was also suggested to tie that info into an already MITRE developed beta software program allowing HUMINT Collection Teams to quickly check incoming information--the idea died somewhere in Baghdad.

The now HTS should have been a further development of HUMINT Collection and a deeply inserted piece of the IPB processes.

Once JIEDDO funding was acquired then it took off on it's own with the associated internal squabbles over direction. Do not forget that it had to prove itself a viable program in short order in order to 1)justify the original funding and 2) to acquire further funding.

Do not forget the internal military pull the Lincoln Group had during the period 2005-2006.

Below was the initial idea which has definitely not evolved to what it is today an empire build to drive individual high salaries, and make key defense contractors rich.

Military Review Jul/Aug 2005 by McFate/A. Jackson

• Provide on-the-ground ethnographic research
(interviews and participant observation) in all areas
of strategic importance (such as Eastern Europe,
the Maghreb, Sub-Sahara Africa, the Middle East,
Southwest Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia)
to support development of training, education,
wargames, Red Teams, planning, and concepts.

Just an opinion of someone who watched, and listened to the initial thinking on the HTS concept development and who was constantly pushing for more MI tie-in not less as HUMINT was failing badly during the 2005/2006 period.

Brett Patron

Fri, 02/12/2010 - 3:02am

DMLI runs Weston Resolve and STAFFEX training. The training should be early on. Way too late in the game introduce MDMP.

The good part is that they bring a Senior Mentor and fairly senior staff. Targeting, and PAO were pretty good blocks of instruction.

Bad part - scenario is REALLY weak, not well thought out, and does not anticipate much below the powerpoint level. Example: you can't throw out a task to identify a location for a CMOC and not have a CA expert able to talk to how the CA unit would plan on executing a CMOC.
Staff is not agile - they have their script and if you do any reasonable thinking, you'll be inside their "OODA loop" pretty quick.

No role players on site so you wind up interviewing local Kansans/Missourians and then extrapolating an effect within scenario (5 "states" break away from US). Rationale for US presence is weak at best.

That's bad enough, but imagine if a bunch of Arab-looking folks descend on your small town asking who the mayor is. Just saying, some folks and local law enforcement might find that a bit worrisome.

None of this is a surprise because to have this synch'd with the course would imply someone at HTS is thinking along that line. They might be; it's not evident from what I saw.

Anonymous (not verified)

Thu, 02/11/2010 - 5:46pm

Outlaw 7:

Can you expand on Lincoln Group? Don't recall them as being responsible for any facet of HTS training, such as DMLI (training as part of Weston Resolve) or an adjunct like SSRA/Glevum Associates. Also would be curious to know more about the merging of the interests of the former JIEDDO TF Cmdr and HTS - I know the latter started from the former (JIEDDO TF), but how this impacted the latter and possibly caused problems, I'd be interested to hear.

Outlaw 7 (not verified)

Thu, 02/11/2010 - 5:01pm

HTS problems are constantly arising due to the start-up problems of merging the interests of the Lincoln Group and the former JIEDDO TF Cmdr in Baghdad during 2006.

Trying to build an empire outside of their natural MI home is really tough for a number of reasons.

Brett Patron

Wed, 02/10/2010 - 3:47pm

This is not a surprise. The only surprise is that it is not more common.

Use of the term "team" is misnomer. They deploy as individuals (generally), form a loose confederation, and then finish tours on individual timetables. The HTS leadership apparently scoffs at the notion of building a team-like capability in garrison. Lots of talk about teamwork; zero action. Their rationale is laughable (offset deployments for continuity.) Briefs well, but has little real relevance.

The training program is hard-broke. It is very incompetently run and a 100% sweep would not be uncalled for.

That senior commanders let them into CENTCOM AOR with the training plan and manning plan ("plan" being used advisedly) that they employ can only be because of morbid curiosity.

As much of a crank as I think Stanton to be, it is tough to refute many of his criticisms. (I too am a former HTS trainee, but I did not deploy).

There is no weapons-carry policy; and since there is no weapons training, pre-deployment (except that which ones to finance on their own), a smart BCT Commander would be leery of issuing weapons. Of course, that begets a security requirement.

I feel for my friends deployed there as HTT members. They truly are out there alone.

Human Terrain is a great idea. And as soon as somebody claims ownership of it, decides to run a professional training program, and employ it like one would really employ such a unique capability, it will be a boon to any command, at any level, in any joint operational phase.

opsupporter

Tue, 02/09/2010 - 1:21pm

HTS came into being after my tours in Iraq and Afghanistan so my perspective is dated. Are these HTTs working without any force protection from the battlespace owner or internal security? In Iraq in 2006, Cdr, MNF-I found that "help for the command" from outside was wandering around Iraq with no observable task, purpose, or oversight. He acted quickly to get all the camels under one tent or back outside. We should be wary of anyone except highly trained specialists doing what is essentially HUMINT without a net. If only for the operational gymnastics that occur with every DUSTWUN for the military unit in the area.

marct (not verified)

Tue, 02/09/2010 - 10:55am

Schmedlap, my understanding on the weapons issue is roughly the same - it's a "maybe" thing. I believe that they are not given any weapons training per se, so they would only be authorized to carry if they can meet the specific requirements (I know HTT members who have carried weapons and ones who haven't).

Outlaw 7 - that's a good point, but sometimes social scientists, especially Anthropologists, need to go out by themselves. Usually, this isn't coming from a desire to play Lawrence of Arabia, it's because of the observer effect. Having said that, that does not mean that there shouldn't be backups, but I haven't heard about any (then again, I shouldn't hear about them!).

Andrew, I've known John for a couple of years now, and he doesn't have a hate on for the HTS or social scientists in general. What he does have, I think, is a serious concern about the management of the program and this, I believe, colours all of his writing. Personally, and yes, I've told him this, I find that most of his writing on the HTS tends to be a touch on the sensational side - I have also been told by several people that he gets about half of what he writes correct, but that it is very difficult to sort out what is correct and what is hyperbole either from him, his sources or a synergy of the two.

Outlaw 7 (not verified)

Mon, 02/08/2010 - 8:48pm

It is a security thing---no CAT II linguist should be walking around anywhere in Iraq by himself for whatever the reason is.

Is it me or does John Stanton sound like a crank? It seems like every one of his postings is about the HTS. What's his deal? Did he tangle with a social scientist and lose?

Anonymous (not verified)

Sun, 02/07/2010 - 11:59pm

Schmedlap

My understanding was that it depended first, on the BCT/RCT commander responsible for the AO and second, possibly, on the Team Leader. So the answer is yes/no/maybe - it depends.

Schmedlap

Sun, 02/07/2010 - 8:49pm

Do they carry weapons?

marct (not verified)

Sun, 02/07/2010 - 7:25pm

Hi jcustis,

My understanding of what training they get prior to deployment is limited. I've heard some good things and some horror stories from people who have gone through it. The only parts I've actually seen were from an early cycle and I, personally, found them unimpressive. I do know that they are in the process of completely revamping their training cycle but all i have on that is the PPT sales pitch, and no details.

jcustis (not verified)

Sun, 02/07/2010 - 5:38pm

"Observers also indicate that those in charge of revising the HTS curriculum and training new batches of HTS students are not qualified to do so as their expertise is in private sector organizational behavior. Some have had no military or field experience and, what's more, hardly understand the US military culture they are embedded in. Yet they are offered contracts that extend, in some cases, close to one month at $1200 per day. Some allege that conflicts of interests abound within HTS with one of them centered around the outlay of $2 million to a group called Cornerstone."
-------------
I'm curious as to what training HTS members receive prior to a deploy, who delivers said training, and who decides on the curriculum.

marct (not verified)

Sun, 02/07/2010 - 4:23pm

Hi Joshua,

Agreed, I can't see the logic behind the leap with the available details. I've heard of lots of "management problems", both in the abstract and concrete, but I really think that this is a stretch given that they are, as you noted, working in a combat zone. It's also not the only time that Anthropologists, archaeologists, etc. have been kidnapped or killed in the field even when not in a combat zone.

The equivalent argument is that every Army casualty is an example of bad training. Until we know how Salome was abducted, assuming it is HTS management negligence is irresponsible.

(And I say this as a bitter former employee of HTS, who quit in disgust at their management practices.)