... It is impossible to gauge the degree to which the U.S. Army's conventional combat skills have been eroded by the focus on counter-insurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is certainly likely that the high operations tempo, endless deployments and shortened training schedules have more to do with any erosion in collective task proficiencies than counter-insurgency manual FM 3-24. Yet, the U.S. military is almost certainly drawing the wrong lessons from the 2006 war if it is used to ignore the hard won lessons of counter-insurgency and revert back to the kind of conventional war-fighting with which the U.S. military has always been more comfortable.
Drawing the wrong lessons has happened before...
Again, excellent article and well worth the read.
Comments
He makes several important points, First, he says:
<i>"Where Hizb Allah enjoyed the most success in information operations was in the years before the conflict--carefully setting the conditions within which the battle would be fought--and in the weeks and months after the shooting stopped. The information operations campaign is not confined to a 34-day window of time, and an attempt to understand Hizb Allahs success in that field is doomed to fail if confined as such."</i>
Just so. We as a nation tend to be short term planners and thinkers on many levels and we thus tend to be reactive. I believe that IO is one domain where that just is not good enough. Our fractious nature and strong internal political disagreements have exacerbated the problem considerably and an adjustment is sorely needed. We must reach an accord on an IO program for the future that has broad support -- not total support, I believe that is unattainable, just broad will do and it must be a long term effort.
He further states:
<i>"Although air power enthusiasts such as Major General Charles Dunlap have argued for a more robust use of air power in unconventional war, historical evidence suggests that air power based punishment strategies such as that employed by Israel in 2006 are not effective against guerrilla groups in hybrid wars."</i>
That echoes what many of us have been saying here. What is effective use of air power in such wars is the unglamorous but terribly important rapid transport of units and materiel to compensate for the greater mobility and tactical flexibility of the insurgents; that and tailored Close Air Support. Both are critically important and both transcend service parochialism. Or should do so...
An added air power thought would be a truly covert insertion and extraction capability. Not a new requirement, Operation Eagle Claw demonstrated the need just a few weeks less than 28 years ago. Given the typical 20 year development cycle for new birds, it seems we're, as far as I know, eight years late.
Exum continues:
<i>"Mastering hybrid warfare means mastering the tactics found in both FM 3-24 and FM 7-8. U.S. Army and Marine Corps units must be proficient in both conventional combined arms combat as well as the kind of population-centric approach encapsulated in the new counter-insurgency doctrine. This is clearly asking a lot of the officer corps, but perhaps not any more than what has been asked of it already in Iraq and Afghanistan."</i>
I find it interesting that he deems it "...clearly asking a lot of the Officer corps..." but seems to believe the other ranks can cope without problems. If that's the case; I don't believe it's asking too much of either category; it's been done in the past and can be done more easily now due to the removal of lot of training impediments. All that's required is will. And willingness...
He also says:
<i>"Hybrid warfare also means civilian and strategic decision-makers must be realistic about what military power alone can accomplish in such conflicts."</i>
I couldn't agree more. However, I see a problem. Given recent and prospective future Presidents and policy makers, where is that realistic knowledge going to come from. According to Goldwater-Nichols, it will come from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We tried that with an Aviator going into Iraq. How did that work out for us? We now have a sailor at the helm; great guy according to all reports. Consummate professional. I'm sure his judgment is great. I'm less sanguine about his knowledge of ground combat...
I do believe Mr. Exum has found a weak spot in the process...
He closes with this:
<i>"In some wars, history teaches us that you cannot shoot or kill your way to victory. As U.S. Army Colonel H.R. McMaster has written,</i> "the principal lesson of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and southern Lebanon might be that military campaigns must be subordinate to a larger strategy that integrates political, military, diplomatic, economic and strategic communication efforts. Guns, bombs and tactics from the Second World War are simply not enough."<i>This has been the harsh lesson of the U.S. militarys counter-insurgency campaigns since 2001, and this is also the enduring lesson of Israels war with Hizb Allah."</i>
On a positive note, I do believe we absorbed that (though I'm not nearly as sure the Politicians have). Now, if we can just focus on being full spectrum prepared and not wandering too far into either pole of the great SSO / MCO divide, we'll be okay.
It would help achieve that balance if a moratorium on service <b>and</b> community internecine warfare were declared... ;)