News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Daniel Riggs
1. The Man Behind China’s Aggressive New Voice
2. What America Didn’t Understand About Its Longest War
3. A Generation of Afghan Professionals Flees Ahead of Taliban Advance
4. Joe Biden’s Russian Cyber Dilemma
5. New Book Hints at Biden’s Strategic Approach to China
6. Rhetoric Divorced from Reality: Deciphering Biden’s Foreign Policy Philosophy
7. Smith-Mundt as Counter-Political Warfare
8. Competition with China already requires Cold War era measures: U.S. intelligence officer
9. Chinese surveillance firm hires former top U.S. sanctions official as lobbyist
10. The 'Ferrari' of US special-operations helicopters may soon be headed out of service
11. New Material May Power Tomorrow’s Cyborg Soldiers
12. From corporate America to conspiracy theory promotion: How a Minnesota man made a career out of anonymously amplifying dark plots
13. Biden to Temper U.S. Use of Sanctions Weapons, Officials Say
14. Afghanistan and U.S. Over the Horizon Capability
15. Green Beret’s Silver Star sheds light on US ground combat in Somalia
16. Thriving Synthetic-Drug Trade Threatens Governance in SE Asia
17. A Special Forces Officer Teaches You 5 Secrets To Overcoming Adversity
18. Beijing Eyes New Military Bases Across the Indo-Pacific
19. Sea Breeze 2021 - An Exercise in the Black Sea | SOF News
20. US does not support Taiwan independence: Kurt Campbell
21. The Tyranny of Battle Drill 6
1. The Man Behind China’s Aggressive New Voice
The New York Times · by Alex W. Palmer · July 7, 2021
This is a very important read for all PSYOP/IO/ Public Diplomacy professionals. It is fascinating and seems to expose so much about China. Remember the Meme is the modern PSYOP leaflet and twitter the means for undermining legitimacy through the sensational transmission of disinformation. It may be the active measures tool of choice these days.
As Sun Tzu said, "what is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy's strategy." I think we have to first expose the strategy and then attack it along with the means and methods of execution.
2. What America Didn’t Understand About Its Longest War
Politico · by Carter Malkasian
There are few scholars who have studied this war up close and personally as Carter Malkasian.
Excerpts: “What we could have done is managed our strategy better. For too long, we set expectations that were too high given the difficulties of understanding Afghanistan and the obstacles we were confronting. Worse, we expended resources, especially in the 2009–2011 surge, attempting to attain massive goals within a few years. A thrifty, humble strategy that could be sustained over decades would have been better than heavy investment seeking wholesale change in a short amount of time. Such a strategy would have muddled through, deploying as few forces as possible, aware that trying to force decisive change would be a waste of resources. Obama basically arrived at this strategy by the end of 2015, having forced down U.S. troop levels from nearly 100,000 in 2011 to around 10,000. I think we could have gotten there much sooner. The end result may well have been the same: The terrorist threat would have receded, President Joe Biden would today be pulling out troops, and the Afghan government would be on the ropes. But in the meantime we would have spent less money and lost fewer lives. That would have been a better outcome, if far from a rousing victory.
For the United States, Afghanistan was a long war but also an experience. It feels wrong to cast the entire experience as bad or evil. Better, I think, to see the good as well as the bad. I would not want to forget the friendships Americans forged with thousands of Afghans who were genuinely trying to improve their country, whether a hard-working farmer, an idealistic technocrat, a heroic commando, an overburdened policeman or a pathbreaking young woman. And I certainly would not want to forget the kindness U.S. servicemen and women brought to many Afghan lives and their dedication to protecting Americans at home. For me, America’s Afghanistan experience is a dark, cloudy front with points of sunlight. The last thing I want to do is condemn it and all those involved.
3. A Generation of Afghan Professionals Flees Ahead of Taliban Advance
WSJ · by Yaroslav Trofimov
Why yes, on one hand this is brain drain. But if they stay many likely face certain death so there will be a brain drain with a different cause.
4. Joe Biden’s Russian Cyber Dilemma
The National Interest · by John Herbst · July 7, 2021
Excerpts: “Effective deterrence, of course, rests on a credible threat of suffering a highly damaging response to any provocation. Nakasone has the authorization that he needs to target a range of Russian entities. He could go after every single GRU hacker and proxy group hacker (taking them offline for a prolonged period and sanctioning them), major Russian firms operating in rogue states (such as Rosneft in Venezuela), key Russian energy and transport infrastructure, and sizable business firms vital to Russia’s trade balance.
The United States may further wish to take advantage of another key Kremlin vulnerability: corruption and a taste at high levels for the “good life” in the West. America’s intelligence community undoubtedly has good information on the holdings of Putin and his senior associates in the West. Why not release a portion of this information as a warning (with a threat to release the rest should a single additional major cyber-attack occur)?
Biden remembers well the hit President Barack Obama and American credibility took when his Syria redline was crossed without an American response. The stakes now are even higher.
Some analysts believe that the White House has been weak in responding to Kremlin mischief because it would like to “park” the relationship with Moscow in order to concentrate on China. This dubious approach is much like appeasing Benito Mussolini in order to wean him from Adolf Hitler. It does not take into account that China has been watching closely the U.S. reaction to serial Kremlin challenges. Letting Putin cross Biden’s redline with impunity would only encourage the China hawks anxious to move on Taiwan. A strong response to this latest provocation will put Putin in his place and solidify U.S. credibility across the world.
5. New Book Hints at Biden’s Strategic Approach to China
The National Interest · by Paul Heer · July 7, 2021
Excerpts: “Given the Biden administration’s mantra—as stated by Secretary of State Antony Blinken—that the U.S.-China relationship “will be competitive where it should be, collaborative where it can be, and adversarial where it must be,” Doshi’s discussion of the prospects for bilateral cooperation merits attention. As noted earlier, he says “in many places, but not all, [the US-China competition] is a zero-sum game.” But he adds that “in other places, there may be room for mutual adjustment, particularly over the kind of order that results, as well as collaboration on transnational issues.” Moreover, he acknowledges that U.S. strategic objectives “also require maintaining some space for transnational cooperation.” But Doshi warns that “Chinese leaders have sometimes recognized that Washington’s desire to cooperate on these issues provides leverage for Beijing, and they have therefore linked progress on shared global interests to concessions in the US-China bilateral relationship.” He thus advises that Washington “will need to delink the two and hold fast to the rule that there will be two tracks in US-China ties: one focused on cooperation and one on competition.” It is not clear whether and how such a rule can be upheld in practice. Nor is it clear what room Doshi and his colleagues in the Biden administration will allow for “mutual adjustment” with Beijing “over the kind of order that results.”
Much will depend on the leverage the United States brings to the table. Doshi acknowledges that China “may be able to devote more resources to [displacing the US] than the US can devote to preserving its own order.” He also observes that Chinese assessments of U.S. strategic decline are based in part on America’s current political dysfunction and structural weaknesses. Many Chinese observers share “a belief that the US has entered a decline so pronounced that its status as the sole superpower is now in doubt. . . . Many see this Western institutional decline as largely intractable and believe the West is unlikely to resolve it promptly. . . . Some believe dysfunction will prove long-term.” Unfortunately, these views are not uniquely Chinese: they are shared globally, including and especially in the United States itself. Doshi, however, concludes his book by affirming that “a descent into fatalism is likely premature” because “American declinism” has been arrested several times before. Indeed, he speculates that the vehicle for arresting it now could be a collective American “rise to the China challenge.”
6. Rhetoric Divorced from Reality: Deciphering Biden’s Foreign Policy Philosophy
The National Interest · by Amanda J. Rothschild · July 7, 2021
Conclusion: “During a press conference following his 2018 summit in Helsinki with President Putin, President Trump touched on a central theme of his own trip in remarking: “I would rather take a political risk in pursuit of peace than to risk peace in pursuit of politics.” American leadership is at its best when it puts domestic politics aside, effectively marshals coalitions of diverse nations that otherwise would not cooperate, and delivers tough, but necessary messages to our partners. Leadership in this sense is no different from leadership in any other context. It is measured not by the strength of one’s popularity, but by the integrity of one’s convictions. As the Biden administration develops its national security doctrine, it may benefit from considering this definition of leadership, taking concrete actions in support of its three thematic priorities, and ensuring that the President’s words do not inadvertently undermine his policies and strategy.
7. Smith-Mundt as Counter-Political Warfare
carryingthegun.com · by DG · July 7, 2021
It is very much worth listening to Matt Armstrong on this podcast.
8. Competition with China already requires Cold War era measures: U.S. intelligence officer
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · July 8, 2021
War is politics by other means and politics is war by other means. Or as Mao said - war is politics with bloodshed and politics is war without bloodshed.
9. Chinese surveillance firm hires former top U.S. sanctions official as lobbyist
Axios · by Lachlan Markay
10. The 'Ferrari' of US special-operations helicopters may soon be headed out of service
Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou
But what can replace it?
11. New Material May Power Tomorrow’s Cyborg Soldiers
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
12. From corporate America to conspiracy theory promotion: How a Minnesota man made a career out of anonymously amplifying dark plots
The Washington Post · by Shawn Boburg · July 7, 2021
Another bizarre story. It is difficult to believe that any person with any common sense and ability to think critically could "self radicalize" the way this man did.
13. Biden to Temper U.S. Use of Sanctions Weapons, Officials Say
WSJ · by Ian Talley
Someone asked me what this might mean for our sanctions on north Korea.
I have been thinking about this for some time. It seems to me that the Administration's priority is on diplomacy with Iran. I think the national security professionals in the administration think they can still deal with Iran and come to a successful resolution on its nuclear (and missile) program. Or at that is their hope.
I think the administration would also like to make a deal with north Korea as well but it will be much harder.
My sense is this. It will not remove sanctions on north Korea for two main strategic reasons: One is that it will want to demonstrate its strength and resolve toward north Korea to counter the criticism it will receive (and is receiving) about lifting sanctions on Iran. It will want to be able to show it is strong and does not easily make concessions. The second strategic reason is to both influence Iran that it will to impose sanctions and is just not going to lift sanctions across the board. It is designed to send a signal to Iran. But the second part of this is that the administration wants to have success with Iran to set an example for north Korea. If Iran does shut down its nuclear and missile programs and agrees to inspections in return for sanctions relief then the US will want to try the same argument on north Korea and use the example of Iran to demonstrate US sincerity and that an acceptable deal can be made.
We also want to keep sanctions in place to try to prevent access to dual use material and to try to hinder the north's nuclear and missile programs by denying it access to resources. Due to the amount of illicit activities being conducted by the north the administration cannot justify lifting sanctions until there is substantive progress toward a deal.
So the bottom line is I do not think sanctions will be lifted on north Korea any time soon regardless of what happens with Iran or any other situation. I think the administration will hold the line on sanctions on north Korea.
14. Afghanistan and U.S. Over the Horizon Capability
sof.news · by John Friberg · July 7, 2021
Conclusion: “Certainly the United States has the capability to conduct over the horizon counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan to hit targets that pose a threat to the the homeland. It won’t be as effective and responsive as operating from a base within Afghanistan; especially consider the loss of intelligence capability. But it can be done.
The advise and train mission can also be done. However, it appears that the political climate will offer a lot of lip service to this OTH training mission but the assets needed (money, people, organization, political will) is most likely lacking. Thus far – it is not apparent that much planning or preparation has occurred on conducting an OTH assistance mission for the Afghan military.
Even if the U.S. got its act together on conducting an effective OTH training mission – there is another significant factor to consider. After twenty years of the U.S. and the international community providing billions of dollars and thousands of military personnel to first fight the Taliban and then provide training and assistance – the Afghan government and military have not been able to defeat the Taliban. The likelihood of the Afghans defeating the Taliban now – even with US and international over the horizon assistance is bleak.
15. Green Beret’s Silver Star sheds light on US ground combat in Somalia
Stars and Stripes · by Chad Garland · July 7, 2021
Another little known story of heroism in combat.
16. Thriving Synthetic-Drug Trade Threatens Governance in SE Asia
rfa.org · by Zachary Abuza
17. A Special Forces Officer Teaches You 5 Secrets To Overcoming Adversity
bakadesuyo.com · by Eric Barker
I served with Mike in the Philippines.
18. Beijing Eyes New Military Bases Across the Indo-Pacific
Foreign Policy · by Craig Singleton · July 7, 2021
A wise conclusion: “The ultimate success or failure of the Pentagon’s counter-basing mission rests on any number of factors. Falling victim to institutional inertia or poor planning should not be among them.”
19. Sea Breeze 2021 - An Exercise in the Black Sea | SOF News
sof.news · by John Friberg · July 8, 2021
20. US does not support Taiwan independence: Kurt Campbell
21. The Tyranny of Battle Drill 6
mwi.usma.edu · by Richard D. Hooker · July 8, 2021
Some important tactical food for thought. Rich Hooker provides us with an example of how SOF TTPs proliferated to the conventional force.
-------------
“The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function.”
- F. Scott Fitzgerald
"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it."
- Aristotle
"I am wiser than this man, for neither of us appears to know anything great and good; but he fancies he knows something, although he knows nothing; whereas I, as I do not know anything, so I do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I appear to be wiser than he, because I do not fancy I know what I do not know."
-Socrates