A Better Model of Military Intervention? By Michael P. Noonan, U.S. News & World Report.
Sunday's Washington Post contained a fascinating article about U.S. covert assistance to the government of Colombia in its war against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels. The Central Intelligence Agency and elements of the U.S. Special Operations Command worked with the Colombian military to provide training, assistance and capabilities such as intelligence fusion and off-the-shelf kits to convert regular "dumb" bombs into precision-guided munitions. (Not only do such accurate weapons help to reduce the probability of so-called "collateral damage," but the U.S. used encryption on the guidance systems to ensure that the Colombians used them against approved targets. When the Colombians showed that they were reliably using them they were provided with full access in 2010.)
This covert assistance coupled with the publicly acknowledged Plan Colombia assistance, in turn, has helped the Colombian government to re-gain large swathes of territory from the rebels, to work with locals to assuage grievances and to drastically reduce the numbers of kidnappings, homicides, and the hectare area of coca plant cultivation.
This type of intervention is generally referred to under the rubric of the "indirect approach" – although such approaches are highly scalable in terms of the commitment put forward. The assistance in Colombia is probably more rightly described as an "indirect indirect approach" because U.S. troops weren't directly engaged in the fighting. Such a mode of operation stands in stark contrast to the large commitments of personnel and materiel such as Iraq and Afghanistan and might be seen as the road not taken over the past decade. But is it feasible and replicable elsewhere? …
Comments
The comparison of our multi-decade support to the sovereign nation of Columbia to our actions in Afghanistan is almost comical and undermines an otherwise good article. We certainly couldn't overthrow Saddam by training his security forces to suppress the Kurds and Shia for example. Articles like this concern me because they focus on the approach and then assume it has wide applicability worldwide regardless of unique factors associated with every conflict. Approaches to achieve our ends have to be tailored based on the situation, not replicated because it may have worked in another nation. That may be the major shortcoming of our COIN doctrine, among other doctrines, since it prescribes a generic clear, hold, and build approach which is resource intensive and still hasn't worked anywhere as of yet.
Our approach to the security issues in Columbia were probably appropriate for Columbia, but I think it is important to point out that the FARC have not been defeated (after three decades plus of conflict), and reportedly more cocaine flows out of Columbia now than prior to our major drug war successes in eliminating some of the Cartels. Nonetheless it does seem to be moving in a positive direction.
The article also focused on "our" approach, and dismissed the efforts of the Columbians which were obviously much more decisive than ours. I think if one does just a cursory read of the history there they'll realize there are multiple factors that have influenced the situation there. Many of them we didn't influence at all. Our collective New Year's resolution when it comes to COIN/FID/SFA is to reduce the impact of our egos on our assessments and strive to be a better partner instead of a grandstander.
By all means study the conflict in its entirety, and add the techniques SOUTHCOM used to your toolbox and use those tools when relevant. Don't blindly assume this is a better way to intervene with the military. Better than what to accomplish what?
<blockquote>2. Recognition that there are "absorptive capacity" issues with regards to our partners in the fight. In locations where we have done better than others, we have tended to match our commitments in resources allocation with the partners ability to accept and manage those resources.</blockquote>
The Columbia vs. Afghanistan comparison is not a very good one for some reasons you note and many others. While Columbia is larger than Afghanistan, it is a lot more urbanized with upwards of 77% of the current 47.7 million living in urban areas. A FARC population of 8,000 is not going to extensively disrupt a far larger urban population in Columbia with good jobs and less reason to join.
In addition, 54% of Columbia's large area has only 3% of its population so it essentially can be ignored. The proximity of Columbia to both the U.S. and coastlines means that unlike Afghanistan, we can/could support activities there far more easily. That also drives down costs vs deploying supplies and equipment to the other side of the world to a landlocked country.
With 49% of their population Mestizo and another 37% white, there is no natural barrier in either religion or ethnicity to hinder relations internally or with the U.S. with whom Columbia shares religious and economic ties. The GDP of Columbia in 2012 was estimated at $370 billion. By the end of 2012 Afghanistan's GDP was about $20 billion but that figure has been grossly inflated by U.S./NATO/ISAF assistance since 2001 when the GDP was about 2.5 billion. Other differences:
* Columbia has 93.6% literacy vs. 28.1% for Afghanistan which partially explains the "absorptive capacity."
* Columbia has a long history of central governance and an established military while Afghanistan does not
* While U.S. troop levels in Columbia have varied from perhaps 800 to a current 180, it reflects less need to help given an established military and police force of 444,000 to include 224,000 in the Army, conscription, and homegrown GDP resources to finance a $9 billion defense budget and leadership that has risen through the ranks...unlike Afghanistan with a newborn ANA and miniscule GDP.
* Columbia's helicopter fleet grew from 20 in 1998 to 255 today to include the world's 3rd largest fleet of UH-60s according to SWJ's Robert Haddick who wrote about Columbia in the June 2010 Air and Space Journal. He attributed that helicopter fleet to much of Columbia's success in combating FARC more effectively given Columbia's rugged terrain. The ANA has a very small aircraft and helicopter fleet in part due to GDP and also due to maintenance "absorptive capacity."
So while we look for alternative solutions to the large footprint of Iraq and Afghanistan, we must closely examine those alternatives before deciding there are parallels that are questionable at best.
Merry Christmas one and all
MAJROD,
The two key differences, IMHO, between where we are in Colombia and where we have been and are going with the other locations that you state that tend to be overlooked.
1. Executive and Legislative commitment to a multi-year appropriation for a long term program which was present for Columbia, but has been lacking in our approaches to the GWOT generally (i.e. 1206 funding has been a yearly OCO appropriation).
2. Recognition that there are "absorptive capacity" issues with regards to our partners in the fight. In locations where we have done better than others, we have tended to match our commitments in resources allocation with the partners ability to accept and manage those resources. Columbia had a much higher level of absorptive capacity than Iraq, and Irag had a much higher capacity than Afghanistan. Some locations in Africa have been more successful because the funding was miniscule and conveniently matched up well with their limited capacity, while in Mali we probably delivered more than they could absorb and the results were less successful.