How Effective Has USSOCOM Been in Fighting the Long War?
by Yasotay
Download the full article: Does The United States Still Need USSCOM?
The establishment of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987 with the passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1987 was designed to fix the problems with Special Operations that were brought to light after the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt at Desert One in 1980. Congress did what the military establishment would not. This legislation provided unity of command and control for Special Operations Forces and elevated Special Operations to a near peer with the Services giving it "service-like" responsibilities as well as a little used Combatant Command authority.
However, in 2009, perhaps it is time for Congress to review their handiwork. Of course many outside the military establishment are enamored with the myth and romanticism of Special Operations. There are so many "groupies" among staffers and in academia that it is hard to see Special Operations for what it really is and what it has become. And within the military, Special Operations has been "hijacked" by a group of hyper-conventional Ranger types and other supporting elements that Special Operations and most important, its heart and soul -- Special Forces - has lost its way. There are so many in and out of the military who claim ties to Special Operations that it is unlikely that there will ever be a critical look at USSOCOM and what it has become.
There is no doubt that Special Operations Forces, including from across the spectrum: the hyper-conventional Special Mission Units including the Rangers and Special Operations Aviation, as well the SEALs, the Air Commandos, the MARSOC Marines and the intellectual, indirect approach experts in Special Forces such as Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations, have made tremendous contributions to the United States' fight against terrorists and insurgents. However, it is important to note that they have done this working for the Combatant Commanders (formerly regional Commander in Chiefs) and Ambassadors and not under USSOCOM.
So let's take a broad look at USSOCOM and specifically focus on its headquarters and what it has done for our nation since 9-11 and what it has become. Congress might want to delve into some of these issues and ask some hard questions.
Download the full article: Does The United States Still Need USSCOM?
Yasotay was a Mongol Warlord and fierce fighter who marauded all over Asia aggressively vanquishing any foe by any means. The author is a patriotic American who has been associated with Special Operations in Tampa for more than 20 years. The views he expresses are as a frequent observer of SOF and they are a distillation as a result of numerous conversations with SOF operators at all levels.
Update:
Abolish SOCOM - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal
Does The United States Still Need a USSOCOM? - Professional Soldiers discussion forum
About the Author(s)
Comments
Nobody / No one of consequence sends:
Can I call you 'No?' ;)
Good post, good and accurate comments. If we do not rein in the bureaucracy endemic throughout DoD and start breaking some rice bowls, we're going to be in trouble.
Congress bears considerable blame for much of the problem but senior uniformed folks could and should stop taking advantage of Congressional dysfunction for parochial purposes.
The Shooter / SF dichotomy is only going to be resolved by separation as you suggest and the Strat recon piece is yet another separate function.
The misuse of SEALs just to get a piece of the action is borderline criminal with the results you noted being an indictment for several people -- now retired, of course...
The status quo is not sustainable. All of DoD needs to be placed in a large bag and thoroughly shaken. Bureaucracy and micromanagement kill.
Greetings & Salutations to all the Operators, Brass, SOF folks and support personnel out there.
This is surely one of those internal issues that most of the military, politicians and certainly few civilians will even get, much less appreciate. But it's a necessary one and a painful one if we're truthful with ourselves. So, I'll throw in some thoughts, maybe helpful, maybe not.
Bottom line is that it is 100% true, SOCOM was needed once upon a time and did many a good thing. Like Unions, they were vital for a time, but then, they became more of an obstacle than an obstacle remover.
It is also a simple fact that everyone and everything needs to do self analysis and be assessed by external sources occasionally, too. Now seems a good time, since we're at a turning point as a nation and as the global economy makes everyone take stock.
I'm coming from the SF background, since '82, SFC & CPT type, AD & NG, so, there will be obvious bias, please take with a grain of salt.
BRASS
The facts are true for those in the know, that the politics that come with all that high brass, whom have, upon occasion protected us, and have just as much, if not more often, sought to accomplish their own political agendas. That means each service has wanted a piece of the pie in terms of budget and action, even if they were not the right tool for the job.
NOTE: Every single one of our SOF elements are supreme experts at what they do. As SF we know we can do it all, but we are not the best at any of it except our bread and butter which is UW. We only do the other jobs either to teach them because we're primarily teachers. Or we need to be able to do them in a pinch as often, we're the only ones in remote places where the other skills of say, PJ's would for sure be the best for the task.
UW
The tricky bit here is that this GWOT is uniquely suited and primarily a UW type mission, and there in lies the rub. To try an make a PJ a UW operator is like trying to make a Ferrari into a Farm Truck, it just makes no sense and there's no need.
Can't blame anyone for wanting to fight and their leaders get kudos for getting their teams into it. But that is a political agenda at service level that has not necessarily been in our best national interests.
SOF
Rangers and Marines are super at what they do. But often, there is the Ranger way or no way. SF is about almost every way and any way, as long as it works. This is a fundamental difference of philosophy that manifest in tactics. So the Ranger mindset is superior when applied as it was intended, but to win hearts and minds, ain't it. Kicking ass and taking names, send the Rangers and Marines!
Same for the SEALS. Facts speak for themselves. Highest number of casualties in both theaters, lowest number of operators. I think the fact that the desert is not an amphibious environment seems to have been forsaken in order for everyone to get in on the action.
Seems there is a huge global piracy issue, perfectly suited for the SEALs to shine and do what they do best, kick butt on the water, yet, that problem seems to be lacking for someone to tend it.
Leaders
Same for all the Officers, they are trying to look out for theirs and that is a part of leadership, to be sure. But also, they are the big picture guys. And too often, they get into the weeds and get wrapped up in their own politics, somehow losing sight of the bigger picture along the way. Easy enough to do, I say. And this is why SF is asking this question.
SF
For those of you who don't know, or don't get it, SF has had to change alot of it's doctrine and training to accommodate the forced SOF attendance in their traditionally SF schools. This has been to the denigration of the SF force to many of the old timers.
For you young SF guys, don't get your hair up, we love you guys. You all joined knowing you would fight and you've done well. you've all met and overcome every challenge set before you. We are talking about bigger picture stuff that effects the whole force and the whole fight on the long term, big picture scale.
SOCOM
I'm no history major and don't want to be. But It would seem that SOCOM came when needed, did great things and then, became something else. For the brass that defends SOCOM as a staff and not a warfighter, sure thing, but... if SOCOM forces policy changes in doctrine, training, staffing, supplies, communications and command, then in fact, they are indirectly effecting the fight in what some might say, is the most important way. I for one, tend to agree. Maybe someone needs to review SOCOM and decide if we still need them or if we need to simply re-direct or maybe even stay on course and accept what we are doing.
But we need to ask the question, "Does the US need USSOCOM?" and we need to answer it, for SF, for SOF and for America.
I was taught not to complain unless you can provide a better way.
It might not be better, and it might not even work, but maybe it is time for SF to get back to being SF and let SOF be SOF. We do have different missions, for different needs and we need to focus on our different missions.
So, why not let there be an SF CMD that is equal and independent of SOF CMD, let the SOF do what they do, keep their power base and let SF do what they do, and not lose the benefits of having had the brass to look out for them over the years.
I for one think the whole military should be fused into one service.
Air, Land & Sea branches, all in the same uniforms, same R&D, same procurement, etc. But it seems, we've only gone on a more diverging path, rather than a more unified one. So, why not continue that and consider separating the SF from the SOF?
This way, every one wins, no one loses.
That's all I have to say about that.
Salute out to all those who have fallen, are serving and will serve.
No one of consequence sends
USSOCOM's downward departure began after an Air Force One Star decided to be politically correct by deciding that "we need to get the SEALs into the fight." In the process of removing Army special operators out of the mountains in Afghanistan and inserting SEALs, SOCOM lost a few operators and a couple of CH-47s. No one was court-martialed for this debacle. As a minimum the assistant Commander at JSOC and the SEAL commander in Afghanistan should have been court-martialed because even a private in the 101st Infantry Division knows that you dont fly a CH-47 on to the high ground to insert troops. Meanwhile back at SOCOM you had MacDill Gate (hiding $20M from Congress) and staff officers running around trying to please General Brown. Brown was determined to get General Holland (Air Force) out of the command as soon as possible. Holland for some unknown reason decided to tour the world in his last four months of command while the Headquarters was trying to resource the war. When Brown took over (instead of LTG Tagney), there was a mass exodus of Colonels and Captains out of the SOCOM headquarters as Brown set out to modernize the rotary wing fleet with his hand selected Army Colonel Bob Richardson who retired and went to work for Boeing. Then you have the Tillman episode and Brown again escapes the responsibility. The Acquisition part of SOCOM fell apart when Harry Schulte took the money from Raytheon leaving Colonel Spellissy, PEO for Special Programs as the only guy standing up to Brown to continue to R&D and procure soldier systems. Spellissy was asked to retire by Brown and then charged with bogus charges which he is still fighting. Holland brought the Marine Corps to SOCOM while all the real operators did not want them, however, they didnt tell Secretary Rumsfeld this. The CV-22 was not supported by one SOCOM aviator but they went to the Hill and smiled and eye winked Congress for fear of pissing them off. The SOCOM headquarters should be abolished and let JSOC take care of themselves which they are more than capable of doing.
" SOCOM? Yes we need them. The consequences would be severe without the 4 Star weight. We must not forget why it was created and how important it has become globally. Each service benefits from having the political and international influence of a relatively small organization and would suffer to the hands of non-SOF if it did not exist. Look at it from a money perspective, can a service afford to have its SOF organizations and afford the ongoing growth? Some would believe that the extra money that would exist if not for SOCOM existence would be divided equally among the services and that would solve the finance issue. Do we truly believe that the services will see SOF as equal? There is still a divide among SOF and conventional forces and without a heavy hitter like the USSOCOM CDR we would lose the fight against conventional wisdom. I agree there are issues that need to be addressed within SOCOM and I firmly believe that Green Berets need more influence in that HQ and we are working on that piece. The SOF Generals are capable of working out the issues and it is up to everyone else to keep the faith. Emotions run high on this topic but if we all study the roles of each SOF element and hold their feet to fire on their duties and responsibilities then we will begin to understand one another. Green Berets go to school for a long time in order to understand UW and it takes years to truly understand the entire spectrum. No other service is educated like a Green Beret to conduct UW. Green Berets want to do that mission but we also enjoy all of the other "stuff" we do. UW is the number reason why we were created and it will always be a necessity to have as we move forward in our country's future. I can only speak from a Green Beret perspective and that is not a great thing in my own eyes. I challenge us all to learn about SOF elements and understand their key roles and functions and apply them to the fight appropriately and stop thinking we all can do everyone elses job that we are not trained for. I guess the heart of this issue can be just a misunderstanding of why we exist independently and jointly. A smart man once told me to master the basics and you will be exceptional. Maybe SOF needs to get back to that cognitive approach.
<a href="http://useucom.wordpress.com/2009/12/17/another-argument-for-increased-… argument for increased engagement</a> by Major Jim Gregory at EUCOMversations.
<i>As the Special Operations Command Europe Public Affairs Officer, I often consider the value of communicating about what we do within the world of special operations. Sure, many of the missions assigned to SOF are secret. In fact, even the mention of specific personnel or units assigned within the community can be considered sensitive. Still, I believe it is important to communicate our value to the public. Doing so informs those who pay our bills (our taxpayers) and those who make key decisions (our government leadership) about where that money goes.
The rationales are generally the same whether were talking about SOF or conventional forces. Beyond the U.S borders, where I currently reside, its important to convey how and why we are building international military partnerships and working with our many allies to build and maintain global stability and security. Effective communication also informs our enemies that we are prepared to defeat them in any environment. Within my community, evidence of a lack of communication exists in the form of two recent blogs: Does the United States Still Need USSOCOM?, which appeared in the blogsite Small Wars Journal just this week and another post on a separate site that was influenced by the SWJ post, entitled Abolish SOCOM. Although I dont agree with the authors assessments, I am confident that some senior decision makers read those two posts... and were influenced by them...</i>
What I think the article and some of the discussions both on Small Wars Journal and a few other blogs illustrate is that we still do not understand the nature of Special Operations and Special Operations Forces very well throughout even our own military and in the interagency and obviously not in the public (e.g, how they should be employed and by whom). There is more emotionalism involved in discussions of Special Operations than there are facts. Title 10 USC does not really explain Special Operations - just lists the activities and some command and organizational guidance. We have a lot of doctrine and a lot has been written but perhaps we need to look hard at how to educate people about SOF.
Again, I really think that the article and discussions demonstrate we still need more education throughout our PME institutions and other venues to provide better understanding of the nature of SOF and how, when, where, and by whom it should be employed (even though all that can be found in doctrine!!). And of course what is required for all military forces (and all elements of national power) is a sound National Strategy (writ large, not SOF specific) and a good campaign plan in order to employ and apply the right forces for the right missions (apologies for continuing to beat that dead horse)
Caveman----Wow! It seems that Yaostay is not the only bitter guy on this thread! Regardless, the inter-SOF squabble that seems to be developing here is in no one's best interests---all too often, we in the community eat our own.
True, SOCOM does have its issues. I am particularly concerned about the increasingly bureaucratic, top-heavy nature of the command, and the byzantine, convoluted procurement process for individual kit (at least that's how it appears for theater SOF). However, SOCOM does provide 4-star top cover for the teams vis-a-vis big Army----who I believe would dismantle ARSOF in a heartbeat if given the chance.
As for SF "losing its way", I respectfully disagree. Anyone currently in the mix knows that ODAs are doing what we pay them to do----that is, building host nation capability while simultaneously dismantling terrorist/insurgent networks through precision, intelligence-driven operations.
De Oppresso Liber,
RT
Yasotay,
You are a bitter man. Probably an SF tabbed 0-5 that got passed over then became a contractor and not doing so well. Never made it through ranger school did you...
You are crying mostly because you think the SF teams are being shut down by SEALs and Rangers(McChrystal, Olson) You really are mixing up a few things about what the HQ does and what the TSOCs do. SF is choosing its own path as well as the other COCOMs. You must not have deployed in a while either or you would know half of what you say is dribble.
I for one will go to the gates of fire with Olson or McChrystal and many others, they are leaders and they are unmatched.
We are not perfect, we make some mistakes and learn from these mistakes and drive on.
They will move away from DA into IW/UW, read the book "Bear went over the mountain". DA is what works in this area of the world until the the right time then you can move into UW/IW and asymetric warfare.
You really need to gather some facts, mud throwing, cheap thrill BS your spouting doesn't help anyone except the enemy.
-caveman
"Does The United States Still Need a U.S. Special Operations Command?
How Effective Has USSOCOM Been in Fighting the Long War?"
One could fairly ask the same questions about all of the Services as well. But the fact is, that the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, like USSOCOM, are all force provider headquarters, and not warfighting headquarters.
After being waist deep in QDR this past year (usually standing on my head per the old joke), my assessment was that actually it looks like SOCOM is going to continue to evolve to become much more "service-like" and that to the converse, that the Services were likely to become much less omnipotent. Time will tell.
SOCOM has plenty of faults, and it has had its fair share of action officers who perhaps sometimes get confused as to their role in the world. It happens. But who will keep the services from tearing apart the tremendous SOF capability that we have built over the past 22 years that SOCOM has existed?
SOCOM, for those not fully aware, has two missions: Force provider for SOF; and to serve as a global synchronizer for GWOT related activities. That's it. Absolultely ZERO warfighting responsibility rests within its ever expanding walls.
So, if one thinks that SOF is being employed ineffectively for the GWOT, or that SF has been some how hijacked or kidnapped, I suggest you walk down the road from USSOCOM a couple blocks and knock on the door at USCENTCOM. After all, they are the warfighting headquarters.
As a former 7th SFG(A) officer who has been away from group for several years, I find it interesting to talk to my contemporaries who, upon returning to group, find that SF has indeed "lost its way." I'm not sure who is to blame, but it seems as if Army SF is focused on DA at the expense of UW. After 9/11, Army SF filled a void that General Purpose Forces (GPF) could not regarding DA missions. However, now, 8 years later, the GPF have developed the capability to do all but the most complicated DA missions. Therefore, it is time for SF to do what SF was created to do; conduct missions that the GPF cannot. We need to refocus on the hard stuff, read UW, before we lose our institutional knowledge. Great article on some of the hard questions Army SF and the Special Operations community in general needs to address.
As this article made its rounds around the cubicles of USASOC I happened to be visiting during one of the discussions it created. As the discussion began I quickly perused the main points and then gave my .02:
- Regardless of the possible accuracy of any of its points the article will do little outside of SF to endear anyone towards its arguments. Which is too bad because some of the points had merit.
- Where it disappointed me the most was where it mentioned the SMU commander getting command of CFSOCC-A and depriving an SF officer of a command. Since the article pointed out the problems associated with being politically correct in making sure all branches got their fair share of benefits- turning around and complaining about a command benefit that should be reserved for the branch with the preponderance of force seemed a little conflicting.
- An alternative solution to killing SOCOM- at least to solve some of the article's identified problems- would be to establish a higher-degree-producing center at either SWC and/or JSOU in order to educate SOF officers, warrants, and NCOs at the senior level in how to command, control, and employ SOF at the SOTF, CJSOTF, and CFSOCC/TSOC levels.
This would give the SOF community a cadre of highly-educated soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines that would be able to employ SOF from all branches. Today we resort to arguing that a command with one predominating force should be commanded by a commander from that force. Unfortunately this does not guarantee that all SOF in that entity will be employed effectively- it only means that most of the forces will be (assuming the force mix doesn't change).
It is true that SF and UW are misunderstood by many at SOCOM and outside of SF. But, in my opinion, we will not solve this problem by demanding SOCOM reward SF officers with more commands and become more UW friendly.
Instead, SF should do what they are known for: infiltrating, building rapport, and making SOCOM safe for other snake eaters and- more importantly- "snake-eater ideas". We will only win the intellectual battle if we co-opt the other services to think like us. If our goal is simply more commanders wearing green berets then we will probably be disappointed: I doubt the entrenched powers will give up control anytime soon.
Of course, first we need to start speaking "joint" better instead of only 5.56 and 7.62...
Some senior SOCOM leaders have made terrible decisions that were service parochical (getting rid of the MH53s), short sighted, and damaging to the force. They have thrown SOF investment out of balance, and it is true that SF is under resourced on the battlefield, which is inexcusable this long into the war. Congress provided ample funding, but they didn't provide sufficient oversight to ensure it was invested correctly. We all know it easy to wow a crowd of Congressional aides who know nothing about the military with a sexy show of consisting of fast rope and fancy shooting. Just like the G.I. Joe video games, but it is real. Hard to make real SF work look sexy, so they're not going to win anything bikini contests, but if they could just get a serious date it would be clear they're actually very sexy in their own way.
Despite the frustration with some leaders in SOCOM, the flaws of a few do not erase the goodness that SOCOM has brought to the SOF community over the years, nor the potential of what SOCOM could bring. Getting rid of SOCOM is the wrong answer.
While SF provides a fantastic capability for our nation, and it isn't simply their ability to conduct UW, but rather their ability to live and work "effectively" with indigenous personnel, regardless if the mission is security cooperation, UW, FID, COIN, peacekeeping, etc. Their focus on deploying small, capable teams that combine the skills of teacher, warrior and diplomat creates a very effective tool for any GCC Commander.
However, SF leadership also needs to become a team player withing the SOF and larger joint community as a whole. When they're admiring themselves in the mirror, they need to look to the right and left and notice their other SOF brothers who also provide capabilities that are just as critical as SF to the warfighting commanders. All these capabilities were developed because they were needed, and they all cost money to develop and sustain, and history has demonstrated that the services will not provide that funding, so yes we need SOCOM. Just because you're mad at Mom, doesn't mean you shouldn't love her.
<b>Outlaw 7:</b>
Actually, GEN Lindsey spent a great deal more time in the 82d than he did in SF. He spent only a little time in the 77th.
It is also noteworthy that Shy Meyer, another big Army guy, when he was Chief of Staff of the Army did more for SF and for what became JSOC than did many so called SOF Flag Officers -- and that was before USASOCOM was activated. It should also be recalled that the big nay sayer to SOCOM was not the Army but the CJCS at the time -- an Admiral. Fortunately or unfortunately, viewpoint dependent, Barbwire Bob Kingston and Dick Scholtes were able to sway Congress...
You are correct in stating the 1969 affair had a very adverse impact on SF. it was also a really dumb action.
Regardless, today, there are significant parochialism faults on both sides of the divide and those who participate in that divisiveness aren't helping anyone.
Just a comment from a former SF VN veteran and someone who came back into the 10th SFGA CBTI during the creation of SOCOM;
1. SF was always up to about the period where big Army tried to disband them both white and black SF ie the CIDG program/MIKE force programs vs say the Roadrunner, Omega, Delta, and MACVSOG. It should be noted that even during Vietnam SF was grossly undermanned as it is today-nothing has changed there.
2. SF was deeply black together with Title 50 (from 1952 through 1974) ie the King of Jordan mission in Sept 70 where half the group had never worn the tab but were wearing the beret so there is a history of working nicely with Title 50 except for the incident in 1969 concerning the killing of a triple agent where Title 50 let SF hang in the wind.
3. SF Det Europe (Bad Toelz) and Det A had up through 1973 a very long track record in UW and the training of many of the NATO units in UW. We could teach UW and conduct UW in our sleep. It should be noted that on both my teams one in BT and one on Berlin 80-90% of the teams were original members from the period 1952-1957. And several had been White Star members.
4. Part of the internal debate inside SF up to about 2008 was that of DA vs FID/UW because it was DA that kept SF alive and is definitely more glamourous that the daily grind of FID/UW.
5. It should be noted that there has always been tension between SF and Joint even during Vietnam--not sure how one changes that tension.
What I see happening from the view where I am currently is that most of the SOF community is fighting for their own history and dollars and doing FID/UW is easy to sell to the higher Commands, even MARSOC had to stand down and retrain after their "problems" in Afghanistan.
SOCOM and SF itself needs to "sell FID/UW" as their core expertise and only they can conduct that core expertise---get back to the CIDG/MIKE Force concepts and SF will never be threatened with disbandment.
NOMAN, while I can see why you may "feel" that way, those are not the facts. The USSOCOM was the idea of our civilian leadership in Congress who could plainly see what DOD could not, and that was DOD was underinvesting in capability and capacity to respond to a growing demand for what was then called low intensity warfare (now IW).
Terrorism was only part of the LIC problem, as there were also numerous communist sponsored insurgencies, the drug war and other other problem sets where SOF skills were in high demand. Correctly in my opinion the immediate focus (not the only focus) was fixing our ability to execute a successful OPERATION EAGLE CLAW like mission. However, that doesn't mean the rest of SOF was not invested in. You can argue that the money was invested may not be in synch with the mission demand, but it is incorrect to say that SF and other SOF organizations didn't receive significant benefit from the formation of SOF. From an Army perspective, I can tell you SF was grossly underfunded by the Army, and "probably" would have remained that way if not for SOCOM. Bill
USSOCOM was established to get JSOC trained, resourced and on target. It was not set up for Unconventional Warfare. USSOCOM/JSOC came about to counter Mid-east terrorist organization in the 1970's. Since then our organization have grown and spent alot of money. Those Mid-east terrorist organizations have been elected to power in certain countries. Who has understood the LONG FIGHT better? A Special Operation and Unconventional Warfare operation are two different things Black helicopters and ropes does not make the mission a UW mission.
Yasotay is the name of a Soviet Spetsnaz Major who is a major character in Stephen Hunter's 1989 novel <i>The Day Before Midnight</i>. Maj. Yasotay ends up fighting both conventional and special U.S. forces in his bid to take over a U.S. missle silo.
It is likely that the author of the USSOCOM piece chose the name Yasotay for the same reasons Mr. Hunter chose it for his character back in 1989.
It should be noted that when SOCOM was founded and the first SOCOM Cmdr was appointed who had been SF from the bottom of his career to his appointment---there was a certain amount of pride that occured throughout the entire SF system as it had taken a major hit in 1969 due to the triple agent affair and had struggled to survive the 70s and 80s via DA.
The first SOCOM Cmdr spend a large amount of his initial time gaining funding and attempting to get equipment approved and purchased which would not have occurred without SOCOM being founded. Funding under his Command became unstuck inside big Army and fundings started flowing in previously unseen amounts.
I was privy to a very heated discussion between the G2 of the Army and the first SOCOM Cmdr over the use of SOTA teams where SOCOM spelled out to the G2 side of the Army that MI personnel had to be tabbed in his Command-this was continued proof concerning the "strained" relationship between SF and big Army MI from the 1969 event and this was in the mid 80s.
In some aspects the Ranger side of the SOF world was being more favored than SF in the 80s as big Army has always been more comfortable with Ranger style SOF than the SF form of operations. This thinking is still happening in the age old internal debate of tank on tank vs. UW/FID as regular Army would love to get back to tank on tank which is why the son of the former Cmdr of MACV Gen Abrams has been reassigned from the CAC to the NTC.
This I believe inherently goes back to the dislike of SF by the senior leadership of big Army starting in 1969 with General Abrams and still I feel continues until today as a number of BCTs in Iraq had problems working with ODAs in their AOR during the period 2005 through 2007.
<b>Outlaw 7:</b>
Actually, it wasn't SOG but some GAMMA teams that were being hit. I have no qualms about what was done but it was dumb to try to cover it up and not tell Abrams and the MACV Staff (they were far more at faulty in this than was Abrams; his mistake was in trusting his staff). The CIA bears considerable responsibility in all that; they wrongly convinced Rheault to stick with cover story even though non-SF MI types were deeply involved in the fiasco and the MACV IG (A former SF Master Parachutist who'd been on White Star) knew the whole story. As usual, lies ruled, some good people got burnt, an entire community got tarred -- and the Agency skated...
Recall though, that the "anti-SOF" Abrams was the guy who stood up the Ranger Battalions and pushed the reorganization of the Groups in the mid 70s. He also encouraged SWC to get back to the UW roots.
All Tankers tend to be opposed to parachutes and <i>anything</i> special. That's been commom knowledge since WW I. MacArthur refused to allow OSS in his theater. Abrams big gripe was that he was in charge but 5th Gp and SOG were doing things he was not aware of -- Unity of Command is the problem...
So did Schwarzkopf, initially, try to refuse JSOC in Desert Storm yet he was Airborne, a Master jumper and had worked as a VN Abn Bde advisor and in MCV J-33. Unity of Command.
Look at Afghanistan. Big issue? Unity of Command...
Working with the boys from Langley is high speed and low drag -- it also annoys the hell out of Army and DoD leadership because they know that if there's a flap, the Agency will slide due to the way our laws are worded and DoD or the Army will pick up the tab for the blame.
Some SF/SOF folks are convinced they're god's gift to warfighting yet a lot of SPCs in the 82d have more combat experience today than do a good many SF/SOF folks. The point there is the attitude that they are the only professionals does not sit well with the rest of the Army that has to plug away for months on end instead of doing the short, sharp high profile quickies. Nor should it. As an old German Oberst once told a SMU guy, "I think that your Special Forces are not so special..." Been there, done that and I think he was quite correct.
A lot of folks really believe all that Airborne, SF and Ranger BS -- that foolishness will get you killed (See Tillman, P.).
This disconnect is long term and it isn't going away and both sides are at fault
I see examples of the disconnect every day. As someone who's been on both sides of that fence several times, I thought it was really dumb in 1951, even more dumb in 1961 -- and it has gotten no better.
Parochialism is counterproductive and terribly stupid. A lot of folks on both sides just need to grow up...
Ken---the 1969 event was not a really dumb action as it was in reaction to the loss of a number of MACVSOG teams and a major security breach by the triple agent.
What was typically dumb was then Titel 50s response to SF on how to handle the situation.
Titel 50 is still making those same mistakes with triple agents ie Afghanistan. Do they ever learn?
You can see still the issues between big Army and SF for example at the NTC where during say a BCT rotation the BCT will often take targets away from SF and vice versa or the simple fact that the CJSOTF is not co-located near the BCT to foster a better flow/exchange of information.
Ken---your comments concerning both sides of the fence are highly correct---even today at the NTC they still cannot get the two to interact in a fair fashion and see how they can both contribute to a success instead it is constantly who can get the credit at the next briefing.
I do not know how many times a SF CWO MI OB type would troll through my interrogation shop in Iraq asking for anything new but when we asked back for their side of the story-stone silence.
When there was conflicting intel on the same subject and we asked for further clarity just to deconflict-stone silence.
But if they were targeting something then it was like we need everything from you all and we need it now--in Diyala they tended in 2005 to focus on Baathists as it was as they quoted like "fishing in a barrel", but when we indicated we were onto a Salafi insurgent group and could use some support--stone silence.
Catching Baathists made the kill or capture charts look great.