Small Wars Journal

ISF Partnering

Thu, 01/29/2009 - 5:31pm
ISF Partnering Brief

by Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, US Army

Senior Combined Arms Battalion Trainer

National Training Center

I put this brief (ISF Partnering) together as a vehicle to discuss partnering with Iraqi Security Forces for units training at NTC as they prepare for deployment to Iraq. Throughout OIF we have used various phrases to describe conducting combined operations to include "put an Iraqi face on it", "IA in the lead", and "By, With, Through". I personally struggled with this in theater and I see units routinely struggle with this as they train for deployment. "IA in the Lead" often becomes a US plan and we put the IA on the lead stack to clear a building to get the "Iraqi face on it".

I prefer the term partnership. A combined approach built upon a relationship developed with our Iraqi Security Force partners. What I have put together here is based upon my experience trying to partner in Baghdad and some reflection on how I could have done it better. Partnering starts at the top with the right attitude. The commander must invest in developing relationships with Iraqi officers and truly try to integrate his staff with his counterpart. How to organize for that integration is also important, whether your unit is partnering with a brigade with several battalions or just one battalion.

We often made mistakes in not adequately preparing for a combined patrol. We show up at the IA unit 30 minutes before the patrol, without adequately conducting troop leading procedures and then complain that our partners screw up the mission. It is much more effective to include our partners in the planning process and use every patrol as a training opportunity - for them and us.

At the battalion and brigade level we should be thinking about how we can include our partners in our targeting process. In theater we started with a weekly synch meeting with the ISF to discuss the focus over the next week. Initially we did this primarily at the staff level. Over time we expanded to include battalion commanders, staffs, and company commanders from the ISF and CF and used it as a training opportunity and forum to discuss issues. We later added an intel synch meeting for the S2s to share information that helped to inform our targeting.

Finally, commanders should think about how they can conduct combined command and control. We tried several different techniques to include establishing our battalion command post as a Joint Security Station with an Iraqi Battalion and also using a smaller tactical command post in a similar role. This also served as a good place to conduct a combined morning update brief which we did two to three times a week.

ISF Partnering Brief

Comments

LTC Kuehl,

Sir, I applaud your efforts to introduce the term "partnering" as a bridge between combat advising and the less effective "put an Iraqi face on it" dogma we wrestled with for so many years.

I would suggest that the definition is taken one step further. In my three tours in Iraq, the most successful performance we had developed after my reconnaissance troop co-located with two Iraqi companies and a police company in a combat outpost.

Initially, the arrangement was difficult as I was tired of rotating out different IA companies every month and my IA counterpart was tired of US officers condescending to him b/c he did not speak English.

After a couple of weeks of posturing, haggling, and vented resentment, we had a breakthrough and become close friends...Sometimes, I still cannot believe what happened.

Officers and senior NCOs began sharing meals together, hanging out, and conducting PT together. Our soldiers and their jundis followed suit...We shared responsibility for security and caretaking of the patrol base, and we began to fight as a team.

Initially, my troop led all missions. As the IA matured, we divided responsibilities. After several jundis were wounded and medivaced by US helicopters within the same golden hour as US forces, our relationship was sealed.

By the time I changed command, my Iraqi counterparts would hardly allow my boys to patrol. They wanted ownership and responsibility of their country. We transitioned into an advisory role providing ISR, CAS, artillery, medivac, and QRF.

Furthermore, prior to a subsequent change of mission, I was considering lowering my Company level PB to a Platoon Plus with CO level HQ.

All of this happened b/c we lived, fought, and bled together. It was a wonderful collaboration.

v/r

Mike Few