From Army Focus on Counterinsurgency Debated Within:
An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The report's authors — all colonels with significant combat experience — say the Army is "mortgaging its ability to (successfully) fight" in the future.
The report, recently obtained by NPR, is the latest twist in an ongoing debate within the Army over whether it is now too focused on counterinsurgency training. The counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the use of minimal force, with the intent of winning the hearts and minds of a civilian population...
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates sent a subtle but firm message to the Army a couple of weeks ago when he announced that Gen. David Petraeus — a staunch counterinsurgency advocate — has been nominated to take the helm of Central Command, where he will oversee the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The post is arguably the highest-profile assignment in the U.S. military today.
"I would say that Gen. Petraeus' promotion is an affirmation of the fact that the counterinsurgency doctrine he wrote and the counterinsurgency strategy that he implemented in Iraq was successful," says Lt. Col. John Nagl, one of the Army's top experts on counterinsurgency doctrine...
Col. Sean MacFarland was among the first to successfully apply counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq in 2006. And yet he was a co-author of the recent internal Army report suggesting that the Army is far too focused on counterinsurgency training. This singular focus, he writes, is weakening the Army.
The report cites field artillery as an example of an area that has suffered from inattention. Since 1775, artillery units have served as the backbone of the U.S. Army. But today, a stunning 90 percent of these units are unqualified to fire artillery accurately — the lowest level in history.
MacFarland declined to be interviewed for this story. But views like his have been amplified publicly by an iconoclastic, Berkeley-educated officer, Lt. Col. Gian Gentile.
"Due to five years in Iraq and six years in Afghanistan, I believe that the U.S. Army has become a counterinsurgency-only force," Gentile said recently during a public lecture in Washington. He also declined to comment for this story.
Gentile, who served two tours in Iraq, is perhaps the most outspoken internal critic of what he calls the Army's dangerous obsession with counterinsurgency...
In a recent posting on a counterinsurgency blog, Col. Peter Mansoor, a top aide to Petraeus who also helped write Field Manual 3-24, accused Gentile of "misreading the history of what's happening in Iraq...
Much of this debate has played out here on SWJ and the Council. Expect more in the coming months...
Comments
As a special operations soldier that has served in combat, I would like to comment on the discussion that the U.S. Army is too heavily focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) weakening our ability to fight conventional battles. I think that as a nation involved in a protracted COIN fight the focus of our national power should be directed towards that fight. I think that currently the burden and responsibility of that fight lies principally on the shoulders of the U.S. Military. As a result, in order to effectively execute our national strategic objectives we have no other choice but to focus on the fight at hand. I think that to be truly effective at a COIN conflict, we must engage all the elements of our national power. The diplomatic, information, and economic might of our nation is not fully engaged in this conflict. As such, the military is responsible for the weight of the fight, thus not allowing us to focus on other tasks.
However, I would say that the U.S. Army is not solely focused on COIN operations. I do agree that our ability to simultaneously conduct a COIN conflict and train for a conventional war is limited, but with the aforementioned systems in place we can quickly adapt to a conventional fight if required. This is evident in our task organization, our institutional education, and the way we equip our force. The nucleus of our task organization is the BCT which is conventionally oriented. The majority of our institutional education is rooted in conventional doctrine. And finally, the way we equip our forces now, and in the future with the Future Combat Systems program, is directed towards successfully conducting a conventional fight.
-The views expressed in this message are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
<I>"I do have to say that the integrity of the three colonels who authored the 'white paper' and of the NPR reporter Guy Raz is sound."</I>
I certainly do not question the integrity of the three Colonels. But the reporter misinterprets their paper and then appears to invent facts to support his misinterpretation.
<I>"You tend to get 'beat-up' in a combat outfit if you tell folks you went to Berkeley."</I>
Hah. I had a Soldier who was a campaign volunteer for Ralph Nader, had a Master's degree in English Literate, and taught poetry at a local community college. I had to ask him one day, "did you get put into the Infantry by accident?"
While I accept that the surfacing of the issue was in good faith and necessary -- and agree the problem needs to be addressed, I would submit one small comment...
A minor point on that 'certification' bit is that in peacetime the two prime grading criteria for Armor and FA commanders are Shooting the tables and Maintenance. Those provide 'metrics' and allow the branches to place emphasis on shooting and maintaining as principal promotion criteria. Other factors count but those are the two biggies.
Understandable and not necessarily wrong, I'm merely pointing out that the promotion boards, lacking much hard maintenance data and no range scores are going to have to work harder.
Schmedlap:
No swipe intended, my friend.
No way, you had a commander who also went to Berkeley, not too many of us out there. You tend to get "beat-up" in a combat outfit if you tell folks you went to Berkeley.
I do have to say that the integrity of the three colonels who authored the "white paper" and of the NPR reporter Guy Raz is sound.
It may also be that Guy Raz mentioned Berkeley because he is a cali native like I am and he is just doing his best to prop-up the golden state.
But you are correct in the sense of your observation that newspaper reporters tend to like to personalize things since it is the personal aspect of stories that often engage people to read their reports.
gian
In all seriousness, I question the integrity of the author of this NPR piece.
I looked at the Artillery White Paper cited in the article. The only mention of evidence that I saw, which might imply that <I>"a stunning 90 percent of these units are unqualified to fire artillery accurately"</I>, was a CTC observation, in bullet point format, that <I>"90%+ of available fire supporters are uncertified."</I> The citation from the NPR piece and that bullet statement in the white paper speak to two different issues. One is qualification, or ability, and the other is certification, or the up-to-date verification of ability.
As for that being the lowest level in history, where does one go for this data? I've seen some bizarre data briefed in absurd detail at some BUB/CUB/C&S briefings, but this data is new to me and seems to be embellished or contrived.
And then there are the other questionable statements and rhetorical devices...
<I>"Since 1775, artillery units have served as the backbone of the U.S. Army."</I> That is stated as if it were an accepted fact so as to increase the sense of emergency in the matter. I was always taught that the NCO corps is the backbone, that wives have the toughest job in the Army, and that the 18-year-old rifleman wins wars - is there any part of the Army that is not <I>the most</I> critical? It seems to depend on what issue we want to stress at the moment. In this case Artillery gets the top prize. If tomorrow we find a similar crisis facing our mess kit repair MOS, then they will be characterized as the backbone of the Army.
I also find it interesting how many articles like to pit LTC Gentile against COL Mansoor, rather than pit the argument of the former against the argument of the latter. In this case, NPR seems to find LTC Gentile's argument useful and sees the need to remind its readers that he is <I>Berkeley-educated officer</I> Lt. Col. Gian Gentile, just to make sure their readers know which person to listen to. (<I>Just to clarify - that is not a swipe at LTC Gentile; just a swipe at NPR's odd way of framing the issues. The best commander I ever worked with was also Berkeley educated.</I>).
<I>"But today, a stunning 90 percent of these units are unqualified to fire artillery accurately -- the lowest level in history."</I>
Where did that statistic come from? 90 percent? Lowest level in history? Does this mean that they are "unqualified" because they are firing artillery in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than on a training range in the US?