The Secret Life of Robert Gates
The Secret Life of Robert Gates by Philip Ewing, Politico
Robert Gates’s tenure running the Pentagon might go down as the greatest performance in acting history.
On the outside, he was an even-keeled, plain-speaking former college president, one who declared to Congress he hadn’t returned to Washington to be a “bump on a log.” He cleaned house at the Air Force after an embarrassing nuclear weapons scandal and, most of all, righted the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — as much as any secretary of defense could.
On the inside, according to an early copy of Gates’s new memoir obtained by POLITICO, he was apparently hating every minute of it. But he kept almost everything behind the poker face…
Also see: White House Rushes to Respond to Gates Book by Jonathan Allen, Politico
There are multiple comments purportedly appearing in Gate’s book (according to the NY Times) that indicate not only was he poorly suited for the Cabinet position of Secretary of Defense at the strategic awareness level, they also demonstrate he neither understand the cultural nature of the conflicts in which the US was engaged during his tenure nor understood this country’s [often chosen] opponents in Asia (sorry Captain Mahan) strategy for successfully competing militarily against the U.S. His comments show that while our selected opponents have taken our measure, many of our leaders such as Gates know not their opponents.
On the issue of mental suitability for the position, I am reminded of my father (who retired in 1967 after three decades in the Navy) once telling me that he knew the precise day he would put in for retirement. In response I asked him for that date. His response was that day would arrive when he began to question the bull…. he accepted and unquestionably put up with as part of the military, the day when he began to think why am I putting up with this nonsense instead of simply realizing it was part of life in that (or actually any) organization. Gates stayed too long, became an angry man, and his comments and (often poorly chosen) revelations, or perhaps just his visions or views of events, confirm that perspective.
Second — and while some may view this as controversial, at least in my opinion, Gates does not realize that at the “strategic” level the U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan could not, would not, and will not produce any sustainable results worth their cost. And worse, the strategy and tactics the U.S. employed in those costly protracted efforts once again demonstrated to the world (“globally”) that “Giap and Ho Chi Minh’s” formula for strategically succeeding against the militaries of Western Nations such as the U.S. remains viable. As the pair realized, simply understand that while a weaker native people’s guerrilla force (now rather arrogantly called insurgents on the part of Euro-Americans) cannot at the tactical level successfully compete with the firepower of America forces, they can outlast them so simply be patient, accept tactical defeats, run up the cost in lives and dollars for the Americans, and keep your countrymen aware that the government and military being left behind by the Western occupiers is a “foreign created,” (i.e. in Western terms a Quisling) one; and one day U.S. forces will depart and the moral, strategic and tactical momentum will belong to the anti-foreign occupier “insurgents.”
There are political and military variations of the “Giap” approach to combating Western military interventions and occupations which we witnessed it in Iraq and are observing it taking place in Afghanistan.
Gates is reported as having written that, “But if I had learned one useful lesson from Iraq, it was that progress depended on security for much of the population. …. That is why I continue to believe that the troop increase that Obama boldly approved in late 2009 was the right decision —- providing sufficient forces to break the stalemate on the ground, rooting the Taliban out of their strongholds while training a much larger and more capable Afghan army.”
One need go no further than these arrogant views to realize why this country politically is so despised across the world. Anyone who believes inserting heavily armed foreign troops into another people’s country is going to be perceived by that population as providing them security understands nothing about how people view living under military occupation and the hostility it breeds. Anyone that believes that the American created Afghanistan Army is capable need only spend some time watch (on YouTube) the 90 minute of so presentation titled “This is What Winning Looks Like.” See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ja5Q75hf6QI.
Demonstrating the art of self deception, and indicating someone totally out of touch with reality, Gate’s is reported by the New York Time as Stating “Fortunately, I believe my minimalist goals were achieved in Iraq and remain within reach in Afghanistan.” True, he probably believes that, but that doesn’t make his belief anything more than self deception.
When it comes to defining and basing success on statistically reported strategically meaningless data and trends the Gate’s / Petraeus Model is as invalid as was the McNamara / Westmoreland Model. It will produce similar strategic failures. If he doubted the Gate’s / Petraeus strategy would not succeed.
President Obama was correct to doubt the viability of that strategy. However, by failing to NOT adopt it, by failing to fire those two and replacing them (at any point in time), he sadly demonstrated his lack of executive / management ability, and that failure requires that he also will carry the blame for this country’s strategic debacle along with Bush, Gates, and Petraeus. Further, that lack of executive ability also explains why this country’s economy remains a shamble – despite the [de facto misunderstood or perhaps more appropriately inaccurate] results reported from application of the Clinton created BLS U-3 statistical model.
Gates, McNamara, Louis Johnson were among the most incompetent Secretaries of Defense whom held that position.
Something that I haven’t seen covered in the stories about Gates’ book is his decision to limit production of the F-22 to 183 planes and shut down the production line. In the long run that may be as important or more important to the fate of the nation than what effect he had on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that decision can be laid almost entirely at his feet. It is incorrect to say Gates’ strategy in this land or that, but not incorrect to say Gates decided about the F-22. Now the fate of American airpower rides squarely on the shoulders of one aircraft type, the F-35. Those shoulders appear to be sloped, narrow, afflicted with rickets and things aren’t getting any better.
For some reason Mr. Gates seems to have been sold a bill of goods on the F-35 and believed all the claims. It would be fascinating to hear how he made his decision and if he still believes in it. Mr. Gates is nobody’s fool and yet he got fooled. How did that happen?
John McCain says that Gates should have waited.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/12/john-mccain-robert-gates_n_4585156.html
We should consider whether former Sec. Gates — in revealing his observations and opinions sooner rather than later — has potentially done much more damage to the military, their families and our country as a whole by (1) discrediting the Commander-in-Chief publicly and, thereby, (2) undermining his (the CINC’s) authority before the nation, our allies, our enemies and, most importantly, our troops; this, while he (the Commander-in Chief) is still in office and must (somehow and in spite of these observations/revelations) continue to lead the nation and command the troops for the next three years.
One would think that such a patriotic, reasonable and intelligent person as former Sec. Gates — clearly understanding the consequences of his actions — would not make such a horrible mistake and, instead, would put the needs of the troops, their families and the country as a whole above his own self-interest.
(In using the term “mistake” here, I am being hopefully optimistic. I would hate to think that former Sec. Gates would undermine the authority of the Commander-in-Chief — before his troops, his nation, our allies and our enemies — by design.)
It now falls to former Sec. Gates to, somehow, rectify this matter and correct this horrible mistake; if this is, indeed, even possible now.
Lacking this, then former Sec. Gates must hold himself responsible for any and all difficulties, dilemmas and disasters which may befall our forces, their families and our nation which can be directly traced to this grossly ill-timed and grossly irresponsible publication of his opinions/observations.
I think that everyone needs to read over on Tom Rick’s Best Defense FP blog the following article written by a former Ranger officer who served a number of times in Iraq and THEN reread the Gates book from end to end.
The article should be mandatory reading for every American who did not serve in the military and who did not have the luxury of serving in Iraq or AFG—it should as well be mandatory reading by every member of Congress as well as it goes to the heart of what a number of writers here have said in varying ways over the last year here at SWJ.
This type of writing must come out of the Iraqi and AFG vets more frequently or the American population will never learn what their responsibility was/is in the actions taken by the US supposedly in their name since 9/11 in both Iraq and AFG.
One of the most heart felt personal critiques I have recently read and it goes back to many of the comments voiced here in SWJ by a previous SWJ Editor—Mike Few.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/15/yes_marcus_they_did_die_in_vain
Mr. Gates somehow thought that a heavy logistical foot print through Pakistan would allow us to crush the Taliban. How paying for both counterinsurgency and insurgency at the same time is supposed to work is beyond me.
As I said earlier, he has done a good job exposing the silliness of American South Asian academia that the Obama administration brought in with it. Yeah, in a few years we are going to solve India-Pakistan, solve Kashmir (the Anglo Americans have been involved since the beginning and won’t be viewed as neutral by at least one major party, State Department types and Vali Nasr and Anne Marie Slaughter and Hillary Clinton or whatever, a third grader should understand that concept) and then crush the Taliban all while paying for their bullets and ours. Um, okay.
But Mr. Gates, when has a counterinsurgent ever won by paying for both sides? And if you knew a key ally was no ally, then, well, how do we justify paying for the bullets against our own when we are facing a threat, to be sure, but not an existential threat?
Seriously, how is this ‘money skimming to be given the Taliban COIN’ supposed to work?
Everyone is coming out with story now and that story is: it’s your fault, not mine. Former Sec. State Clinton is not saying anything which is pretty smart or shrewd or just plain icky, depending.
Oh, and Joe Biden wasn’t wrong about everything, according to your supposed world view. In the late nineties, he spoke up against sanctions against India because he pretty much figured they wouldn’t really do anything anyway. Didn’t Daniel Patrick Moynihan say the same thing? And the same vibe was extended to Pakistan by some, engagement was better. I dunno, maybe the Pressler Amendment guys were wrong, it’s just that, the US can funnel money through the IMF and did. And Colin Powell was sent early on in the Bush administration to get mil-mil training back on track. World is good porous for some types of sanctions to work and engagement might be better than cutting off but it won’t change basic regional calculus.
Nothing the US has ever done has worked in that region, changing regional calculus, I mean. Never. Not since 1947.
Since the Bush administration waived this stuff and you thought sanctions were waste of time too, how is he wrong about everything?
Nice playing to the domestic crowd though.
I don’t get you Mr. Gates. You had to have known all along and, yet, you thought our logistical foot print through Pakistan would work? Why? How could it possibly have worked to “crush the Taliban”? It’s completely illogical to pay for their bullets and imagine crushing them.
I don’t mind you, I just don’t get you. The system did a number on you, huh? The stuff you learned during the Cold War did not help us post Cold War. That is the great tragedy of the American win, post 90’s. We blew it for our own people, that supposedly “glorious” win as you called it in your last memoir. Dirty, dark and difficult win. That kind of stuff, you don’t do in this era. Don’t work. An abomination.
As I said in another thread, I sort of pity your generation. The system really did a number on some of you guys, patriots and hard workers and all.