As US and European officials ponder what to do about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, they are coming to a perhaps surprising conclusion: The simplest way to stabilize the country may be to negotiate a truce with the Taliban fundamentalists who were driven from power by the United States in 2001.
The question policymakers are pondering, in fact, isn't whether to negotiate with the Taliban but when. There's a widespread view among Bush administration officials and US military commanders that it's too soon for serious talks, because any negotiation now would be from a position of weakness. Some argue for a US troop buildup and an aggressive military campaign next year to secure Afghan population centers, followed by negotiations.
How the worm turns: A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable that the United States would consider any rapprochement with the Taliban militants who gave sanctuary to Osama bin Laden as he planned the devastating attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. But the painful experience of Iraq and Afghanistan has convinced many US commanders that if you can take an enemy off the battlefield through negotiations, that's better than getting pinned down in protracted combat.
More at The Washington Post.
Comments
The Taliban have a constituency in Afghanistan. They represent the concerns of a significant group of people, and unless those people can find another representative for their issues and values, the Taliban will have a significant role going forward; either as an armed opposition group or as a political party.
It would be best if they are a political party. In a representative government, the Taliban would have a voice but not a dominant voice. Unless the IRoA can find a way to coopt the issues that the Taliban finds agreement from the population on, the Taliban will remain relevant.
It would be best to negotiate from a position of strength. Those who subscribe to the issues or concerns will not go away. They are the reason that the Taliban can exist, as they support and inform them without actually fighting.
If the IRoA can negotiate from a position of strength, the Taliban can find a way to inclusion of their issues in the national agenda without completely destroying the IRoA.
What the Zoomie said. :)
He's absolutely correct and Ignatius -- like most of the punditocracy -- has a short memory and is too politically attuned to show common sense.
Not to mention that with Afghanistan, that's all we're likely to get in any event. Nor is their choice of government much of our business. It will be their choice, if it is imposed by terror and force it may not be a desired choice but it will be a pragmatic one. If it gets to the point that they don't wish to tolerate it any longer, them they, the Afghans, will do something about it.
<i>How the worm turns: A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable that the United States would consider any rapprochement with the Taliban </i>
How's that? We were never at war with the Taliban: we demanded that they give up bin Laden, and when they refused, we invaded so as to get the job done ourselves. Whether that was a good decision or not, there is nothing surprising about now reverting to the original position. We can tolerate a Taliban presence in Afghanistan if that does not equate to sanctuary for al Qaeda. Blue skies! -- Dan Ford