NATO Advisors Withdrawn from Afghan Ministries after 2 Officers Killed
The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan on Saturday recalled all NATO personnel working in Afghan ministries in the Kabul area — a bold and potentially divisive response to the killing of two American service members by an Afghan security official in the country’s fortified Interior Ministry earlier in the day.
Reuters reported that President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta expressed their support for the decision by ISAF commander General John Allen. The move highlights the growing tension, mistrust, and antipathy between ISAF and some of their Afghan partners that peaked over a Quran burning incident earlier this week. The coming week will be very telling as the sides chart their way ahead in a relationship that is strained and has a limited future.
Sir,
It has been confirmed that one of the officers killed was an Afghan Hand. Interesting for this to happen to someone who would understand the issue and have empathy for the Afghans.
R/
In Afghanistan we can do what we need to do (in terms of denying those who wish to attack us the infrastructure to do so) from the air.
It is clear that IF there are any locals who want to buy what we are selling, they are an infinitesimal and/or ineffective minority.
It is time to say adios.
I have had the course.
I’ve had the course with our civilian leadership that can’t call a spade a spade. Afghanistan isn’t significant in terms of national security. The problem they represented was dealt with by SF and the northern alliance. Since then it has been feel-good stuff, our domestic politics and inertia. If the Afghans don’t care about their women and kids, how can we spend our kids and our money to do so? Should we?
I’ve had the course with senior officers crafting policies and ROE (whose perverse and invasive nature increases with each level down the chain of command). ROE that handcuff those who are outside the wire… that make their jobs both impossible and more dangerous.
I’ve had the course with line unit commanders who downgrade the performance of the local counterparts when they arrive in-country so that they can upgrade that performance at the end of the deployment show “progress” and get a good oer.
I’ve had the course with the idea that line units can be used in this fashion as effective counter-guerrilla elements.
Events and revelations of the past few months have laid bare a system of resume polishing by way too many field grade and higher officers that reminds me of Vietnam. Too many fake reports of progress, too many ROE tweaks to make sure you stay on the right side of those set up by HQ. Too many decisions taken out of the hands of the men on point so as to avoid upsetting the locals or your superiors. (Special note to Brigade CO’s who feel the need to clear fire missions for platoons and companies in contact. You either need a new Battalion CO or we need a new Brigade Commander… or both)
Surely now it is clear that the locals don’t (and probably won’t) like us… they never do unless we win (and at that not for long).
Surely now it is clear that using line combat units in this role is like brain surgery with a cleaver or EOD with mittens. Does not work… and don’t tell me about Anbar… no correlation except possibly both places have sand.
Look, when our backs are against the wall, there is no price too great to pay. That’s part of the commitment you make when you take the commission.
BUT, when we are just positioning ourselves for the next slot and running out the clock, any loss is too great if it is your son or daughter. I know too many parents with a hole in their heart because of this kind of game playing and it needs to stop.
Here is a link to study done by the Army about ANA and ANP personnell murdering ISAF personell. It is called “A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility.”
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/trust-incompatibility.pdf
I haven’t finished it yet but it is extremely interesting. This is not problem of small magnitude. A significant number of ISAF people are being murdered by ANA and ANP people, and the problem is getting worse.
An important conclusion is that these killings are not the result of ideology. The killers are mostly just ticked off at either perceived personal slights or at various incidents or patterns of behavior, night raids, convoy behavior, errant air strikes etc.
What I saw and heard during my time advising within MOD during 2010-11 leads me to believe that most incidents are probably personal, most likely from perceived insult, slight, or arrogance. It reminded me a lot of growing up in a small southern town – folks were outwardly fervent, strangers were suspicious, and insults always led to fights.
Contrast an adviser’s sense of right/wrong, and the moral obligation to report corruption with an Afghan’s need for increased revenue to pay back patrons and you have a likely recipe for green on blue. Book desecration just provides a spark, or a believable excuse.
The crucial question overlooked in Dr. Jefferey Bordin’s report is whether certain attributes of Islam itself, mistaken as cultural influence, could be contributing to the distrust developed between Afghans and the deployed Americans.
In fact, the following study suggests that a feature of Islam called sharia may be the driving force behind the distrust that has developed:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1952515
It will do little justice to assume the so-called cultural incompatibility behind the attacks and put our soldiers at great peril, when the reality appears to be very different.