Military Force vs. Diplomacy: One Without the Other? By Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, Defense One
… some top American diplomats question whether the two – military force vs. diplomacy – can be so easily divorced from one another.
“Diplomacy is not an alternative to military force; it is the use of all elements of U.S. force in a coordinated, cumulative way to achieve our results in other countries,” said former U.S. ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey, a diplomat who spent much of the last decade focused on the Middle East. “I’m not sure the administration has the tradecraft right.” …
Comments
The following is offered to possibly explain why we now look more to diplomacy, etc., rather than to the military to achieve our nation's goals:
1. The primary foreign policy goal and objective of the United States is to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
2. The United States intends to use all of its assets (to include its military assets) and all of its instruments of power and persuasion (to include those contained within the private sector) to bring about these political, economic and social "developments" in other countries.
3. In these endeavors, however and henceforth, the military will no longer take the lead. It will now, instead, play more of a supporting role, while our other instruments of power and persuasion (governmental and non-governmental) move to the front of the column and take the initiative.
4. In making these changes to our modus operandi, the United States accepts that it now must view these necessary transitions -- of outlying states and societies to a more western way of life and a more western way of government -- as:
a. More of a long-term project which
b. May need to be handled in a more delicate manner.
5. Why these necessary changes in understanding and operations? Because we have learned/re-learned that populations, despite "end of history" and "universal values" thinking, often will not, even if liberated from their oppressive regimes/governments:
a. Drop like so much ripe fruit into our hands. And, thereafter,
b. Quickly, easily and, mostly on their own, adopt our way of life, our way of governance and our values, attitudes and beliefs.
6. This such understanding was the basis for the "military first"/"military in the lead" option that has been tried in recent years, and which now has been discredited.
7. Thus, we now understand/re-understand that what we are up against are not just contrary regimes but, indeed, and as in days past:
a. Contrary values, attitudes and beliefs. Upon which
b. Contrary populations -- even in this day and age -- still cling to.
8. This new/old understanding of human nature and war tells us that today, as in the past, we must be prepared to convince, coerce, compel and if necessary defeat -- not only the opposing regimes and their military forces -- but also the belligerent populations. (Herein, one might suggest, lies the requirement for landpower.)
9. This new/old understanding of human nature and war also helps explain the return to the study of the "human domain;" which had been downplayed and marginalized with the advent of "end of history"/"universal values"/"we need only liberate the population from the oppressive regime" thinking.
10. Thus today we acknowledge/re-acknowledge that, because of the human factor:
a. Ruthlessness will still often be required to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western lines, this or
b. Much more time and much more finesse may be needed to bring these outlying state and societal transformation projects to fruition.
11. Given that ruthlessness has been rejected as the way to proceed in these matters. And given that the military, generally speaking, is not an instrument of finesse nor an instrument that can be applied, in great force, for very long periods of time. Then this explains why we have been required to look elsewhere, to other ways and other means (diplomacy; other WOG/NGO assets in the lead; more time and more finesse) as the manner in which to pursue our foreign policy objectives (described at paragraph No. 1 above).