Marine Corps Operating Concepts attempts to answer Gates

At a recent meeting with students at the Army's Command and General Staff College, Defense Secretary Robert Gates wondered out loud, "And the question is, since the Marines have essentially, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, played the role of second land Army, what differentiates them from the Army? And what is their mission going forward that makes them unique? ... We will always have a Marine Corps. But the question is, how do you define the mission post Iraq, post Afghanistan?" The new Marine Corps Operating Concepts attempts to answer those questions.

For over two hundred years, the U.S. Marine Corps has fought a two-front war, one against enemies like the Barbary pirates, the Japanese army, and al Qaeda and the second against the real mortal threat, those brigands inside the Washington Beltway who see the Marine Corps as a wasteful appendage ripe for snipping off. No one doubts the Marine Corps has done great service in Iraq and Afghanistan. But similar acclaim after World War II did not prevent calls for reducing the Marine Corps to a near-ceremonial guard. Steep budget cuts loom once again over the Pentagon. What makes the Marine Corps unique and worth spending money on?

According to the new Marine Corps Operating Concepts paper, the Marine Corps will have competitive advantages in two crucial areas: assuring littoral access and fighting "small wars." The Operating Concepts asserts that the Marine Corps's naval character endows it with unique traits and capabilities not found elsewhere in the U.S. military. These traits and capabilities make the Marine Corps the obvious tool to use when undertaking littoral access operations. Second, the Operating Concepts believes that these traits and capabilities result in a distinct advantage when fighting "small wars." These are the answers the Operating Concepts gives to Gates's questions.

The Operating Concepts paper envisions three forms of littoral access operations: engagement, such as security force assistance and "Phase Zero" operations; crisis response, such as humanitarian relief and evacuations; and power projection involving either major or irregular combat operations. With much of the world's population living near the sea and sea lines of communication and nautical chokepoints critical key terrain, the Operating Concepts asserts that littoral combat will remain an essential capability. The document explains that the Navy/Marine Corps's flexibility, global mobility, and ability to transport large combat power and logistical support remain relevant and essential capabilities.

The Marine Corps's naval character should provide the Marine Corps with unique advantages regarding "small wars" operations. The United States' maritime strategy is based on broad cooperation with allied and partner navy, coast guard and marine forces. This maritime strategy puts the Marine Corps in regular contact with cultures around the world. This familiarity and experience with foreign cultures and military forces should give the Marine Corps an important advantage when waging irregular conflicts.

The authors of the Marine Corps Operating Concepts will need to prepare for at least two rebuttals. First, Gates wondered how the Navy and Marine Corps will be able to operate in heavily-defended littoral areas in the age of precision anti-ship missiles. The Operating Concepts paper acknowledges the issue and explains how the Navy and Marine Corps are preparing for this challenge. Second, the Marine Corps's plan to heavily involve itself in security force assistance and foreign internal defense missions may set up a clash on territory already claimed by the U.S. Army Special Forces. The document explains that even in the post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan era, demand for SFA/FID is likely to exceed the supply of Special Forces. Second, there are specialized maritime SFA/FID training requirements that the Marine Corps has a unique capacity to deliver.

Secretary Gates asked what makes the Marine Corps unique. The Operating Concepts paper attempts to answer the question. What remains to be seen is whether Gates and the Congress are —to buy the answer.