Elkus and WILF are Wrong!
To beat the Prine-evil approach to journalism like the dead horse that it is, Elkus and WILF are not only wrong in their assessment of what works in such situations, but dangerously so. They argue for the suppression of the popular will of a populace in the name of preserving some form of government judged as unacceptable in its current form. For Americans such approaches are counter to the very cornerstone of the foundation our country was built upon. While people everywhere are certainly not Americans (a small fact leaders in Washington seem to forget at times), a reality of the emerging environment we all live within is that treating insurgency as war and employing ones military to simply suppress popular will in the name of maintaining governmental control is as obsolete as the many empires and regimes which followed this approach to their respective, historic demise.
It is worth commenting on each of the WILFian points offered by Elkus for examination.
“Victory is produced by combat, and the goal of operating forces should be to break the enemy’s will.”
Victory in war is indeed produced by combat, and absolutely in war between nations the breaking of one’s opponent’s will is essential. Not just the will of the combatant, but that of the entire nation. But combat within a nation is a far different matter, and equally important, all combat is not war or even warfare. Damn the lawyers for producing and then interpreting documents such as the War Powers Act. They sit there in their crisp starched shirts and read the black letter of the words other lawyers placed on the documents they hold in their manicured hands with a certainty that ignores fine nuances of various purposes for combat or nature of combatants. The law is clear, and they proclaim simplistically that all combat is war. This in turn enables those within the profession of arms to extrapolate that if all combat is war, and all war is war, then one must simply get busy about the business of breaking the enemy’s will. Who among us, however, desires to live in a nation where the government has employed the military to break the will of the people to force our submission to a form of government deemed unacceptable? Even if the group controlled in such manner today is a small, troublesome minority, it is only a matter of time until one finds their own segment of the populace in such an unfortunate minority role. Payback in such situations is rarely gentle.
“The rule of law, governance, and other things seen as the goal of COIN are products of control, which requires destroying, deterring, and intimidating the enemy.”
Insurgency does not occur when the government loses control of the populace, but rather when the populace (or some distinct segment of the populace) comes to reasonable perceive that it is they who have lost control of the government. Rule of law is absolutely a critical tool of every government in establishing and enforcing the order under which civilized society is able to function. But it is justice under the rule of law which promotes stability among the people. Modern COIN is rooted so deeply in ancient colonialism that one cannot easily distinguish where one ends and the other begins. The true “enemy” in any insurgency is that family of governmental programs, policies and laws, which combined with the manner in which they have been applied and enforced, have served to push some segment of the populace to the point where they feel they have no option but to act out illegally “…to throw off such government and provide new guards for their future security.”
“The prize is not the population, but the control the government can gain when the enemy is destroyed.”
Indeed, the population is not some prize to be won or lost; rather the population is the very essence of the nation. Government and insurgents alike share this common DNA and emerge from the populace to compete for the right (and reciprocal duties) to lead and serve the populace in a manner consistent with their expectations. Similarly, it is not government forcing some artificial control over the population that creates the basis for stability, but rather government acting in a manner consistent with the expectations of the populace and ensuring that trusted, certain and legal means are clearly available to the entire population to control government that carries the day.
“An inability to do these things is indicative of a policy or strategy failure.”
No, it is the belief that such things must be done that is indicative of a policy or strategy of failure. Tactics matter little when one’s strategy is upside down. One can be as war-like as WILF, or as “populace-centric” as Kilcullen, or as “nation building” as CNAS, and expect equal degrees of failure from each. The world is changing and it is time to set aside our doctrines of attempting to control populaces subjected to situations they find intolerable by any such ways and means. Foreign powers must learn to respect the sovereignty of smaller nations, and governments of nations of every size must learn to listen to and serve their entire populace with equity and justice.
So yes, “war is war;” but insurgency is not war, and the sooner we accept that premise, the sooner we find the stability we seek; at home and abroad.
The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's alone
Bob:
Your argument makes sense, sort of, if one is talking about internal activities within a state dealing with insurgencies, rebellion, violent social movements–e.g., Magsaysay in the PI, as Mike Few has argued the American Civil Rights movement, or perhaps today the Columbian government and its internal activities against insurgents.
But then at the end of the post you said this:
“So yes, “war is war;” but insurgency is not war, and the sooner we accept that premise, the sooner we find the stability we seek; at home and abroad.”
I am sorry but when a foreign occupying power commits major ground forces to suppressing a rebellion in a foreign land and that suppression is resisted violently by the insurgents, well that is in fact WAR.
Are you saying the Napoleon’s peninsular War was not war? Or are you saying the American Vietnam War was not war? If they were not wars then what would you call them? Not to quibble with you Bob, but really if Vietnam was not war, then we should have never awarded CMHs, Silver Stars, thousands and thousands of purple hearts? I use these points to probe how far your argument can work.
thanks
gian
Gian,
Your point is not a quibble at all, but an important one. The examples you cite are all back to Nation on Nation, as once a powerful external party comes into the mix to exert its will and force its solutions onto another, it very much brings war to what was previously an internal insurgency, or through war and the creation of illegitimate government served to created internal insurgency as a natural by-product.
But to solve the insurgency, one must focus on that internal dymanic that is not war. Often the condition precedent to any form of enduring stability is to remove the “war” aspect associated with that foreign presence. If one must intervene, one can avoid triggering iterstate war by simply subjugating ones intervention completely to the sovereignty of the nation one is intervening to support. Napoleon subjugated his sovereignty to no one, and the US certainly acted in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan alike in a manner where our sovereignty and our will and our objectives trumped that of the respective host nations; and all of those governments suffered from a lack of local legitmacy due to that very fact.
As to combat and valor there is no requirement for either to occur within a legal construct of “war.” Much combat in the history of our nation did not occur in a state of war, and that non-war status in no way detracts from the efforts or the valor of those so engaged.
In recent years we have used the word “war” to create an artificial importance to the nature of the combat we have committed our military to. We have used this term to extract large budgets from the Congress. Congress has used this word to justify outrageous deficiet spending. Presidents have used this word to justify the aggressive nature of their foreign policies. It is time to stop abusing this word to justify actions that are otherwise unjustifiable.
So, yes, war is war, but not all combat is war.
Cheers!
Bob
Bob,
I’m struggling to find one one tidbit in your response that supports your argument that Wilf’s points are wrong. Wilf has the historical record on his side, and your theory at best may have a few examples that offer a modicum of supporting evidence to your claims. Not that it is wrong, but rather its application only applies in a small percentage of situations. Furthermore, even if your theory was generally correct that would not refute Wilf’s arguments on the correct application of military force. Much differeent than a whole of gov approach.
Victory has been produced by combat throughout history, and that “fact” is not changing. Either the enemy is defeated, or just as likely forced to realize a political settlement. Whether or not the American people support this type of action is completely irrelevant to whether it works or not. We’re not the only nation in the world that supports other nations conduct COIN. I know you non-concur with Sri Lanka’s victory, because it refuted your theory, but the facts are still facts, even when they’re disagreeable.
You claim “Insurgency does not occur when the government loses control of the populace, but rather when the populace (or some distinct segment of the populace) comes to reasonable perceive that it is they who have lost control of the government”. In some cases this may be true, but again it isn’t relevant, for a government that desires to continue to exert control over an unruly population, force generally works. The absence of force will almost guarantee the government will fail. The world isn’t fair, and minority groups have been pushed to revolt, and in most cases they have been effectively crushed with violence. The rule of law only works if it is enforced by the state.
We can strive to win the population all we want, ultimately fear /coercion is a great motivator, and the side that applies it effectively has a distinct edge over the other. I’m not advocating coercing the population, but defeating those who do. Building roads, clinics and teaching women to sew will accomplish nothing (assuming the State wants to win) if the insurgents are allowed to coerce the population.
I am not sure whether I agree or disagree with Wilf’s statement that, “an inability to do these things is indicative of a policy or strategy failure.” Strategy is bigger than the M in DIME, and DIME is still only strategic means, not a strategy itself. However, when the U.S. military is employed to defeat an insurgency, which we are in Afghanistan (right or wrong doesn’t matter), then I agree our military strategy is deeply flawed. On the other hand an effective military strategy without a coherent overall strategy wouldn’t get much more accomplished. We as Americans are all about justice, equal rights, etc., but as you know the rest of the world doesn’t work that way.
I think Wilf’s point is entirely valid once it has been decided that a challenge to government authority warrants the use of armed force in response. I think RCJ’s points need very careful consideration before that decision is made, especially when a foreign power is reaching a decision to use armed force in response to a threat to some other government.
Wilf’s propositions have a tendency not to question policy: it’s simply assumed that policy is viable and intelligent. That’s not necessarily the case. If we adopt a policy of supporting a government that cannot govern or that is detested by most of those it seeks to govern, we’ve backed ourselves into a bit of a corner: you can’t make a bad government better by killing people who oppose it. No strategy or tactics can succeed if the policy they are designed to implement is uncertain, unrealistic, and ephemeral.
RCJ’s theory also has some weaknesses, notably in the tendency to treat insurgency entirely as a conflict between government and populace, rather than (as is often the case) a conflict between or among various segments of a populace.
For those who are interested, I have responded here.
Needless to say I agree with Gian p. Gentile and Dayuhan.
http://rethinkingsecurity.tumblr.com/post/14623897446/greatest-hits-part-2
Sigh. Angels. Pin…
Bob is right — sometimes. Not always.
Wilf and Adam are right — sometimes. Not always.
The determination of whether military force is desirable must be made prior to any commitment of such force. If the decision is made to commit an armed force then violence will ensue. If that occurs, it is generally better to do it forcefully, harshly even and get it over with — attempts to go softly will generally result in more casualties for everyone, more costs and more problems.
The ‘government’ may in fact be the problem but the ‘insurgents’ may or may not be reacting to that.
METT-TC.
Bob,
Where in history is your mythical mass popular support? Even the recent uprising in Egypt wasn’t supported by a majority anymore than the 99% movement, but of course one could be easily fooled into believing that by the media coverage. It was a group that formed an identity and was effectively mobilized and led, even 11% of the population supporting an insurgency (maybe mass popular support in your opinion) can overwhelm a government’s ability to respond effectively. I suspect there were few true insurgencies (and the Civil Rights movement was not an insurgency) in the world that had mass support. Insurgencies throughout time have been suppressed/defeated through the application of force, which is generally (not always) a requirement to convince the insurgents that pursuing alternative means other than violence would be wiser. Applying violence effectively is the role of the security forces, of which we are a part. Violence alone will defeat an insurgency, but to defeat a very aggressive and growing insurgency (Iraq, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Greece, Algeria, Philippines, etc.) violence is a required element of an overall strategy. Currently we have fooled ourselves into thinking we can bypass the use of violence and defeat insurgents by simply throwing good will at the people, and that if somehow we can con the people into supporting us the insurgents will quit fighting. Both assumptions are wrong, first “we” will not be able to con the people, and the insurgents will keep fighting as long as they have a safe haven and the belief they can win through the application of violence. FM 3-24 is no more a strategy than applying wanton violence. You claim that now the people are sovereign, and we better wake up to it. I wish that was true, but the State is capable of suppressing the people, and there is little evidence to support the contrary. Mubarak didn’t fall because of the crowds in Cairo, he fell because the Army refused to support him. The Army now refuses to support the protesters, who do you think will win? I wish the people were sovereign, and the trend seems to be heading in that direction, but we’re not there yet. Agreed that all the military can do is suppress the insurgency, but that is a viable and achievable military objective in some cases. The objectives we have in Afghanistan now are neither. I don’t want to debate the policy, we are probably in agreement on that to begin with, but I want to debate the proper use of the military “if” we’re sent into a situation like Afghanistan and Iraq. I would hate to see thousands of Americans die again due to strategy (or lack there of) based on political correctness instead of history and science.
Bill M,
I wouldn’t class the Philippines as “a very aggressive and growing insurgency”. I’d call it something else, something that actually illustrates RCJ’s point: a recurring insurgency. We often read that the Huk rebellion was defeated, and we are occasionally enjoined to learn lessons from that “victory”. Of course that “victory” was rather hollow, since the rebellion subsequently re-emerged in more sophisticated form as the NPA, which has in turn seen up and down cycles. The Muslim insurgency in the south was largely co-opted in the 1970s, only to re-emerge down the line.
Armed force can suppress insurgency and create a window for reform, but if that window isn’t used, the insurgency is likely to reappear. The problem that poses for us as an intervening party is that often we justify intervention as a means to create space for a bad government to grow, improve, and reform, when in fact all we do is to protect a bad government from the consequences of its own mistakes and remove any incentive to reform. Why would anyone straighten out and address the causes of insurgency when they have big brother willing to lay blood and treasure on the line to protect it from the insurgency?
Before we commit ourselves to protecting a government we need to make an accurate and cynical assessment of that government’s will and capacity to take over that role and address the causes of conflict. If they don’t want to do it, we can’t make them do it: they will just play us like a fish on a line, as has happened so many times before. The idea that we can induce reform and improved governance in governments that have neither the desire nor the incentive to change the status quo is completely bankrupt.
We must come to understand, I believe, what the role of the host nation government, from our perspective, really is in these matters.
a. In the days of the Cold War, we considered that the role of the host nation government was to kill communists and to help contain/roll back communism.
b. Today, the role the host nation government, from our perspective, is to modernize the state and society and to effectively deal with — and if necessary destroy — those “hard cases” that would continue to resist our/their modernization efforts.
Herein, as one might surmise, “resolving the insurgency” (on terms that do not specifically meet our exact requirements noted at “a” and “b” above) was/is not our objective in these affairs.
Yesterday, we were in the business of killing, containing and rolling back communists/communism. And that is what the we “hired” — and assisted — the host nation goverments to do.
Today, we are in the business of modernizing outlier states and societies — and overcoming those that would actively resist our such efforts. And, today, that (state and societal transformation/modernization) is what we “employ” — and assist — the host nation governments to do.
Question: Are we, really, in greater danger today — as compared to the Cold War — in pursuing our objectives in this manner?
Are we “in the business of modernizing outlier states and societies — and overcoming those that would actively resist our such efforts”? Since when, and according to whom?