The Ukrainian August 2024 offensive: Some initial thoughts

The Ukrainian August 2024 offensive:

Some initial thoughts

By Martin N Stanton, COL, USA (ret)

Introduction:

In recent weeks the Ukrainians have sustained a division (-) sized offensive deep into Russian territory southeast of Kursk traveling over the same ground that saw some of the largest tank battles in WW2.  This offensive surprised the Russians and they have not been very effective in countering it.  It is the most significant development in the Ukraine war in over a year.  Below are some of my initial thoughts on this. 

Some observations of the Ukrainian August offensive:

• The Ukrainians practiced good OPSEC – The offensive came as surprise to many observers in the West (including myself) and that’s good.  The fact that they were able to mask the preparations for an attack of this size is impressive.  It speaks well of their ability to hide important movements not only from the Russians but from friendly Western elements… that frequently leak like sieves (I would be fascinated to learn how much US representatives in Ukraine were told about it before the attack kicked off – I suspect not much).  The ability to mass forces without drawing enemy attention in this drone / ISR intensive war is impressive.  We need to go to school on how they did it and what kind of Russian reconnaissance threat they were facing.  

• The Ukrainians had good Intelligence – The Ukrainians knew where the Russians were weak and penetrated there.  They also appear to have had sufficient knowledge of Russian reserves and reinforcement capability to not get bogged down fighting on the first defensive belt and instead penetrate deeper – again, an unusual event in a war that has been relatively static in the manner of WW1 trench warfare for over a year.  It will be interesting in the future to find out how much intelligence was provided by outside friends and how much was developed with indigenous ISR capabilities.  How ever they obtained their knowledge of the Russians dispositions and capabilities in the critical sector, they made good use of it.

• They were able to sustain a drive – Not only did the Ukrainians pick the right spot to attack into Russia; they also kept going.  They expanded their penetration and conducted combat operations while they were doing it using a fair amount of logistics and conducting forward resupply and re-fit operations in stride.  This means sustainment of operations – which were a major Ukrainian shortcoming for much of the war, have (at least in this offensive) been addressed as an issue.  If not perfectly, at least “good enough”.  This is huge.  Sustaining drives has been a major shortcoming of both armies in the Ukraine war.  The implications of this (to date) successful offensive are significant.

• The Ukrainians appear to be able to hold what they have taken, at least for now – The Ukrainians appear to be consolidating their gains inside Russia.  Every day they hold a place is time for them to create the kind of defenses that make maneuver hard and that the Russians have difficulty penetrating.  Even if they don’t intend to hold the full extent of their penetration, they can create a defensive belt miles inside Russian territory and then withdraw in good order to occupy it. 

Positive Impacts of the August Offensive

• They have inflicted losses on the Russians – The Ukrainians appear to have decimated the Russian units that were spread out in an economy-of-force role holding this front.  Not huge losses mind you but not insignificant ones either.  More importantly, the casualties do appear to have been in a lopsided nature (IE significantly fewer Ukrainian than Russian).  In this “You Tube” war where truth is hard to discern due to the exaggerated claims of everyone on both sides posting, the current Ukrainian offensive does appear to have done well in this regard.  None of the Ukrainian units involved appear to have been reduced to combat ineffectiveness as far as I can tell, while several Russian units likely have been. 

• The Ukrainian offensive has forced Russia to shift forces – The Russians are moving forces to contain the penetration (I originally wrote the Russians were “racing” to move forces, but this would have given the wrong impression, even in an emergency their movements have been relatively sclerotic).  These are either reserves that cannot no be committed to other fronts or forces repositioned from those other fronts directly.  This means the Russians ability to conduct offensive operations anywhere else has taken a big hit.  Nor does it appear that the Russians will be able to mass sufficient forces to drive the Ukrainians out anytime soon. 

• The Ukrainians now hold Russian territory as a bargaining chip for negotiations. This is a huge development.  Prior to this offensive the Russian strategy was clearly to wear the Ukrainians down to force a peace on them that codified the new national borders on the existing front lines – which were all inside Ukraine.  No longer.  The Ukrainians now hold territory inside Russia that they can use as a negotiating lever to force Russian withdrawal.  Ending the war on the boundaries that existed before Feb 2022 would be a disaster for Putin.

• Provides morale boost for Ukrainian forces, nation and international supporters – The success of this offensive has been a huge shot in the arm for Ukraine.  The unending grimness of trench warfare and its seemingly limitless casualty lists was sapping the morale of Ukraine and its international supporters alike.  For the first time in a long time something other than a forced peace at severe disadvantage seems possible. 

Things are looking up, but Ukraine isn’t out of the woods by any means:

                  The August offensive has been a good news story all round, no doubt about it.  There are still ways it could turn bad though.  It’s important we examine them.

• The Ukrainians could penetrate too far and overextend themselves:  Seizing Russian territory as a bargaining chip is all for the good, but the Ukrainians must avoid taking more terrain than they can reasonably hold and still maintain a mobile reserve.  The last thing they need is for the Russians to (finally) get organized and cut off their penetration from the flanks like they cut off the Germans at Stalingrad.  The Ukrainians should hold only what they can defend and sustain.

• Unrealistic expectations in negotiations:  The Ukrainians may be able to get back all the territory that the Russians have taken since Feb of 2022 or most of it at least.  Trying to get the Crimea back would probably be something the Russians would balk at.  Right now, the Russians are reeling. This could make them in more of a mood to negotiate.   Asking for too much could harden their stance.  Victory is getting back to Feb 2022.

• Russian Tactical Nuclear use:  Putting on my “Red Team” hat, I’m frankly surprised the Russians haven’t used tac nukes in the Ukraine war.  They’d be the war winning “Easy” button; a quick way to force Ukraine to terms.  This makes me think less of Putin – who plays the role of a hard man but who lacked the courage to spare his nation the massive losses they’ve suffered by using a few 10KT airburst weapons.  Harry Truman had more guts.  That said, continued embarrassment around Kursk could lead to tactical nuclear weapons use in a desperation move.  Once he realizes that the West would squawk but not really do anything of substance, Putin might lose his inhibitions about using them more frequently.  I assess this as low probability, but it’s not out of the question. 

Summary

        The August offensive has been a huge black eye for Putin and has changed the dynamics of the Ukraine war in a way not seen in over a year.  It’s been an all-around good news story for Ukraine when they badly needed one.  It could (as opposed to “will”) shape the outcome of the war to something more favorable to Ukraine.  Let’s hope they can keep the momentum.