Nation Building: Impossible Missions
Nation Building: Impossible Missions by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times
I just read a book that Barack Obama and Donald Trump would both enjoy.
It argues that the last two decades of U.S. foreign policy were an aberration — an era when America became so overwhelmingly more powerful than any rival that it got geopolitically drunk and decided that it didn’t just want to be a cop on the beat protecting our nation, but also a social worker, architect and carpenter doing nation-building abroad.
It was all done with the best of intentions, and in some cases did save precious lives. But none of the efforts achieved the kind of self-sustaining democratizing order we wanted, which is why neither this president nor the next wants to be doing any more of that — if they can at all avoid it.
But can they? …
Thomas Friedman and the internationalists at the New York Times and their like are just worried about their position as global lecturers and meddlers. Since the end of the Cold War, an entire profession of managing people overseas has arisen (expanded, really) from NGOs, think tanks, GONGOs,contractors, academics, an entire class of professionals that need client states for something to do. Or else, who needs their expertise or opinion? Maybe some local can do the job better and without any help from the States.
Let me give the most succinct and simplistic explanation I can for the phenomena we are seeing.
In the post WWII/Cold War era we helped Germany, Japan and South Korea to rebuild themselves. (We love to tout the Marshall Plan but one of the keys to the Marshall plan was that we did not DO things for the Europeans – we provided assistance so that they could do things themselves).
In the Post Cold War World (PCWW) we took on the role of not only the world’s policeman but also the world’s problem solver and instead of helping people to helping themselves as our old cliche goes, we started really doing things for people and countries in earnest and took on the role of building nations for people rather than helping people build (or rebuild) their own nations.
A simplistic overly broad generalization I know but I think we need to examine our mindset change from helping others help themselves to the idea that we have to do things for them and by definition impose our ways on others even though our ways may not be compatible with the culture, customs, tradition, and history and even security needs and desires of others.
Excerpts:
QUOTE Don’t get him wrong, Mandelbaum says. The U.S. beat back some very bad actors in Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, and later in Libya. “The military missions that the United States undertook succeeded. It was the political missions that followed, the efforts to transform the politics of the places where American arms prevailed, that failed.”
Why? Because political success was never within our control. Such normative transformations can only come from within, from the will of local actors to change long-embedded habits, overcome longstanding enmities or restore long-lost political traditions.
In each of these cases, argues Mandelbaum, political transformation “was up to them — and they were not up to it.” END QUOTE
And this is key:
QUOTE The only option is more consensual government and social contracts among equal citizens. But that gets us back to Mandelbaum’s argument: What if it’s up to them and they’re not up to it — and the result is growing disorder and more and more of their people fleeing to the world of order in Europe or North America?
Then we may have to find a way to help them at a cost we can afford — even if we don’t know how. This will be one of the biggest foreign policy challenges facing the next president, which is why this book is a must-read for him or her. END QUOTE
The civilizations that built functional democracies with or without American assistance had one thing in common:
Absence of powerful and regressive religion-based ideologies that discouraged modern education and therefore, wealth creation and people empowerment.
Details: http://www.amazon.com/Defeating-Political-Islam-The-Cold/dp/1591027047
The article — and I presume the book — presumes a particular path of action…or rather, inaction. Our failure was that we attempted to make large-scale modifications to political, economic, and social systems without committing the time and resources necessary, expecting people to magically fall in line simply because we’re good guys. Under other conditions, we succeeded reasonably well with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. There’s nothing inevitable about the “hands off” approach we attempted to take in Afghanistan or Iraq.
The article also hews to Friedman’s believe that the social media-linked masses have powers far greater than recent history proves out. Egypt and Bahrain seem to be having no trouble controlling their populations. Disorganized mobs don’t produce permanent change, and rapidly changing a mob into an organized group is a highly visible, and therefore risky, job.
I shouldn’t get so focused on Silicon Valley that I forget old school DC contracting:
http://www.thenation.com/article/how-hillary-clinton-militarized-us-policy-in-honduras/
Good old big data.
Edited and added to a bit:
Nation-building an impossible mission? Because such is not within a great nation’s, a great power’s or a great civilization’s “control?”
Pure BS.
From our article above:
BEGIN QUOTE
It was the political missions that followed, the efforts to transform the politics of the places where American arms prevailed, that failed.”
Why? Because political success was never within our control. Such normative transformations can only come from within, from the will of local actors to change long-embedded habits, overcome longstanding enmities or restore long-lost political traditions.
In each of these cases, argues Mandelbaum, political transformation “was up to them — and they were not up to it.”
END QUOTE
Let’s take a run at this assertion using, as I often do, a comparison of the Soviets/the communists’ similar “expansionist” efforts — and their similar promotion (of their version ) of “world revolution” — this, following World War II and after Stalin’s death.
Herein to note, and re: the communist’s such “expansionist” efforts back then, that while only one communist nation might have existed cir. 1944, by about 1980 approximately one-third of the world had “gone communist.”
This being the case, and as per the logic of our author above (political success is not within the control of the outside power — such normative transformations can only “come from within”), then:
a. Did the Soviets/the communists succeed, re: their “political transformation” efforts in other countries following WWII, because they, and their way of life, etc., were so very much loved and embraced by the locals?
b. And did the U.S./the West, in stark contrast and re: our similar “political transformation” efforts following the Old Cold War, fail because we, and our way of life, etc., were so very much hated and rejected by the natives?
Such, I suggest, is simply not the case. Rather, I suggest that the Soviets/the communists, following WWII, succeeded because they understood the operational environment. While the U.S./the West, following the Old Cold War, failed because we did not. Explanation:
a. The U.S./the West erroneously thought, following the Old Cold War, that it would encounter a “WELCOMING” operational environment; one that was defined by such ideas as “universal values,” “the overwhelming appeal of our way of life” and “the end of history” (the western version of such ideas). This suggesting that the U.S./the West need only liberate the “pining for westernization” populations from their oppressive regimes (think those denying “westernization”) to achieve our “political, economic and social transformation” goals for other countries.
b. The Soviets/the communists on the other hand, and following World War II, were under no such significant illusions. Thus, the Soviets/the communists understood that they would encounter a “CONTESTED” operational environment re: their “transformational” designs for other countries (much as we have experienced post-the Cold War). And would, accordingly, have to adopt more-coercive means/methods to accomplish their objectives.
(Principle among these being the use of, for example, “unconventional warfare.” In this regard, see the following 1962 paper and, specifically, the portion entitled “Weapon of Peaceful Coexistence.” http://www.jstor.org/stable/1034145?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.)
Herein to suggest that the U.S./the West also, and following the many failures it has recently encountered via its faulty “WELCOMING” operational environment construct, has now:
a. Likewise embraced a proper “CONTESTED” understanding of the world (specifically, vis-a-vis our “transformational” designs for same). And, thus, the U.S./the West now has, likewise:
b. Embraced such coercive means, measures as “unconventional warfare,” “political warfare,” etc. — this, so as to achieve its “transformational” objectives in the clearly “CONTESTED” operational environment that we now readily acknowledge.
BOTTOM LINE:
Political success — re: transforming other states and societies more along one’s own political, economic and social lines — “not within the control” of an “expansionist” great nation, great power and/or great civilization?
Pure BS. (As the specific Soviet/communist example above illustrates, and as history in general informs us.)
Rather, the “expansionist” great nation, great power and/or great civilization, to gain greater chance of “transformational” success re: other states and societies, simply must:
a. Adopt as fact (as those before us have done and re: their such “transformational” designs for other states and societies) that such operations will be undertaken in a “CONTESTED” (rather than in a “WELCOMING”) operational environment. And that the “expansionist” great nation, great power and/or great civilizations must, accordingly,
b. Adopt more-coercive strategies, means, measures, etc. (for example: unconventional warfare, political warfare, etc.); which are appropriate for such a — now properly understood — hostile operational environment.
And this, I believe, is exactly what we have been doing recently and are now doing today.
(Herein to understand that it is more the idea of “universal [western] values,” etc., that is being rejected today — not so much the idea of “nation-building?”)
BOTTOM, BOTTOM LINE: Abandon “nation-building” missions? Ain’t going to happen. Adopt, instead, (a) a proper “CONTESTED” operational environment understanding and, accordingly, (b) the more-coercive strategy, means, measures, etc., appropriate for same? Yep. That, I suggest, is exactly what we “expansionist” folks are doing today.
Throwing my two cents in, I largely agree with Mr. Dave Maxwell and largely disagree with Bill C. What matters is what the target population wants and believes. If they do not want to change, they will not. Using the old adage, we can show them how to fish but we can’t lite the stick of dynamite and throw it in the lake for them.
However, it is more complicated than that. As Bill C. has pointed out in the past, our failures are due to a fallacious concept of human nature. We believe that everyone has the same values hierarchy that we have. We (Westerners, and in particular, Americans) believe that everyone around the world values Self-Direction (freedom) more than Conformity or Tradition. That is not true. While all humans share the same set of values, they rank them differently. As long as we assume a universal value hierarchy – as long as that is an unquestioned “Fact” in every plan — we will fail.
Well, we won’t fail everywhere. In places where it is a happy coincidence that the majority of the population has a value hierarchy that matches ours, we will likely succeed. That was the case in the Post WWII Western European Theater, and partially true in Japan. Korea took some cajoling, but they came around after a few decades. But in places like Iraq and Afghanistan (and even Vietnam), where Traditional tribal values run deep, it is not an easy sell.
The next question is, what causes people to change their value hierarchy? But that is another conversation.
Curmudgeon, Warlock, et. al: (Moved this discussion to the top of the page so that we can have more room to work.)
I found this excerpt of a publication, which seems to be on-point. I have only glanced at it so far, but it seems to address certain of the issues that we have been discussing below.
Let me know what you think.
The title of the publication is indeed compelling, as this such title is:
“Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World.”
(The potential problem here being, however, that this is a year 2000 publication and a great deal of “nation-building” water has flowed under the proverbial bridge since then. On the positive side, and in spite of the title, the author also appears to discuss “democracy by force” in the Cold War and pre-Cold War eras also.)
Excerpt:
“Nation-building has indeed evolved from the Cold War days — when it was primarily an American or Soviet-controlled endeavor — to today’s occupation jointly run by any combination of the US Government, the United Nations, and some member states.”
http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam032/99012838.pdf
Curmudgeon and Warlock:
Gentlemen, have you perused COL Maxwell’s item below — re: the use of force generally — and specifically the use of force associated with political warfare and unconventional warfare in support of same — which COL Maxwell suggests as an option for the purpose of, in this instance, unifying North and South Korea?
https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_03_01.jsp?bid=DATA03&page=1&num=996&mode=view&category=11 (Go down to Item Number 5 and punch in PDF at the article there entitled “Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance”
This is the general world-wide trend that I seem to be seeing today, to wit:
a. An acceptance by the U.S./the West that our “soft power” (attraction) simply cannot do get the transformational job done; as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya would seem to indicate. (We cut the head off the snakes but the people did not, as we clearly expected, move out smartly in our direction.)
b. An acceptance by the U.S./the West that “hard power” (force) — in the form of such things as “political warfare” and “unconventional warfare,” etc., employed in the service of same — these must be used to achieve our such political objective. (Using elements of his own people against him, we will step on the head of the snake — bring pressure to bear thus on him — herein hoping to cause him to move out smartly in our direction.)
In this New/Reverse Cold War of today and re: the U.S./the West contemporary expansionist agenda (as was the case in the Old Cold War of yesterday and re: the Soviet/the communists expansionist agenda back then) note that ALL “different” states and societies are targeted for transformation; whether these such states and societies are “threatening,” actually attacking us, or not. In this regard, consider former National Security Advisor Anthony Lakes (exceptionally “Soviet”-like?) such words in 1993:
“During the Cold War, even children understood America’s security mission; as they looked at those maps on their schoolroom walls, they knew we were trying to contain the creeping expansion of that big, red blob. Today, at great risk of oversimplification, we might visualize our security mission as promoting the enlargement of the “blue areas” of market democracies. The difference, of course, is that we do not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion or repression.”
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html
With the formal adoption of such things as political warfare — and unconventional warfare, etc., in the service of same — could ee still say, with a straight face, that “we do not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion or repression? I think not.
Bottom Line:
We hoped to achieve our grand political objective, of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines via our “soft-power” alone, and by simply taking out “resisting-transformation” leaders who — we believed — were all that stood in our and the populations’ “transformational” way. This did not work, as the populations, it turned out, were not with us in this regard. (The population had other ways that they wished to order, organize and orient their lives.)
Now we believe that, to achieve our grand political objective, of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines; this will require that we (much to our disappointment, embarrassment and chagrin) bring “hard-power” to bear (in, for example, the form of “political warfare” and “unconventional warfare,” etc., employed in the service of same). In this manner, to force the standing governments of these “resisting transformation” nations to (a) change their minds re: “transformation” of their states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and, thus, (b) do much of the hard transformational work for us. (Examples: The communist Soviet and Chinese leadership were the ones that did the “heavy lifting” re: the — admittedly incomplete — “transformation” of their states and societies.)
Arguments which suggest that “transformation” is an “impossible mission” re: certain other states and societies — or that this such objective should be pursued, re: these very “different” states and societies, in other ways (for example, as per the “economic development first” thesis) — these do not appear to hold much sway with our national leadership — republican or democrat — and not immediately after the Old Cold War nor currently.
Possibly we will need to fail — re: these suggested “hard power” approaches also — before such alternative ideas will find adequate purchase?
(Or course we might, as with Russia and China above[?], achieve a degree of success re: this such “hard power” approach also?)
Another way to look at these “nation-building” failure thoughts/questions:
First, from the perspective of the idealists, to wit: those believing in such things as “universal values” (for example: Bush Jr., Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz and, indeed, our authors Mandelbaum and Friedman above):
In these folks eyes, to achieve successful transformation — of non-western states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines — all that was needed was for the populations of such entities (all pining for “westernization”) to be liberated from their oppressive regimes and to be given, thereafter, a modest modernization “hands-up.”
Thus these idealist folks, placing their faith in such things as “universal values” would, understandably (and indeed consist with their such “universal values” faith/belief) send in only moderate numbers of military units (needed, per “universal values” thinking, only for regime decapitation); forces which were inadequately manned, trained or equipped to meet the diverse and indeed massive numbers of “non-universal values” enemy populations that they would in fact encounter.
When things go South, these idealists (most recently, Mandelbaum and Friedman above) blame failure on the population — which is said to “not have been up to the transformational task”; this, rather than attributing failure, as they rightfully should, to the fallacy of very own idealist “universal values” ideas.
Now it was left for the realists (who understood from the get-go that [a] such “universal values” ideas were indeed folly and that, accordingly [b] the cost in blood, treasure and political capital of pursuing “transformation” was much too great?) to somehow clean up the mess that had been made for them by these ill-informed idealists.
Bottom Line:
The blame for transformational failure in the Greater Middle East and elsewhere lies not with the populations of these regions — as the idealists (such as Mandelbaum and Friedman above) would suggest.
Rather the blame for these transformational failures lie –clearly — at the feet of the idealists, to wit: those individuals that, imprudently, (a) embraced these questionable “universal values” concepts and who (b) acted upon them.
Thus, nation-building as an impossible mission?
Not if you understand, from the very beginning, that the population is more likely to be your enemy rather than your friend. And, accordingly, that you can only count on the population as standing against you. In this manner, likewise, to understand that you, obviously, cannot count on the population to do the transformational “heavy lifting” for you; this, re: your — not their — transformational effort/cause.
Given these such negative factors, to understand that in the present post-Cold War World, as indeed was the case during the Cold War World of old, that one is more likely to achieve one’s political objective — transformational or otherwise — via the standing regime rather than via the populations?
This, given our understanding that “universal (western) values” — which was not present in the Old Cold War of yesterday — is still not present today even a quarter century thereafter?
Such things as foreign policy, national security strategy, tactics, thoughts on intervention, etc., accordingly, to be considered and developed as per this exact negative — and indeed realistic (“universal western values” have still not become manifest) — understanding of our present world?