US Eyes Military Thrust With Islamic State Vulnerable
US Eyes Military Thrust With Islamic State Vulnerable
Jeff Seldin, Voice of America
The entry of U.S. special operations forces into northern Syria to energize the fight against the Islamic State comes as intelligence officials see the terror group as the most vulnerable it has been in some time.
IS has been accustomed to acting as an aggressor, but U.S. intelligence officials say its momentum “has largely been blunted” in Syria, where Kurdish forces are drawing closer to its de facto capital of Raqqa.
“It has suffered significant casualties, lost key leaders and can no longer rely on sweeping victories to boost morale,” a U.S. intelligence official told VOA.
“If forces advancing from the north are successful in defeating ISIL in or around Raqqa, it would mark one of the few instances where ISIL has been defeated from a position of strength,” the official added, using an acronym for the terror group.
Advise and Assist
That advance from the north is exactly the push the U.S. hopes to strengthen with the insertion of fewer than 50 special operations troops backed by increased air power, including A-10 Thunderbolt ground support aircraft and F-15 Eagle strike fighters out of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey.
“This is a start,” a senior U.S. defense official said Friday, describing the mission as strictly advise and assist, with an emphasis on operational planning and logistics in order to help Syrian Kurds, Turkmen and Arab groups “take and hold territory.”
For now, the U.S. plan is to keep the special forces back from the front lines, at the headquarters of the various rebel elements taking on Islamic State fighters. As a result, they will not be able to help identify targets and call in precision airstrikes.
Still, their presence could give anti-IS forces, like some of the Kurdish forces, an advantage, including the ability to combine on-the-ground intelligence with electronic surveillance from U.S. drones and satellites.
“Putting those two together can help the Kurdish forces in planning attacks, directing where those attacks will take place and doing other things that will increase their effectiveness,” said Brian Michael Jenkins, a senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation, a global policy think tank.
A former member of the U.S. Army special forces, Jenkins said the insertion of special operations forces can also go a long way toward keeping anti-IS groups in the fight.
Human Shields?
“This will enable us to more effectively coordinate that resupply, specifically if we are going to be doing more resupply of Kurdish forces from the air,” he said.
U.S. planners may be eyeing another benefit as well: forcing Turkey to hold off on airstrikes against Kurdish forces in the area.
“They’ve been attacking forces that have been making significant headway against ISIS," said Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a counterterrorism analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, using another acronym for the Islamic State. “I think it is in U.S. interests to raise the price of going after the YPG, which is fighting against ISIS.”
There is concern, however, that such a strategy could turn U.S. forces in Syria into unwitting human shields.
“Let’s get these guys in Syria, so that way, the Russians know that our guys are on the ground, so they won’t bomb rebels anymore. The Turks know our guys are with the Kurds, so they won’t bomb them anymore,” said Michael Pregent, an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute and himself a former special operator.
“They’d also be able to say, ‘We didn’t know there were Americans there,’ ” he said.
Pregent, who embedded with Kurdish Peshmerga forces in Mosul, Iraq, from 2005 to 2006, warned that the U.S. plan appeared to be deeply flawed in other ways, starting with a lack of backup.
“What you do not do is telegraph that we are going to be sending 50 special operators into Syria when we have no ground forces in Syria,” he said. “Embedding with an indigenous force only works when you have conventional forces on the ground.”
The numbers, too, point to potential problems, given a standard U.S. military ratio of 10 special operators per 500 allied fighters.
Pregent said 2,500 rebel troops, even with U.S. advisers, are “not near enough to do anything” against an Islamic State force entrenched in one of its key strongholds.
Others also worry that a small contingent of U.S. special operations forces is not enough to change the course of events in Syria or in neighboring Iraq.
“We’ve seen this train-and-advise-and-embed,” said Patrick Skinner, a former intelligence officer now with The Soufan Group, a strategic security intelligence consultancy. “We’ve seen this repeatedly over decades, and it almost has never worked.”
“We’re making tactical decisions and calling it a strategy,” he added.
Modest Expectations
Still, some analysts say the decision to send a small group of special operations forces into Syria shows the U.S. strategy may be on the right track.
“I think the Pentagon has learned and the administration has learned the hard way that it’s really hard to be effective with proxy forces if you’re not actually there with them,” said Jessica Ashooh at the Washington-based Atlantic Council, an international affairs research group.
Still, Ashooh called the potential payoff “good but not enormous.”
One senior U.S. defense official also tried to lower expectations, calling the move an effort “to gauge what's possible.”
And just because the U.S. sees the Islamic State as more vulnerable than in the past, it does not believe that making gains will be easy.
“ISIL has been backed into a corner before and often comes out swinging,” an intelligence official said.
The Russian intervention in Syria is on account of the geostrategic gains that it sees. It is banking on its initiative in bringing some order to the chaos in Syria, gain some re-recognition as a great power and tide over the negative effect of its Ukraine policy. To an outside observer it appears that it has achieved all objectives. It has gained the advantage that the player who makes the first bold move gains. Speaking in the UN General Assembly on 28 Sep 2015 President Putin said that the West is making an enormous mistake by not cooperating with Assad to stop the ISIS. The world would like to see the fundamentalism epitomized by ISIS to be reined in and in that context Putin’s words ring true.
The US action to belatedly move a handful of Special Forces and additional firepower may have an effect on the conflict in the manner that the US desires. However the notion of being in command of the situation that Russia has projected has won it a psychological edge. To the world the Russian intervention in fact offers the only ray of hope to reigning in the ISIS. It would have earned the US greater goodwill in case in the very convulted situation the USA had in some manner been able to be on the same side of the wall as Russia. It would have enabled it to pull its chestnuts from the fire without risking loss of face and committing ground troops, an aversion (at this point of time), which is very evident to the world. Cooperation with Russia even if implied only would have been a better strategy for the US in Syria.
We should remember that it took 55 advisers and more than a decade in El Salvador so “the 50″ (not the be confused with ‘The Fifty” in the Great Escape) in Syria are going to need even more time. Just saying. (note sarcasm)
We can hope a handful of combat advisors, proxies, and air power will result in a repeat performance of Afghanistan in 2001/2, but that is unlikely. The reference to El Salvador is interesting. It could be interpreted as 55 U.S. advisors being the decisive game changer. The reality is they were part of a collective whole that eventually resulted in the defeat of the FMLN. There were always more than 55 advisors, the 55 number was the TDYers, plus other agencies, and a good deal of training offered to their troops in U.S. This effort prevented the FMLN from achieving a military victory, but it wasn’t enough to defeat the FMLN alone.
Victory was the result of the confluence of El Salvadorian government reforms, FMLN atrocities that pushed the people away, and the collapse of the USSR, among other things. There won’t be a silver bullet solution for Syria either, instead multiple factors will converge, and the outcome will remain uncertain until the end.
I think the SF teams may create opportunities that can be exploited that could prove to be a game changer. More likely it will be a long drawn out affair as each opponent adapts to the other, and we settle into a strategy of erosion, waiting for the decisive political solution to emerge from the chaos.
Bill M—this might interest you–picked this up on social media today…
Video of the Switchblade loitering UAV near Izaa found by SAA https://www.facebook.com/Military.Media.Syria.Central/videos/481563902050162/?permPage=1 …
Only US forces known to use it.
Izraa is +-40km from Israel. Means UAV was launched inside Syria (10km op. rang ). US SOF in Horran plain ? Little IS presence in Daraa