In White House’s Iraq Debate, Military Brass Pushed for Doing Less
In White House’s Iraq Debate, Military Brass Pushed for Doing Less by Greg Jaffe and Missy Ryan, Washington Post
As President Obama was weighing how to halt Islamic State advances in Iraq, some of the strongest resistance to boosting U.S. involvement came from a surprising place: a war-weary military that has grown increasingly skeptical that force can prevail in a conflict fueled by political and religious grievances.
Top military officials, who have typically argued for more combat power to overcome battlefield setbacks over the past decade, emerged in recent White House debates as consistent voices of caution in Iraq. Their shift reflects the paucity of good options and a reluctance to suffer more combat deaths in a war in which America’s political leaders are far from committed and Iraqis have shown limited will to fight…
In addition to being weary from 14 years of war and the traditional reluctance of general officers to use military force unless it is the last resort while for the past 14 years the political leadership has been all too willing to use selected military capabilities as a first resort, I think the senior military leadership was given a mission that could be not be accomplished because of the political leadership. How would you expect the generals to react when told that you have to degrade and destroy ISIL but it rests on the foundational administration policies of “no boots on the ground,” no nation building(not that I am advocating nation building at all – I believe the can be used for stability operations but only the people of a nation can build a nation and its state – we cannot do it for them) , do nothing that can be associated with Bush 43, have no mission creep (which is really problematic for anyone who knows that strategy needs to be adaptive and iterative but any change to the strategy based on assessment and understanding of actual conditions, military and political, is automatically deemed mission creep and this means that strategists have to come up with the perfect strategy the first time and from then on it cannot be adapted) and worst of all you are told to destroy ISIL but you have to outsource the fight to ineffective proxy forces whose interests are not aligned with the US and requiring political solutions to achieve success that the US cannot forced upon the partner governments and organizations. The name of the mission in Iraq and Syria should be Mission Impossible and the Task Force should be called the Impossible Mission Task Force. I am sure that military leaders are frustrated because their best military advice is not heeded. And the final source of reluctance is the knowledge that the US military will be blamed by this administration for the failure of the impossible mission they were given.
What we seem to have — whether re: the Middle East, Russia and/or China — is a failure of indoctrination.
“indoctrinate:
to teach (someone) to fully accept the ideas, opinions, and beliefs of a particular group and to not consider other ideas, opinions, and beliefs.”
Thus, a failure to have the people of the Middle East, Russia and/or China:
a. Fully accept our “new” ideas, opinions and beliefs. And a failure to cause these populations to:
b. Let go of their “old” ideas, opinions and beliefs.
What can our military do about this — somewhat worldwide — “failure of indoctrination” situation?
One would suggest: Not much.
Our current policies bring up two violations of rational thought (citing Hastie and Dawes here)…
first, sunk costs should not be considered, but we sure do consider them. The current administration wishes to avoid the entangling actions engendered by Bush 43…Congressional Republicans (and presidential hopefuls) seek an aggressive policy to avenge our OIF/OND losses. Thus policies are more defined by “what they are not” than “what they are”
second, we “anchor and adjust,” meaning we simply modify existing plans rather than put in the intellectual energy to develop wholly new ones which may be more effective.
Ways to fix and develop a coherent policy? Though tough, perhaps we take a hard look and really try to identify what the ends are. Apply potential whole of government ways and means and assess probabilities and consequences along the way. Also ensure our policy is adaptive within the constraints of those probabilities and consequences.
Bottom line, we really need to think this through.